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Do Middle Eastern regimes use the contest between secularism and religion as a domestic 
authoritarian survival strategy, and if so, has this been projected into their regional policies in 
response to the ‘Arab Spring’? Post-Secular Theory has focused on the role of religion in 
domestic politics, neglecting the international and regional sphere, whilst also 
disproportionately focusing on the West, neglecting, for instance, the Middle East.  To address 
this gap in the literature, this research looks at the domestic motivations for foreign policy, 
specifically for the purposes of regime survival in four key states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Qatar. The investigation uses existing theories that consider regime survival strategies, 
such as Selectorate Theory, and religion and domestic politics, including Jonathan Fox’s 
Secular-Religious Competition Perspective. These have been adapted and applied to the 
Middle East, exploring their usefulness beyond providing explanations for domestic political 
behaviour.  
To test this, the co-optation patterns of sect and degree of secularism/fundamentalism within 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar was compared to the militias sponsored by each 
respective regime in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen as a means of discovering the existence 
of authoritarian survival strategies that use religion in the regional sphere. The research found 
that the case study states sponsored militias that matched the regime’s domestic winning 
coalition of support in terms of position on the secular-fundamentalist scale and sect. The 
secular-fundamentalist scale was created to rate the regimes and the militias in terms of 
religiosity. In doing so, it provides a tool for assessing the ongoing societal contest between 
secularism and religion, as outlined by Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective. 
The significance of this research is that it establishes the presence of the contest between 
secularism and religion, and also sectarianism, as regime survival strategies in the regional 
sphere, specifically in militia sponsorship in Yemen and Syria. Therefore, this research 
proposes the incorporation of an additional causal variable into explanations for international 
state behaviour in the Middle East: the desire of elites to stay in power and the subsequent 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The outbreak of mass protests against Tunisia’s Ben Ali in January 2011 took the world by 
surprise.  However, no one could have foreseen the dramatic events that happened next. The 
unrest quickly spread across the region, contesting or negating the power of ruling elites in 
Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Sustained protests took place in Morocco, Iraq, 
Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan whilst minor protests occurred in Djibouti, 
Mauritania, the Palestinian National Authority, Saudi Arabia and Moroccan-occupied Western 
Sahara. In 2011 it looked as if the region’s authoritarians were looking at a sweeping rejection 
of their governance and that a new breed of politician could be ushered in. The events were 
even more surprising because the cascade of protests occurred in a region where analysts 
had typically decided that ‘Arab exceptionalism1’ applied: that Middle Eastern citizens were 
so accepting of authoritarianism that street-led challenges were highly unlikely. Not only did 
the protests prove the analysts wrong about the ‘Arab Street’, but it also exposed the deep 
dissatisfaction in the region with illiberal rule. To politically survive, the states needed to 
either adjust to, or suppress, the events. They were now vulnerable to widespread and 
escalating civilian discontent that was shared across the region. What did the regimes do next? 
How have the regimes responded to this regionally generated challenge?   
The ‘Arab Spring’ strengthened the Middle East’s authoritarian ruling elites understanding 
that the domestic threat of over-throw and revolution could be inspired by regional events 
beyond their own borders. Regional norms regarding authoritarianism and cronyism were 
under threat. This meant that to ensure their survival in the new era following the disruptive 
‘Arab Spring’ the states needed tactics that faced and dealt with this new reality. The 
authoritarian survival tactics that the regimes used domestically now needed to reach into 
the regional sphere, and suppress or manage uprisings in other states to prevent them 
                                                          
1 Arab exceptionalism is a body of scholarship that attempts to explain authoritarian persistence in the Arab 
Middle East during the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, political stagnation in the region contrasted with 
the shifts towards constitutional change elsewhere around the globe (Porras-Gomez, 2020). The explanations 
for this phenomenon embraced the following: “the weakness of civil society, the deliberate manipulation and 
division of opposition forces, the co-optation of social forces through the distribution of rent, cronyism, and 
stunted economic liberalization, the region’s cultural endowment, the prevalence and peculiar logic of 
monarchy, the embrace of liberalized autocracy, the effective manipulation of political institutions such as 
parties and electoral laws” and conditions that foster “robust authoritarianism, specifically, the presence of an 
exceptionally muscular coercive apparatus” (Bellin, 2012, p. 128).  Arab exceptionalism was dramatically 
challenged by the eruption of the ‘Arab Spring’ across the region in 2011. 
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inspiring uprisings at home. In other words, the outcomes of uprisings and/or civil wars need 
to be managed to ensure the victors supported a continuation of regional norms regarding 
authoritarian rules, and did not disrupt the domestic survival strategies of intervening states.  
The regimes need regional counter revolution strategies to ensure the endurance of 
authoritarianism.  
In 2019, eight years after the beginning of the first protests in Tunisia, Syria and Yemen are 
still in the throes of active and militarised conflict between elites, political movements, 
militias and communal groups. Who wins will not only have an impact on the regional 
aspirations of the region’s states, but also on their ability to hold onto power and to enforce 
stability at home. Therefore, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar are 
all seeking to steer the outcome of these two conflicts. In doing so, the states are supporting, 
or targeting, select militias. The militias they respectively sponsor reflect the institutional 
structure of support within the sponsoring states and the authoritarian strategies these 
regimes use at home - strategies that deploy sectarianism, secularism and fundamentalism as 
key tools. This extension of authoritarian survival strategies into the regional sphere may be 
the new tool of ruling elites and reflects their growing understanding that, in a globalised 
world, civilian unrest and opposition movements readily cascade across borders and 
represent a severe threat to their continued rule. Therefore, if authoritarianism is to survive, 
it has to learn to manage not just domestic unrest, but regional unrest as well, including the 
suppression of groups within other state’s conflicts. Given this, foreign policy reflects more 
than just geopolitical interests and hegemonic contests. As Hal Brands points out in relation 
to China and Russia, “increasingly assertive foreign policies […] are measures of domestic 
fortification as well” (Brands H. , 2018, p. 73), further observing that “dictators are seeking a 
world made safe for authoritarianism” (Brands H. , 2018, p. 72).  This research explores the 
implications of these statements in relation to militia sponsorship choices in civil wars, 
specifically how these patterns relate to the domestic use of religion, secularism and 
fundamentalism within authoritarian survival strategies. The specific strategies that will be 
investigated are the patterns of militia sponsorship in the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars by Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. 
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Sectarianism, Secularism and Fundamentalism as Regional Authoritarian Survival 
Strategies 
The key argument of this research is that secularism, sectarianism and fundamentalism are 
used by authoritarian states in the Middle East as authoritarian survival strategies, and that 
these strategies are frequently extended into the regional sphere, particularly under 
conditions of regional instability. Rather than political survival considerations serving as a 
variable which limits regional aspirations, this research postulates that decisions made by 
states in the regional sphere are frequently made primarily in the interests of the ruling elite. 
This is reflected in the patterns of militia sponsorship in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars by 
the states that serve as the case studies for this research:  Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and 
Qatar. These states use regime survival strategies to reinforce their rule. Given religion 
remains a significant source of political legitimacy in the Middle East, these strategies 
frequently seek to appeal to the same-sect citizens in other countries as the ruling elites in 
the states deploying survival strategies, and those citizens who share the regime’s ideology 
as it relates to religion and the role of religion in governance. Citizens that are from a different 
sect and/or significantly less or more religious than the ruling elites are more likely to face 
political repression. Therefore, authoritarian survival strategies in the Middle East tend to 
focus on securing domestic support from those with the same level of religiosity and the same 
sect as the regime elites, albeit there are some important distinctions, such as Iran’s support 
of Sunni Hamas. Additionally, some sects, such as the Syrian Alawites and the Yemeni Houthis, 
do not fall readily into either the Sunni or Shia categories. However, in both cases, even if the 
faith is different to Iran’s Twelver Islam, the group’s identity has a greater religious affiliation 
with Shia regional networks. This indicates the political use of ongoing contest between sects, 
and between religious and secular actors in the domestic sphere.  
This thesis investigates the domestic authoritarian survival strategies that use sect and 
religiosity as causal variables that predict the case study states’ choices of militia sponsorship 
in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. It finds that the sponsored militias match with inclusion-
exclusion patterns relating to sect and religiosity in the regimes’ survival strategies that they 
use in the domestic sphere. The domestic contests between fundamentalism and secularism 
are reflected in militia sponsorship patterns in regional conflicts by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
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and Qatar. This means that Jonathan Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective Theory, 
which posits that religious and secular actors are engaged in ongoing competition over policy 
within states, has relevance when explaining regional politics. This research also looks at 
Selectorate Theory in relation to regional politics. Selectorate Theory’s premise is that the key 
focus of ruling elites is their own political survival. This research asserts that when looking for 
explanations for international behaviour and foreign policy choices, ruling elites’ strategies to 
secure their political survival need to be considered.  Given the match between domestic 
authoritarian survival strategies and militia sponsorship patterns in Syria and Yemen by Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, this research posits that Selectorate Theory also has 
explanatory power in the regional sphere as well as the domestic2.   
Given the general acceptance of Secularisation Theory within the West, which assumed that 
societies would become secular as they modernised, the International Relations field, has, 
until recently, tended to neglect religion. However, Post-Secular Theory’s successful 
refutation of Secularisation Theory’s key findings that as states modernise they also secularise, 
and the assertion that secularisation has been particular to the Western development, has 
fostered a greater focus on religion in International Relations and Political Science analysis.  
As such, Post-Secular Theory has led to burgeoning research on the impact of religion within 
domestic politics as scholars like Jonathan Fox (who examines domestic competition between 
secular and religious actors), and Sarah Feuer (who considers political opposition and religious 
regulation), fill important gaps in the literature on this topic.  However, the role of religion in 
foreign policy analysis is still relatively understudied. This research seeks to build upon the 
existing scholarship in this field, in that it considers the impact of religion on foreign policy 
choices, specifically regarding militia sponsorship by intervening states in the Syrian and 
Yemeni civil wars. 
Religion is explored and understood in this research as a tool in political competition to 
support one’s interests, where fights over political power and privilege occur over the degree 
of religiosity between religion and secularism. Religion is also understood as the boundary 
between political groups and their respective elites. Selectorate Theory outlines how political 
                                                          
2 Selectorate Theory and Religious-Secular Competitive Perspective Theory both form part of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis and are discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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elites seek to secure and hold the support of specific groups in society. Ethnic Conflict Theory 
has established that politicians frequently seek to secure support through the manipulation 
of ethnic and sectarian groups, establishing in- and out-groups on the basis of sect or ethnicity.  
By mapping the groups that regimes seek to retain as supporters according to Selectorate 
Theory, this thesis finds that the in-out group patterns of support for regimes significantly 
reflected religious identity groups.  Previous research tells us that Middle Eastern states use 
religion for legitimacy and utilise politically significant levels of sectarian mobilisation. This 
thesis looks to make this dynamic explicit. The research therefore, is positioned in the 
literature between foreign policy and contests over secular-fundamentalist religiosity, 
sectarian mobilisation, authoritarian survival strategies and regional politics. 
The focus of this investigation is on the use of religion as an instrument in the Middle Eastern 
regional system to pursue domestic political survival. Four states are of key interest to this 
research: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. It tests for the presence of religio-political 
tactics that serve authoritarian resilience in the regional sphere by analysing domestic regime 
survival tactics against patterns of militia sponsorship in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. The 
regimes are compared by looking at the sectarian makeup of the militias they sponsor, and 
by considering the position between secularism and fundamentalism of the militias and how 
this relates to the sponsoring states’ domestic patterns of inclusion and exclusion based on 
religiosity. This provides an explanation for the four states’ foreign policy decisions in the 
Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, which are linked to enhancing their regional power and 
maintaining autocratic leadership at home. The similarity between domestic authoritarian 
survival strategies and regional choices regarding militia sponsorship, as they relate to sect 
and religiosity, are analysed against the theoretical framework.  The theoretical framework is 
crafted from an extension and adaptation of Mesquito and Smith’s Selectorate Theory, 
Jonathan Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective, Barry Buzan’s work on the idea of 
the state, Sarah Feuer’s observations on religious regulation and political opposition, and Lisel 
Hintz’s Identity Hegemony Theory. As such, this research investigates the following questions: 
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Primary Research Question:  
Do Middle Eastern regimes use authoritarian survival strategies that use sectarianism, 
secularism and fundamentalism, and, if so, are these strategies also used in the regional 
sphere? 
Secondary Research Questions:   
What is the impact of sectarianism, secularism and fundamentalism on patterns of militia 
sponsorship in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars? 
Is the ongoing domestic contest between religion and secularism, as described by Jonathan 
Fox, present in the MENA regional sphere as well? 
Does Selectorate Theory, which describes domestic politics, have relevance in regional politics? 
This research project searches for a link between domestic regime survival strategies and the 
use of religion, secularism and sectarianism in regional policies. In order to establish whether 
a link exists a specific and measureable aspect of their foreign policy was chosen: militia 
sponsorship in regional civil wars. By identifying if patterns of militia sponsorship exist which 
are linked to elites’ sectarian identity and religiosity, this research expands the number of 
factors that motivate foreign policy decision-making, asserting that they include authoritarian 
regime survival as a potential objective, particularly when unstable regional conditions exist.  
Structural Realism, Black Boxes and Authoritarian Survival Strategies 
In order to identify patterns between domestic survival strategies and militia sponsorship, 
this research applies Selectorate Theory to the domestic politics of the four case study states 
and then links the findings to the militias sponsored or resisted in the Syrian and Yemeni civil 
wars. This also tests whether Selectorate Theory is applicable and relevant to decisions made 
in the regional sphere. In doing this, by extension, the thesis also tests the relevance of 
Structural Realism, which asserts that international politics is constrained by structural and 
material considerations, and that a state’s responses are dictated by its place in the hierarchy 
of states. Structural Realism considers states to be ‘black boxes’ where the relative balance 
of power between states in the system, regional or international, is key to explaining 
7 
 
behaviour; as opposed to the states internal regime characteristics, politics and 
ideology/religion. This research accepts that structure imposes restraints on regional politics 
and on the ability of states to push their domestic survival agenda into the regional scene. 
However, this research argues that when considering how the case study states engage in the 
civil wars in Yemen and Syria, through patterns of sponsorship with specific militias, there is 
a need to look past structural factors as religion also plays a role. Thus, this research hopes to 
add to the emerging body of research that seeks to break the view that states are indeed 
‘black boxes’ when it comes to foreign policy analysis in the Middle East. Neoclassical realists 
such as J.W. Taliaferro, S.E. Lobel and N.M. Ripsman also attempt to address this, seeking to 
explain the impact of the internal dynamics of states on foreign policy (Taliaferro, Lobell, & 
Ripsman, 2009, pp. 4-5).   
Karen E. Young also seeks to investigate the impact of leadership on foreign policy, lamenting 
that “foreign policy analysis of the Gulf, however, is often hindered by the ‘black box’ of 
leadership within the Gulf Arab states” (Young, 2015, p. 4). Investigating the domestic 
strategies of the Gulf states has also been hindered by long held academic assumptions that 
centre on Rentier Theory explanations for authoritarian survival strategies in the Middle 
Eastern and North African security complex. Justin Gengler challenges the narrow focus on 
Rentier Theory in his research on the ethnic political mobilisation in Bahrain (Gengler, Ethnic 
Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf, 2011 ).  
Neoclassical Realism considers how security and foreign policy relates to national interests. 
Taking a neoclassical realist approach to US military interventions, Colin Dueck describes how 
“conceptions of national interest are considered in the light of domestic political incentives 
and constraints. This establishes that domestic politics “matters” not as a primary cause of 
intervention but rather as a powerful influence on the exact form” (Dueck, 2009, p. 139).  In 
contrast, this research counters that the domestic survival of elites can and often is a primary 
cause of intervention, at least by authoritarian states. Thus this research, looking at the 
impact of internal regime and ideology on foreign policy, alternatively asserts the relevance 
of the internal survival strategies of authoritarian ruling elites. This project focuses on the 
decision making process between foreign policy and authoritarian survival strategies, 
specifically strategies that are structured around religion. 
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There is a branch of theory on military interventions that supports the premise that 
interventions are driven by domestic political considerations. This includes Diversionary War 
Theory, described by authors such as Peter Trubowitz, Helen Milner, Jack Synder and Michael 
Hiscox (Jaroslav & Jasinki, 2008) (Trubowitz, 1998) (Milner, 1988) (Synder, 1993) (Hiscox, 
2002), which posits that “problematic domestic circumstances motivate a country’s leader to 
divert popular discontent by launching a militarized international crisis” (Jaroslav & Jasinki, 
2008, p. 641). Jaroslav Tir and Michael Jasinski tied Diversionary War Theory to domestic 
politics and ethnic conflict, whereby they described how an “embattled leader can elicit public 
support by using armed force against ethnic minorities within his/her country” (Jaroslav & 
Jasinki, 2008, p. 641). If we consider Diversionary War Theory in relation to this research, this 
project essentially looks into situations whereby leaders facing region-wide discontent at 
authoritarian rule attempt to elicit public support and strengthen their domestic power by 
arming or resisting sectarian or religious/secular militias in other states’ civil wars. Although 
the leaders of the case study states did not face the same domestic pressures from the ‘Arab 
Spring’ as more vulnerable regimes such as Syria, they were/are still sponsoring groups that 
match the intervening elite’s support base in terms of sectarianism and/or degree of 
religiosity/secularism, and resisting those that do not represent the same religious positions. 
However, it is unlikely that these strategies are operationalised without consideration for the 
region’s dynamics. The sponsorship of select militias is likely to also support the objective of 
trying to undermine or depose of regional adversaries for example, thus the regime’s 
endgames in Syrian and Yemeni civil wars will reflect both domestic survival strategies and 
regional patterns of amity and enmity.   
Religion and Authoritarian Survival Strategies 
This research looks at external authoritarian legitimation practices that use religion, religious 
secularism and sectarianism in the Middle East. As a consequence of globalisation, it has 
become harder to shield populations from external influences due to greater mobility and 
connectivity; as such, autocracies are having to increasingly manage the external 
environment in order to preserve authoritarian stability at home. Thus, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Qatar have adopted increasingly activist foreign policies following the ‘Arab Spring’. 
This has been particularly relevant since the ‘Arab Spring’ revealed that the main threat to 
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the regimes was not domestically mobilised opposition, but the mobilisation of region-wide 
cross-sectarian discontent. The regimes used sectarian narratives to manipulate and control 
this discontent. Consequently, it coalesced into the sharing of sectarian community based 
frustrations within states and across borders. Under these conditions, organised opposition, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, began to coordinate with the grassroots uprisings making 
the Iranian, Saudi Arabia, the UAE autocracies more vulnerable.  Qatar’s ties to the Muslim 
Brotherhood network has meant it is less vulnerable to threats from this quarter.  
In response, the regimes initiated regional authoritarian survival strategies. Religion and/or 
religious secularism form the basis of the many authoritarian legitimation frames in the region. 
Additionally, sectarianism and the intensity of religious convictions form the basis of inclusion 
and exclusion in terms of co-opting and repressing sections of the population as per 
Selectorate Theory. Regimes need to extend enough dividends and identity group benefits to 
same sect supporters to keep them invested in the political survival of the existing ruling elites, 
and to repress out-groups. As such, this research looks at the domestic projection of these 
policies in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ by analysing the sponsorship of militias in the 
Yemeni and Syrian civil wars by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. The extensions of 
regime survival strategies into the international arena remains understudied, and this 
research explores this as it relates to religion, sectarianism and religious secularism. A central 
premise of this research is that the authoritarian quest for stability and survival extends 
beyond the domestic sphere, into the international.   
Expanding the Competition Perspective to International Relations and Foreign 
Policy Analysis  
Fox explains that the contest between secular and religious actors in policy making is ongoing. 
Thus, in the Middle East, the contest between the degrees of secular or religious governance 
is a permanent feature and has been instrumentalised in the contest over power and privilege 
by both the regimes and their challengers. In order to place the Competitive Perspective into 
an international relations framework, this thesis places it under the umbrella of Competitive 
Shaping. Described by the Foreign Policy Research Institute as “the variety of discrete means 
of contesting the state and the system surrounding it, contesting hearts and minds” (Elkus & 
Noonan, 2018, p. 1). This theoretical approach stresses that “competition for power and 
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influence lies at the core of political and social life” (Elkus & Noonan, 2018, p. 1). Given fear 
of each other’s militaries, and the destructive power of today’s weapons, competitive shaping 
in the ‘gray zone’ has become a more prominent feature of states’ security agendas than the 
use of outright military threats or force. Competitive Shaping as a concept tends to assume 
that attempts to alter the internal dynamics of other states is part of a strategy for regional 
power. This research explores the possibility that attempts to shape the internal dynamics of 
other states in the Middle East can be explained as extensions of the intervening regimes’ 
domestic authoritarian survival strategies. Hals Brands describes gray zone conflict and 
competition further: 
Gray zone conflict is best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but 
that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict 
and open interstate war. Gray zone approaches are mostly the province of revisionist powers 
– those actors that seek to modify some aspect of the existing international environment – 
and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated 
with victory in war. Yet gray zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains without 
escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing 
the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring. Gray zone 
challenges are thus inherently ambiguous in nature. They feature unconventional tactics, 
from cyberattacks, to propaganda and political warfare, to economic coercion and sabotage, 
to sponsorship of armed proxy fighters, to creeping military expansionism (Brands, 2016). 
Brands outlines that states use competitive shaping strategies to achieve gains that would 
previously have been associated with war, pointing to material and territorial gains. However, 
this research seeks to establish that the gains sought by the case study states in the post-
‘Arab Spring’ environment are related to their own domestic stability. Whilst the FPRI’s 
Competitive Shaping concept excludes direct military intervention, it includes the sponsorship 
of militia in proxy wars. In the Middle East, “state, non-state and quasi state actors […] 
compete with governments and other sub state entities” (Elkus & Noonan, 2018, p. 15). The 
FPRI identifies Saudi Arabia as one of the states who “aggressively attempt to shape 
international and intra national environments through a variety of official, semi-official and 
illicit means” (Elkus & Noonan, 2018, p. 15).  Iran, and the small states of Qatar and the UAE 
are also actively attempting to shape the Middle East. Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar’s 
interventions in the Syrian and Yemeni civil war feature state versus non-state actors in an 
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international setting; for instance, Iran versus the anti-Assad mosaic of weaker non-state 
actors. In both Yemen and Syria, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also pitted against weaker non-
state actors, albeit their efforts are not always in unison as they at times support opposing 
groups. None of the non-state actors are capable of launching a full-scale campaign both in 
their own state and against the intervening state on its home turf, except to a limited extent. 
This largely removes the risk of all out inter-state war for the intervening state. However, 
smaller scale inter-state conflicts are still an issue, for example the 2019-2020 Persian Gulf 
crisis whereby tensions between Iran and allies and the US and its state allies spilled over in 
a series of maritime clashes (Katzman, McInnis, & Thomas, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications 
for U.S. Policy, 2020, pp. 2-12).  
International relations features many examples of states using internal divisions to stoke 
factionalism and weaken rival states. Religion is a significant internal division that is stoked 
and manipulated by actors, non-state and state, in the Middle East. Jonathan Fox’s 
Competitive Perspective Theory identifies a key religious rift, outlining how society contains 
an ongoing and permanent tension between the forces of secularism and religion. This 
research looks into the political use of this tension between secularism and religion as a 
competitive shaping strategy to weaken both State adversaries and domestic opponents as 
well as strengthening regional allies and internal support.  
It is assumed, and tested, that the domestic survival strategies that states use to ensure 
authoritarian resilience extend into the regional sphere and feature attempts to reshape 
other states. In order to test this, this thesis uses a theoretical framework (described in 
chapter 2) which outlines the use of religion as a political tool by political elites and/or outlines 
ways in which domestic elites preserve their own power in domestic politics. These 
predominantly domestic focused theories are adapted and extended to fit the purposes of 
this project ensuring the framework works in the regional sphere. This theoretical framework 
is then used in the chapters that follow to test if domestic regime survival tactics that involve 
religion can be found in the regional sphere. For example, Selectorate Theory is used to test 
for sectarian favouritism in the distribution of dividends by the state, and Feuer’s religious 
regulation ideas are used to test for the presence of manipulation of religion in order to 
mitigate threats from transnational religious ideas and networks. Autocratic regimes such as 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are ideal for testing Selectorate Theory and sect/religion, 
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given that authoritarian regimes rely on small winning coalition 3  systems and a large 
selectorate. This means they tend to produce high degrees of rent seeking and cronyism, 
making patterns of sectarian religious inclusion and exclusion from state benefits more 
pronounced than in a democracy with a larger winning coalition (Mesquito, 2014, p. 65). As 
the thesis focuses on domestic explanations for foreign policy, to help separate the regime 
survival strategies from regional geo-politics, Buzan’s Regional Security Complex (Buzan, 2007) 
criteria are applied; specifically, the patterns of amity and enmity across the Middle Eastern 
and North African region.  
This research investigates the question of whether or not the regional policies of states 
manipulate the competition between religious and secular actors, and, if so, are these policies 
used to support regime survival. This investigation therefore extends the Competition 
Perspective put forward by Jonathan Fox, in which he posits that religious and secular actors 
are involved in ongoing competition rather than an existential situation whereby one cancels 
the other out (Fox, 2019, p. 524). This research looks at how this competition is moved into 
the regional sphere to maintain authoritarian stability. Additionally, this research investigates 
the religious logic to the choices regarding the sponsorship of foreign militias by Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Qatar given the emergence of religious extremists, sectarian overlaid civil 
wars and the risks of Islamist elites moving into political power within the uprisings in Yemen 
and Syria.  
Thesis Structure 
The theoretical framework of the thesis, which extends and expands the work of Fox, Feuer, 
Buzan, Smith & Mesquito and Hintz to fit the regional sphere and the project, is outlined in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also features a research tool created to further describe the religious 
makeup of the regimes and militias; the religious-fundamentalist index which establishes 
criteria for rating the regimes and militias in terms of religiosity/secularism. Chapter 3 
describes the domestic strategies that use religion as the frame for domestic authoritarian 
survival strategies in Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Having established this, Chapter 
                                                          
3 Selectorate Theory outlines how regimes need the support of a group of essentials, the winning coalition, 
who are drawn from a bigger group of influential supporters, the real selectorate. This is described in greater 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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4 explains how the case study states use their religious capabilities to project influence into 
the regional sphere in order to achieve foreign policy goals. These chapters provide the 
explanatory backbone of the research project.  
Chapter 5 analyses data collected on militia sponsorship in the Syrian civil war by Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Qatar between 2011 and 2019. The sponsored militias are analysed in 
terms of sectarian makeup and compared against the authoritarian survival strategies of the 
regimes. The militias’ religious-fundamentalist index ratings are then compared against the 
corresponding sponsoring regimes. Finally, militia sponsorship preferences are compared to 
the domestic survival strategies of the regimes using the theoretical pillars as a framework. 
The findings are then evaluated against the research questions. In chapter 6, the same test 
used in chapter 5 is applied to the Yemeni civil war. This chapter then applies these findings 
by looking for religious derived authoritarian stabilisation and survival tactics in the regional 
sphere. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions as a whole, finding that religion is present in 
international systems as an extension of the domestic survival strategies of ruling elites.  
The overall focus of this thesis aims to contribute to filling the gap in the International 
Relations field  with regards to religion. As Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker point 
out “while religion has emerged as a significant factor in some analyses of international 
relations, controversial and unexplored questions remain concerning the role of religion in 
the foreign policies of states” (Warner & Walker, 2010, p. 2/43).  This research postulates that 
religion’s presence in foreign policies is to a significant extent due to the extension of religious 
strategies used by ruling elites to survive politically into the regional or international sphere. 
The source of such foreign policy (and much domestic policy as well) is political survival, and 
sectarianism, religious secularism and fundamentalism are some of the most prominent 
mechanisms for ensuring authoritarian stability and maintenance in the Middle East. Typically, 
the analytical framework for studying religion and foreign policy places it firmly in the domain 
of constructivism; an approach that focuses on how religion effects foreign policy decision 
making through the influence of religious heritage, identity, ideas and culture on state 
interests and state institutions. This thesis explores an alternative approach, demonstrated in 
the analytical map for religion and foreign policy presented below. Here the focus is on 
religion’s role as a political tool, which is dependent on its societal importance. The religious 




Figure 1.1. Map of Religion and Foreign Policy4 
The following research aims to test and make explicit the above analytical map, figure 1.1, as 
it relates to religion as a political instrument, specifically focusing on  the political survival of 
ruling elites. In standard analytical mapping of foreign policy, power is, as Warner and Walker 
state, drawn from the work of Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervais, as the key variable that 
states are concerned with internationally. States “assess their relations with other states and 
take actions with or against them based on a clear calculation of power and survival” (Warner 
& Walker, 2010, p. 8/43) (Waltz, 1979) (Jervais, 1999). This source of power relates to state 
survival and sovereignty in the international system. This research focuses on the inclusion of 
box I. Power and the political survival of the ruling elite, positioning the elite’s political survival 
as a key variable of foreign policy decision making in the international sphere. Typically, within 
                                                          
4 The structure of this map is derived from Warner and Walker’s Macroscopic Map of Religion and Foreign 
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literature on strategic culture it is in terms of religious belief systems and the impact of these 
cultures of belief on state strategy that the literature contemplates religion. When it comes 
to religion and conflict this has led to a focus on “the significance of institutional religion-state 
connections and ideological distance between disputants to account for the varied 
significance of religion in interstate conflicts” (Henne, 2012, p. 753). Alternatively, this 
research argues that these are the dynamics that elites are able to instrumentalise, rather 
than the key cause of disputes. This is in keeping with Kaufman’s Symbolic Politics Theory 
which discusses the cynical and predatory use of ethnic group fears by ruling elites to mobilise 
same identity group supporters to oppose their political challengers (Kaufman, 2006, p. 48). 
Thus, this research considers religion in terms of its role as an instrument of political power, 
and as such this research aims to include religion in international relations as a strategic 
political survival mechanism in the domestic and international spheres.   
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
The Intersection of Religion and Political Survival 
Introduction 
This research investigates the impact of secularism, sectarianism and fundamentalism on the 
sponsorship of militias in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. The investigation looks to establish 
whether certain relationships between religion and the state produce the expected patterns 
of foreign militia sponsorship. These patterns are further tested to see if they correlate with 
the projection of domestic authoritarian stabilization strategies into the international arena.   
Religion has been overlooked in IR theory due to a widespread belief that religion has little 
impact on international relations and that the process of modernisation would lead to 
secularism: the study of religion’s impact on politics, at least in the IR realm, was therefore 
going to become increasingly unnecessary. Additionally post-secular scholars have focused 
on the West neglecting regions such as the Middle East.  As a result, there is a growing body 
of literature on religion within domestic politics in political science research, with the 
emergence of new theories that seek to explain religion and domestic politics. IR theory, 
however, needs a stronger body of theories to explain religion’s impact on the global political 
scene, including in the Middle East. There are some emerging theories: Lisel Hintz has 
established that states project domestic identity issues into their foreign policies when moves 
to advance a specific national identity are blocked domestically. However, given that 
globalisation has amplified the reach of transnational religion, and that religion is showing 
signs of increasing or maintaining its influence, more work is needed. This research seeks to 
investigate the religious component of regional politics in the Middle East through expanding 
and adapting some of the emerging theories on domestic politics and religion to fit the 
regional realm.  
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework used in this research which tests how states 
use religion in regional systems to achieve domestic political survival. The thesis contains  case 
studies in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 on four prominent Middle Eastern states: Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
the UAE and Qatar.  This framework positions religion in IR theory as an ideology that is 
engaged in an ongoing contest with secularism, and as an identity derived political instrument 
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used in regional systems to achieve political ends. The research focuses on a regional system 
(Middle East) given that the international system’s norms, intergovernmental organisations, 
and international regimes are largely secular5, operating through a system defined as the 
liberal or rules based order. Furthermore, this research is conducted at the regional rather 
than state level due to the already burgeoning research at the domestic level given the post-
secular acceptance that religion has an impact on domestic politics. The impact of religion on 
the regional level is generally under researched in the literature. As such, this research focuses 
on the use of religion in regional strategy as a tool to ensure domestic political survival. 
Many analysts, such as John Mearsheimer, have concluded that the international system is 
moving from a unipolar system towards a multipolar arrangement (Mearsheimer J. , 2018). 
As the system shifts towards multipolarity, regional dynamics and competition will 
increasingly affect the international system - they will not remain localised to regional 
geographic boundaries.  As such, regional systems require greater analytical and scholarly 
scrutiny. This research seeks to expand the literature on the impact of religion on politics; and 
provide explanations for the political use of religion in regional systems as a tool to ensure 
domestic political survival. This is achieved through extending and synthesising theories that 
focus on the strategic use of religion in domestic strategies for regime survival.  These 
theoretical extensions are then used to test if these religious strategies are used in the 
regional sphere as well.  
This chapter proceeds in five stages. The first stage begins with a description of Secularisation 
Theory and then moves to position this research in reference to recent scholarship on Post-
Secular Theory. The second outlines the key theoretical framework including Selectorate 
Theory, Buzan’s idea of the state, Feuer’s ideas relating to religious regulation and opposition 
movements, Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective, Buzan’s Regional Security 
Complex framework and Hintz’s Theory of Identity Hegemony.  The third adapts these 
theories to fit regional systems, thus forming the theoretical pillars of this research. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the methodological application of the theoretical pillars. 
                                                          
5 It is difficult to find any research that has tested this, which may be because it is felt to be an intuitive 
understanding of how interstate relations are conducted at the system level.  
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A Brief History of Religion and Politics in Europe 
Prior to the emergence of Post-Secular Theory, IR theorists had largely agreed that religion 
would become increasingly irrelevant to understanding international relations due to the 
secularising impact of modernity which has been most prominent in the Western world.  
Modernization refers to the profound shift from pre-modern and traditional lifestyles and 
societal systems to modern politics, economies, societies and cultures which possess a high 
degree of technological development, and a reliance on scientific explanations for real-world 
phenomena. This shift contributed to the development of secularism: the separation of 
religion from the political sphere and the relegation of religion to the private lives of 
individuals. However, the West’s own history shows that modernity is only one contributing 
factor towards secularization. The history of much of the non-Western world supports this 
idea as modernisation outside of the West has not typically resulted in secularization.  For 
instance, despite modernization’s global advance, 80% of the global population still identifies 
with a religious group (Hackett & McClendon, 2017).  
The Christianization of the Roman world during the late antiquity period, between the 3rd and 
8th centuries, is as central to the culture and religion of modern Europe as is the growth of 
secularism (Thomas & O'Mahoney, 2014, p. 108), which is generally understood to have 
grown out of the Enlightment period’s focus on reason, liberty and scientific method in the 
late 17th/early 18th Century. Europe’s progression towards secular sovereign statehood was 
accelerated by the Protestant Reformation which started in 1517 and was initially focused on 
reforming the Roman Catholic Church, however the religious competition unintentionally 
resulted in a transfer of resources from religious to secular uses, enhancing the bargaining 
power of secular rulers (Cantoni, Dittmar, & Yuchtman, 2018, p. 2037).  Wars were fought 
along confessional lines and were initially settled by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 which was 
based on cuis religio, euis religio6, allowing Protestant and Catholic princes to enforce their 
specific Christian theologies within their own territories, thereby strengthening their 
sovereignty. However, this arrangement proved unstable with events leading to Europe’s 
deadliest religious  conflict - the Thirty Years’ War - which started in 1618 and ended in 1648 
(Shah & Philpott, 2011, p. 31).  
                                                          
6  Means ‘whose the realm, his the religion’ 
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In the two centuries between the Reformation in 1517 and the early eighteenth century, 
Central and Western Europe were intermittently disrupted by clashes between different 
variants of Christianity (i.e. Catholic, Lutheran, Zwinglian and Calvinist). A crisis in the complex 
medieval political system had seen the emergence of a key struggle within the political regime 
that centred on competition between the Protestant and Catholic religious and political elites.  
The church, a ‘transnational’ organization, enjoyed enormous legitimacy and influence over 
medieval society, including the powerful nobility, owing to its consistency and ability to make 
good on its promises” (Owen, 2010, p. 88).   John M. Owen explains further, 
When it appeared likely that a polity would change from one established religion to another 
– i.e. conversion of the rulers, lawful succession or revolution – strife in neighbouring polities 
would intensify and actors would identify their interests more and more closely with co-
religionists regardless of polity and against inhabitants of their own polity who adhered to a 
rival religion. Transnational ideological polarization altered the incentives facing rulers. The 
promotion in other polities of their own branch of Christianity began to override other 
interests. Rulers would intervene and counter-intervene to overturn or support their rival 
religion in foreign polities” (Owen, 2010, p. 87)7.  
This political configuration, transnational political Catholic versus Protestant political 
competition, was at its most severe during the catastrophic Thirty Years War. The war ended 
in the Peace of Westphalia with a set of agreements which established the norm of non-
interference in another polity’s domestic affairs, thus reducing religio-political foreign policies. 
Transnational Catholic versus Protestant competition ceased when, in the late 17th Century, 
political elites saw a way out of the instability and destruction of religio-political contest 
through adoption of a regime that tolerated religious diversity, as was practised in the 
Netherlands and then England (Owen, 2010, p. 88).   
Religion and politics were intertwined in early modern Europe. In medieval Europe “the 
‘religious’ and ‘political’ realms…were seen by virtually everyone as intimately mingled” 
(Owen, 2010, pp. 90-91). Hence, political authority, with its responsibility to maintain social 
order, was obligated to monitor and enforce religious belief and practice to some extent; a 
ruler who failed to fulfil this obligation cast his own legitimacy into doubt (Owen, 2010, pp. 
                                                          
7 This dynamic is a significant feature of Middle Eastern foreign policies in the current era and is explored 
within this research. 
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90-91).  There is also significant entanglement between religion and politics in the modern 
Middle East. 
Despite modern secular representations of religion as irrational faith, religion is innately 
connected to the feeling and reinforcement of community. Scott Thomas explains that, during 
the Middle Ages and throughout early modern Europe, religion was understood as a 
“community of believers rather than as a body of doctrines or beliefs” (Wilson, 2012, pp. 103-
104). Given this, the European wars over religion were fought to preserve a particular way of 
communal life as opposed to being solely fought over “intractable beliefs regarding the nature 
of the world and God” (Wilson, 2012, pp. 103-104). Challenges from within Christianity from 
such groups as the Lutherans, who “held that the religion that bound society must be one 
without mediation between the believer and God; clergy must have no special spiritual or 
legal privileges, and that secular authorities must be supreme” (Owen, 2010, p. 98), gradually 
weakened the medieval norm of religio vincula societatis (religion is the bond of society) 
(Owen, 2010, p. 118). This strengthened the relative power of secular actors within the 
political sphere. 
IR theory draws from an Anglo-American understanding of religion and politics, which posits 
that religion is not a significant factor in politics. Given Europe’s history of religious and 
secular elites both participating in governance, this finding does not investigate whether 
Europe’s past has implications for politics elsewhere around the globe. Elizabeth Shakman 
Hurd explains, 
Most realist, liberal, English school, feminist, and historical-materialist approaches to 
international relations treat religion as either private by prior assumption or a cultural relic to 
be handled by anthropologists. Even constructivists, known for their attention to historical 
contingency and social identity, have paid scant attention to the politics of secularism and 
religion, focusing instead on the interaction of pre-existing state units to explain how 
international norms influence state interests and identity or looking at the social construction 
of states and the state system with religion left out of the picture. […] The presumption that 
religion has been privatized and is no longer operative in modern politics or that its influence 
can be neatly encapsulated in anthropological studies of a particular religious tradition and 
its external influence on politics, has led scholars of international relations to miss or 
misconstrue some of the most significant political developments of our time. This narrow 
vision is in part attributable to a rigid and dehistoricized secular/religious binary that 
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prestructures the field of academic political science and international relations (Hurd E. , 2011, 
pp. 167-168).  
The history of all civilisations is marked by the interchange between religion and politics.  Both 
politics and religion are institutions that operate in the realm of rules and norms to govern 
life.  The degree to which politics and religion are interwoven varies greatly, but perhaps no 
civilisation has ever separated the two as effectively - although unevenly - as Western 
civilisation, with US secularism a unique case.  
The Peace of Westphalia and the Emergence of Secularism 
The Peace of Westphalia, commonly regarded as the “origin of modern international 
relations”, ended the religious wars in 1648, and represented the consolidation of Europe’s 
transformation from medieval Europe to the modern state system (Shah & Philpott, The Fall 
and Rise of Religion in International Relations: History and Theory, 2011, p. 31). Part of this 
modern state system involved the growth of secularism, described by Jose Casanova as the 
“passage, transfer, or relocation of persons, things, function, meanings, and so forth, from 
their traditional location in the religious sphere to the secular spheres” (Casanova, 1994, p. 
17).8 
The Peace of Westphalia, and the subsequent adoption of political regimes that tolerated 
religious diversity, began the move towards European secularisation.  Secularism grew out of 
the Enlightenment, which originated from philosophers such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Hume 
among others. The Nineteenth Century saw ideas supporting political secularism 
strengthened by the work of Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche and Feuerback and in the Twentieth 
Century by Durkheim, Weber, Dewey, Freud and others (Shah & Philpott, The Fall and Rise of 
Religion in International Relations: History and Theory, 2011, pp. 24, 27). The Enlightenment 
thinkers of the late 17th and early 18th centuries believed the process of modernization, with 
its emphasis on rational thought and scientific enquiry, would corrode religion’s impact on 
society, discrediting religious explanations in favour of secularised theories and answers to 
individual and societal issues. This would lead people to become more “free, rational and 
                                                          
8 Erin K. Wilson describes secularization as “the gradual restriction or removal of religious influences in the 
public realm, the separation of the transcendent and supernatural from the immanent and natural, through 
various institutional, political, legal, social and even theological mechanisms” (Wilson, 2012, p. 15).   
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cosmopolitan” (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011, p. 50). As the church was abandoned by the state 
the lack of symbolic and financial support weakened it further (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011, 
p. 50).  
Additionally, the Enlightenment was hostile to traditional sites of power, namely the political 
power of the Roman Catholic Church, and the political and economic privileges of the 
aristocracy. Themes usually associated with the French Revolution of 1789, such as liberty, 
equality and fraternity, placed individual rights at the forefront and thus religion was made 
to “respect the values of the public sphere” (Friedman, 2016). Cultural and philosophical 
changes that grew out of Modernism in the 19th and 20th centuries strengthened this move 
away from tradition bringing in admiration for the culturally new and unexplored. Religion 
was thought to be too ‘volatile’ to be involved in politics and the ideology of political 
secularism developed. 
The aforementioned developments set the basis for the emergence of Secularisation Theory 
in the 20th Century, which describes religion as waning in the face of modernisation and 
progress. Falk argues that the separation of church and state “was intended to facilitate 
governmental efficiency as well as to provide the basis for a unified politics of the state in the 
face of religious pluralism, and a background of devastating sectarian warfare. Ostensibly, in 
the modern world, religious identity was declared irrelevant to the rational enterprise of 
administering the political life of society” (Falk, 1988, p. 381). Secularization Theory 
internalised these developments making them the basis of its assumptions. It thus assumes 
religion to be a force that impedes the management of political matters in a state, and insists 
that it be relegated to the private sphere (Hurd E. S., 2009, p. 32). Put succinctly, the main 
tenet of Secularization Theory is: “The assumption that religion will tend to disappear with 
progressive modernization” (Casanova, 1994, p. 7). However, whilst rational enterprise and 
modernisation supported the development of secularization in the European context, it has 
not done so in much of the rest of the world, indicating that Secularisation Theory was not a 
universal explanation for religion and politics and that an alternative one was needed.  
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Jonathan Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective explains that secularism emerged 
as an ideology in Europe that competed with religion to influence government9 (Fox, 2015, p. 
33-34). According to Fox, in Europe “rather than causing religion’s decline, modernity has 
caused the rise of secularism” (Fox, 2016, p. 155). As a result, in Europe, secular actors from 
the 15th Century onwards increasingly saw an opportunity to oust religious actors from 
political power in order to greatly strengthen their own power. Secular actors developed a 
narrative which asserted that sectarian violence was attributed to the involvement of religion 
in politics, and therefore religion had to be held accountable. The solution offered was to 
separate church and state.  However, as the genocide against the Jews in WWII demonstrates, 
Europe was quite capable of sectarian violence within a secular system where separation of 
church and state was well established. Although IR theory typically describes Europe as 
secular, this description of the history of religion and politics in Europe serves to remind us 
that the Middle East’s tight nexus between religion and politics is, historically, the norm. As 
the next section explains, Post-Secular Theory seeks to correct the assumptions of 
Secularisation Theory. As such, post-secular investigations emerged as a challenge to the 
literature declaring that the global decline of religion was inevitable.  
Challenges to Secularization Theory 
Undermining Secularization Theory’s most basic premise is the fact that large parts of the 
world, including the Middle East, have modernized since the 18th Century, yet religion has not 
declined in Muslim states to a significant degree. In the early 2000s, scholarship focused on a 
resurgence of religion and surmised that its influence on international politics would grow 
accordingly (Hatzopoulos & Petito, 2003, p. 12). The proportion of religious communities 
continues to grow at a greater rate than the religious non-affiliated population in the global 
population. Population projections from the Pew Research Center predict that the religiously 
non-affiliated category is set to grow from the 2015 figure of 1.17 billion to 1.20 billion by 
2060.  However, due to population growth, the number of non-affiliated persons is expected 
to shrink as a proportion of world population, from 16% in 2015 to 13% in 2060.  Additionally, 
the Center sees little indication to suggest that as states modernise and grow economically 
                                                          




there will be a decline in religiosity. There is limited evidence to support this in the Middle 
East, and in India numbers have remained constant (Lipka & McClendon, 2017). In contrast, 
the world’s largest religions, Christianity (31% of world population) and Islam (approximately 
23%) are predicted to continue to rise by 2060 as a proportion of the world’s population; 
Islam faster than Christianity (Pew Research Center, 2015)10. 
Thus, Secularization Theory has begun to unravel. In 1968, renowned sociologist Peter Berger 
stated that “by the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, 
huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture” (Berger, 1968, p. 3). At the time, 
developments supported the theory with the influence of major religions over culture and 
politics in decline on every continent. Ideologies such as nationalism, socialism and 
modernism were on the rise, science was exposing religion as superstition and democracy 
and free thought were repressing religion in the name of progress (Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 
2011, pp. 1-2). However, by 2013, Berger withdrew his 1968 assertion that secularism would 
spread worldwide as modernization advanced. He declared that “the data doesn’t support 
this” (Berger, 2013). Research indicates that religion is holding its own against secularism. The 
Pew Research Center released statistical analysis for 234 countries which projected that in 
2070 two thirds of the globe would likely be either Christian or Muslim, suggesting that not 
all populations are becoming more secular. Given projected population increases within the 
two largest religions, religion around the globe is expected to become more homogeneous. 
Green sums it up as follows: “The world is on track to become a more homogeneously 
religious place, not a more diverse and secular one” (Green, 2015). Many scholars also 
presented secularisation, especially its key emphasis, the separation of church and state, as a 
desirable political outcome, although they did not prescribe a programme for the 
implementation of secularization. Rather, they assumed that religion could not survive under 
the conditions of modernity.  
The increase in religious adherence and/or religion’s continued prominence across the globe, 
has highlighted the theoretical shortcomings of IR theory when it comes to religion. 
Renowned International Relations scholar, Professor Robert Keohane, stated that “the 
                                                          
10 For definitions of the religious groups refer to Appendix C of the Pew Research Center’s report titled The 
Future of World Religions:  Population Growth Projections, 2010-2070 (Pew Research Center, 2015) 
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attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly 
secular with respect to motivation. They ignore the impact of religion, despite the fact that 
world-shaking political movements have so often been fuelled by religious fervour” (Keohane, 
2002). Academic attention was further drawn to religion after the publication of Samuel 
Huntington’s article “The Clash of Civilisations” in Foreign Affairs, revitalising research in the 
field (Hehir, 2012, p. 19).  Even in Western Europe, where most adults to do not claim to be 
practising Christians, a majority still continue to identify as Christian: for example, in France, 
18% of all adults claim to be practising Christians, 46% non-practising Christians and 28% are 
religiously non-affiliated (Pew Forum, 2018).  Approximately 8% belonged to other religions  
(Pew Forum, 2018). This has important implications for politics. The Pew Research Center 
found that amongst Western Europeans, identifying as Christian was associated with higher 
levels of nationalism and wariness of immigrants, for example (Pew Forum, 2018). 
Post-Secular Theory 
As a consequence of the data refuting the universal spread of secularism, interest in Post- 
Secular Theory emerged in the late 1990s. This theory constitutes the academic rebuttal of 
Secularization Theory; specifically, its key assumption that the “relevance of religion has 
waned”. Post-Secular Theory is described by Jurgen Habermas as a “change in consciousness” 
that acknowledges that Secularisation Theory is specific to the development of European 
secularisation. Post-secularism represents a shift towards an intellectual understanding that 
religion is relevant within political analysis.  According to Hent de Vries, religion “lives on” and 
that “issues of pluralism and social cohesion, the quest for identity and the need for 
integration, respect for other (that is to say their beliefs and values), as well as the liberty in 
principle to express oneself”, are also relevant within political discussion (Mavelli & Petito, 
2014, pp. 1-2). The post-secular viewpoint rethinks the boundary between religion and state 
and attempts to work towards a de-Westernization of the political theory of international 
relations (Mavelli & Petito, 2014, p. 7). This research seeks to add to this, through the study 
of the Middle East in the post-secular framework. Falk argues that part of this new direction 
is an acknowledgement of the continued prominence of religious and civilizational identities 
on the international scene (Mavelli & Petito, 2014, p. 9). Post-Secular Theory also questions 
the validity of the argument that modernization and progress can only proceed in the absence 
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or waning of religion (Habermas, 2008, p. 20). Erin K. Wilson describes how “globalisation has 
contributed to the emergence of post-secularism in society, to opening up spaces for faith 
based organisations to participate in contemporary politics” (Wilson, p. 220). As such, the 
post-secular turn recognises the redistribution of political power in the international system 
such that the authority and power of the state is fluid (Wilson, 2014, p. 220) and conditioned 
by entities such as transnational religious groups.  An acceptance of post-secularism also 
underlines the need for ongoing research into religion and politics, including research into the 
use of religion within competitive shaping strategies and in regions outside of the West. 
Competitive shaping is a term coined to describe strategies used in the growing arena of 
competition between states that falls short of outright war. This arena between political 
competition and outright war is often called the grey zone. The Foreign Policy Research 
Institute (FPRI) defines it as follows:  
Competitive shaping is the art of a country or non-state actor altering the context in which an 
opponent makes a decision such that the country or group attempts to bend the opponent 
to its will through measures short of the use of major coercive military force (Elkus & Noonan, 
Competitive Shaping in World Politics: A Bibliographic Essay and Course Outline, 2018, p. 3).  
Wilson points out that both “secular and religious actors are using religious worldviews and 
values as one among numerous resources to challenge dominant neoliberal/market globalist 
paradigms…[as such] faith based actors are enjoying increased recognition as powerful forces 
in contemporary politics” (Wilson, 2014, p. 225).  The primarily secular far right and populist 
movements in Europe are utilising Christianity as an identity marker, as opposed to a faith, in 
order to advocate for the reassertion of European civilization at the expense of globalisation, 
pluralism and liberalism. It appears that increased exposure to the global creep of Western 
cultural norms has strengthened Islam as a key identifier, whilst the influx of immigrants and 
fear of Sharia law across Europe has, in turn, increased the West’s identification with its 
Christian heritage. This is strengthening religious identification within politics. Thus, Post-
Secular Theory asserts that religion is relevant to international relations and politics. It fails, 
however, to describe how religion is instrumentalised within foreign policy (Hamid, 2014); it 
is not enough to say it is, the how and why need explaining. As such, Post-Secular Theory 
opens up IR theory to accepting that religion is relevant internationally, though it gives little 
guidance as to how to understand and interpret this growing awareness within IR.   
27 
 
Additionally, although academic discussion of the Middle East in post-secular scholarship is 
sparse, Luca Mavelli points out that religion can operate as a “crucial provider of moral norms 
for a secular domain” in his research on the 2011 Egyptian revolution (Mavelli, 2012, p. 1059). 
This is also evident within the Middle East’s secular regimes such as Syria, whereby religion is 
instrumentalised both as an identity and to provide the regime with moral legitimacy. Mavelli 
further identifies that in the Middle East, secularism is not a political project based around 
modernisation, but around disciplining religion to the state’s survival needs through the 
political mechanisation of secular-religious competition. Thus, regimes use their political 
agency to “foster expressions of religiosity” and secularism that work to strengthen the 
regime  (Mavelli, 2012, pp. 1077-1078).  This research looks to further investigate the use of 
the secular-religious dynamic as an authoritarian survival strategy within the regional sphere.  
Sarah Feuer argues, and this thesis also takes this position, that globally: “Most governments 
have continued to exhibit a mix of religious establishment and a separation of religious and 
state authority, while religion has remained a central part of people’s lives around the world” 
(Feuer, 2014, p. 5). In order to increase its usefulness, Secularisation Theory would have done 
well to abandon its sole focus on conclusions gained from studying the West’s historical 
experience, and drawn instead from global medieval and modern history, looking for the 
alternative routes secular politics can take in competition with religious power. Secularisation 
Theory fails to explain all the possible choices available to political actors regarding religion 
and politics, focusing solely on moves towards secularism as an inevitable path. This creates 
issues for looking at religion and politics through IR theory, as these theories are based on a 
basic acceptance of the secularisation thesis. To correct this, and in order to grasp the political 
complexity of highly religious regions like the Middle East, IR theory needs to move towards 
a greater adoption of Post-Secular Theory’s understanding of politics, whereby religion can 
and frequently does coexist with modernity and with secularist ideology.  
The Theoretical Framework: Theories on Religion and Political Survival  
Post-Secular Theory emphasises the ongoing significance of religion in politics. As a result of 
the adoption of post-secularism, new theories that explain the relationships between religion 
and politics are being developed.  The theories utilised in this thesis are: Jonathan Fox’s 
Secular-Religious Competition Perspective (Fox, 2018); Hintz’s theory on the use of identity 
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within hegemony contests (Hintz, 2016, Vol. 22(2)); and Feuer’s work on government 
regulation of religion (specifically where her insights apply to political opponents) (Feuer, 
2014). The theoretical framework also includes de Mesquito and Smith’s Selectorate Theory 
that considers political survival and competition (Mesquito & Smith, 2011) as well as Buzan’s 
idea of the state and Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan, 2007).   
De Mesquito and Smith’s Selectorate Theory 
De Mesquito and Smith’s theory of political survival outlines what drives political decisions. 
They assert that leaders ultimately make decisions aimed at political survival. Leaders 
calculate who their domestic political ‘base’ is, or what de Mesquito and Smith call the real 
selectorate, which is the actual support base from within the broader potential support base 
which is called the nominal selectorate.  From within the real selectorate, regimes need the 
support of a winning coalition. The winning coalition is the essential supporters whom the 
ruler needs to remain in power or the “quantity of selectors whose support the leader must 
retain to remain in office” (Smith, Morrow, De Mesquito, & Siverson, 2008). In de Mesquito 
and Smith’s words, Selectorate theory is as follows:  
For leaders, the political landscape can be broken down into three groups of people: the 
nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition. The nominal selectorate 
includes every person who has at least some legal say in choosing their leader. […] …in Saudi 
Arabia’s monarchy it is the senior members of the royal family”.  […] (The winning coalition) 
are the people whose support is essential if a leader is to survive in office. […] Fundamentally 
the nominal selectorate is the pool of potential support for a leader; the real selectorate 
includes those whose support is truly influential; and the winning coalition extends only to 
those essential supporters without whom the leader would be finished. A simple way to think 
of these groups is: interchangeables, influentials, and essentials” (Mesquito & Smith, 2011, 
pp. 4-5).  
Dena Motevalian further explains that “a leader must manage the struggle for power among 
political coalitions to garner support and maintain a position of power” (Motevalian, 2016). 
Dictatorships only require a small coalition to remain in power as autocratic power is largely 
maintained by heavy use of internal security forces, the provision of private benefits to the 
elite, and the use of authoritarian religious practices in places like Saudi Arabia, which de 
Mesquito and Smith describe as having a “tiny nominal and real selectorate, made up of the 
29 
 
royal family and a few crucial merchants and religious leaders” (de Mesquito & Smith, 2011, 
pp. 6-7).  “In small-coalition polities like dictatorships, leaders can stay in power through the 
judicious use of private rewards. However, in some dictatorships, various selectorate 
members competing for loyalty can be observed, while in others, there are few selectorate 
members and the dictator is vulnerable to them” (de Mesquito & Smith, 2011, p. 5). A diagram 
illustrating Selectorate Theory features below: 
 
Fig. 2.1. Diagram Representing Selectorate Theory (de Mesquito, 2014, p. 82).  
Essentially, this theory emphasises that politics is about groups competing to defend their 
interests (Gobry, 2018) and elite’s strategies to get into and remain in power relative to those 
interests. As de Mesquito and Smith state:  
States don’t have interests. People do. […]National interest might have been on each of their 
minds, but their personal political welfare was front and center. The prime mover of interests 
of any state (or cooperation for that matter) is the person at the top – the leader. So we 
started from this single point: the self-interested calculations and actions of rulers are the 
driving force of all politics. The calculations and actions that a leader makes and takes 
constitute how she governs. And what, for a leader, is the “best” way to govern? The answer 
to how best to govern: however is necessary first to come to power, then to stay in power, 








type of politics could be addressed from the point of view of leaders trying to survive (de 
Mesquito & Smith, 2011, p. xxiii & xxiv). 
De Mesquito and Randolph M. Siverson have stated that variations in the two institutions of state 
power, the winning coalition and real selectorate, can have repercussions in foreign policy. For 
example they state that “leaders in states with small winning coalitions should be able to take greater 
risks in their policies, because if these fail, they will be able to mobilize and distribute private goods to 
reinforce their position” (de Mesquito & Siverson, 2017).  This research seeks to use variations in the 
two institutions to explain differing choices regarding militia sponsorship in the Syrian and Yemeni 
conflicts. Therefore it explores the ability of Selectorate theory to predict foreign policy.  
Feuer’s Ideas of Religious Regulation 
Sarah Feuer also looks at political survival, stating that the “nature and degree of state 
regulation of religion (or ‘religious regulation’) in the Arab world has been a by-product of 
authoritarian regimes' strategies of political survival” (Feuer, 2014). She outlines how “State 
regulation of religion in these countries is also shaped by the form and tenor of the group(s) 
a regime perceives to be its most formidable political opponent(s). Specifically, the degree to 
which a regime's political opponents frame their demands and base their own legitimacy on 
religious grounds will colour the state's regulation of religion” (Feuer, 2014, p. 20). She 
outlines how the opponents are related to the regime’s alliances and how regimes 
consolidate power.  Feuer includes the hegemonic political party in her analysis, as part of 
what Selectorate Theory describes as the winning coalition (Feuer, 2017, pp. 10-27). She goes 
beyond the ‘winning coalition’ of support that is essential for regime survival by also 
investigating the impact of political opponents on religious policy, as well as ideology and 
institutional strength. She states:  
State regulation of religion in these countries has resulted from the interaction of three 
factors: (1) the regime's ideology of legitimation, (2) the nature of the regime's primary 
political opponents in society 11 , and (3) the robustness of the regime's institutional 
endowment, as reflected in the presence or absence of a hegemonic political party and the 
relative strength of the state's bureaucratic apparatus.[…] A regime's ideology of 
legitimation – i.e. the overarching set of justifications a regime offers for its right to rule – 
influences state regulation of religion” (Feuer, 2014).  
                                                          
11 Italics added.  
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For the purposes of this research, Feuer’s ideas on the impact of the regime’s political 
opponents on religion and politics is relevant, and her work on religious regulations is related 
to Selectorate Theory.  Given the need to appeal to the real selectorate, Middle Eastern 
regimes tend to reflect, to varying degrees, traditional stances on religion. This is all part of a 
“bid for political legitimacy” (Feuer, 2014).  Feuer describes the religious identity framework 
within which a state must work as progressing from traditionalist to non-traditionalist (Feuer, 
2014). The theoretical pillars used in this research instead employ a scale from secular to 
fundamentalist (outlined in the methodology section of this chapter).   
Buzan’s Idea of the State 
There is a link between Feuer’s stress on politicians using religious legitimacy and Buzan’s 
‘idea of the state’. If the idea of the state contains a substantial religious component, the 
more likely it is that both the regime elites and their political opposition will use religion for 
legitimacy and to undermine each other12. By using Islam as the key idea of the state, for 
example in Iran and Saudi Arabia, states are able to gain religious legitimacy, and thus attempt 
to outflank both Islamist and secular opposition. Buzan describes how a “widespread and 
deeply rooted idea of the state” holds the “territorial-polity-society package” together. 
Without an idea of the state, it would have difficulty operating and ruling over its territory 
(Buzan, 2007, p. 70).  Fundamentalists and other religious extremist groups also have a key 
idea that holds their group together, albeit without the territorial structure of a state.  
Religion as a political idea has important implications. Buzan outlines how a state is bound 
together by more than its physical base and its institutions. States are bound by a sense of 
purpose around a unifying “idea of the state” (Buzan, 2007, p. 75). He continues: “A strong 
idea of some sort is a necessary component of a secure state, and the clear implication has 
been that the idea of the state must not only be coherent in its own rights, but also widely 
held” (Buzan, People, 2007). This could take the form of the expression of the dominant 
nation, and/or an organising ideology such as Islam, democracy or communism for example. 
The idea of the state can be deeply rooted: for instance, Zionism is linked to the very 
formation of the Israeli state, and democracy is strongly identified with Europe, to the point 
                                                          
12 This is not to discount that there could be genuine religious sentiment amongst leaders. However, this 
research focuses on the use of religion as a political tool.  
32 
 
that in these instances, shifts towards new ideologies or ideas of the state would be 
transformational and probably highly destructive. The idea can be weakly held or strongly 
held, but contested within the state. In either case, the state “stands on fragile political 
foundations” (Buzan, 2007, p. 80). Given that a state’s internal socio-political cohesion is a 
key indicator of its strength as an entity, the idea of the state is central to state security. Thus, 
the ideas/ideologies need to be defended and they are “vulnerable to [the] interplay of ideas” 
(Buzan, 2007, pp. 79-80) and “ideologies can be penetrated, distorted, corrupted and 
eventually undermined by contact with other ideas. They can be attacked through their 
supporting institutions and they can be suppressed by force” (Buzan, 2007, p. 80).  In non-
secular states, religion typically forms part or all of the idea of the state.  The idea of the state 
always contains a stance on religion – including where the organising ideology sits on the scale 
between secularism and fundamentalism. For instance, in a discussion about the battle 
between Islamism13 and Western secularism in the Middle East, Bassim Tibi explains this 
contest for power as follows, “Islamists attempt to topple secular regimes as a step in their 
quest for a new world order. Islamism as a variety of religious fundamentalism is not about 
terrorism, but rather the order of the state and the world. This process takes place as a war 
of ideas14 (Tibi, 2010, p. 162).  It could also be argued that the strength of non-state Islamism 
could also weaken the religious legitimacy an outwardly Islamist state such as the UAE for 
example.  
Political rivals in religious states typically express the ongoing tension over the role of religion 
in politics:  that is, where on the scale between secular and fundamentalist should governance 
sit. This ongoing conflict between the secular and religious is an ideal target for competitive 
shaping strategies with some Middle Eastern states using foreign policy to target this dynamic. 
Competitive shaping strategies typically aim at switching the elite in power, dividing the 
state’s citizenry and/or challenging the idea or ideology of the state. Buzan describes this as 
state (A) seeking to manipulate the internal factions of state (B) for the purposes of backing 
                                                          
13 Tibi describes Islamism as follows: “Islam is for Islamists a system of government based on a concept of a 
divine order to be established both in the Muslim world and worldwide. The utopian fantasy of Islamist 
fundamentalism is to replace the prevailing Westphalian secular order of sovereign states with an Islamic one. 
It is for this reason that political Islam is a concern for international security. Because Islamism is a variety of 
religious fundamentalism that claims universality for its political beliefs, Islamists place Islamic civilization in 
conflict with the rest of humanity and create divides within Islam” (Tibi, 2010, p. 163). 
 
14 Italics added. 
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the faction which pursues policies favourable to state (A) (Buzan, 2007, pp. 134-135). 
Leveraging internal divisions over religion, specifically how secular or religious the 
idea/ideology of the state should be, is a political strategy used by states within the Middle 
East.  
Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective 
In line with this reasoning, Jonathan Fox’s Secular-Religious Perspective extends the post-
secular argument, embracing the consensus that religion’s role in politics has not waned with 
secularization in much of the non-Western world, and proceeds to analyse instead how 
religion and politics coexist. Fox posits that religion in politics primarily manifests as an 
ongoing competition between religious and secular ideologies. This rests on the assumption 
that secular and religious elites contest to dominate “in social and political settings to fill the 
same social and political space” (Fox, 2015, p. 17). Political success between religious and 
secular actors is, therefore, about the success of a “worldview”, with the prevailing worldview 
discourse becoming hegemonic; in the West, the secular discourse, and thus secular actors, 
have emerged triumphant.  
Fox tested this in his research on secular-religious competition in Western democracies from 
1990 to 2014 (Fox, 2016, p. 155). In support of his theory, he outlined shifts in thinking away 
from Secularization Theory.  First, he advocated for a move towards seeing secularization not 
as inevitable progress but as an ideology (i.e. secularism). He describes secularism as “an 
ideology or set of beliefs that advocates the marginalization of religion from other spheres of 
life” (Fox,  2015, p. 27). Fox narrows this definition further, concentrating on political 
secularism which he defines as “an ideology or set of beliefs advocating that religion ought to 
be separate from all or some aspects of politics and/or public life” (Fox, 2016, p. 155).   
Whereas in the past religion was the “primary form of social control and order”15 (Fox, 2015, 
pp. 20), the growth of secularism presents an alternative ideology that was able to emerge 
because of the following factors:  
                                                          
15  Michaela Neulinger describes this in Austria prior to World War 2, whereby the Catholic Church was so 
dominant that it represented a “morality of coercive power”, ruling the ethical debate over societal rules with 
little resistance (Neulinger, 2018).  
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Religion is no longer needed for legitimacy. Modern political ideologies now fulfil this function. 
Second, religion is no longer the primary source of knowledge. […] Third, religion is being 
replaced as the primary form of social control and order. In the past, people obeyed social 
rules and norms because they believed in an omniscient, omnipotent God who punishes 
transgressions. Today social control is enforced primarily through the fear of getting caught 
by humans”. […] Religion is moving from the public sphere to the private sphere. […] Fifth, 
secular institutions are fulfilling functions formerly provided by religious ones […] including 
welfare, education, and medicine. […] Sixth, relative truth is replacing absolute truth.  Religion 
holds to an absolute truth. Today, many consider truth relative (Fox, 2015, pp. 20-21). 
This description aptly fits the West, although Hussein Agrama qualifies this position for the 
Middle East and North Africa, defining the relationship between the state and religion as 
being one of sovereignty; for example, the state exercises its sovereign power when it 
regulates religion. Religion continues to operate strongly as a competing force in religious 
states such as Saudi Arabia, contesting norms and rule setting. Therefore, the measure to 
which a state is free from religious limitations or considerations is a measure of how sovereign 
the state is in relation to religion within society (Agrama, 2010, p. 500), and this dynamic is 
measured within the secular-fundamentalist scale index shown later in the chapter.  
Fox outlines how secularism has challenged religion’s place as the dominant political ideology 
and, according to Agrama, wrestled with religion for greater sovereignty over state decisions. 
This dynamic has developed into a shifting scale of influence between the two in the modern 
era.  The challenge from secularism has generated shifts within religion in response, the most 
notable of which is fundamentalism which has risen to challenge the legitimacy of secular 
political and social orders. Fundamentalism, however, has not managed to stop the shift away 
from the pre-modern era when religion and the state shared the task of maintaining order, 
to one in which state power is dominant over religious power (Fox, 2015, p. 34).  Teije H. 
Donker tested Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition Perspective in his research on post-
revolutionary Tunisia. Donker critiques the theory as being too narrow in its analysis of the 
religious-secular dynamic. Both Donker and Agrama emphasise that secular-religious 
competition is a continual process of “drawing the boundary” between religious mores and 
secularity rather than just simply an ideological contest, and that actors have considerable 
agency over this process. Donker asserts that this dynamic is an ongoing feature of society. 
Whilst this research does not take Donker’s view that Fox excluded this position, Donker does 
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raise a point that requires emphasis; that the conflict regarding state-religion relations not 
only reflects the difference in the extent that religion and state should be integral or separate, 
but also how actors relate the two (Donker, 2013, pp. 2-6).  As such, this research focuses on 
how political actors relate to the secular-religious dynamic; i.e. specifically how they 
strategize this dynamic for political survival. Additionally, applying the secular-religious 
competitive perspective to the Middle East helps to separate the elite’s sectarian strategies 
that involve divisive political tactics based on religious affiliation, from the “ideational 
confrontation over the norms of political Islam” (Santini, 2017, p. 104) and secularism that is 
particularly evident in the Saudi-led Sunni regional bloc consisting of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Bahrain and to a lesser extent Kuwait and Egypt, following the ‘Arab Spring’. 
Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Framework 
The use of sectarian tactics by political elites is not just a domestic phenomenon; sectarianism 
is strategized in the Middle Eastern regional order as well. To analyse the impact of competing 
religious identities on regional politics, this research uses Buzan’s Regional Security Complex 
Theory. Buzan’s describes regional security complexes as a subset of states within which the 
security of each state cannot be understood within analysing the “pattern of security 
interdependence in which it is embedded” (Buzan, 2007, pp. 157-159).  Patterns of amity and 
enmity develop between the states within security complexes, and in some cases become so 
involved that they constitute sub complexes within the greater security complex (Buzan, 
People, 2007, p. 166). Within this system, there exists a hierarchy of power among the states 
with the larger and more powerful states often competing for the role of regional hegemon. 
Regional powers are able to set the rules and norms of the region to their own advantage, 
and have the “material, organisational and ideological resources for regional and 
international power projection” (Schrim, 2005, pp. 110-111).  
Given the instability of the Middle East, security issues occupy a very prominent place in states’ 
foreign policies; in line with Realist thinking, the Middle Eastern states operate under the 
assumption that the more powerful they are, the more secure they should be.  Therefore, 
among the more powerful Middle Eastern states the contest for security – both regime 
security and state security – is centred on battles for regional hegemony. Efforts to alter the 
regional balance of power are reflected strongly in the patterns of enmity and amity between 
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states (Buzan, 2007, pp. 158-160). States adopt different approaches to their regional security 
complexes. Status quo states wish the dynamics of the regional security complex to remain 
broadly the same and work towards this end. Revisionist states push against the dominance 
of the status quo, thus competing with status quo states. Buzan describes revisionist states 
as being either orthodox, radical or revolutionary. Orthodox revisionism focuses on power 
and status. These states are not working to change the existing rules and norms of the system, 
but seek to rise up the hierarchy in the system. Revolutionary revisionism involves a struggle 
for power and a challenge to the existing rules and norms. Radical revisionist states take the 
middle ground; there is no central attempt to completely restructure the system, but an 
attempt to reform aspects of it and increase the power of the radical revisionist state (Buzan, 
2007, pp. 241-244).  
The Middle Eastern security complex features three sub-complexes, North Africa, the Levant 
and the Gulf. Previously, the Levant sub-complex, which centres on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
had dominated the region’s narratives, however the Gulf sub-complex (including Iraq and Iran) 
has become increasingly prominent in the region’s security dynamics. The Gulf sub-complex 
drives the two dominant geopolitical rifts that shape the region: the Middle Eastern regional 
security complex is characterised by an “increased salience of the regional geopolitical rivalry 
between a Saudi-dominated Sunni camp and an opposing Iran-led one” and an intra-Sunni 
split over degrees of secularism and Islamism. Ruth Hanau Santini outlines how the Saudi-
Iranian competition “should have led to the strengthening of intra-camp cohesion and 
solidarity” (Santini, 2017, pp. 93-94). However, the Sunni camp has been marked with 
significant disagreements over Qatar’s position on Islamism, secularism and the emergence 
of Islamist democracies. This division is driven by the Saudi and UAE-led anti-Islamist counter 
revolutionary efforts in reaction to the ‘Arab Spring’, which was capitalised on by Muslim 
Brotherhood linked Islamist political actors in Egypt and Tunisia. The election of Islamist 
parties is not seen as being in line with Saudi and Emirati interests and therefore Qatar’s close 
relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood caused a dilemma for the Saudi-Emirati anti-
Brotherhood axis (Koca, 2017, p. 45).  
Adding to the complexity following the ‘Arab Spring’, Egypt and Tunisia experienced “deep 
contestations over the institutionalization of democracy” (Koca, 2017, p. 45).  Given both of 
the elected ruling parties at the time were Muslim Brotherhood linked, this contestation was 
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overlaid with disagreements over the norms of political Islam and secularism.  Furthermore, 
Egypt’s short lived Muslim Brotherhood government and Tunisia’s Ennahda looked to another 
aspirational regional hegemon as a guide for creating Islamist focused democracies: Turkey 
under the Justice and Development (AKP) party. Turkey’s former Prime Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, referred several times to Turkey’s close relationship with the first democratically 
elected governments in Tunisia and Egypt stating that in his opinion the three governments 
operated as if they were the cabinet of one country (Koca, 2017, p. 51).  In contrast, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE supported the military coup that subsequently toppled the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood government. The anti-Muslim Brotherhood axis’s blockade of Qatar in 
2017 intensified its counter revolution efforts. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt 
imposed the blockade in 2017, accusing the regime of supporting terrorism whilst laying down 
a set of demands, including that Qatar shut down Al Jazeera. In response, Turkey sent troops 
to protect Qatar’s sovereignty.  The post-‘Arab Spring’ environment in the Middle East is 
essentially one in which regimes are attempting to insulate themselves against further 
uprisings and it has been marked by division about how to do this amongst the Sunni states.  
The more prominent split in the Middle East is between the two alliances respectively led by 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. This new regional cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is centred 
on “securitized rivalry” whereby the securitization of religious identity groups has driven 
sectarianism into a defining “regional cleavage” (Santini, 2017, p. 103). This politicization of 
the sectarian divide serves two purposes - it distracts from the domestic vulnerability of the 
regimes following the ‘Arab Spring’ and potentially serves to unify intra-bloc cohesion. 
However, the aforementioned rift in the Sunni bloc centred on disagreements regarding the 
norms of religion and politics, and electoral Islam - and the impact different secular-religious 
balances will have on quietening civilian unrest following the instability of the uprisings.  
These defining regional confrontations involve religion and the divide between the Iranian led 
Shia bloc and the Saudi Arabian led Sunni bloc, and the second rift between the Saudi Arabian 
led anti-Islamist bloc and the pro-Islamist bloc, form the basis of this research into the use of 




Table 2.2. Key Actors in the Gulf Subsystem of the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex: 





System: Position on 
Secular/Religious 
Norms 
Preferred Leadership of 
Regional System 
Qatar Radical Revisionist, 
increased Islamism 
Moderate Islamist, not 
resistant to democratic 
Islamism in the region, 
but opposes democratic 
Islamism domestically  
Diffuse or balanced, not Saudi 
Arabia-led, Sunni bloc 
United Arab 
Emirates 






secularity and moderate 
Islam 
Saudi Arabia/UAE-led, Sunni 
bloc 





secularity, Salafi Islam 
Potential Hegemon, Sunni bloc 
Iran Revolutionary 
Revisionist 
Potentially seeks more 
States led by Shia 
Islamists 
Potential Hegemon, Shia bloc 
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 
Hintz’s Theory of Identity Hegemony 
In the Middle East, although the states rule through autocratic power, religion still shares with 
the state the role of maintaining social order. This gives greater scope for the political 
instrumentalisation of religion. Hintz relates this to political struggles that contain clear 
evidence of identity contestation, such as between conservatives and moderates in Iran for 
example. She proposes that religious identities can be instrumentalised in the regional sphere 
                                                          
16 Religious secularity is a term taken from Naser Ghobadzadeh’s research on secularism in Iran where religious 
secularist discourse is calculated to discredit the Iranian regime’s claim to religious legitimacy. This research uses 
the term religious secularism and/or religious secularity to describe this secular-religious position and applies it 
outside of the Iranian context.  Religious secularism is described here as advocating for the secular elite control 
over politics, religion and society, whilst emphasising moderate Islamic laws (moderate Islamism), a Muslim 
identity for the state and a strong presence of Islam within society.  
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for domestic political purposes, with foreign policy serving as an “alternative arena in which 
elites can politicize identity debates” (Hintz, 2016). She “argues that elites choose to take their 
identity contests to the foreign policy arena when identity gambits at the domestic level are 
blocked” (Hintz, 2016, p. 335). The foreign policy arena can be useful for advancing identity 
moves as “the contenders and rules in the foreign policy contest differ” to the domestic 
setting (Hintz, 2018, p. 9 of Chapter 21). Specifically, domestic opponents lack resources in 
the regional setting in comparison to the state’s elite so by moving the identity proposal 
contest into the regional arena the state typically gains an advantage. Additionally, domestic 
opposition movements with regional political links are affected by moves to thwart their 
transnational networks. This helps explain the reasoning behind UAE attempts to weaken the 
Muslim Brotherhood regionally in order to decrease its ability to appeal to citizens at home. 
Hintz’s ideas conceptualise political form and identity as dependent on the “political inclusion 
and exclusion” of societal blocs; in this analysis, identity is not primordial but constructed to 
further the interests of social and political groups (Howarth, 2010, pp. 313-314).  As Hintz 
describes, contests over the identity of a particular social group carry “immense ontological 
significance, as groups compete against each other to delineate, among other standards, the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, desired goals of the group, and friends and enemies – 
essentially who ‘we’ are and how we should behave” (Hintz , 2018, pp. 19). The stronger the 
domination of an identity group over the others, or an identity proposal for an identity group, 
the less able the alternative national identity proposals are able to influence policy and the 
more the elite of the dominant identity group are able to secure support by distributing 
dividends. Identity in this instance does not solely refer to permanent identity structures such 
as sectarian group, but the different identity proposals that a sectarian group, for instance, 
can adopt.  Competing elites need an ideology and an identity from which to generate support.  
The next section establishes the theoretical pillars for analysing religion and foreign policy.  It 
does this by synthesising and extending the above theories further and relating them to the 
international realm.  
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Religion, Power and Political Survival: Theory Adaptions to Fit International 
Relations 
The theoretical framework adopted and utilised by this thesis seeks to establish an analytical 
toolbox for researching the religiously based strategies prominent states use in the Middle 
East in their pursuit of security, power and survival.  The framework considers multiple factors 
where they intersect with religion. These include: 
1. The need of ruling elites to maintain the support of the winning coalition for regime 
survival (de Mesquito & Smith, 2011); 
2. The strategic use of religious regulation and religion to weaken domestic opponents 
(Feuer, 2014); 
3. The ongoing societal contest between religious and secular ideologies (Fox, 2015);  
4. The idea of the state  (Buzan, 2007) and hegemonic battles that feature identity (Hintz, 
2016). 
These features sit in this framework as contributing factors for the choice of religious 
strategies that states employ in their quest for regime security and power. The 
aforementioned theories are adapted here to fit the regional context. Although these 
theories are extended and synthesized to fit the regional sphere, their focus on regime 
political survival and power is kept so as to not extend these theories so far that their 
explanations are no longer valid.  
Fox’s theory outlines how competition between the religious actors and secular actors in the 
political arena has been, and still is, an ongoing feature of domestic politics. (Fox, 2015). This 
research extends this to look at the political use of the societal contest between religious and 
secular ideologies, specifically looking at how regimes use the competition between 
secularism and religion for regime survival and to obtain political power. Feuer’s focus on how 
moves to counter domestic political opponents affect the religious strategies of the ruling 
elite is also adapted in this framework to focus on how that ruling elite moves the contest 
between secularism and religion into foreign policy in order to thwart domestic opponents. 
This strategy has the potential to be effective because many religious political opposition 
groups in the Middle East have links to transnational networks. If we take the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, for example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, fearful of the Brotherhood’s support of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, have sought to weaken the network so as to weaken the influence of their 
Brotherhood-linked domestic opponents (Lacroix, 2014). Additionally, in religious societies, 
politicians find it very hard to avoid taking a stance on the role of religion in politics17 – as 
such, this stance can be used against a political opponent. This research tests whether or not 
the domestic contest between religious and secular ideologies, as outlined by Fox, is moved 
into the foreign policy arena when the opportunity arises. However, whereas Fox stresses 
ideological competition, this research will additionally focus on competition between secular 
and religious actors. This dynamic can relate to domestic opponents, and also to regional 
opponents in the battle for hegemony, and the contest for/against the status quo18 within a 
regional security complex.  
The framework also draws upon de Mesquito and Smith’s Realist analysis which finds that 
ruling elites need to maintain the support of their winning coalition - who are drawn from the 
real or potential selectorate for regime survival.  The theory states that support is gained 
through the provision of private and public goods. In his recent research, Peter S. Henne also 
drew on de Mesquito et al’s work, alongside other theories that focus on political institutions 
and political survival.19 Henne states that his theory of political survival stems from the “dual 
nature of political behaviour – survival seeking leaders and principled ideological religious 
groups – and the tension between religious groups’ beliefs and leaders’ self-interest” 
motivates his theory of religious political relationships (Henne, 2016, p. 28).   
In his research on domestic politics and counterterrorism policies, he concluded that a 
“regime’s primary motivation is to survive” and that as a result “religion will only influence a 
regime’s behaviour if it affects regime elites’ survival calculations”. He goes on to state that 
this is most likely to happen when religion and the state are closely linked (Henne, 2016, pp. 
13-14). This research takes the position that closely linked means that religious citizens and 
groups are the key members of a state’s real selectorate and, ultimately, their winning 
                                                          
17 I.e. particularly in relation to where the state fits on the scale between secular and fundamentalist. 
18 You could argue quite convincingly that the status quo in the Middle East is intimately connected with 
identity and religion. 
19 Henne’s theoretical platform draws from such works as Smith and de Mesquito’s “The Logic of Political 
Survival”, Acemoglu and Robinson’s, “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty”, Smith’s 
“ Political Groups, Leader Change and the Pattern of International Cooperation” and Smith and de Mesquito’s 
“Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting”.  
42 
 
coalition; therefore, retaining the support of religious actors is of primary importance. 
Illustrating this, Henne claims that close relationships between religion and the state is an 
indicator of how cooperative or not a regime will be regarding US counterterrorism strategies. 
The closer the tie to religion and religious support for survival, the more reluctant the state 
will be to carry out counterterrorism measures  (Henne, 2016, p. 14). Although this research 
makes the exception that this is unless these measures are used to frame opponents as 
terrorists as is the case in Syria and Egypt following the ‘Arab Spring’ for example. Henne 
further asserts that reluctance to pursue aggressive counterterrorism measures is more of an 
indicator of the impact this will have on their religious domestic audience than evidence of 
support of Islamist or extremist groups (Henne, 2016, p. 14). This calculation is not static and 
is likely to change over time and in response to specific events. Henne’s adjustment to 
Selectorate Theory will be put to use when analysing amity and enmity patterns relating to 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the case study states.  
Amir Bagherpour’s research on Selectorate Theory in the Middle East and North Africa 
reached the conclusion that the theory’s emphasis on public/private rewards at the exclusion 
of non-material benefits, such as religion, ignored the fact that in the Middle East and North 
Africa region religious dividends, as separate from material dividends, have a significant 
impact on political support. Bagherpour argued that “the public private goods argument does 
not hold because the leadership is driven by ideological preferences that have less to do with 
financial gain and more to do with the acquiescence of Islamic principles” (Bagherpour, 2012, 
p. 77).  He discovered that “political survival (i.e. stability) is best achieved in Middle East and 
North Africa through the right proportion of private-public goods and an element of religiosity 
that is expressed either by religious parties or official partnership with the government at 
large” (Bagherpour, 2012, p. 79). This research accepts Bagherpour’s positon that de 
Mesquito and Smith’s Selectorate Theory needs to include religion to be relevant to the 
Middle East North Africa region, and thus extends the Selectorate Theory to include the 
provision of both material and non-material dividends to supporters. Furthermore, this 
research’s framework asserts that real selectorates in domestic politics have an identity 
component; regime supporters are more likely to be from the same identity group as the 
political elites and that religious legitimacy is a key factor in the survival of the case study 
regimes in the face of the ‘Arab Spring’. In the Middle East, the real selectorate’s identity 
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group is decided on religious grounds and therefore, the elite is likely to belong to the same 
sectarian group as the dominant identity group, i.e. both the elite and the real selectorate are 
Sunni in Saudi Arabia. Identity is a useful base for a political selectorate due to in-group 
favouritism and out-group hostility that is to varying degrees prevalent in identity groups. 
Within each religious identity group there are often other identities which can also be 
politically very important, for instance tribal affiliations in the UAE and Qatar. However, this 
research’s key focus is on religious identity in terms of sectarianism and the contest between 
secularism and religion as features of the support base of the regimes, and of their 
authoritarian survival strategies.  
This framework also extends Selectorate Theory, using a stacked Venn diagram to illustrate 
the support base of the regimes, but also applying the theory in order to show where potential 
sites of political opposition in terms of religiosity and sectarian exclusion sit relative to the 
regime. For instance, Qatar’s regional connections with Islamists help to bolster its religious 
credentials at home, and this is evident in the regime’s tactics in both the domestic and 
regional arenas. In contrast, the UAE excludes Islamists from its support base and instead of 
attempting to encourage their cooperation, it works to repress domestic Islamist forces. This 
is also evident in its domestic and regional tactics and is outlined in later chapters.  
The framework’s recognition that identity groups feature within the dynamics of Selectorate 
Theory gives us a greater ability to establish which religious identities a state is likely to 
feature within its international or regional strategies. This is particularly applicable to the 
Middle East where religious identities represent the competing factions within political 
contests for power. As such, given social identity relates to a regime’s selectorate of potential 
support, and religious identity groups in the Middle East exist across borders, religious 
identity based factions can be engineered by using religious strategies in foreign policy20. For 
instance, this might include moves to bolster a particular religious identity as the natural 
leader of the Muslim Umma where this identity reinforces the strength of the winning 
coalition’s identity at home. This particularly applies to the Turkish and Saudi Arabian foreign 
policies which seek identity hegemony.   
                                                          




Regional and domestic contests for hegemony included in this framework are strengthened 
by the incorporation of Hinz’s Theory of Identity Hegemony, whereby contests over identity 
that are blocked domestically are moved into the foreign policy arena to attempt to secure a 
breakthrough. In deciding which religious identity is being contested in foreign policy, a state’s 
grand narrative or idea of the state needs to be examined. These grand narratives “Constitute 
a range of broad guidelines for legitimate political action but also to function as a sort of 
navigation compass for the state. As legitimacy is an important precondition for regime 
stability in most states, overall policies tend to be identity-guided in this broad sense” (Danish 
Political Science Association, 2012, p. 8).  Therefore, where the idea of the state is strongly 
religious, and where the real selectorate is predominantly made up of the dominant sectarian 
identity group, religion by necessity becomes one of the key considerations regarding an 
elite’s political survival and this is reflected in both domestic and foreign policy.  
The theoretical pillars for this research are demonstrated by the diagram below. 
Figure 2.3.  Map of Theoretical Pillars. Source:  Author 
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Authoritarian Survival Strategies in the Regional Sphere 
Along with increased attention on the role of religion in politics, the use of foreign policy to 
strengthen autocracy at home has also been the subject of a growing number of research 
projects. Work by Adele Del Sordi, Emanuela Dalmasso, Johannes Gerschewski, Karen Young 
and Marlies Glasuis focuses on the international mechanisms with which autocratic regimes 
seek to legitimise and sustain their rule (Sordi & Dalmasso, 2018); (Gerschewski, 2013); 
(Young, 2015); (Glasius, 2018). Much of this research follows from Gerschewski’s 
identification of legitimation, repression and co-optation as the key pillars of stability for 
authoritarian regimes. Shkel and Gareev apply Gershewski’s conceptual framework to 
Selectorate Theory investigating how the “sustainability of a non-democratic regime depends 
on the autocrat’s ability to form a loyal empowered coalition that includes the principal 
segments of influential elites” (Shkel & Gareev, 2015, p. 206). Sebastian Hellmeier and Nils B. 
Weidmann also draw on Selectorate Theory arguing that when mobilising rallies in support of 
their authoritarian regimes, “autocrats mobilize their supporters selectively as a strategic 
response to political threats” (Hellmeier & Weidmann, 2019, p. 1). Looking beyond the 
organisation of rallies, this research looks into the selective mobilization and co-optation of 
supporters through a sectarian and religiosity framework. Maria Josua analyses the success 
of different types of co-optation patterns in Jordan, ranging from structural, traditional, 
identity related, material and personal co-optation patterns. She explains that authoritarian 
legitimation and support patterns do not work through democratic institutions and 
procedures but alternatively use co-optation to secure the support of strategically important 
segments of society (Josua, 2011, p. 2). These authors’ findings help to support this research 
which focuses on identity related co-optation, and specific inclusion/exclusion patterns which 
have featured significantly as authoritarian survival strategies in the post- ‘Arab Spring’ 
context. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the Middle East are frequently based around 
religious societal structures. However the dividing line is not just inter-sect through sectarian 
identities, but also intra-sect, with a focus on levels of religiosity and/or secularism. These 
two patterns of inclusion/exclusion form the key frame in this research.  
In exploring authoritarian strategies of domestic political survival, research has moved 
towards looking at the operation of these strategies internationally, with researchers such as 
Adele Del Sordi and Emanuela Dalmasso investigating how regimes “use their international 
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activities to boost legitimacy at home” (Del Sordi & Dalmasso, 2018, p. 95). Del Sordi and 
Dalmasso created a dynamic legitimation model to explain how authoritarian elites seek to 
create a positive international brand that reinforces their domestic strength (Del Sordi & 
Dalmasso, 2018, p. 95). This ties into Lisel Hintz’s research into the movement of identity 
contests into the regional or international sphere when they are blocked at home (Hintz, 2016, 
Vol. 22(2)). Lisel Hinz’s research, alongside work by Jonathan Fox, Bruce Bueno de Mesquito 
and Alastair Smith, Sarah Feuer and Barry Buzan, provides the grounding of this research. 
Knitting it Together: Realist Constructivism 
Realist Constructivism:  Power and Identity 
There are implicit tensions between the theories in the framework. Selectorate Theory’s 
position which holds that states do not have interests - political elites do -, sits alongside 
Buzan’s ‘idea of the state’ whereby each state has a unifying idea, whilst accepting that the 
structure of the international system impacts on geopolitical decision making.  All these 
elements impact elite’s decisions regarding the authoritarian survival strategies which are 
studied in this research. These seemingly contradictory approaches reflect the complexity of 
the Middle East; it is a region where realpolitik plays a prominent role, but where religion also 
plays an important role in politics and society. Realist Constructivism is used to knit the 
theoretical frame together and to bridge religion to IR theory by incorporating it into a Realist 
Constructivist theoretical framework.  The ‘grand theories’ have not dealt with religion in 
much depth. This includes Constructivism, although it’s focus on narratives, identity and 
norms make it the most obvious choice to tackle the objective of bringing religion into the 
sphere of IR theory. This research positions religion within Realist Constructivism, welding 
together realism’s competitive hierarchical world, with the socially constructed politics of 
Constructivism. 
Alexander Wendt asserts that the makeup of a state’s material interests is decided by the 
state’s ideas around which interests they should or should not pursue, and how they define 
those interests (Wendt, 1999, pp. 92-96). Therefore, within each state there will be specific 
ideas that contribute to decision making regarding interests – and to some degree this will be 
constituted from a state’s position on religion and secularism. As such religion is an idea that 
47 
 
goes, as Wendt would say, “all the way down” (Wendt, 1999, p. 92). Traditional IR treats 
religion as simply an instrument to pursue national interests. This research takes the position 
that religion can also be a state interest.  Murray, Knox and Bernstein describe this further,  
Realpolitik suggests that decision-makers can strip strategic calculations of all considerations 
save those of pragmatism and power. The term exudes a sense of hard-headed sagacity. In 
fact, however, it is profoundly misleading – and even ideological – for the naked exercise of 
power for its own sake is seldom the ultimate goal. Power is a means, not an end. It exists to 
advance or defend the interests of the groups who control it. The fundamental assumptions 
about the nature of society and even the purpose of human life of those groups in turn shape 
their perceptions of interest. From a historical perspective many, if not most, case studies of 
the making of strategy would make no sense without consideration of the role of belief 
systems (Murray, Knox, & Bernstein, 1994, p. 13).  
Wendt asserts that power and interests have the impact they do because of the ideas that 
constitute them (Wendt, 1999, p. 35)21. The degree of socialisation of an idea speaks to its 
strength and impact on the political system.  Wendt outlines that socialisation can change the 
state’s properties, thereby refuting the neorealist emphasis on material based explanations 
for systemic structure (Wendt, 1999, p. 102). Furthermore ideas make up culture. Wendt 
believed that ‘“culture” lurks just behind “interest”’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 104).  
Regime’s religious authoritarian strategies are constructed out of cultural ideas regarding sect 
and religiosity. Regime survival is focused on the accumulation and exercise of political power. 
Hence, in order to account for the instrumentalisation of religion in politics, the framework 
needs to move beyond Neorealism or Structural Realism’s treatment of states as “black boxes” 
wherein a state’s place in the system’s hierarchical structure rather than their internal 
dynamics or governance regime is prioritised in analysis (Mearsheimer, 2010, pp. 78-79). 
Therefore, although realist ideas and assumptions about hierarchy and competition are 
within this framework, given religion is a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon, 
                                                          
21 This relates to Gramsci’s thoughts, which Kendie describes as follows: “Ideas build societies. Ideas move 
nations from one stage of development into another. When people are exposed to ideas, they become 
conscious. In effect, the battle field for Gramsci is the struggle of ideas. He maintains that revolution is about 
people. Its primary objective is to challenge society for the better. But change is the result of the stimulus evoked 
by the friction of one group of ideas upon another. Thus, when members of the same group maintain different 
ideas with regard to the same subject in opposition, they necessarily evoke comparison, debate and discussion, 
thus enhancing consciousness. It is in this light that one should study Gramsci's theory of domination, hegemony, 
consciousness and revolution” (Kendie, 2006). 
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constructivism is clearly a highly relevant theoretical tool through which to analyse religion in 
the international system (Barkin, 2010, pp. 156-157).  
The Realist explanation regarding regional policies focuses on national interests and structural 
considerations. Wendt states that the two defining features of Realism; power and egotistic 
national interests, are accepted features across IR, and indeed within Constructivism. He 
qualifies this by stating that the purpose for which material forces are employed is what drives 
social and political function, not the material forces themselves (Wendt, 1999, p. 113).   
Authoritarian survival strategies are constructed from the regimes understandings of  how to 
instrumentalise the power of religion and sect to ensure their political survival.   
Wendt goes on to state that he is not positioning “interest as a rival explanation to power, 
nor claiming that interests cause power to have certain effects”.  Instead he asserts “that 
power only explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest. The argument 
is constitutive, not causal” (Wendt, 1999, p. 109).  This is not an either/or argument, “material 
forces are not solely constituted by their social meaning, and social meanings are not immune 
to material effects” (Wendt, 1999, pp. 109-110).  The interest in question in this research is 
not religion for its own sake, but for the political survival of elites. Given the combination of 
realpolitik and the political mechanisation of religious ideas and social constructs, Realist 
Constructivism is used to knit this eclectic selection of theories together into this research’s 
conceptual framework. 
Methodology   
The explanatory variable in this research is the relationship between religion and the state.  
The outcome studied is the differing patterns of militia support based on the secular-
fundamentalist Index and sectarian considerations. This research adapts the pluralist 
methodological approach to International Relations research by using both quantitative 
methods and interpretive qualitative methods in the research process. This is important given 
that political science involves both measurable and observable factors as well as 
unobservable entities and processes. Wedeen outlines some key concerns related to 
researching aspects of culture such as religion and ethnicity.  “Constructions” of ethnicity are 
hard to measure for instance, putting it at odds with the quantitative direction IR research 
has taken. However, anthropologists assert that intensity of identity matters when it comes 
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to ethnic violence (Wedeen, 2002, p. 724). Furthermore governments work on assessing 
which terrorists groups are the most severe security threats (these assessments often need 
more accuracy). Therefore assessments relating to extremism and the political construction 
of religion and identity are clearly important. Although as Wedeen states “coding ethnic 
groups is an inherently perilous enterprise” (Wedeen, 2002, p. 724), the fact that 
governments and analysts do assess terrorists groups across a range of metrics points to the 
fact that such assessments, while difficult, can inform policy and practical recommendations 
for reducing risk and combatting threats. As Lisa Wedeen relates: “Mathew Kocher has 
pointed out to me that the locus classicus for factors analysis is IQ. Like intensity of identity, 
we cannot measure intelligence directly, so scientists have devised a number of tests that 
operate as ‘functions of intelligence’” (Wedeen, 2002, p. 725). Although the direct impact of 
religion on regime survival and hegemonic contests is difficult to measure, support for militias 
in conflicts, actions against religious activists, and the intensity of violent fundamentalism 
within religious narratives, for instance, help to test for patterns of violent or aggressive 
political behaviour. By analysing the political choices of the case study states where religion 
plays a large role in political life and society through the theoretical framework’s extension of 
the aforementioned theories on, this thesis hopes to discover these patterns of behaviour. 
These patterns typically reflect strategies in response to shifts in support and opposition for 
a regime and as such are purely pragmatic. The analysis consists of four case studies, which 
allows for cross-case analysis to account for variation between cases, and within case analysis, 
which focuses on the causal mechanisms connecting religion-state links to the sponsorship of 
foreign militia groups. 
The Secular-Fundamentalist Scale 
In this effort, additional tools are used to advance the analysis and address, at least in part, 
the following questions: how do you quantify a religious group or political actor? How do you 
measure the use of religion as an instrument? Establishing a criteria to test for and measure 
the strength of religion’s involvement in politics would enhance research into the 
instrumentalisation of religion, religious motivations, and identity’s role in both domestic and 
regional hegemonic contests. The secular-fundamentalist scale, created by the author of this 
thesis by synthesising various definitions of fundamentalism and secularism as articulated by 
Bob Altemayer, Bruce E Hunsberger, Alfred Stepan, Lina Khatib, Harold G. Koenig et al., Hasan 
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Mustafa, Jonathan Fox and the Pew Research Center is an attempt to help bridge this gap 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004, 14(1)); (Stepan, 2011) (Khatib, 2016); (Koenig, Wang, Al 
Zaben, & Adi, 2015, 6(3)); (Mustafa, 2015); (Fox, 2018); (Pew Research Center, 2017). Feuer 
describes how a regime’s ideology of legitimation influences its politics. She gleans that from 
the “speeches and writing of ruling elites, foundational documents such as constitutions, and 
rituals performed by the state, we can imagine regimes falling somewhere along a spectrum 
of ideological legitimation” (Feuer, 2014, p. 20). While Feuer describes regimes sitting on a 
spectrum of ideological legitimation that moves from traditionalist to non-traditionalist, this 
research’s framework considers the ideological position on a scale from secular to 
fundamentalist.  
While the secular-fundamentalist scale operates as a fairly rudimentary test or measure when 
applied to research from primary and secondary sources it allows us to test certain criteria. 
For example, when considering the question ‘does Qatar support extremist Salafi groups in 
Syria?’ This research tests this by comparing the secular–fundamentalist rating of militias 
supported by the case study states with the regimes’ winning coalitions. The secular-
fundamentalist scale aids with further discovery. Amir Bagherpour claimed that acquiescence 
to religious norms by leaders led to greater stability in face of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Bagherpour, 
2012, pp. 78-79). Therefore, where a regime sits on the secular-fundamentalist scale 
potentially has implications for regime stability and survival.  During the region-wide 
discontent of 2011, Bagherpour argued that citizens showed greater support for the regimes 
in the Middle East that were less secular and had greater religious legitimacy. This is 
particularly evident when we consider that both Syria and Saudi Arabia are identified by 
Bagherpour’s model to be equally autocratic and maximalist in their approach to internal 
security; however, Islamist Saudi Arabia survived the ‘Arab Spring’ whereas the comparatively 
more secular Assad regime has been fighting to survive. Bagherpour, however, neglects to 
assess whether the regime elites belong to the majority or minority religious sect 22  or 
alternative explanations regarding regime survival of the ‘Arab Spring’ unrest, such as co-
optation and resource mobilisation; whilst this research focuses on the contest between 
                                                          
22 One of the risks of strict hypothesis testing in International Relations is that the limits of the hypothesis can 
neglect to account for other potential variables. For instance, Bagherpour does not take into account whether 
or not the sectarian group of the regime elite in question is a minority or majority, and what impact this has on 
his assessment.  
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secularism and religion as an authoritarian survival strategy, these alternative explanations 
are acknowledged in this research.  Bagherpour asserts that when looking at regime security 
and stability you need to address how well “the ideological preference of the society is being 
addressed by the extent of religiosity” (Bagherpour, 2012, p. 80). As such, Bagherpour makes 
clear that “religious preferences must take into account the calculus for political survival in 
MENA”  (Bagherpour, 2012, p. 76); thus it is likely that regime stability in the Middle East since 
2011 is to an extent related to how well regimes balance between religion and secularism. 
Given this research looks extensively at domestic stability as a motivation for regional 
religious strategies, this finding is significant and thus the secular-fundamentalist scale below 
was developed for this research through synthesizing a variety of literature on religiosity and 
types of secularism.  
 
Secular–Fundamentalist Scale 
 Anti-clerical                                                                                      Religious 
         Secularism                                                                                                                                                                                         Extremism      
 
        1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9          10       
Table 2.4. Secular-Fundamentalist Scale 
 
1 
Anti-clerical Secularism: hostile to religion, high level of control over religion, 
predominantly autocratic, varied  levels of religious intensity across society but 
suppressed by government, a higher ideology that is placed as a ruling value system for 
society  i.e. communism, state system.  
 
2 
French Laicite: one weakly preferred religion, emphasis on rational thought and science, 
progressive, modern, egalitarian, multi-cultural in theory, religion limited to the private 
sphere, varied levels of religious intensity across society/very high levels of non-religious, 
there is no ‘correct’ religion, state system.  
 
3 
Anglo-Saxon Secularism: preferred religion but respect for all, principled distance from 
religion, religious neutrality by state, accommodates established religions, varied levels 
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of religious intensity across society/high levels of non-religious, no ‘correct’ religion, 
religion limited to private sphere, state system.  
 
4 
Secular Model of Religious Accommodation: preferred and established religion, 
modern, does not deny religion a place in public sphere but religion generally considered 
a private affair, varied levels of religious intensity across society tending towards 
publically visible preferred religion, state system.  
 
5 
Politically Secular/Religious: Established preferred official religion, political elites more 
powerful than often co-opted religious elites, separation of church/mosque and state, 
secular governing ideology with accommodation of highly religious populace, religiously 
diverse, moderately high levels of religious intensity, some groups highly religious, some 
hostility to outgroups, state system.  
 
6 
Religious Secularism: political elites more powerful than religious elites, considerable 
separation of church/mosque and state, official religion  constitutionally privileged, 
highly religious with religious state identity, some weak religious pluralism but 
dominance of the official religion strictly maintained, high levels of socially embedded 
religion, one true religion, some hostility to outgroups, state system.  
 
7 
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious: religious elites influence political elites, supports 
scriptural based law, comparatively non-sectarian, state identity strongly religious, 
nationalist, promotes sectarian unity, anti-Western, high levels of religious intensity in 
society, religion socially embedded, one true religion, hostility to religious outgroups, 
state system.  
 
8 
Highly Theocratic: religious leaders subordinate to, but highly influential with, political 
leaders and over society, religious police, official religion, authoritarian, very high levels 
of religious intensity in society, religion socially embedded and forced, Sharia/Biblical 
source of law, religious ethnocentrism, state identity religiously linked, one correct 
religion, hostility to outgroups, highly extrinsic religion orientation23, state system. 
                                                          
23 Extrinsic religion is defined as a means of achieving some self-serving end that promotes social support, comfort 
and self-esteem, whereas intrinsic religion is defined as being an ultimate end in itself, for those involved in this type 
of religion. People with an intrinsic religious focus are mainly encouraged by a promise for personal spiritual 
development and for a deeper, more meaningful relationship with God.  In contrast, extrinsic religion is typically 
co-related with higher levels of out-group prejudice and intrinsic towards more favourable out-group attitudes and 






Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic: religious leaders are the political leaders, official 
religion, nationalist religious ideology, religious police, very high religious intensity, 
socially embedded and forced religion, authoritarian, religious ethnocentrism, some 
features of religious imperialism, one correct religion, high level of hostility/violence 
towards outgroups, conversion away from official religion dangerous, Sharia/Biblical 
source of law, religious state identity, highly extrinsic religion orientation, state system.  
 
10 
Religious Extremist: Global religious imperialism, transnational, belief that religion is the 
source of law and political leadership, high level of control over religion, hierarchical,  
traditionalist,  ethnocentric, autocratic, religious identity, return to purity of ‘golden 
years’ or early religious prophets (archaism), extreme outgroup hostility, highly extrinsic 
religion orientation, disregard for state boundaries.  
     
N.B.  This scale was created by the author through synthesising varying definitions from 
literature by the following authors: Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s revised religious 
fundamentalist scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004, 14(1)); Alfred Stepan’s work on 
multiple Secularisms (Stepan, 2011); Khatib’s ‘More religious yet still secular?’ article (Khatib, 
2016); Koenig Wang, Al Zaben and Adi’s Belief into Action Scale (Koenig, Wang, Al Zaben, & 
Adi, 2015, 6(3)); Hasan Mustafa’s list of vetted Syrian militia groups (Mustafa, 2015);  
Jonathan Fox’s secularism models (Fox, 2015, pp. 29-32); and the Pew Research Center’s 
research on state official and preferred religions research (Pew Research Center, 2017).   
Rather than generating fieldwork data, this research focuses on evaluating existing data and 
data from open source intelligence on-line platforms and clearinghouses through the 
parameters of its theoretical framework, which is made up from merging and extending 
existing theories, including emerging theories on religion and politics. The vast majority of 
theories on religion and politics focus on the domestic sphere. This research tests the 
explanatory power of a relevant selection of these theories outside of their domestic 
grounding to see if they possess a broader relevance than anticipated; i.e. to see whether the 
theoretical dynamics established at the domestic level are present at the regional level as well. 
This research needs a large selection of difficult to access data which has therefore been 
gathered from a broad selection of secondary sources such as foreign correspondents, 
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government officials, the theses of Henn, Baghourpour and Hintz, and data from the Pew 
Research Center for instance. The data analysed is broad, comprehensive and gathered by 
people with close access to events with institutional levels of research resources and as such 
aptly meets the needs of this research. It would be impossible to personally collect from 
fieldwork such a comprehensive and reputable data set with which to work.  Furthermore, 
primary sources were difficult to access given that there is a considerable amount of secrecy 
and sensitivity about information relevant to national security and religion in the Middle East. 
Therefore, this research relied on information gathered from external and open sources of 
information and intelligence including the following:  
 Professional and Academic Publications: information acquired from journals, 
conferences, symposia, academic papers, dissertations, and theses. 
 Media: print newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Most of these sources are in 
English, except where Arabic media has an English version of their publication available 
online.  
 Public Government Data: public government reports, budgets, hearings, press 
conferences, websites, and speeches. Although this source comes from an official 
source they are publicly accessible and may be used openly and freely. 
 Internet: open source intelligence platforms, clearinghouses for terrorists publications, 
online publications, blogs, discussion groups, citizen media (i.e. – cell phone videos, 
and user created content), YouTube, and other social media websites (i.e. 
– Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.). This source also outpaces a variety of other 
sources due to its timeliness, ease of access and the availability of translations of Arabic, 
Farsi and Turkish sources into English. 
 Commercial Data: commercial imagery, financial and industrial assessments, and 
databases. 
 Grey literature: preprints, working papers, business documents, unpublished works, 
and newsletters. 
Militia Sponsorship Patterns: Method, Language Sources and Data Issues 
The militia sponsorship patterns in chapters 5 and 6 were created by identifying the dominant 
sect of fighters in each militia sponsored by each of the case study states, then comparing 
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them to the sect of the regime elites.  An additional test was carried out in which the ideology 
of each militia, particularly as it related to sect, religion and secularism, was identified and 
put into the theoretical framework and subsequently given a secular-fundamentalist index 
rating. This was then compared to the corresponding sponsoring regime.  The sectarian and 
secular/religious data was then collated and demonstrated by tables and pie charts.  
Where possible the information gathered on the militias has been collected from Arabic 
speaking analysts who have contact with those on the ground in Syria and Yemen and/or 
provide English translations of their work.  Open source intelligence platforms who rely on 
predominantly Arabic primary sources, such as Bellingcat, have also been used to make 
assessments regarding the militias in the sample. Other sources are typically based in the 
Western academic sphere or material from clearinghouses that translate literature from 
Islamic extremist groups and other Arabic sources into English.   
Another issue with the gathering of data regarding the militias is that civil wars are highly fluid. 
Given this some militias have disbanded, reformed, changed leadership and name, merged or 
switched umbrella group or sponsor.  This has been sorted out where possible but in some 
cases conflicting information has meant that a militia is included that may or may not have 
changed names or other alterations.  The number of these instances has been relatively few 
and not enough to affect the trends identified in the findings.  
Research Focus and Case Studies 
This research investigates the political survival strategies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and 
Qatar from the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings of 2011 to 2019 at the regional level. These case studies 
allow the role of religion and foreign policy to be considered insofar as the fall-out from the 
2011 ‘Arab Spring’ carried implications for the regimes' ideological underpinnings, political 
opponents, regional alignments, and winning coalitions. The post ‘Arab Spring’ responses of 
these states offer a useful test of the use of religion in foreign policy to secure regime survival 
and to shift regional allegiances.  There is also rich data related to the case studies chosen in 
this research. For example, despite the difficulty of gathering primary source information, the 
two civil wars examined in Chapters 5 and 6 are heavily reported on, and investigated by, 
those with access. Furthermore, the four states of interest are either major status quo (Saudi 
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Arabia and UAE) or revisionist (Qatar 24  and Iran) players in the Middle Eastern security 
complex and religion is active within their foreign policies. The theoretical importance of 
these states is also evident in the strong domestic and regional sectarian based alliances that 
they maintain, and the character of Sunni-Shi’i relations internally. All these states, to varying 
degrees, harbour considerable suspicion of their minority Shia populations or in the case of 
Iran, minority sectarian groups such as the Sunni. For instance, in 2019 33 activists, all Shia, 
were executed by the Saudi regime, in what was seen as an effort to repress minority dissent 
against the regime (Dadouch, 2020).  Additionally, at times the UAE has deported non-citizen 
Shia out of suspicion of support for Iran and Iranian allies (Katzman, 2020). They also extend 
this suspicion into the regional sphere, tending as a rule, and again to varying degrees, 
particularly in the case of Qatar, to favour alliances with transnational groups, states or 
movements that consist of the same sectarian group as themselves. Nevertheless, given these 
alignments are essentially strategic in nature there are variations to this sectarian pattern 
where the opportunity presents itself, for instance Iran’s alliance with Sunni Hamas and some 
Lebanese Christian groups. However, these variations are not as common as alliances with 
groups of the same sectarian identity. Within their sectarian group, they tend to favour 
alliances with groups that have the same secular-fundamentalist rating as themselves.  For 
instance, in a display of sectarian unity and out-group distrust, developments since the 1979 
Iranian revolution spurred Sunni fears of Shia Islamists driving to install similar theocracies, 
leading to the declaration from the Jordanian King in 2005 that the region was under threat 
from a “Shia crescent” led by Iran (Black, 2007).  The four countries vary in their approach to 
religion-state relations, with the UAE a relatively secular state, towards Iran, the Shia 
theocracy. They are all considerably closed political systems, and with the exception of Iran, 
the three Gulf States are all monarchies. All four states have strong religious narratives and a 
religious identity, and engage with religious issues and with co-religious communities 
internationally. The differences in relationship between religion and the state among the case 
studies allows for the comparison between the mechanisms connecting religion-state 
connections and foreign militia sponsorship.  Thus this research studies the relationship 
                                                          
24 As a radical revisionist as opposed to a revolutionary revisionist, Qatar’s revisionist aspirations are 
considerably more restrained than Iran; i.e. some resistance to Saudi Arabia as the regional hegemon, and an 
acceptance of Islamism outside of monarchy. 
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between varieties of secularism (Qatar and the UA E) and fundamentalism (Iran and Saudi 
Arabia) on patterns of foreign militia sponsorship in the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars.  
An additional observation needs to be made regarding these case studies.  As noted, this 
research adopts Bagherpour’s position which asserts that;  
Power is gained and maintained not just from economic benefits but also by appeasement of 
the rising religious preferences within the Middle East North Africa selectorates. The countries 
that are least prone to collapse are predicted to be those who have religious elements within 
their winning coalitions. Those leaders which have largely ignored the rising religious tides in 
their countries have suffered at their own peril (Bagherpour, 2012, p. 77).  
Even the new Egyptian President, despite assuming power through the removal of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, has increasingly used religion to bolster his legitimacy, “calling publicly for a 
“religious revolution” to help combat extremism”, whilst shutting down religious entities that 
do not support his leadership or his version of a controllable religion (Walsh, 2016, p. 1).  This 
strategy is similar to that used by Assad in Syria. 
This research employs the case study method which has “considerable advantages in studying 
complex phenomena” (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 171).  As Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman 
state, “many puzzles in IR [are] difficult to model formally and to test statistically” (Bennett & 
Elman, 2007, p. 171): the Middle East is a particularly complex region, with high levels of 
conflict, sectarian contests, oil resources and foreign power involvement.  The focus of this 
research, religion, is difficult to quantify given it is an ideational concept, heavily dependent 
on identity, narrative, sectarian solidarity and in-group/out-group dynamics; all of which are 
difficult to measure statistically as political strategy. This means that this research is focused 
instead on investigating through the use of emerging theories on religion and politics. The 
case study states were chosen for a specific set of criteria that relate to its search into the use 
of religion in two sets of strategies; within the secular-religious contest and within sectarian 
dynamics.  The four states considered in the case studies emerged as some of the most stable 
in the Middle East following the ‘Arab Spring’, at least in part due to their extensive use of 
domestic religious policy, albeit alongside other authoritarian survival strategies. Given this, 
it is assumed that religion is used in their regional strategies as well. Additionally, these states 
feature Islam heavily in their idea of the state – both Saudi Arabia and Iran are Islamist regimes 
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for instance – and both have intervened in the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars in the aftermath 
of the ‘Arab Spring’ which is examined in Chapters 5 and 6. Yemen and Syria are/were 
autocratic, politically secular regimes. In contrast, the four case studies are comparatively 
more Islamist, although Qatar and the UAE have some elements of political secularism. The 
case studies’ high levels of political Islam, in contrast to the secular states where their foreign 
policy is studied, is a useful dynamic for this research given that it helps to highlight the testing 
of Fox’s variable; that is, secularism versus religiosity in the political sphere.  
In order to guide this research and connect it to the strategic use of religion in the regional 
sphere, existing theories that seek to explain the use of religion domestically are adapted to 
fit this purpose. As Walt and Mearsheimer state, “the creation and refinement of theory” 
(Mersheimer & Walt, 2013, p. 429) is the most important focus of social science. Therefore, 
this research aims to closely link theory and method and, as such, the method applies the 
theoretical pillars in order to see if observable relationships are discovered between regional 
strategies and religion. The theoretical pillars of this research are grounded in relatively new 
theories; as such, if the assertions of these theories bear out in this research their 
explanations will be strengthened. The information gathered in accordance with the 
theoretical framework will be assessed to see if there is an observable relationship between 
religion and religious identity and the strategies employed by the case study states in their 
interventions in Syria and Yemen. The links between the research on the use of religion as a 











Table 2.5. Theoretical Framework 
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 




Selectorate Theory The state’s ultimate aim is survival, 
primarily achieved through dividends 
to supporting selectorates. 
Relationship between religion 
and religious identity groups 
and the winning coalition. 
Establishes the relationship 
between the regimes and 
foreign militias along the lines 
of their secular-fundamentalist 
position.  
Buzan’s Idea of the 
State 
Religion as idea, identity and 
legitimacy. 
Relationship between a state’s 
religious narratives and the 





The political use of this ongoing social 
dynamic. 
Relationship between a state’s 
rating on the secular-
fundamentalist scale and the 
rating of sponsored militias in 
Syria and Yemen. 
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
States seeking to advance domestic 
identity projects through regional 
strategies. 
Relationship between domestic 
identity aims and support for 






Religion and the marginalising of 
political opponents through regulation 
and repression. 
Relationships between the 
suppression of domestic 
political opponents, 
transnational Islam and militia 
groups in Syria and Yemen. 
Conclusion 
Given IR theory has largely accepted the key insight of Secularization Theory - that as 
modernisation spread, religion’s political importance would correspondingly shrink - religion 
has not been adequately incorporated into this research field.  The part of IR literature that is 
interested in religion’s implications for politics has since moved on from the basic, and 
erroneous, assumption at the heart of Secularisation Theory. Post-Secular Theory supports 
the idea that whilst secularization did take place in Europe, religion has remained prominent 
in the rest of the world, continuing to effect both society and politics. As the international 
system appears to be moving from unipolarity towards multipolarity, regional systems are 
going to have an increasing impact on the interactions of the largely secular international 
system. This research tests the extent to which regional systems feature the political use of 
religion. In order to test the use of religion in regional systems, this research adopts a 
framework that extends theories about domestic political behaviour that explain that 
religious strategies are aimed at political survival and power. Focusing on regime survival and 
the quest for power, the actions of the four case study states are assessed in the Middle East 
to see if these dynamics exist in the regional sphere as well. This research hypothesises that 
religion is used regionally as an extension of domestic regime survival strategies and that 
cynical identity politics at the domestic level is linked to regional hegemonic contests. 
This chapter makes the case that religion is relevant to International Relations, and outlines 
the theoretical framework for researching religion in regional politics. This consisted of 
identifying theories that helped to analyse the intersection between domestic politics and 
religion. These theories were then adapted to fit international relations, specifically within 
the regional sphere.  In the following chapters, research is conducted into the sponsorship of 
militias by the case study states in Yemen and Syria through the lens of religion as instrument 
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and motivation. The information gathered will be assessed using the theoretical pillars in 
order to test for the extension of the domestic religious strategies for political survival into 
regional politics.  Before this takes place, the next chapter examines the specific domestic 
religious strategies used by the case study states in preparation for testing for their use within 








Chapter Three: Secular-Religious Competition and Religious Identity 
in Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
The aim of this chapter is to lay out the domestic strategies that involve religion for regime 
survival in the case studies. In particular, it focuses on the way in which sectarian solidarity 
and the secular-religious contest are used strategically by politicians. The previous chapter 
outlined the theoretical pillars of this research: Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition 
Perspective, Selectorate Theory, Feuer’s observations on the relationship between religious 
regulation and domestic opposition, Buzan’s idea of the state, and Identity Hegemony 
Theory25. In this chapter, these theories are applied to the case study states as a framework 
for discovering the domestic mechanisms of religion and politics. The emphasis is on 
identifying patterns and strategies, with the state as the focal unit. There is an overall focus 
on the strategic use of the ongoing competition between secularism and religion, and 
patterns of sectarian support. This chapter lays the groundwork for applying the theoretical 
framework in later chapters by establishing how sectarian solidarity and the contest between 
secularism and religion are used as regime survival strategies at the domestic level in the case 
study states. These strategies are then isolated for use in later chapters. These strategies 
coalesce around Gerschewski’s three pillars of authoritarian stability: legitimation, repression 
and co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 13). Shekl and Gareev, through following the 
fundamentals of Selectorate Theory, created the table below to demonstrate the principal 






                                                          
25 Identity Hegemony Theory is included in the final section of this chapter but not in the body of the text as it 
relates to the regional sphere.   
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Table 3.1. Derived from Shkel and Gareev’s The functions of the three strategies of 
authoritarian government in regards to principal political actors 
Strategies                                            Actors 
 Insiders Outsiders 
Co-optation Extend dividends: 
material, political, 
religious and societal 
(status). 
Marginalise and frame as a threat to stability.  
Repression Enforce a high price for 
organising against the 
regime, monitor 
closely. 
High price for organising against the regime and 
framed as threat to main supporters of regime. 
Legitimation Maintain loyalty given 
lack of alternatives, 
religious legitimacy. 
Marginalise or eliminate any leadership so no 
alternative leadership available. 
 (Shkel & Gareev, 2015, p. 206) 
Drawing from this, the survival strategies regimes use at the domestic level which are 
structured around religion are shown in figure 3.2. below. 























As Røbæk observes “political rulers who rely on exclusivist governance structures have 
incentives to exploit available identity divides to stengthen their hold on power when faced 
with popular unrest such as that seen during the Arab uprisings” (Røbæk, 2019, p. 25). In the 
Middle East the predominant identity marker is based on religion, with Røbæk’s research 
presenting descriptive statistics that show that the Middle East is the only region in the world 
where this is the case and that in the Middle East people are more likely to be excluded from 
politics based on religious affiliation than other developing regions (Røbæk, 2019, p. 23). This 
finding is supported by research by N. Bormann, M. Vogt and L. Cederman, who found that 
“ethnic exclusion and discrimination are highest in the Arab world” (Bormann, Vogt, & 
Cedermann, 2012, p. 5). Therefore, co-optation patterns of political inclusion and exclusion 
are insitutionalised along religious and sectarian lines. However, it is important to recognise 
that exclusion and inclusion from politics is also driven by other factors in the Middle East, 
such as material and social-institutional factors including the development of a new crony 
capitalist/state arrangments, material co-optation, tribal and clan connections, uneven 
economic development and environmental impacts exacerbating existing inequalities, for 
instance the drought in Syria between 2004-2008 (Abboud, 2019; Josua, 2016; Josua, Co-
optation Reconsidered: Authoritarian Regime Legitimation Strategies in the Jordanian "Arab 
Spring", 2016; Richani, 2018). Maria Josua argues that “mechanisms of institutional-structural 
and material co-optation” is complemented by “traditional and identity related co-optation” 
which accounts for the “context-specific dynamics especially in Arab monarchies” (Josua, Co-
optation Reconsidered: Authoritarian Regime Legitimation Strategies in the Jordanian "Arab 
Spring", 2016, p. 32). This research focuses on the engineering of identity related co-optation, 
specifically religious divides, for the purposes of authoritarian survival.  This is demonstrated 
through Selectorate Theory, which focuses on the inclusion of important groups into the 
regime’s support base, in this chapter.   
The thesis accepts a Machiavellian view of religion and politics. On the one hand, while it 
accepts that religion can be an interest, it mainly focuses on the use of religion as a means 
rather than an end. It is assumed that acquiring and strengthening power is the key focus of 
political actors, a viewpoint strongly reflected in De Mesquito and Smith’s Selectorate Theory. 
Whilst accepting the idea that Muslim leaders may genuinely have religious motivations, it 
shares the position, articulated by Machiavelli that “the supremacy of political power over 
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religious principles [occurs] in political decisions” (Ali, 2015, p. 246). In order to describe the 
relationship between religion and secularism in Qatar and the UAE, a term is borrowed from 
Ghobadzadeh’s research on Iran. He describes a specific cleric-driven Iranian discourse on 
secularism as ‘religious secularity’, which he outlines as a “position between top-down 
secularization and top-down Islamization” (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 14). Although 
Ghobadzadeh uses this term in relation to Iran, in this research this term is used to describe 
the discourse surrounding the growing evolution of a Middle Eastern model of secularism. 
One of the key difficulties that politicians must navigate in the Middle East is the unresolved 
issue of Islam’s relationship with the state (Hamid, 2017). Since the introduction of the 
Western derived state system in the Middle East after World War I, this question has 
remained unresolved; hence, the secularism v. Islamism divide and balance of influence 
between religion and state power is a central feature of Middle Eastern politics.  
The chapter is structured around the respective theories with each theory applied to the four 
case study states. The first section discusses Fox’s secularism-religion competitive perspective 
and identifies survival strategies using this dynamic. This is followed by de Mesquito and 
Smith’s Selectorate Theory and how religion impacts on Selectorate dynamics in the case 
study states. The third section outlines religion and the idea of the state and the fourth deals 
with the use of religious regulation to weaken domestic opposition. The final section isolates 
the strategies outlined in the chapter for application in subsequent chapters which show how 
religious strategies used domestically extend into the regional sphere. 
Alternative Explanations  
This thesis focuses on the contest between religion and secularism as an explanation for elite’ 
political choices in the MENA region with regards to regime survival strategies. However, it is 
important to establish that this explanation is crafted to sit alongside, not replace, existing 
explanations for regime decision making.  A key explanation for regime survival decision 
making is Rentier Theory. This theory argues that the wealthy MENA states extend rents, from 
oil and gas revenue, to their citizenry, whereby financial security decreases demands for 
political participation and increases acceptance of a trade-off between freedoms and security 
(Gengler, 2013, p. 3). However, Justin Gengler points out that Rentier Theory neglects to 
consider the non-material benefits that these states attempt to secure support from their 
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citizens with, such as attempts to secure legitimacy through emphasising the Muslim identity 
(Gengler, 2013, p. 5). This argument is picked up by Bagherpour who argues that in order for 
Selectorate Theory to apply in the Middle East it needs to include non-material dividends that 
are extended to citizenry in order to attempt to win and retain their political acquiescence 
(Bagherpour, 2012, pp. 77-79).  
Furthermore, distribution of financial resources within the Gulf MENA states is uneven, with 
political power and financial opportunity typically granted to those closest to the regimes. 
This is an example of crony capitalism, whereby the support of the winning coalition is secured 
by granting economic privileges to those that actively support the regime, creating a financial 
and political divide between insiders and outsiders (Malik, Atiyas, & Diwan, 2019, pp. 1-3). 
Additionally clientele and patronage networks “play an important role with respect to gaining 
access to material and immaterial goods and for the (re)distribution of private and public 
resources in everyday life” (De Elvira, Schwarz, & Weipert-Fenner, 2019, pp. 1-2). These 
networks are often based on tribal and agnatic structures. 
Rentier Monarchy, the outcome of a special combination of oil and tribalism, is also a hybrid 
of tradition and modernity virtually unique to the Middle East region. […] Large extended 
royal families substitute for the ruling parties of the republics and tribal networks are the 
equivalent of corporatist associations. The threat from the military that toppled many 
monarchies has been contained by keeping it small and/or recruited heavily from royal 
families and tribes rather than the urban middle class. All classes – bourgeoisies, middle 
classes, working classes – become dependent economically on the rentier state; and because 
the majority of those residents that do much of the work are not citizens entitled to state 
benefits, even the least of citizens has a stake in the system (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 383). 
Until the Arab Spring, Arab exceptionalism was a common explanation for the endurance of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East. It asserted that in contrast to global trends at the time, 
most states in the Middle East were not interested in democracy. This was frequently based 
on the acceptance of Rentier Theory; that citizens were content economically in many Middle 
Eastern countries so were less likely to resist the authoritarianism which was commonplace 
in the region (Hinnebusch, 2006, pp. 373-374). Explanations varied from Modernisation 
Theory’s emphasis on cultural factors to Democratisation Theory whereby Hinnebusch 
pointed out that the regimes reformed in ways that strengthened authoritarianism in reaction 
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to democratic pressures, rather than reforms that were progressing towards democracy 
(Hinnebusch, 2006, pp. 373-374). Further explanations sought to explain that the 
fragmentation of nations within the Middle East’s Western imposed borders was detrimental 
to the political mobilisation needed for citizens to pressure for democratic change given this 
weakened identification with the state (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 378).   
Regime Survival and the Secular-Religious Contest in the Middle East  
In the Middle East, discussion around divine versus popular sovereignty emerged following 
the death of the Prophet Mohammad in the seventh century CE. This developed from a rift in 
the faith community, which arose over who was to assume the mantle of leader in the place 
of the Prophet Mohammad.  Ghobadzadeh explains: 
When the Prophet died in 643 CE, Muslims were faced with two options to determine his 
successor. The majority of Muslims, the Sunnis, believed that governance was not a sacred 
matter and should be decided by Muslims, whose consent (baya’at) is the source of the ruler’s 
authority. The minority group, the Shi’s, contended that the ruler possesses divine right and 
that God had appointed the Prophet’s son in law Ali, as the rightful successor. Thus, in Shiite 
austere theology, popular sovereignty cannot constitute a basis for legitimacy (Ghobadzadeh, 
2014, p. 32). 
Shi’ite issues with popular sovereignty laid the groundwork for the Iranian theocracy’s claim 
to political legitimacy. Indeed, ongoing issues between popular and religious sovereignty form 
part of the continuing renegotiation between shifting varieties of secularism and Islamism 
which is a central feature of political contests in the Middle East. Thus, Fox’s assertion that 
secularism behaves as a rival political ideology to religion, is highly prevalent in this region.  
In order to measure the degree of religiosity and/or secularism of the case study states the 
secular-fundamentalist scale is used. However, it is important to make a distinction regarding 
the secular fundamentalist scale; it is predominantly a measure of the involvement of religion 
in politics. At the extreme ends of the scale, this is frequently tied to authoritarianism and 
highly repressive governance. However, this needs qualifying, as the scale is primarily a 
measure of governance as it relates to religion. As such, it is separate from measures of 
repression. Therefore, a state can be more religious in terms of the direct and formalised role 
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religion plays in politics but its domestic governance may be less repressive than states in 
which religion has more distance from government. 
Regime Survival and the Secular-Religious Contest in Iran 
An example of the vulnerability of regimes to disagreements within the secular-religious 
spectrum was evident in the revolution which overthrew the Iranian Pahlavi regime. “The 
authoritarian secularism of the Pahlavi regime triggered a revolution in 1979 that resulted in 
the establishment of an Islamic state” (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 4). The Shah held that secular 
officials should lead, therefore justifying his own power. On the eve of the revolution, 
Ayatollah Khomeini declared that Iran should be ruled not just by an ideologically Islamist 
regime, but by a clerical regime; one in which the clerics were the ruling class. Khomeini’s 
case was helped by public resentment of the secular superpowers, the US and the Soviet 
Union, against which he pitched the political power of Islam stating, just prior to the 
revolution that “we are fighting against international communism to the same degree we are 
fighting against the Western world” (Halliway, 1980). Analysing the Iranian revolution through 
Selectorate Theory, it appears that Iranian clerics recognised that they had enough support 
from within the selectorate to run an Islamist agenda.  Many of the groups vying for leadership 
of the revolution were secular; for example, the liberal constitutionists, the National Front, 
and Marxists like the Fedaian guerillas. This fed on, and into, broader regional dynamics of 
the time as a Shia religious revival was sweeping the region in response to suppression by 
Sunni regimes, Westernization and Western dominance. In this context, claiming leadership 
as God’s messenger was a potent argument and this assisted Khomeini’s drive to emerge as 
the figurehead of the revolution. This is in keeping with Feuer’s understanding that positions 
on religion reflect the domestic dynamics of political competition.   
The Iranian Islamic state is rated 9 (religious fundamentalism) on the Secular-Fundamentalist 
Scale26 featured in chapter one; it “believes that the leadership of the Shia clergy is divinely 
ordained and that political power rests with God, and not with the people” (Mohseni, 2016, 
p. 42).  However, within the regime, there are other factions: “the Republican, or 
comparatively more secular end of the scale, believes that power rests with the people and 
                                                          
26 See Appendix 11, Secular-Fundamentalist Ratings for Case Studies, page 338. 
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works to reform the Iranian system to make it more responsive to the populace” (Mohseni, 
2016, p. 42).  However, political opposition from outside the regime looks to discredit the 
regime’s Islamist structure. Thus, Daesh is being challenged by a “religious secularity 
discourse that strives to liberate religious experience from state intervention” (Ghobadzadeh, 
p.4). Given this theological discourse exists outside of the political sphere, it is able to avoid 
the ruling clergy’s repression (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 3). The two most significant political 
movements against the Islamic regime have been the reformist movement (1997-2005) and 
the Green movement (2009 onwards). Both of these political movements’ narratives included 
this religious discourse, offering an alternative understanding of Islamism than the Iranian 
regime’s velayat-e faqih. This religious secularity narrative opposes both “the politicization of 
Islam and authoritarian secularism” (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 6). Whereas Western secularism 
sought to emancipate politics from religion, in Iran the religious secularity discourse seeks to 
rescue religion from the corrupting influence of politics. The argument is that the formation 
of the Iranian Islamic state has demonstrated that using religion to govern transforms religion 
into a political instrument of the state (Ghobadzadeh, Religious Secularity: Shi'ite Repudiation 
of the Islamic State, 2014, p. 4.5).                                                                        
Additionally, religious reformist scholars argue that Islam is compatible with contemporary 
conventions such as “democracy, human rights, freedoms, and secularity” (Ghobadzadeh, 
2014, p. 4). They assert that religion is God-given and that as the religious experience is a 
private affair state domination of religious belief disrupts the traditions of Shi’a and their 
religious beliefs. As such, Islamist reformist scholars seek the emancipation of religion from 
the corrupting influence of the state (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 4). As Ghobadzadeh explains: 
“The formation of the Islamic state is claimed to have been inevitable in order to implement 
the socio-political dimensions of Islamic teachings. Politics, in this articulation, should be used 
to accomplish religious goals. However, the experience of the Islamic state in Iran has proved 
antithetical: religion has been employed as a tool to achieve political ambitions” 
(Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 27).                                                                                                                                                            
Religious secularity as a discourse is not confined to Iran. Ghobadzadeh points out that 
lowing the ‘Arab Spring’, which religious secularity has emerged as a growing discourse fol
have driven a surge in the questioning of both state dominated secularism, and of state 
. It appears the ‘Arab Street’ wants a new (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 10) dominated Islamism
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the region. The Iranian regime’s efforts to  arrangement regarding religion and secularism in
 ehcounter this narrative come under its general efforts to counter all forms of opposition. T
:religious secularist opposition to the regime thus face a number of challenges, including 
The biggest challenges include a strong clerical oligarchy with its own formidable 
military/security establishment; massive ideological apparatuses for indoctrination; and 
continued mass support of layers of society whose livelihood depends on mosques 
and bonyads (religious foundations) and who are ready at the polling booths, as well as in the 
suppressive arms of the regime against the opposition (Rahnema, 2011, p. 45). 
In sum, given the theocratic and authoritarian nature of the Iranian regime, which in some 
ways contradicts core tenets of Shia religious doctrine and custom, political opposition has 
developed around a religious secularity narrative that challenges Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih 
and seeks to sever the theological link between religion and politics in Iran.  In terms of regime 
survival, this represents a potential rift to the regime’s patterns of inclusion and exclusion as 
religious clerics are typically within the regime’s support base, however here the challenge to 
the regime’s religious legitimacy is coming from within the religious institutions.  
Regime Survival and the Secular-Religious Contest in Saudi Arabia 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia are the only Wahhabi states.  However, whilst Qatar has kept religious 
power in check, Saudi Arabia was forged on the back of the Wahhab reform movement and 
the political ambitions of the Saud family. Thus, Saudi Arabia is highly theocratic and is rated 
8 27  according to the Secular-Fundamentalist Scale 28 . Saudi Arabia seeks to maintain 
domestically the politically quietist strand of Salafism, Wahhabism. The ulama helps the 
regime in this task, with the Grand Mufti Abd al Aziz al Sheikh delegitimising the ‘Arab Spring’ 
protesters during 2011 by claiming that protesting was Un-Islamic (Roelants & Aarts, 2016, p. 
16).  
Since the ‘Arab Spring’, this arrangement between religious and political power has come 
under scrutiny from the al-Saud elite. In 2017, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman 
announced that Saudi Arabia would “return” to a “moderate Islam29  that is open to all 
                                                          
27 See Appendix 11, Secular-Fundamentalist Ratings for Case Studies, page 338. 
28 The Secular-Fundamentalist Scale is outlined in Chapter 2, page 49. 
29 In this research, moderate Islam is understood in relation to radical or extremist Islam, which has a strict 
radical interpretation of Islam and believes in the superiority of the Islamic faith, promoting the persecution or 
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religions”.  He continued, stating that Saudi Arabia would “eradicate promoters of extremist 
thoughts” and that the state was “returning to what we were before – a country of moderate 
Islam that is open to all religions and to the world” (Al Jazeera News, 2017). As a result of this 
strategic and somewhat disingenuous shift, the Saudi ulama have become concerned that 
members of the Saud royal family are working towards a greater separation of religion and 
state. In an illustration of these tensions, in 2013, Prince Mutaib, in the presence of the King, 
stated, “religion (should) not enter into politics.” In response, the Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh 
Abdul Aziz al-Taifi, warned that “whoever says there is no relationship between religion and 
politics worships two gods, one in the heavens and one on earth” (Dorsey,  2014).  For the 
regime, this emerging moderate narrative reduces the threat of both secular reformists and 
the extremists who the Saudi government can no longer completely outflank given the more 
fundamentalist example of DAESH.  
In contrast to the key assumption of Secularization theory, Saudi Arabia has moved towards 
modernism, albeit at a slower pace than the UAE and Qatar, but also retained a role for 
religion in its politics. This represents an attempt to broaden the base of support for the 
regime to include emerging influential groups, such as women and the large youth population 
for example. This cannot be done however, without lessening the power of the religious 
establishment. As the dominant faith in the state, Wahhabi Islam is supported by Saudi wealth 
and power (Rentz, 1969, pp. 274-277). Wahhabi conservatism rests in its drive to purify the 
Islamic community by returning to the ways of the Prophet and the first generations of 
Muslims, placing an emphasis on the literal interpretation of the Qu’ran and the Hadith 
(Alrebh, 2017, p. 278-279; (Rentz, 1969, p. 271). Conservatism in Saudi Arabia is well 
entrenched, therefore reducing the fundamentalism of the Saudi state risks disrupting the 
unifying force on which the state is built, including the patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
relative to the regime.  However, it appears that King Salman has calculated that the risks of 
societal stagnation and extremism are greater, and that strategic moves towards modernism 
and religious moderation are in order to co-opt new support groups, especially as the region’s 
                                                          
repression of alternative faiths, cultures and Islamic sects. Moderate Islam, in contrast, promotes the 
coexistence of Islam with other faiths and is thus pluralist in nature.  Moderate Islam supports the right of others 
to their own faith and does not impose its own beliefs or convictions onto others.  Moderate Islam accepts the 




youth bulge and their related under/unemployment helped drive the ‘Arab Spring’ across the 
region. Alternatively, perhaps, as part of his wider reshuffle of the political elite which began 
in 2018, he has decided to correspondingly reduce the power of the religious clerics.   
Regime Survival and the Secular-Religious Contest in the UAE 
The United Arab Emirates follows the Maliki School, which was established by Malik ibn Anas 
al-Asbahi in the eighth century on the Arabian Peninsula. The Maliki School is less 
conservative than the Wahhabism, scoring 6 on the Secular-Fundamentalist Scale 30 . It 
represents a form of religious secularism, and this is reflected in the UAE’s approach to 
religion and politics (Esposito, 2014).  The degree of secularism in the UAE is unrelated to its 
repressive with regards to religion, in fact Pew Research Forum findings have indicated that 
the UAE has relatively high governmental restrictions on religion and there is some 
governmental hostility towards minority religious groups (Pew Research Center, 2018).   
Recent developments in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar suggest a deliberate state-led shift 
towards limited political secularism, or at least towards moderate Islam. This ongoing shift is 
a counter-revolution tool to help consolidate state power following the challenges of the 
‘Arab Spring’.  (The National, 2017); (Athanasoulia, 2020); (Roberts D. , 2016); (Brignone, 
2018). However, Michele Brignone argues that whereas Qatar interprets Sunni Islam as a 
“political reading of Islam, based on criticism of the existing order and authoritarian regimes, 
that is attentive to social justice, that advocates for a project for the re-Islamisation of 
societies and establishment of ‘Islamic-democratic’ regimes”, the UAE is focusing on a move 
towards “an Islam that is focused on personal spirituality, is against violent interpretations, 
and which is present on the public scene but does not interfere with the political and 
economic choices of rulers” (Brignone, 2018, p. 3). Stella Athanasoulia argues that Prince 
Salman bin Muhammad is seeking to promote a move towards moderate Islam that is “more 
amenable to the renewed perceptions of the Saudi economic model and would voice no 
opposition to those reforms that seem too Western-like and risk alienating the society from 
its conservative norms” (Athanasoulia, 2020, p. 11).  The ‘Arab Spring’ provided an opening 
for Islamists, and saw the development of democratic religious secularism in Tunisia where 
                                                          
30 See Appendix 11, Secular-Fundamentalist Ratings for Case Studies, page 338 
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the Islamist political party Ennahda evolved into a self-described ‘Muslim-Democrat’ party 
(Ounissi, 2016). This Tunisian reconciliation of democracy, religion and limited secularism 
challenges the UAE’s efforts to tie religious secularity to monarchical autocratic governance.  
Given Michael D. Driessen’s research31 has argued that there is a regional preference for pious 
political leaders but not for clerical rulers, this could have implications for the Gulf regimes. 
Driessen outlines this finding: “[it] illustrates a broad, consistent preference for the indirect 
influence of religious values on politics and little support for direct forms of religious 
interference in politics” (Driessen, 2018). Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, have 
broadened their range of strategies including softening their Islamic ideology and increasingly 
embracing “norms related to human rights and democracy” (Volpi & Stein, 2015, p. 282). A 
new governing arrangement with Islam has evolved in Tunisia, where “the majority of 
Islamists do not support the idea of an ‘Islamic state’ that dominates (through outlawing) 
politics”, instead “supporting the idea of bringing Islam to the state, through democratic 
political means” (Donker, 2013, p. 221). This potentially represents a challenge to Emirati 
legitimacy, linking moderate Islam to the democratic model of transferring political power. 
The most significant threat to elites sometimes comes from those opponents that share their 
most salient idea, but link it to another concept. For an autocratic state that advocates for a 
more personal and less political Islam, the success of political Islam within a democratic 
system is an immediate threat to the dominance of the existing elite.  
The UAE ties moderate Islam to a form of secularism. However, secularism in the Middle East 
is not the same as secularism in the West. David Roberts, wrote in Foreign Affairs that: 
“Emirati decision-makers hold a deep belief in the importance of separation the church and 
the state in the Arab world” and that, “[f]or all the GCC states, religion represents an 
important dimension of governance” (Roberts D. B., 2016).  Roberts believes that while the 
UAE seeks to distinguish between politics and religion, it is able to emphasise the importance 
of Islam to the country with projects such as the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque (Roberts D. B., 
2016). Dr Alshateri, from the National Defence College in Abu Dhabi, argues that, “Gulf states 
without exception carry many religious functions. They oversee mosques and imams. The 
various governments of the Gulf include a mandatory subject of Islam in public and private 
                                                          




schools. The Islamic legal courts or Sharia Courts are part of state institutions and 
governments implement much of Sharia by the force of the law, especially, on family status 
matters” (Langton & Dajani, 2017).  This is explained further by Dr Mohamad Habash, 
associate professor of Islamic studies in Abu Dhabi: “Many of the existing UAE laws are civic 
or secular, but they do not contravene Islamic basic principles as defined by Islamic scholars”  
(Langton & Dajani, 2017). 
The UAE’s domestic situation enables it to pursue limited secularism or religious secularism. 
The political elite enjoy a significant level of charismatic legitimacy32, freeing them somewhat 
from the need to enlist further support through the ulama and religious networks (Christie, 
2010 , p. 29). Additionally, the state has considerable financial ability to secure political 
support (Christie, 2010, p. 209). Furthermore, clerics are ‘encouraged’ to speak solely on 
religious and theological matters, and to espouse involvement in politics or current affairs 
(Pinto, 2012, pp. 209-211).  In September 2015, for example, a popular Emirati Islamic Scholar, 
Sheikh Waseem Yousef, tweeted on August 18 that “all Muslim Sheikhs agreed that building 
temples for infidels is forbidden” (Roy, 2015). The tweet, released during the visit of the Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was seen to be criticising the UAE regime’s decision to allot 
land for the building of a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi. In response, Yousef’s primetime 
programme on Noor Dubai TV channel was axed and he was publically reprimanded by Dr 
Farouq Hamada, the religious advisor to the Crown Prince Court in Abu Dhabi, who stated, 
“the UAE has established policies for religious tolerance. […] Such divisive and radical ideas 
do not belong in the modern world” (Roy, 2015).  
Emirati moves towards secularism and moderate Islam are framed to weaken the state’s 
political opponents, particularly Islamists. The UAE regime believes that involving religion and 
clerics in state affairs encourages extremism and threatens regional stability (Partrick, 2017). 
The UAE’s Ambassador to New York described the UAE position as follows:  
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You’re talking to a country [the UAE] that favors the Western approach of separating religion 
from governance. And part of the reason the UAE has become what it is today is because we 
don’t inject Islam when we’re debating our economic policy; we don’t find a religious verse 
that helps guide our energy policy (Otaiba, 2017). 
Otaiba’s words followed a co-authored editorial titled ‘Extremism between Religion and 
State’, written in the state approved newspaper Al Ittihad a few days earlier. This article, 
written in Arabic, alleged that religion had been used as a political ideology, which is the 
founding basis of the Muslim Brotherhood. The editorial went on to state that the idea of a 
religious caliphate belongs to history and that the Middle East needs to move forward. It 
further described that the classical period33 of Islam was reworked to support the imperial 
projects of the Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman empires (Hasan, 2017). This is a clear 
refutation of a radical Islamist tactic; the use of Islam during the classical period to form a 
political ideology to structure modern states. 
However, despite strategically positioning itself as a tolerant and modern Muslim state and 
encouraging a personal spirituality that is present socially but does not challenge the State, 
the UAE faces opposition to its drive towards political secularism domestically. Data from a 
rare public poll shows that two-thirds of Emirati citizens disagree that “‘we should listen to 
those among us who are trying to interpret Islam in a more moderate, tolerant, and modern 
direction. Overall, then, Emiratis tend to be socially traditional and conservative politically, 
despite the glamour and glitz of downtown Abu Dhabi or Dubai” (Pollock, 2018).  However, 
the regime promotes moderate Islam, focusing on pragmatism in matters relating to religion, 
not absolutism (Pinto, 2012, pp. 209-211). Efforts to counter extremist Islam focus on building 
on moderating Islam in the UAE, and discrediting extremist voices. These efforts extend 
towards suppressing voices that counter the UAE’s efforts to establish religious secularism.   
Regime Survival and the Secular-Religious Contest in Qatar 
Qatar also mirrors this trend towards religious secularism, thus rating 6 on the Secular-
Fundamentalist scale34, encouraging a moderate separation of Mosque and State, whilst 
maintaining a strong Islamic presence in society. Despite sharing Wahhabism with Saudi 
                                                          
33 The classical period describes the first generation of Muslims who co-existed with the Prophet Muhammad. 
34 See Appendix 11, Secular-Fundamentalist Ratings for Case Studies, page 338. 
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Arabia, the Qatari treatment of religion is strikingly different.  This has become increasingly 
evident since Qatar sought integration into the global market. The political relationship 
between mosque and state is also different in Qatar. Whereas there is a mutual dependence 
between the ulama and the state in Saudi Arabia, Qatari politics has a more secular character. 
Qatar’s political elites have been able to maintain relative domestic independence from the 
religious scholar class due to the lack of an indigenous ulama (Baskan, 2011) meaning that 
there has been little domestic pressure from clerics to have a say in state matters. This ability 
to dominate the religious clerics, has meant that the political secular elites are able to hold 
power in Qatar and to introduce more progressive norms into society, particularly relating to 
women’s rights, education (Al-Muftah, 2017) and media (Seib, 2005).  
Religious power is also limited through the structure of the state’s political institutions. There 
is no equivalent to the Saudi religious office or title of Grand Mufti, both of which provide 
religious support, sometimes in the form of fatwas, for the Saudi state’s policies. Furthermore, 
in Qatar high profile religious scholars with enough stature to fill the role of religious political 
leadership are typically non-nationals, and thereby subject to visa sponsorship. As such, the 
state is able to monitor and regulate them with great efficiency (Birol Baskan, 2011). Muslim 
Brotherhood exiles from such states as Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Libya are not able to 
practise politics in Qatar. Although clerics such as the high profile Muslim Brotherhood-linked 
Yusuf Qaradawi have a good relationship with the state, religion and religious establishments 
are not generally players within domestic politics of Qatar, however Qaradawi is active in 
regional politics. 
The Qatari royal family belongs to the same tribe as al Wahhab, the founder of Saudi Arabia’s 
Wahhabism, the Banu Tamim tribe. Whilst this contributes to the Al Thani’s legitimacy, it also 
presents a potential risk as this could be an avenue for Saudi Arabian leverage over Qatar 
(Khlebnikov, 2015). The previous Emir Hamad al Thani’s communications director, reiterated 
that Qatar alone would direct religion within Qatar irrespective of that fact that the Wahhabi 
faith originated in Saudi Arabia, and despite Saudi pressure for Qatar to adhere to strict Saudi 
Wahhabi interpretations (Dorsey, 2013). There are long standing rumours that the Saudi 
government resisted the leadership of the previous Emir Hamid al Thani after he staged a 
peaceful coup against his father. Any moves that strengthen Saudi ties domestically, including 
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a close embracing of Saudi leadership of the Wahhabi school, could potentially provide 
openings for Saudi interference against the current branch of the royal family.  
In a continued effort for their shared Wahhabi religious tradition to not be a gateway for 
greater Saudi influence, Qatar’s religious scholars are sent to Egypt’s al Azhar University as 
opposed to Saudi religious institutions such as the Imam Mohammed Ibn Saud University in 
Riyadh.  Without native religious scholars, and with the Saudi scholars influence obstructed, 
the Al Thani’s are able to avoid enforcing the strict traditions of the Wahhabi school. The 
Qatari regime is thus able to pursue a greater separation of Mosque and State.  For instance, 
women are able to drive, non-Muslims can consume alcohol and Qatar sponsors Western arts 
such as the Tribeca Film Festival (Dorsey, 2014).  
Qatar perceives that the Saudi clergy’s role in policy making has prevented the Saudi regime 
from developing the flexibility to adapt as conditions change and thus Saudi Arabia has been 
unable to provide the region with visionary and effective leadership. Given the challenges to 
existing regimes and their claims to legitimate leadership as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’, Qatar 
sees Saudi Arabia’s political relationship with a conservative and restrictive ulama as outdated 
and uninspired (Dorsey, 2014). Qatar believes that the region needs to move forward, and 
move forward of its own accord, before it is pushed, if the present elites are to remain in 
power (Dorsey, 2014). The previous Emir, Hamad al Thani, has said that he believes that the 
region’s ‘Arab Street’ is inevitably going to demand democracy, and that when democratic 
elections take place, Islamist governments will come into power (Al-Thani, 2005).  
The Al Thani’s rely on a religious secularity strategy to help support their governance, 
whereby a strong public presence of religion is balanced by considerable power in the hands 
of the political elites.  Despite some separation of religion from politics, the Al Thani’s are 
highly religious and support select Sharia laws. They represent pious secular rulers who grant 
citizens material and religious rewards and retain the support of the highly religious Sunni 
population. 
Conclusion: Secular-Religious Competition Perspective  
Without having gone through the secularization process of the West, both Qatar and the UAE 
have managed to separate religion from politics to a significant degree, whilst resisting 
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secularization socially and culturally. The Qatari and Emirati experience refutes the 
assumptions of Secularisation Theory, proving that religion and the state can separate 
politically in the Middle East without religion becoming marginalised and whilst retaining an 
Arab Muslim state identity.  In contrast, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are more dependent on 
religion for legitimacy. With the exception of Qatar, however, the Gulf States and Iran face 
Islamist opposition that looks to differentiate their position from their regimes, either by 
aligning with democratic ideals and some form of religious secularism, or by expressing a 
more fundamentalist approach to Islamism. 
The Arab states have shown significantly different approaches to Islamism following the ‘Arab 
Spring’.  It appears that shifting the state’s position on the scale from religious towards 
religious secularism has emerged as a key tactic for negating Islamist opposition - this is 
particularly evident in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Alternatively, Qatar has openly supported 
transnational Islamists in order secure their cooperation with regime interests and to 
neutralise their appeal to citizens through preventing domestic Islamists from being able to 
present themselves as the more Islamist alternative to a religiously illegitimate regime. This 
split between the Qatari approach and the anti-Muslim Brotherhood counter-revolutionary 
tactics of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates has become so severe it has developed into a 
significant cleavage in the Gulf sub-complex. The intensity of this disagreement, which has 
shifted the patterns of enmity and amity in the Gulf, likely indicates how significant these 
regimes, or at least the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, view getting the position on the Secular-
Fundamentalist scale right for counter-revolution efforts and to help avoid future unrest. 
However, Iran does not appear to be seeking to renegotiate its position on the scale from 
fundamentalist to secular, which would be difficult for the regime to successfully carry out as 
their core legitimacy and idea of the state is firmly based on Shia fundamentalism. An attempt 
to shift a state’s core legitimacy could bring the whole structure down.  What is clear is that 
getting ‘right’ the state’s position within the ongoing societal tensions between secularism 
and fundamentalism is seen as closely tied to the ability of regimes to retain the support of 
their same-sect base.  
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Authoritarian Durability, Political Selectorates and the Secular-Religious Contest 
This section uses Selectorate Theory to indicate the strength of the links between religion and 
a state’s survivability. De Mesquito and Smith’s theory purports to explain how the support 
of the winning coalition in a polity is essential for regime survival; it follows that the groups 
within the real selectorate and the winning coalition get greater dividends from the regime in 
order to retain their support. Peter S. Henne’s research adds to this understanding. He 
concludes that the strength of the ties between religion and the state is indicated by the 
presence of religious groups in the regime’s winning coalition 35 . The greater the state 
dependence on religion for survival, the greater the influence clerics and religious groups 
possess (Henne, 2013, p. 83).  This research uses this test to identify the presence of religious 
actors in the winning coalitions of the case study states. Sectarian groups are also positioned 
in the selectorates. This research additionally incorporates Bagherpour’s assertion that the 
dividends received by the real selectorate and the winning coalition are not just material; they 
can be religious dividends, for example. Additional research by Michael D. Driessen supports 
Bagherpour’s claim, indicating that displays of “religious favouritism increases support for 
publically pious religious candidates” (Driessen, 2018, p. 26), strengthening the idea that 
religious benefits can act as political dividends within the Middle East. Bagherpour argued 
that the degree of Islamism within regimes was indicative of their ability to survive the ‘Arab 
Spring’. As Figure 3.3 shows, support for Sharia law to be the legal system is fairly prominent 
across the Muslim world lending strength to this finding. 
                                                          
35 Henne’s measure also incorporates the type of regime as well, i.e. whether the regime leads a weak or 




Figure 3.3. Support for Sharia Law. Reprinted from The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and 
Society (Pew Research Center, 2013)36 
However, whilst this research explores religiosity and secularism as authoritarian survival 
strategies, it is important to avoid reductionist conclusions, particularly given that alongside 
religious co-optation strategies Saudi Arabia used material strategies such as increasing the 
allocation of rents in the face of the ‘Arab Spring’ for example. Bagherpour also failed to 
account for the sectarian arrangements of the regimes he surveyed. Bagherpour identifies 
that most of the regimes that fell or face serious revolutions were/are the more secular ones: 
Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. However, in terms of regime survival in the face of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, sectarian dynamics, alongside military, economic and political dynamics, 
have also emerged as an important indicator of stability in the face of unrest. Referring to the 
states that faced significant uprisings but survived (i.e. Syria and Bahrain), large numbers of 
the majority sect participated in the uprisings, specifically the sect to which the regime elites 
did not belong. The regimes of both states initially securitised sectarian divisions as a means 
of discrediting cross-sectarian unity against their rule, and this became part of their successful 
counter-revolutionary strategy, which also included foreign military intervention in both 
states, with the Peninsula Shield Forces clearing protests in Bahrain and the military support 
of Russia and Iran shoring up the Assad regime in Syria.  The regimes that have fallen, including 
                                                          
36 The Pew Research Center grants permission to publish their website content. A statement to this effect is 
available here: https://www.pewresearch.org/about/terms-and-conditions/ 
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Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Tunisia, all faced revolutions from within a cross-sectarian 
mobilisation or from the same sectarian group as the existing regime, meaning that dividing 
the protest movements along religious lines was difficult. Consequently, this research 
assumes that when designing a counter-revolution strategy following the ‘Arab Spring’, states 
were less concerned about sect driven uprisings from within marginalised sects, and more 
about uprisings that mobilised from within the same sectarian group as the ruling elites. In 
most Middle Eastern examples, the sect of the elite is the majority sect, excluding Syria and 
Bahrain. Additionally, the societal secular-religious contest was leveraged as a regime survival 
strategy.  For instance, following the 2013 coup which ousted the Muslim Brotherhood and 
installed President Abdel Fattah al Sisi, President Sisi has attempted to portray the 
Brotherhood as a religiously extreme terrorist group. However, religious co-optation is only 
one regime survival strategy. Nevertheless, shifts in the degree of secularism and Islamism, 
and the securitarisation of sectarian insecurity, have emerged as mechanisms within the 
counter-revolution effort.  
Given the relative importance of the degree of religiosity to regime survivability in the Middle 
East, not only does the state co-opt its own sectarian group with favouritism, it is logical to 
assume that the more a state relies on religion for legitimacy and for maintaining the support 
of its winning coalition, the more the state represses and monitors religion37. Pew Research 
Center data contained in Figure 3.4 indicates that the Middle East has significantly more 
restrictions on religion than other regions, indicating concern over maintaining same-sect 
support, mobilisation through religious networks and concern over sectarian mobilisation. 
The Pew Research Center’s 2018 data places Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria in the very high 
restrictions category with scores of 7.71, 8.3 and 7.31 respectively  (Pew Research Center, 
2018).  Given the reliance on religion for political survival, it would be expected that following 
the ‘Arab Spring’, Middle Eastern states adjusted governmental restrictions on religion as part 
of the counter- revolution effort. Figure 3.6 indicates that this is the case, with data 
concluding that governmental restrictions on religion rose in the Middle East following the 
‘Arab Spring’. In terms of applying Selectorate Theory, Amir Bagherpour argued that 
Selectorate Theory needed to be revised to account for the role of religion stating that 
                                                          




regimes that have survived the ‘Arab Spring’, such as Saudi Arabia, possessed “legitimacy 
derived from implicit approval of their Islamist allies” (Bagherpour, 2012, p. 2). This research 
therefore accounts for religion by including religious leadership as part of the winning 
coalition or essentials, given their support has proven to be essential for regime survival in 




















Table 3.4. Government Restrictions 2011: Comparing the Middle East and North Africa with 
the Rest of the World. Reprinted from The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society  










Table 3.5. Government Restrictions on Religion in the Middle East and North Africa before 
and after the Arab Spring. Reprinted from The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society    
(Pew Research Forum, 2013) 
 
 
The next sections itemise the support for the case study regimes by applying Selectorate 
Theory, thereby establishing the significance of sectarian and religious support necessary for 
their survivability.   
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Applying Selectorate Theory to the Case Study States 
Strategies for Maintaining Identity-based Real Selectorates: Iran 
 
Figure 3.6. Selectorate Structure of Iran. (Venn diagram created by author from assessments 
based on the research). 
Inputting the societal pillars of support for the Iranian regime into Selectorate Theory clearly 
establishes the sectarian basis of support for the regime. Iran’s real selectorate is made up of 
religious Shia, with the winning coalition of essential support made up of Shia who are either 
highly religious or at least outwardly support the theocratic basis of the regime, who are 
present in the business elite, religious establishment, and the upper echelons of the security 
apparatus. Given the degree of legitimacy and support the theocracy generates from Islam, 
religion is clearly an important mechanism for regime survival, however, as a Reuter’s 
investigation revealed, this exists alongside the material co-optation of religious elites 
(Steckow, Dehghanpisheh, & Torbati, 2013). Ghobadzadeh’s research on religious secularity 
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in Iran indicates the extent of control religion exerts over society when religious identity forms 
the cornerstone of the winning coalition.  He describes this below: 
The clergy’s role in Iran’s political sphere goes well beyond the positions mentioned 
specifically in the Constitution and other legislation. For example, a Friday Imam, a leader 
who possesses enormous power to influence local issues, is appointed for each and every city. 
Almost all state organizations include a cultural branch, which is generally led by a cleric. Every 
university has an office that represents the Supreme Leader, filled without exception by 
clerics. Furthermore, a set of religious courses designed by clerics are included in all university 
curricula, and all students, irrespective of their field of study, are expected to study them. 
Another institution led by the clergy is the Sazeman-e Aghidati Siyasi (Political and Ideological 
Organization), a powerful division within the armed forces, including the country’s army and 
the Islamic Revolution. The clergy is omnipresent in the country’s political mosaic. 
(Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 148). 
Shia are a clear majority in Iran, however, given Iran is a Shia theocracy, the religious dividends 
for religious Shia are considerable as indicated by data collected by the Pew Research Center.  
If we refer to Appendixes 1-4, which feature the Pew Research Center’s survey questions on 
Governmental Restrictions on Religion (GRI), the results indicate that privileges and 
government access is granted to Shia Muslims and/or that minorities are discriminated 
against. This backs up Baghourpour’s claim that dividends to government’s support base as 
outlined in Selectorate Theory includes both material and non-material benefits, and 
additionally supports Driessen’s assertion that religious favouritism encourages support for 
outwardly pious politicians. Whilst there are other dividends, such as financial benefits, 
religious favouritism is part of the bargain between the Iranian regime and its support base. 
Iran, however, also relies heavily on the security apparatus to enforce control.  As such, 
financial, religious and status privileges are granted to the security apparatus.  Through 
religion and the primacy of security for the maximal 38  Iranian regime, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has emerged as an essential part of the winning coalition 
and as such is given considerable resources and power.   
                                                          
38 Barry Buzan referes to maximal states as a state that is more responsive to the regime elites than its citizens. 
As such, they tend to have a disproportionate internal security apparatus as there is less reliance on 
harmonizing state and individual interests to maintain stability (Buzan, 2007, pp. 53-54).   
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The Iranian military consists of two parts: the regular military and the IRGC. The key difference 
between the two are their raison d’etre. The regular military is tasked with defending Iran’s 
territorial integrity. The IRGC, whilst it also works to defend Iran, is tasked with the defence 
of the Iranian theocratic regime. This task links the IRGC intricately with the theocratic elite, 
and this has enabled it to expand its influence beyond mere defence and into the “politics, 
economic, strategic and sociocultural arenas” (Ostovar, 2016, p. 5).  
The US sanctions regime enacted against Iran between 2006-2015 and again after 2018 to 
discourage efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, significantly enabled the IRGC to gain 
dominance over the Iranian economy.  The state, strapped for funds after being unable to 
trade internationally, turned to the IRGC in a move that “saved the country”. With the private 
sector only amounting to 20%, “the reality is that the Guards Corps are the locomotive for our 
economy” stated Bahman Esghi, Secretary General for the Tehran Chamber of Commerce 
(Erdbrink, 2017).  The IRGC has oversight of the powerful Basij militia and Quds Forces. The 
Quds Force is concerned with foreign interventions so is not described here, however, 
Ostovar outlines the civilian Basij’s function as follows: 
It pervades all levels of Iranian society through local chapters affiliated with schools (primary 
schools through to universities), factories, government offices, and mosques. Iran’s regime’s 
regime has encouraged the development of the militia as a means of creating an ideologically 
and religiously orthodox citizenry devoted to the leader and Iran’s theocratic system….the 
Basij functions primarily as a sociocultural organization. It provides instruction and sponsors 
religious orientated events meant to cultivate affection for Iran’s Islamic system, its social 
mores, and the supreme leader. It also acts as a security force involved in activities such as 
moral policing and counter protest operations (Ostovar, 2016, pp. 5-6). 
Belonging to the Basij provides considerable economic privileges that are not available to 
other citizens, such as employment preferences, welfare provisions and other material 
support.  
The ultimate goal of the Basij’s economic activities is different from that of the IRGC. While 
Basij commanders have benefited from the financial privileges of controlling companies, the 
Basij’s economic activities are less profit-centered and more oriented toward populism. The 
Basij’s entrepreneurships concentrated mainly in two different branches (the BCF and the 
CBO). Each of these clusters has a specific function, such as motivating enlistment in the Basij, 
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distributing propaganda through public services, and controlling the market (Golkar, 2011, p. 
637). 
Golkar describes how the IRGC-controlled Basij has become “one of the biggest economic 
networks in Iran, with influence in every sector of the economy from banking to construction, 
the retail sector to stocks, and import/export activity” (Golkar, 2011, p. 636).  The IRGC’s 
power and influence could reach a level that would make it a potential threat to the Iranian 
regime itself. As Svolik identifies, regimes face the danger of a military coup when the military 
has a high level of dominance over both the economy, foreign policy and domestic repression 
of dissent. The more indispensable the military is to the political regime, the more power it 
has to usurp the political elite’s power (Solvik, 2012, p. 127).   
The Iranian budget further reflects the prominence and influence of both religion and security.  
In 2017 the budgets showed the amounts allocated to the state’s religious institutions, 
military and paramilitary forces. Following protests in 2017 focused on economic issues, these 
figures were criticised by activists given the large IRGC budget and the increase in money 
allocated to Iran’s wealthy religious foundations (Cunningham & Mufson, 2018).  An example 
of such gains are the US$17 million allocated for the mausoleum and residence of Ayatollah 
Khomeinei in an effort to protect his ideological heritage. These foundations have other 
revenue streams, most significantly donations from the faithful. For instance, Astan-e Qods 
Razavi foundation, which controls a local Shi’ite shrine in the city of Mashhad, own 43% of 
the real estate in the city making it the biggest real estate owner. These budgetary gains 
indicate that “The theocratic regime of Iran considers such institutions vital for its survival. 
Through propaganda at the national and international level, they recruit and train new 
supporters for the regime” (Radio Farda, 2017).  Additionally, a Reuters investigation into the 
assets of the Supreme Leader and other regime elites revealed that Senior Ayatollah’s have 
huge business empires, with both real estate and industry ownership as well as investments 
(Steckow, Dehghanpisheh, & Torbati, 2013). 
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Strategies for Maintaining Identity based Real Selectorates: Saudi Arabia 
 
Figure 3.7. Selectorate Structure of Saudi Arabia.  (Venn diagram created by author from 
assessments based on the research). 
In Saudi Arabia, the Sunni Arabs and co-opted Shia make up the real selectorate, however the 
winning coalition consists of Sunni elites. Because the winning coalition includes the religious 
establishment, its support for the Saudi regime is essential. However, the factions that make 
up the regime only come from within the wealthy Saudi royal family. As de Mesquito and 
Smith describe, “dictators, monarchs, military junta leaders, and most CEOs all rely on a 
smaller set of essentials. It is more efficient for them to govern by spending a chunk of 
revenue to buy the loyalty of their coalition through private benefits[…] Thus small coalitions 
encourage stable, corrupt, private goods orientated regimes” (Smith & de Mesquito, 2011, 
pp. 11-12). 
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The GRI in Appendix 2 indicates that the Saudi regime favours Sunni Islam, thus granting 
religious privileges to its support base. As status and societal preference is granted on the 
basis of religious identity, the faithful are essentially tied to the regime as it is very difficult to 
leave their essentially captive sectarian group given conversion is prohibited. This also means 
that actively opposing the regime when a citizen belongs to the same sect as the elite can be 
framed as acting against the interests of your sectarian group. This cements in-group, out-
group competition as a highly significant political mechanism, and means that regimes can 
securitise sectarian dynamics to their advantage. In common with Iran, strict religious rules 
operate to discipline the citizens to the religious legitimacy of the Saudi regime. Appendix 2 
shows governmental restrictions on religion are very high, with Saudi Arabia rating 7.71 out 
of 10 as show in Table 3.5. Religious police, although their power has been restricted in recent 
years, operate to enforce religious norms.  There is a reason for this; alongside oil wealth, 
religion is the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s regional status and domestic legitimacy, and thus 
the regime must ensure that religion retains its dominance in society, and remains powerful 
as the creator and enforcer of societal norms.  
Strategies for Maintaining Identity based Real Selectorates: UAE 
 
Figure 3.9. Selectorate Structure of the UAE. (Venn diagram created by author from 
assessments based on the research). 
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Correlating the Pew Government restriction figures in Appendix 3 with the diagram 
demonstrating the selectorate structure of the UAE, we can see clear indications that Sunni 
Muslims receive non-material dividends that relate to their religion and religious identity 
within the UAE. Furthermore although the Emirates is less restrictive then Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, it still maintains a high level of control over religion, with an index figure of 5.53. If, as 
de Mesquito and Smith assert, states are predominantly preoccupied with survival, then this 
will be indicated in their treatment of religion – if religion is important to political survival 
than we expect to see both a high level of control and monitoring of religious identities and 
the distribution of religious dividends. Appendix 3 clearly shows that the UAE government 
favours one religious group: Sunni Muslims.  
Additionally, in common with Saudi Arabia, the UAE has co-opted the ulama into their service, 
with control of religion extending to directing the ulama’s narratives. The topics of sermons, 
for instance, must be approved by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. This 
means that sermons serve as strategic narratives in the interests of the state.  For example, 
in 2017 the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments released the text of the 
sermon for the coming Friday titled On Sectarianism.  This sermon asserted that “Islam is a 
religion that calls for respecting the humanity of mankind with no discrimination on basis of 
race or colour” (Al-Mujadila: 18) (General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, 
2017).  Sermons on national unity and opposing religious extremism are clearly in the 
interests of state stability and in keeping with the UAE’s promotion of moderate Islam. 
Another government sanctioned sermon worked towards state harmony and was titled Equity 
and Moderation in Islam:  Islam as the “Middle Path” (General Authority of Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments, 2011). Among the goals of the General Authority, as listed on the regime’s 
website, is to “instil the principle of moderation in Islam through religious guidance to achieve 
security and enhance religious awareness” (General Authority of Islamic Affairs and 
Endowments, 2010). The UAE’s less conservative Maliki theology enables it to criticise 
Islamism more directly and to soften its Islamic identity towards moderation, enabling the 
regime to discredit Islamist opponents. 
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Strategies for Maintaining Identity based Real Selectorates: Qatar 
 
Figure 3.9. Selectorate Structure of Qatar. (Venn diagram created by author from assessments 
based on the research). 
Through examination of the Pew Research Center’s investigation of the governmental 
restrictions on religion and on social hostility relating to religion which appears in Appendix 
4, it emerges that Qatar favours Islam above other religions. Conversions are restricted and 
the government highly regulates religious affairs, particularly of the preferred religion, Islam.  
Referring to Appendix 4, with the exception of GRI.Q.12, Qatar’s results are very similar to the 
UAE’s, showing a clear favouring of the Sunni sectarian group which is the most prominent in 
the real selectorate and the winning coalition. The favouring of this sectarian group over the 
others when it comes to religious matters, shows that in order to maintain regime strength 
the Qatari government grants both non-material, (i.e. religious benefits) and material benefits 
to this group. As Baghourpour has pointed out, religious populations expect religious 
concessions and privileges to secure their loyalty.  
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Conclusion: Strategies for Maintaining Identity Based Real Selectorates 
In keeping with the breakdowns demonstrated through applying Selectorate Theory, Justin 
Gengler outlines how a regime’s core constituency is typically from the same religious and 
ethnic group as the regime leaders (Gengler, 2017, p. 182).  According to Ethnic Conflict 
Theory, this strategy makes political sense as the dynamics inherent within identity groups 
are useful for managing loyalties within selectorates. For instance Social Identity Theory 
describes how identity groups have varying levels of in-group favouritism and out-group 
suspicion. Clearly, the Middle Eastern states are utilising this dynamic through their 
securitization of their minority groups; i.e. the Saudi leadership equated Shia protests with 
Iranian regional motivations in order to prevent the unrest they experienced during the local 
‘Arab Spring’ protests from unifying across sectarian lines.  
Applying Selectorate Theory clearly demonstrates which religious identity groups receive the 
greatest financial and social status dividends from the state. Effectively, Selectorate Theory 
demonstrates the sectarian hierarchy within the state. This hierarchy is evident when the 
results from the Pew Research Center’s GRI and Social Hostility Index (SHI) are applied against 
Selectorate Theory. Additionally, focusing on a select sectarian group reduces the size of the 
real selectorate, as does the political marginalisation of women – minority religions and 
women become politically irrelevant.  Therefore, as Albertsen and de Soya describe, the 
regime can focus on passing dividends to a smaller Real Selectorate and Winning Coalition, 
thus enabling the regime to “control people at minimum cost”, and retain the “ruler’s control 
over enormous wealth” generated from oil and gas (Albertsen & de Soya, 2018, pp. 256-257).  
The breakdown of a state’s selectorates demonstrates how political competition is structured 
within a state. It reveals which groups are marginalised and which are incorporated into the 
support base of the regime. Within a democracy such as the US selectorates are structured 
around competition between left and right through the agency of political parties. The Gulf 
monarchies do not have a democratic system, thus political parties cannot effectively 
compete amongst themselves through guaranteeing benefits to their voters/selectorates; 
thus, instead, political competition is fought through identity groups rather than political 
parties. An important dynamic to note in this instance is that citizens cannot easily leave a 
sectarian group, unlike a political party. Therefore, the importance and permanence of 
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sectarian identity makes it highly relevant politically in the Middle East.  Ethnic Conflict Theory 
explains the actions of this dynamic with ethno-sectarian groups ranked hierarchically in 
order of dominance from the ethnic elite towards subordinate and unranked ethnic groups, 
with identity groups seeking to advance their political and social power relative to other sects 
(Horowitz, 1985, pp. 22-23).  Therefore, uprisings and revolutions can be instigated by ethno-
sectarian groups wanting to force a redistribution of economic and political power (Horowitz, 
1985, pp. 83-84). However, whilst within the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ this was a significant 
driving factor in the Syrian, Yemeni and Bahrain uprisings, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya faced 
uprisings from within the same sectarian group as the regime elites. Looking at the results of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, whereby the successful revolutions came from same-sect uprisings against 
their regimes, we can conclude with some confidence that same-sect uprisings are the 
greatest domestic threat to regime survival. How well the regime addresses the dominant 
sect’s identity needs through the idea of the state has an impact on the strength of this 
group’s support for the regime, and thus affects regime survivability. This is discussed in the 
following section. 
The Idea of the State and Secular-Religious Competition 
Buzan has described state stability as being tied to having a strong and well accepted ‘idea of 
the state’, whilst Anne-Marie Slaughter explains that states need “an overarching national 
narrative” (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 3). This idea, or narrative, of the state 
is closely linked with legitimacy and the identity of the state. Within the Middle East 
legitimacy is closely tied to Islam, and state identity is tied to the hegemonic Muslim identity 
within each state. For instance, the Saudi state identity is linked to the dominant identity, i.e. 
Sunni Islam, specifically Wahhabi Islam. Furthermore, research by Feuer and Bagherpour 
showed that not only was it important for regime survival in the face of the ‘Arab Spring’ to 
have Islam heavily featured as the idea of the state but furthermore rulers were judged by 
the degree to which they adhere to their chosen ideological preference (Feuer, 2014) 
(Bagherpour, 2012, p. 77). Bagherpour established that the Islamist regimes survived the 
‘Arab Spring’ intact, whilst the more secular regimes, or in the case of Yemen, confused, 
regimes faced difficulties.  However, of the regimes that survived considerable uprisings such 
as Syria and Bahrain, the uprisings were led primarily by a competing sectarian group.  Of the 
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regimes that fell during the ‘Arab Spring’, the uprisings came from within the regime’s own 
sectarian group.  The regime survival tactics as they relate to the dominant religious identity 
group contain a focus on the state’s position on the secular-fundamentalist scale, and 
understandings about religion and governance.  The idea of the state plays heavily into this 
dynamic and as will be apparent for each case study state.  
The case study states in question use religion as the identity/idea of the state. Beyond the 
appeal of group bonds and in-group dynamics, Wedeen makes further observations about 
religion and political obedience in her book, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and 
Symbols in Contemporary Syria. She observes that the highly visible and ritualised daily 
displays of religion (calls to prayers five times a day, mosques, women’s dress, etc.) can act as 
a ‘disciplinary device” and that by “inundating daily life with [religious] symbolism, the 
regime[s] exercised a subtle yet effective, form of power” (Wedeen, 2002, p. 723). Ownership 
and control of religion and the linking of religious symbols with the regime elites through 
ritual, dress, mosque building and references in speeches, all work to strengthen the regime’s 
power by permeating religion’s power and influence over society. Religion is spiritually 
meaningful and, in religious societies, to challenge religion is highly risky as the Pew Research 
Center’s SHI demonstrates. As such, religion disciplines its faithful to obey its values and 
norms, or face social repercussions.  With regimes aligning themselves as the promoters and 
defenders of the faith, they are able to control and commandeer this obedience which often 
has large historical meaning and is a lifelong, if not generational, habit. Tying obedience to 
religious authority to political authority turns religion into a valuable strategic tool. Building 
an idea of the state that relates to the dominant religious identity is a key part of linking 
regimes to religion’s social power. Furthermore, Islam and Arab traditions both place a strong 
emphasis on the ‘virtues’ of obedience to leaders. Culturally, such social and religious norms 
strengthen autocratic leadership.   
Iran and the Idea of the State 
The Iranian idea of the state rests on the following key points: a Shia religious identity, 
guardianship of the Islamic jurists, leader of Shia solidarity, supporter of the oppressed and 
its religious moral superiority (Aarabi, 2019).  
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The current identity of the Iranian Islamic Republic emerged under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Khomeini who seized power during the 1979 revolution. To strengthen his regime’s religious 
and political legitimacy, Khomeini sought to recast the idea of political leadership in Shia 
theology. He asserted the right of clerics to rule through what he called the velayat-e faqih 
(rule of the Jurists). This form of governance rests on the notion of divine sovereignty. In 2009 
Ayatollah Khamanei described this as follows: 
All Muslims ought to obey the commands of the Valey-e Faquih (Supreme Leader) and submit 
themselves to his orders and prohibitions…Commitment to the Valey-e Faqih is not separated 
from commitment to Islam and guardianship of the infallible Imams  (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 
Pg. 30). 
In order to justify clerical leadership, Khomeini asserted that the Islamic Jurist-led government 
was the highest religious institution. He emphasised religious narratives in order to ensure 
regime survival, positioning cleric rulers as a branch of the Prophet Mohammad’s 
guardianship (Ghobadzadeh, 2019). He is quoted supporting this idea below: 
A government which is a branch of the Prophet Mohammad’s absolute guardianship is one of 
the primary Islamic precepts and takes priority over all subsidiary precepts, even over praying, 
fasting and pilgrimage…if necessary, [a] governor can close or destroy mosques 
(Ghobadzadeh, 2019). 
Thus, the legitimacy of the state is claimed to be given by God – essentially the Iranian regime 
uses Islam as an “authoritarian legitimation strategy” (Lorch, 2019, p. 263).  This discourse 
between divine versus popular sovereignty is the initial basis of the Shia-Sunni division and 
can be traced back to the death of the Prophet Mohammad. Ghobadzadeh outlines that 
whereas the Sunni decided that governance was not a religious concern and that rulers should 
be chosen by the people, the Shia believed that the “ruler possesses divine right” and that 
God had chosen the Prophet’s son-in-law as his successor.  Therefore, in fundamental Shi’ite 
theology, popular sovereignty is not the basis of legitimacy (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 3&4 of 
Chapter One). The religious claims of an Iranian state are crystallized into three forms: (a) 
claim of divine foundation for the state, (b) conflation of religion and state, and (c) the 
exclusive right of the clergy to political leadership”  (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 17 of 
Introduction). In order to de-legitimize the Iranian state, religious scholars are challenging this 
idea of divine sovereignty (Ghobadzadeh, 2014, p. 11 of Chapter 1). To counter opposition 
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narratives, the regime attempts to raise the idea that, given the state is the highest religious 
institution, to challenge the state is to attack religion.  
The Iranian idea of the state positions the state as leader of the region’s Shia. This enables 
the state to leverage influence from the strength of Shia sectarian solidarity. As Gengler 
describes, the historical narrative of Shi’ism is one of struggle and self-sacrifice in the face of 
more powerful, but corrupt, political and religious oppressors (Gengler, 2011, p. 336). Iran 
seeks to locate itself within this narrative as the defender of the oppressed, drawing strength 
from the narrative’s historical relevance. Domestically, this narrative is mirrored by Iran’s 
perception of itself as surrounded and targeted by enemies – the Sunni states, Israel and the 
US.  Discourse around defending the oppressed has a relevance outside of the Shia sphere 
with the Muslims identifying with the oppression of Palestinians by Israel which Iran looks to 
exploit. However, since the 2011 Arab protests and uprisings, the narrative around oppression 
has become linked to the Arab citizens in their struggle against corrupt and autocratic leaders. 
As a consequence, Iran’s support for the counter-revolution in Syria against the Assad regime 
has damaged Iran’s ability to cast itself as the supporter of the oppressed  (Mansour, 2019).   
The domestic opposition would need to develop narratives that work to de-link the regime 
from religion in order to avoid the charge that its challenge to the state is a challenge against 
Islam.  This narrative is typically based on asserting a form of secularism that preserves the 
dominant role of Islam in society, described here as religious secularism. The Iranian regime 
relies on outbidding its domestic opponents on matters of religion. It remains to be seen 
whether religious secularity shifts the religious and political arena in Iran.  
Saudi Arabia and the Idea of the State 
Saudi legitimacy, like Iran’s legitimacy, rests heavily on its religious credentials. Saudi Arabia 
has considerable religious capital given the following factors: it is the custodian of the Holy 
sites of Islam in Mecca and Medina, the origin state of the Islamic faith, the birthplace of 
Mohammad and the regime is a combined historical project between the prominent Salafi 
theologian Muhammad Al Wahhab and the al-Saud family. Crown Prince Muhammad bin 
Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud’s statement outlining the Saudi regime’s Vision 2030 plan 




The first pillar of our vision is our status as the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds. We 
recognise that Allah the Almighty has bestowed on our lands a gift more precious than oil. 
Our Kingdom is the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, the most sacred sites on earth, and the 
direction of the Kaaba (Qibla) to which more than a billion Muslims turn at prayer.  […] All this 
comes from the directive of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin 
Abdulaziz Al-Saud, may Allah protect him… (Saudi Arabian Government, 2019). 
Given the conservatism of the Wahhabi faith and the spread of Salafi Islam across the region, 
in order to retain domestic legitimacy the Saud’s must outflank fundamentalist opposition 
figures. This had become challenging in the post-‘Arab Spring’ environment given that Islamist 
moderates and extremists have inserted themselves into the power vacuums and electoral 
processes that have developed across the region.  However, the worldwide condemnation 
and downfall of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State or ISIL) has discredited extreme Salafi 
Islam to Saudi Arabia’s advantage. To differentiate the Wahhabi faith from Islamic extremism 
and to delegitimise Islamic terrorism, Prince Muhammad bin Salman has worked to specify 
that the Saudi idea of the state is conservative, not extremist, Islam. 
The UAE and the Idea of the State 
The idea/identity of the Emirates is first and foremost a moderate Arab Sunni identity. 
However, one of the most significant challenges facing the UAE is how to sustain monarchical 
rule in the face of rapid modernization. The Western path to modernity outlined by 
Secularization Theory must be avoided if the state’s religious legitimacy is to remain valid. 
Vania Pinto states that increasing the profile of religion and culture in order to sustain the 
status quo – monarchical leadership - has been a significant part of the efforts to manage this 
within the UAE (Pinto, 2012, pp. 49 , 51).  
In another potential challenge to its religious culture, the UAE relies heavily on foreign 
nationals for labour (Snoj, 2015). Given the resulting high number of expatriates,39 Emiratis 
fear a loss of traditional culture and a weakening of religion. Therefore although the 
legitimacy of the Emirati regime is significantly grounded in its ability to provide the domestic 
conditions for generating wealth, it must also address the gap between the expatriates and 
their conservative citizens. Religion, Khaleeji culture and identity are the primary means 
                                                          
39 UAE citizens number only 11% of the total population, i.e. 1,084,764 of a total 9,577,000 (Snoj, 2013). 
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through which both the Qatari and Emirati regimes reassure their citizens that their traditions, 
and the hegemony of the Sunni Arab identity will not be overtaken by Western and other 
influences (Pugliese, 2011).   
Promoting moderate Islam as the idea of the state enables the regime to create the conditions 
necessary to both generate wealth (for which they need foreign labour) and to protect the 
Islamic identity. To help facilitate this, the regime has been working to incorporate an 
acceptance of religious pluralism into its version of moderate Islam (Samir, 2015). There are 
24 churches in the UAE, partially funded by local rulers. With Christian numbers in the UAE, 
including non-citizens, at 10 per cent, demographics and the UAE’s integration into global and 
Western economies makes it wise to facilitate the faith within the UAE provided it poses no 
threat to the dominance of the hegemonic Sunni Muslim identity.  Additionally, a new law 
passed in 2015 making it illegal to discriminate based on Islamic law, therefore calling 
someone else an ‘infidel’ is punishable by law, providing protection towards non-Muslims or 
heterodox Muslims. This anti-discrimination law reveals differences between the Middle East 
and North Africa region and the West. Whereas in the West much discrimination is racial, 
discrimination in the Middle East is first and foremost religious (Samir, 2015). Sheikh 
Maktoum, the Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE, outlines his reasons for the new 
law: 
The new law adds to our assets, the strength of our social fabric as well as the mechanisms of 
protecting our country and people from the plagues of fanaticism, discrimination and hate 
spread by extremist and terrorist ideologies and ignorance, in Arab and Muslim countries as 
well as across the globe (Maktoum, 2015). 
In 2016, the UAE created two new ministerial positions, the Minister of State for Happiness 
and the Minister of State for Tolerance. Sheikh Maktoum tweeted that it was hoped that the 
Minister of State for Tolerance would work towards establishing tolerance "as a fundamental 
value in UAE society". Given the growing stigma surrounding Salafi Islam, an Islamic identity 
that tilts towards political secularism and religious tolerance yields considerable ‘global 
capital’ (BBC, 2016) (United Arab Emirates Government, 2019).  
In a speech commemorating the UAE’s 44th national day in 2015, Sheikh Maktoum 
emphasised that they “have no alternative but to engage in a confrontation with those who 
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use religion to achieve goals that are not endorsed by the religion. Those who distorted our 
religion, more than the enemies of our religion ever could, have inflicted on all Muslims 
damages that are unprecedented in terms of scale, depth and consequences” (Maktoum, 
Sheikh 2015). In a region where leaders are beset by the threat from radical and political Islam, 
but where Islam remains the unifying and central idea, the UAE is attempting to shift the 
orientation of its own domestic Islam towards a moderate version that strengthens the state’s 
security. The Ambassador to the EU, Mohamed Issa Abushahab links moderate Islam and 
regime stability stating: “At a time when our societies are facing threats from outside and 
within, there is a growing recognition that tolerance and diversity is a powerful counter-
measure to extremism” (Abushahab, 2018).  Referring to the Pope’s visit which marked the 
UAE year of Tolerance in 2019, he described the UAE as “a hub in a volatile region, where 
cultural diversity is ingrained as part of our social fabric. The values of openness and tolerance 
are critical prerequisites for stability” (Abushahab, 2018). 
The UAE, alongside Chechnya and Egypt, are looking to develop a functional model of 
moderate Islam, one that possesses the Sufi orientation on personal spirituality rather than a 
political and social focus (Makahleh & Karasik, 2016). The emphasis on moderate Islam is not 
a move, though, towards Western style secularism with its removal of religion from both 
political and social spheres: such secularism would provide a political opportunity to Islamist 
opposition to the regime. Instead, the Emirati royal families have worked to stress the 
importance of religion in the Emirates, making mosques among the most prominent 
landmarks in the UAE as a means to boost the status of religion as a cultural and identity 
marker. For instance, the Awqaf Ministry constructed 54 new mosques in Al Ain city, bringing 
the total mosques built in 2016-2017 to 94 (Awqaf, 2017). This governmental support of 
mosques as identity markers helps to retain support from the Sunni Muslims that make up 
the real selectorate, and to outflank Islamists (Pinto, 2012, pp. 49, 52, 58-61). 
Qatar and the Idea of the State 
Qatar’s idea of the state and legitimacy is strongly linked to the Arab Muslim identity, 
therefore the hegemony of the Kahaleeji tribal identity over potential alternatives is 
important for the longevity of the regime. The brand of Islam promoted by the regime as the 
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idea of the state is Wahhabi Islam; however, the regime has worked to create a progressive 
model of the faith. 
Similar to the UAE, Qatar is dependent on expatriates to expand its labour force. The need to 
cater for these expatriates, and integrate into the Western dominated international economy, 
has shifted the regime’s calculations regarding religious pluralism. With Christians numbering 
approximately 100,000, making up 13% of the Qatari population40, Qatar opened its first 
church in 2013.  Reverend Bill Schwartz, of the Church of Epiphany in Qatar, thanked Qatari 
leaders and the Qatari people “who generously accept the principle that the large expatriate 
workforce in their country should be encouraged to follow their own religious heritage and 
traditions” (Davies, 2013).   
Although in comparison to other Middle Eastern states, Qatar is unusually open to European 
culture in the commercial sphere, following the ‘Arab Spring’, it became clear that Qatar still 
held the previous Emir’s belief that the ‘Arab Street’ preferred some form of Islamic 
governance (Al-Thani, 2005), with Qatar signalling the importance of the Arab Muslim identity 
(Anderson, 2016).  As such, the first challenge outlined in Qatar Vision, the mission statement 
of the Qatari government, is the challenge of modernisation and the preservation of traditions. 
This statement reads: 
Preservation of cultural traditions is a major challenge that confronts many societies in a 
rapidly globalizing and increasingly interconnected world. […] Moreover, the greater 
freedoms and wider choices that accompany economic and social progress pose a challenge 
to deep-rooted social values highly cherished by society. Yet it is possible to combine modern 
life with values and culture. […] Qatar’s National Vision responds to this challenge and seeks 
to connect and balance the old and the new (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 
2008). 
Within his speech inaugurating the 45th Advisory Council session, the Qatari Emir, Tamim al 
Thani, declared a continued commitment to “genuine Arab and Islamic values and traditions” 
(Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). In keeping with this, the regime has undertaken 
projects that emphasise the Arab Muslim identity; for instance the Museum of Islamic Art, 
which opened in 2008 and is highly publicised by the regime, features an unprecedented 
                                                          
40 This figure includes non-citizens.  
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display of Islamic art spanning the full 1400 years of the Muslim religion  (Museum of Islamic 
Art, 2017). Additionally, in 2013, Qatar’s Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs opened 25 new 
mosques leading up to the year’s Ramadan (Marhaba, 2014).  Qatari reactions to the blockade 
led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia have resulted in intensified efforts to develop both cultural 
capital and increased openness to the world.41 Proud of his independent stance, a cult of 
personality has developed around the Emir, and national pride is strong (Adams, 2016). This 
dynamic is also evident in Saudi Arabia and the UAE; all three Gulf States are increasingly 
seeking to strengthen their legitimacy through a militarised nationalism which links their 
Islamic and Arabic heritage with the military domain, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE linking 
their military intervention in Yemen to national pride (Ardemagni, 2020).  
Conclusion: Idea of the State  
Imad Mansour identifies that state building begins with ideas that are developed through 
narratives. All the case study states feature Islam and some degree of Islamism as one of their 
core ideas, if not, as is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the main idea of the state. Two 
forms of Islamist actors rose to prominence in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’. First, the 
democratic religious secularity of Muslim Brotherhood linked actors such as Ehnahda in 
Tunisia and, second, extremist actors such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq. These actors have 
differentiated their ideas around Islamism in relation to the existing regimes and as a result 
intensified the political salience of the secular-religious debate. Given the reliance on Islam 
as a pillar of the regimes, the outcome of this debate has important implications for the 
stability of the case study regimes. The states are attempting to outflank these emerging 
Islamist challenges. In the case of the UAE, the state is working to advance a state sponsored 
version of religious political secularism that serves the interests of the state elite (Fox & 
Tabory, 2008).   
The Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent, stand out as working to shift the idea of the 
state, probably in reaction to the Islamism within the ‘Arab Spring’.  The Emirates appears to 
be attempting to shift its idea of the state away from religion, possibly in order to reduce the 
                                                          
41 “Qatar has become the most open country in the Middle East and the 8th most open in the world in terms of 
visa facilitation according to The World Tourism Organization’s (UNWTO) recently updated visa openness 
rankings” (The Peninsula, 2018).  
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appeal of Islamism and to shift the regional norm away from religious involvement in 
governance, towards a more secular stance that stresses the primacy of secular, but pious 
politicians, over religion. As Tije H. Donker notes, the use of Islam as a political tool is not 
exclusive to Islamists (Donker & Nettertorm, 2017, p. 152).   This political action is described 
by Anne Marie Wainscott and Fox: “all states regulate religion”, (Fox & Tabory, 2008), “[S]ome 
states go a step further, [however], attempting to shape the content of citizen’s religious 
beliefs in-line with an official state sponsored theology” (Wainscott, 2018, p. 3). This 
regulation and construction of religion is a means of obstructing political opponents who 
pursue a religious agenda.  
Countering Political Opposition through the Secular-Religious Dynamic  
Feuer’s research focused on religious regulation and regime survival. She outlined how state 
regulation of religion is “also shaped by the form and tenor of the group(s) a regime perceives 
to be its most formidable political opponent(s). Specifically, the degree to which a regime's 
political opponents frame their demands and base their own legitimacy on religious grounds 
will color the state's regulation of religion” (Feuer, 2014). Taking its cue from Feuer’s findings, 
this section looks into the severity and key patterns of religious regulation used by Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Iran to suppress political opposition. It also investigates links 
between religious regulation and regime survival, referencing the Pew Research Center’s GRI 
and SHI data42, particularly as they relate to the sectarian blocs within the selectorates of the 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Qatar.   
The ‘Arab Spring’ has established collective action against the regime as the key threat to 
regime survival.  Social Movement Theory outlines three casual factors that lead to protest 
movements: political opportunity, mobilising structures and framing. Religion can play a part 
in mobilising uprisings, as collective action is typically mobilised through established social 
structures and communicated through existing social networks (Jackson, 2012, p. V & 4).  
Mosques and religious groups are able to form the structures, narratives and vehicles for 
mobilisation. Eghdamian and Hessler outline this below:  
                                                          
42 See Appendixes 1-8, page 320. 
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 Mosques not only served as sites from which protestors received their motivation, they also 
functioned as centres for protesters to prepare for demonstrations (Hessler 2011). Without 
mosques, political mobilisation during the Arab Spring would have been impossible. Beyond 
this ‘mosque to square’ narrative, ideological support for activists in the Arab Spring also lay 
in Islamic concepts and motives that had shaped the political landscape of the region for 
centuries (Eghdamian, 2014). 
The case study states also use religion’s existing social networks, narratives, moral status and 
social structures for political purposes, as is evident from the religious morality focus of Saudi 
Arabia’s religious police, which help establish the power of the regime through religious 
regulation. This is discussed further below. 
Regime Security, Political Opposition and Religious Regulation in Iran 
Minority Mobilisation 
In Iran, Shia make up 90-95% of the population and the Sunni 5-10%. The other minority 
groups make up 0.6% (World Population Review, 2019) and face marginalisation, particularly 
the Baha’i faith43. The Iranian regime engages in significant repression of its minority identity 
groups. Its repression index figure is in the very high category for the GRI ranking as is 
apparent in Appendix 1 and Appendix 5. Bozorgmehr reports that the regime works to keep 
the profile of Sunni Islam low; Sunni imams are appointed and vetted by the Shia regime and 
they are unable to run their own religious schools. They are also unable to build Sunni 
mosques in the capital and have to follow the Shia religious calendar (Bozorgmehr, 2015).  In 
2013 the UN Special Rapporteur also reported the persecution of minority religious groups 
stating: 
Reports from and interviews with members of the Bahai, Christian, and Sunni Muslim 
communities continue to portray a situation in which adherents of recognised and 
unrecognised religions face discrimination in law and/or in practice. This includes various 
levels of intimidation, arrest and detention. A number of interviewees maintained that they 
were repeatedly interrogated about their religious beliefs, and a majority of interviewees 
reported being charged with national security crimes and/or propaganda against the state for 
                                                          
43 It is likely that some of the persecution of Bahai’is relates to theology; the Bahai’is believe that prophets are 
relevant to a people, place and time, and that as such other prophets will and do follow Muhammad. 
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religious activities. Several interviewees reported that they were psychologically and 
physically tortured (Shaheed, 2013). 
Rehman adds to this, stating: “More broadly, the Special Rapporteur notes that reports of his 
predecessor have described how some ethnic minority groups in Iran constitute a 
disproportionately large percentage of persons executed or imprisoned” (Rehman, 2018).   
Cross-Sectarian or Same-sect Mobilisation? 
There have been five waves of unrest since 1979 in Iran, with three in the last decade and 
the most recent occurring in 2018. Iran uses the following methods to discourage cross-
sectarian or Shia based mobilisation against the regime: intelligence and surveillance 
(including the IRGC), operations against protest movements (involving the regular police, 
police special forces, the Basji, the IRGC and its Imam Ali Forces and Thar Allah44), the 
judiciary, media, plain clothes police forces and providing financial and logistical means, 
including steadily increasing budgets for security forces, and providing financial support for 
loyal groups (Veisi, 2018).    
The IRGC has grown to become one of the pillars of the regime, essential for its political 
survival. It positions itself as the guardians of the Islamic revolution and defends the Islamic 
system of governance seeing itself as involved in a cultural war against Western values, 
secularism and democracy. The citizen Basji works in society to develop proper citizens who 
are devout and support the Islamic velayat-e faqih system of government (Ostovar, 2016).  
The IRGC’s primary focus is clearly its military tasks. However, Ostovar identifies the IRGC as 
“a religious organisation” but goes on to argue that “religion is malleable. How it is 
emphasized, when it is evoked, and to what degree it shapes behaviour are all in part 
determined by political factors” (Ostovar, 2016, p. 237). This supports Feuer’s assertion that 
religion is regulated in accordance with the survival needs of the state (Feuer, 2014); religious 
regulations and religious narratives are designed to protect the regime. 
                                                          
44 Translates to ‘The Revenge of Allah’. 
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Regime Security, Political Opposition and Religious Regulation in Saudi Arabia 
Minority Mobilisation 
Appendices 2 and 8 indicate that there are very high levels of religious restrictions in Saudi 
Arabia with the state receiving a GRI score of 7.71. To limit the advancement of Shia, Shi’ites 
are banned from holding high status jobs and government positions.  Additionally social 
hostility against minority religions is high in Saudi Arabia, with the Pew Research Center 
reporting that religious groups have acted to prevent the operation of other religious groups. 
The Shia in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province are “treated as a security threat rather than a 
community to be integrated” (Strobl, 2017).  This securitization of the sectarian dynamic has 
its roots in the discourse of state linked takfiri45 Wahhabi clerics who declare the Shia are 
guilty of apostasy. This discourse has become deeply embedded in the identity of the Sunni 
elite and the regime (Strobl, 2017, p. 215). As Strobl notes, “what is notable is that Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia arrived at the institutionalization of their ongoing sectarian anxieties, and 
[have] found ways to build the existing Saudi hegemony and anti-Shia order” (Strobl, 2017, p. 
218).  
Cross-Sectarian or Same-sect Mobilisation? 
Faced with protests during the ‘Arab Spring’, the Saud regime drew on Wahhabi positions to 
discourage unity across sectarian, ideological and tribal lines and to counter the non-sectarian 
demands of the new activist groups such as the National Youth Movement. For instance, the 
protest entitled the ‘Day of Rage’ was described by the regime as a “Shia conspiracy” (Walther, 
2016, pp. 9-10). Iran was depicted as being the master mind behind protests in the Kingdom 
and the Saudi regime was further defended by co-opted Sunni clerics dutifully issuing fatwas 
declaring it was un-Islamic to protest (Burke, 2011). 
The Saudi state also faced opposition from Salafi dissidents who oppose westernisation and 
claim the Saud state is neglecting to sufficiently implement its sacred duty towards Islam, 
essentially questioning the Saudi state’s commitment to its core idea of itself as a 
                                                          
45 A Muslim who accuses another Muslim (or an adherent of another Abrahamic faith) of apostasy. The 
accusation itself is called takfir, derived from the word kafir (unbeliever), and is described as when ‘one who is 
a Muslim is declared impure’. 
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conservative Islamist state.  The Saudi leaders portray Saudi Arabia as “the purest model of 
the Islamic state, declaring it is modelled on the example of the Prophet Muhammad’s state 
in seventh century Arabia” (Bunzel, 2017, p. 241).  However, as Jasim Lorch identifies,  high 
levels of Islamism in the state may drive Islamist opposition to take increasingly radical 
stances in order to distinguish themselves (Lorch, 2019).   As such, ISIL and other extremist 
groups have mounted a counter claim that they represent the ‘purist’ example of the 
Prophet’s Islamic State. An added difficulty for the Saudi state is that whereas AQAP focused 
on the ‘far enemy’, Westerners and Western interests in the Middle East, ISIL has a distinctly 
anti-Shia, and anti-‘apostate’ focus. With the exception of Oman, the anti-Shia alignment in 
many ways ties in neatly with the Sunni Gulf States fears that the Middle East is in danger of 
domination from a Shia crescent led by Iran. ISIL outlines this narrative, declaring that  “the 
Shia aspire to a massive state in the shape of a crescent, stretching from Syria through Iraq 
down through eastern Arabia to Oman and Yemen, ultimately encompassing Islam’s holy 
places in the Hijaz”. It continues, “Shia of the Eastern Province are secretly loyal to Tehran 
and are readying to free themselves of the Sunni yoke when the time is right” (Bunzel, 2017, 
pp. 250-251).  ISIL used the regime’s securitization of the Shia issue to its advantage, criticizing 
the Saudi regime for failing to contain the Shia ‘threat’, stating, “The Al Salul will never protect 
you from the Rejectionists. Indeed, they have been unable to protect their artificial borders 
from the Houthi scum, so how will they protect you from the Rejectionists if they join together 
against you?” (Bunzel, 2017, p. 250).   
The anti-Shia outlook of the Wahhabi school has created additional problems for the Sauds in 
that it is difficult for their scholars to criticise ISIL in defence of the King (Bunzel, 2017, p. 251). 
Therefore, with extremism becoming a problem, in 2014 the late King Abdullah criticised the 
clerics for their reluctance to address Daesh, which in part is due to the Salafi clerics’ support 
for the rebels and the ‘jihad’ against the Syrian regime (Bunzel, 2017, p. 257). In 2001, after 
September 11, the King also called on his scholars to steer away from the dangers of 
“extremism”.  This move towards moderating Wahhabi Islam has been continued by Prince 
Muhammad bin Salman who declared in 2018 that Wahhabi Islam needed to correct its 
course and emphasising moderation. As he put it, “We are simply reverting to what we 
followed – a moderate Islam open to the world and all religions” (Bunzel, 2017, p. 258). 
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The dangers from Islamism are not only at the fundamentalist end of the scale. Saudi Arabia’s 
legitimacy is also threatened by the idea of a democratic Islamist country. As such, Saudi 
Arabia is wary of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly given the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
English language website indicates support for democracy (Ikhwan Web, 2014); (Ikhwan Web, 
2017). Through a hegemonic identity lens, a moderate democratic Sunni Islamist government 
may be able to challenge the al Saud’s claim to religious leadership of the Muslim world, 
hence the Saudi - Turkish hostility. It could also weaken the appeal of Saudi Arabia’s identity 
which features a strong commitment to its puritanical Islamist dogma and autocracy. This all 
means that Qatar’s erstwhile promotion of political activism, Islamic or otherwise, is viewed 
as a threat. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s social contract, which is similar to the approach taken 
by other Gulf States, is based on the combined financial benefits of no taxation and the 
provision of welfare in exchange for political rights46. Given it is extremely difficult to tackle 
the regime on the basis of economic provision, this requires domestic opposition to challenge 
it on positions regarding “culture, ideology and civic society” (Dorsey, 2013).  Thus, Qatar’s 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood, a political group that focuses on issues of religion and 
culture, is seen as a direct threat to the rest of the Gulf (Dorsey, 2013). 
Regime Security, Political Opposition and Religious Regulation in the UAE 
Minority Mobilisation 
Referring to Appendices 3 and 7, the UAE scored highly on the Pew Research Center’s index 
for governmental restrictions on religion, coming in at 5.53.  This lower score can be 
attributed to the UAE’s efforts to move towards greater secularism and pluralism. However, 
there is governmental hostility towards minority religious groups and a discriminatory 
practice of asking religious groups to register. Due to greater theological and cultural 
openness however, the SHI score of the UAE was comparatively lower than other Middle 
Eastern states.  
                                                          
46 This is described in rentier state thesis which claims that “economic satisfaction breeds political indifference 
in resource dependent states”.  This has since been qualified by Justin J. Gengler, who asserts that within 
Bahrain “the Sunni-Shia conflict disrupts the mechanism of the political buy-off available in Bahrain” (Gengler 
J. J., 2011, pp. 2-4). 
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Despite an initial rise in sectarianism following the ‘Arab Spring’ between Sunni headed states 
led by Saudi Arabia and mostly Shi’a regional alliance led by Iran, the UAE continues to have 
a relatively integrated Shi’a community. Like Omani Shi’a, Emirati Shi’a are financially 
integrated, with Shi’i families amongst the wealthiest in the state.  Nonetheless, the increase 
in sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi’a regionally has had an impact on the regime’s 
attitude towards Shi’a in the UAE.  There is greater wariness regarding Shi’i who follow Iranian 
imams for instance, and Iranian influence over UAE Shi’a is monitored closely  (Majidyar, 
2013). 
Unlike Saudi Arabian Shi’a, the UAE’s 10-15% Shi’i community are able to worship and 
congregate in their own mosques and husseiniyas47. Although these religious buildings are 
private property, governmental financial assistance is available for maintenance and building. 
Ironically, the Shi’a have more religious freedom then the Sunni, probably because Shi’i are 
not the winning coalition48 or even the real selectorate (Smith & de Mesquito, 2011, p. 5). 
Thus in contrast to the Sunni majority, Shi’i are able to choose their own mosque leaders and 
write their own sermons whereas the identity group on which the regime depends for 
continued legitimacy and support, the Sunni, are monitored more closely. However, there is 
an implicit assumption that these Shi’a sermons will not go against the interests of the state.   
Cross-Sectarian or Same-sect Mobilisation? 
Given Friday prayers and mosques became sites of revolutionary mobilisation during the 
‘Arab Spring’, religion has come under extra scrutiny in the Emirates. In a move designed to 
decrease the ability of same-sect opposition to organise through mosques - a common 
feature in the ‘Arab Spring’ - in 2018 the state passed the following laws, reducing the ability 
of mosques to act as sites of political mobilisation: 
The New law requires prior licensing of the following activities: 
1. Hosting lectures and sermons 
2. Organizing seminars within the mosques 
3. Conducting Quran memorization circles 
                                                          
47 Shi’ite congregation hall. 
48 Essential supporters without whom the leader/regime would be finished (Smith & de Mesquito, 2011, p. 5) 
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4. Collecting donations or other aid 
5. Assigning or appointing any person on a temporary  or permanent postion to hold or 
organise any religious or social events 
6. Distribute books, leaflets, video or audio recordings 
7. Bringing food to the mosques 
8. Belonging to any illegal group or carry out any political or organizational activities 
The following are prohibited: 
I. Mosque employees are prohibited from preaching, reciting or teaching religious 
lessons, or Quran memorization activities outside the mosques 
II. Involving oneself in entities authorized in participate in any media activities without 
prior permission 
III. Belonging to any illegal group or carry out any political or organizational activities (STA 
Law, 2018) 
It is likely, as Wainscott points out in relation to Morocco, that the rise of extremists has 
provided the UAE and the other case study states greater opportunity to regulate religion and 
therefore gain greater control of the state’s religious identity (Wainscott, 2018, p. 5).  
Additionally, with regards to the Sunni majority, the ‘Arab Spring’ has had a dramatic effect 
on Abu Dhabi’s calculations, resulting in a crackdown on Islamist groups both domestically 
and regionally (Roberts, 2016). The largest opposition group in the UAE is the Muslim 
Brotherhood linked Al-Islah. Al Islah’s platform includes emphasising moderate Islam, moral 
guidance and discouraging extremism. Its agenda includes an elected national assembly. Al-
Islah is the sister organisation to Ennahda which is an Islamist political party in democratic 
Tunisia, with whom the Emirati regime has a troubled relationship. In order to counter Al-
Islah’s appeal the state casts it as promoting an agenda that is counter to the UAE’s religious 
and cultural tolerance, a threat to political stability and a threat to the successful 
transformation of the Emirates from a tribal society into a wealthy modern state (Hakala, 
2012). The regime propagates a narrative that opposition figures and Islamists are extremist 
destabilising elements in society and/or foreign agents employed to disrupt the UAE. The 
Emirati regime has been conflating Islamists with highly publicised extremists across the 
region such as ISIL, and promoting its version of religious secularity as the antidote. The 
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Emirati US ambassador outlined this support for moderate Islam in an interview with The 
Atlantic, 
Sunni extremism comes from within. Sunni extremism attempts to hijack our religion and 
then use it for political reasons to gain power, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, like 
Hamas in Palestine. These groups hide behind religion but use religion for political purposes 
(Otaiba, 2017). 
Hundreds of al Islah members were arrested, the group was officially disbanded and the 
Muslim Brotherhood was labelled a terrorist group. Other civil society groups were disbanded 
or expelled as well, with some groups unrelated to Islamism, such as the Gulf Research Center, 
caught in the wide net cast by the government. Although the contagion of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
protests did not reach the UAE, the high visibility of regional Islamists within the aftermath of 
the uprisings - particularly within the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, Tunisia’s initial elections 
and Egypt’s revolution - intensified Abu Dhabi’s concern about Islamist groups. As such, the 
UAE’s domestic and foreign policy have since reflected an extreme distrust of Islamists  
(Roberts, 2016).  However, despite the regime’s best efforts, support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood remains persistent. Following a poll conducted in the UAE, David Pollack 
describes the situation as below: 
Fully one-third of the country’s Sunni citizens49  continue to have at least a “somewhat 
positive” attitude toward the Brotherhood. That number has not budged in the past three 
years, despite a vociferous and at times heavy-handed official campaign against the group 
(Pollock, 2018). 
Although the UAE is actively opposed to Islamism, and advocating for greater political 
secularity in the Middle East to push back against the rising influence of Islamists following 
the ‘Arab Spring’, it is also careful to emphasis its commitment to Islam. Abu Dhabi’s 
construction of a huge and enormously expensive mosque, the Sheikh Zayed Mosque, 
emphases this point. Islam the faith is firmly secured and supported within the UAE, in 
contrast to the political ideology of Islamism.   
                                                          
49 Sunni make up 90% of the total population. 
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Regime Security, Political Opposition and Religious Regulation in Qatar 
Minority Mobilisation 
Qatari Shia represent around 10% of the population (Pew Research Center, 2009) and, 
generally speaking, they are well integrated into society.  They tend to support the regime 
and are able to practise their religion with considerable freedom. They are present across 
most government departments and also have their own Shia family court system. Given the 
Shia are present in low numbers, plus the close relationship between the Qatari regime and 
the Shia merchant class, the Qatari regime are not significantly perturbed by Iranian attempts 
to influence Qatari Shia.  Of the two main regional Shia theological centers in Iran and Iraq, 
Qatar’s Shia tend to be followers of Iraq’s Najaf center lead by Ayatollah al Sistani who is 
comparatively moderate. Additionally, although they have religious networks linking them to 
Shia in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon, Qatari Shia do not typically maintain political connections 
outside of Qatar. Prior to the ‘Arab Spring’, the Emir of Qatar maintained relationships with 
Shia leaders, unlike other Gulf nations.  For instance, he discussed the Bahraini protests with 
Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al Sadr in 2011, and met with Iranian Ayatollah al Khamenei in 
Tehran in 2010. However, Qatar’s involvement with the Gulf military unit, the Gulf Peninsula 
Shield Force, and the suppression of the Shia led uprising in Bahrain in 2011, has complicated 
matters. Additionally, the rising sectarian tensions across the region have also impacted Qatar.  
In June 2013 Qatar deported Shia, in this case 18 Lebanese Shi’ites. This was due to concerns 
and anger regarding Hezbollah’s support for the Syrian regime and expanding Iranian 
influence (Majidyar, 2013).  
Cross-Sectarian or Same-sect Mobilisation? 
Like the UAE, Qatar does not allow the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists to operate 
domestically. However, Qatar has long served as a refuge for Islamist exiles fleeing from their 
home countries, with the proviso they do not attempt to engage in Qatari politics. Abdel 
Ghaffar Hussain describes in the Emirati paper Al Khaleej how in the 1950s and 1960s Muslim 
Brotherhood members sought refuge in Qatar. Among them was the high profile cleric Yusuf 
al Qaradawi, but also another prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Abdul 
Badi Saqr. Saqr became the advisor to the Qatari ruler and Director of the Qatar National 
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Library.  What this signifies is the high levels of contact with the regime that some Muslim 
Brotherhood members had at the time (Mubarak, 2013). However, despite this, the Qatari 
Muslim Brotherhood has struggled to gain ground domestically. Proselytization is difficult in 
Qatar, as the Wahhabi creed of Salafi Hanbali Islam is firmly entrenched and is at odds with 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s more moderate approach. Although the regime’s orientation and 
policies do not chime with a standard interpretation of the Wahhabi faith, the elites are not 
seeking to undermine its influence in the private sphere. Furthermore, Qatar provides limited 
opportunities for political influence by religious scholars, and this includes Muslim 
Brotherhood clerics.  As David Roberts states “Doha does not entertain the notion of religious 
influence on politics at the institutional level” (Roberts D. , 2014).  This has limited the political 
influence of both Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and Wahhabi clerics.  Furthermore, with the 
wealthy state adequately supporting local initiatives often undertaken by the Muslim 
Brotherhood elsewhere, i.e. running food banks and local sports clubs etc., there is limited 
opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood to insert their leaders into the mezzanine level of 
rule between the government and the people within Qatari society (Roberts D. , 2014, pp. 25-
26). Essentially, the internal structure of Qatari society means that political secularism is able 
to be established with greater ease then elsewhere in the Gulf. 
By remaining politically quietist within Qatar, the Brotherhood obtains a refuge and is able to 
use Qatar as a “launching pad for its expansion into the Emirates and especially Dubai” 
(Roberts D. , 2014). The Brotherhood also strengthens the regime’s legitimacy as it serves as 
evidence of the regime’s support for Islam. The regime is wary of increasing the profile of 
Wahhabism given Saudi Arabia is considered the custodian of the Wahhabi faith along with 
being the guardian of the two holiest sites. A high profile for Wahhabi Islam in Qatar could 
increase religious fidelity to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, instead, Qatar used the religious profile 
of the Muslim Brotherhood to increase its Islamic credentials, giving it greater control over 
the Qatari based Brotherhood members than any potential Saudi clerics. Furthermore, the 
Muslim Brotherhood ideology is more popular and widespread than Wahhabism within the 
region as a whole (Roberts D. , 2014, pp. 26-27) providing Qatar with networking 
opportunities. Qatar’s open door policy to Muslim Brotherhood members has enabled it to 
engage through Brotherhood networks within Egypt, Syria and Libya during and since the 
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Arab Spring. However, as indicated in Appendices 4 and 8, Qatar still maintains a high level of 
control (6.17) over the religious activities of both its minority groups and the Sunni majority. 
Conclusion: Regime Survival and the Regulation of Religion  
The regulation of religion is aimed at reducing the dangers to the regimes from Islamist 
opposition and from minority sects attempting to gain greater access to state resources and 
power.  Religious states act as both regulators and participants in the religious marketplace, 
structuring religious opposition and support through both religious regulations and religious 
dividends as they compete to dominate the religious sphere (Wainscott, 2018, p. 4). 
Restricting and monitoring religion is part of the religiously based survival strategies of the 
regimes. Additionally, minority sects have less religious support and often face greater 
religious restrictions and social hostility. Furthermore, given the theological teachings of 
minorities often clash with the idea of the state and thus a key pillar of the regime’s legitimacy, 
regimes work to reduce the visibility of alternative religious influence in society.  However, as 
is evident in the UAE, the engagement of the same-sect religious institutions and clerics in 
political and ideological matters is highly monitored, often more than the minority sects. This 
reflects the vulnerability of the regimes to religiously based political challenges from within 
their own sect, particularly towards charges of abandoning Islam. This is especially evident 
given that during the ‘Arab Spring’ regimes that were toppled by same-sect uprisings were 
typically relatively secular by Middle Eastern standards. Many of these protest movements 
were organised through and after Friday prayers, with the movements using the pre-existing 
networks of the mosque to facilitate organising protest marches. Additionally, Islamism is the 
most prominent means of opposing the autocratic regimes; therefore, it is expected that 
monitoring of the majority sect’s religion will be significant. Qatar takes a dual approach to 
the regulation of religion; on the one hand it significantly monitors sectarian groups, and on 
the other it also makes use of the Islamist networks across the region as a source of influence. 
Regimes restrict and monitor religion in order to reduce the ability of Islamists and opposition 
forces to use religion to mobilise opposition whilst attempting to harness the political power 
of religion themselves through incorporating religion into the idea of the state.  
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Conclusion: Domestic Religious Strategies and Regime Survival 
The ‘Arab Spring’ shattered notions of an ‘Arab exceptionalism50’ and established a new 
political environment the case study regimes have to navigate.  The purpose of this chapter 
has been to show the domestic strategies these states use to help secure political survival. 
These strategies centre on the contest between religious secularism and Islamism, sectarian 
based selectorates, the idea of the state, and the monitoring and/or favouring of specific 
religious groups. The tactics identified in this chapter are outlined in the table below in 
relation to the theoretical pillars of this research. Subsequent chapters will continue to 
consider these strategies, where they will be tested to investigate how the case study states 
use religion for political survival in regional politics. 
 
Table 3.10. Domestic Tactics relating to Theoretical Pillars 
Theoretical 
Framework 




Strategic religious narratives that counter opposition positions on 
secularity/religion, labelling opposition groups as terrorist/extremist, 
collaborating with groups that share the same understanding of 
religious secularity, supporting a religious group that has no domestic 
heritage. 
Selectorate Theory: de 
Mesquito and Smith 
The regime’s sect predominantly features in the real selectorate and 
the winning coalition, the winning coalition includes religious elites 
and religious security forces, the regime distributes religious dividends 
to it’s same-sect supporters. 
Idea of the State: 
Buzan  
Religious basis for idea of the state which counters both secularist  and 
Islamist opposition forces, the state strongly supports a specific 
                                                          
50 The assumption that the Arab world remain autocratic for a variety of reasons, including the provision of 
wealth to citizens through rentier economies, and the culture of Arab Islam.  
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religious identity, the state works to shape citizens’ religious beliefs in 
line with an official state-sponsored theology. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political Opponents: 
Feuer 
Use of religious ideology to frame security forces’ purpose, strict 
monitoring of both minority and same sect groups, monitoring of 
mosques activities and limiting the reach of dissenting clerics. 
Identity Hegemony 
Theory: Hintz 
This theory investigates the projection of identity contests blocked 
domestically into the regional sphere, and as such will be applied to 
the above strategies in the following chapters.  
 
If, as Milan V. Solvik states, authoritarian control and survival has a core problem; “the 
problem of conflict between small authoritarian elite in power and the much larger 
population excluded from power” (Solvik, 2012, pp. 123-124), then analysing the key issues 
in the chapter points to religion being an important part of the case study regimes’ strategies 
to resolve this tension.  This is despite the fact that the 2011 Arab protests were significantly 
motivated by non-religious aims and ideas related to dignity, democracy, free elections, 
human rights, employment, the resignation of oppressive regimes, more political freedom, 
less corruption, less unemployment and reduced food scarcity.  The regimes are unwilling or 
unable to grant many of these demands, such as democracy, free elections, human rights, 
resignation of regimes, more political freedom, less corruption (as this impacts crony 
networks) as they weaken or remove the authoritarian structure of the regimes which is 
crucial to their survival.  Therefore the states must focus on other means of placating or 
suppressing political opposition that does not weaken autocracy. Given many citizens express 
a clear preference for some measure of Islamism, this is therefore likely to have some impact 
on citizen satisfaction with the regimes and is an issue on which the regimes can shift without 
damaging their structure, and in fact this can be manoeuvred in order to suppress dissent. 
This helps to explain the increased focus on where states, and Islam as a whole, should 
position the relationship between religion and politics. Additionally the increased 
securitization of sectarianism following the ‘Arab Spring’ has been another tactic the regimes 
have chosen to use as part of their counter-revolutionary efforts. Middle Eastern states rely 
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on the securitization of sectarian divides in order to marginalise and suppress the sects 
outside of the regime’s real selectorates, whilst attempting to tie the security of the sect 
within the real selectorate to the survival of the regime.   
The ‘Arab Spring’ has placed the authoritarian regimes on notice.  The protests were a clear 
signal that the existing structures that maintained their power were creaking under the 
weight of 21st century communications technology, and the unmet needs and wants of their 
citizens. In order to strengthen their authoritarian fortresses against the unrest, the regimes 
have used a variety of tactics, including tactics that centred on the strategic use of religion. 
Table 3.11 shows that the domestic strategies that use religion concentrate on either 
sectarian competition or the ongoing contestation between religion and secularism within 
same-sect political competition. As such this research hypothesises that the regimes’ use of 
sectarian identity politics and the contest between religion and secularism within their own 
sectarian group will also be instrumentalised within the regional sphere and this will be 
explored in the chapters that follow. Ultimately, states work to secure the allegiance of status 
quo citizens, groups and states, against those that would reconstruct the socio-political order, 
both domestically and regionally. To an extent, the socio-political order in the Middle East 
reflects patterns of sectarian solidarity and regional contests between varieties of Islamism 
and religious secularism. As such these dynamics have been used as counter-revolutionary 
tactics to shore up existing regimes, strategies to undermine the survival of rival states facing 
unrest and within efforts to shift both the pattern of alliances across the regional system and 










Chapter Four: The Securitization of Regional Rivalry and 
Transnational Islam 
Introduction 
The Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Iran look to expand their power and influence in the 
international arena beyond their geographical location and immediate population. The three 
most powerful tools at their disposal are oil and gas, wealth, and religion. Using their financial 
and military resources, the states have employed tactics to utilise Islamic bonds across regions 
to their own advantage. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar’s wealth is invested globally, thereby 
extending these states’ financial reach and strengthening their connections within the 
wealthy Western financial sphere in particular. By utilising religion and the international 
political economy, Qatar and the UAE have become wealthy small states that have been 
successful at projecting their influence onto the world stage. Within the Middle East, Qatar 
and Iran have typically worked to project influence through sectarian or Islamist actors; 
however, the ‘Arab Spring’ saw a rise in foreign policy activism from all the case study states, 
including the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The states clearly saw a need to ensure the region’s 
fluctuating dynamics shifted to support the survival of their regimes. 
Religious capabilities are a form of latent power. States use their religious capabilities to 
project influence in the regional and international sphere to achieve foreign policy goals. 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and the UAE attempt to reorder regional and international 
hierarchies by disrupting and manipulating the internal dynamics of competitor states. This is 
connected to Joseph Nye’s idea of ‘soft power’, described by Mandaville as the idea that you 
can get states to do what you want by the appeal of your ideas and norms (Mandaville & 
Hamid, 2019). Although Nye does not equate soft power with religion, in the Middle East the 
appeal of Islamic mores are used to increase a state’s influence. Peter Henne elaborates,  
Religion intensifies transnational influences in the domestic sphere. Increasing societal 
religiosity tends to correspond to greater identification with coreligionists abroad and global 
religiously salient issues. Religion also creates tangible transnational connections through 




These tactics fit what the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) describes as competitive 
shaping. Competitive shaping is a term coined to describe strategies used in the growing 
arena of competition between states that falls short of outright war. This arena between 
political competition and outright war is often called the grey zone (Elkus & Noonan, 2018, p. 
3).  This chapter investigates tactics that use religion as a competitive shaping strategy or as 
Elkus and Noonan describe “the shaping of the heart and the mind by doctrines designed to achieve 
advantage via moral force” (Elkus & Noonan, 2018, p. 3).  
Many of these strategies involve strategic narratives. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 
point out that “domestic political contestation over strategic narratives is central to political 
outcomes” (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 8).  In order to ensure their political 
survival, it is important for the regimes to control the strategic narratives in the region. The 
idea of the state that makes up a state’s identity and ideology are built up by narratives, and 
many key narratives in the Middle East centre on Islam and the contestation between 
secularism and fundamentalism. Roselle et al. identify that domestic policy legitimacy can be 
pursued at the international level when conducting foreign policy  (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, 
& Roselle, 2013, p. 8). As such, the secular-religious dynamic has emerged as a key focus of 
regional strategic narratives in the post-‘Arab Spring’ Middle East.  
The ‘Arab Spring’ also created an opportunity for sub-state and transnational religio-political 
opposition groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The lack of an effective 
and flexible response to the protests by most of the regimes, who largely remain committed 
to the status quo, has contributed to a decentralisation of authority into local entity hands. 
Ungoverned spaces in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq and the Sinai have enabled non-state actors 
to create enclaves from which to mobilise opposition and to project operations against states 
and other competing groups. Most of these non-state actors directly address or confront 
issues of either secularism or religion. These issues relating to religion and politics are a 
prominent feature of the governance issues facing the region (Alaaldin & Mezran, 2018, p. 
25).  This creates the opportunity for Islamism to be the main opposition movement across 
the Middle East. Islamism’s focus on religion forces the regimes to address religious 
governance issues and intensifies the importance of religious narratives and sectarian bonds 
across the region.  
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Iran works to promote its own interests through transnational Shia networks, establishing 
links, both political and religious, with Shia communities in other states and with regimes 
faces common regional and international foes, such as Syria. These communal bonds are 
reinforced by the marginalisation of the Shia in Sunni dominated states and within regional 
politics. The Sunni states also use religion to pursue their own interests, funding the spread 
of their own political theologies.  For instance, Saudi Arabia has sponsored Muslim institutions 
across the global Muslim Umma, leading to criticisms that it has spread a conservative and 
intolerant brand of Islam that has heightened tensions between the Muslim diaspora and 
their host countries.  
Part I of this chapter investigates Iran’s use of Shia transnational networks in the MENA region 
and relates this to Iran’s competition with Saudi Arabia for hegemony over the Muslim Umma. 
Part II outlines the religious diplomacy of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar finishing with 
Part III that analyses the rifts within Sunni Islam between the pro-Qatar Islamist camp and the 
Emirati/Saudi led anti-Islamist front, and the contest between religious secularism and 
fundamentalism across the region.  
 Part I. Iran and Shia Transnational Networks 
Theology, Exporting the Revolution and the Evolution of Velayat al-Faqih 
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the regime has sought to reinforce its legitimacy by 
exporting its revolution. Iran assumed that Shia, typically marginalised minorities within Sunni 
led states, would be receptive to a transnational Shia political network supported by the Shia 
theocracy. The success of a regional Shia movement would lend strength to the key pillar of 
the clerical power in Iran; Khomeini’s new dictate, the guardianship of the Islamic jurists or 
velayat-e faqih’.  
Theologically, Shia Islam is more tied to governance than Sunni Islam. For instance, in contrast 
to Sunni Islam, Shi`ism asserts that the faithful need religious leaders as an intermediary 
between Allah and themselves, potentially marginalising solely political leaders. As the Shia 
Islamic community developed, the religious scholars, who are said to have filled the vacuum 
created by the missing Imam from the ninth century, became the religious and political 
leadership, collecting taxes and administering justice, alongside interpreting religious texts 
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(Louer & Rundell , 2020, pp. 7-20).  However, it was not until Ruholland Khomeini (1901-1989) 
created the doctrine, velayat-e faqih51  in 1970, that clerical leadership was described as 
having the right to govern the state (Louer, 2012, p. 6). Louer explains this further, 
The presence of clerics at the highest level in the structures of command is without question 
a characteristic distinctive of the Shia version of political Islam. Sunni political Islam, both in 
its ideology and in terms of its social base, was from the outset built up in opposition to the 
traditional religious “establishment”, which it views as having been appropriated by impious 
governments, and consider as responsible for the decline of Islam. The development of Shia 
political Islam, by contrast, is inextricably bound up with that of the clergy though there are 
also anti-clerical currents within it (Louer, 2012, p. 5). 
Thus, Iran’s theological and political significance to Shia has not just grown out of Khomeinei’s 
revolutionary doctrine, but it is also a historically constructed phenomenon. For instance the 
Shia Safavids (1501-1722) used conversion, orchestrated by imported religious scholars, to 
shift Sunni loyalty towards themselves. “Tasked with endowing the new regime with 
legitimacy, they developed Shia doctrine and ritual, while refining the process of recruitment 
to the clerical hierarchy which thus developed the necessary critical mass. Persia became the 
incontestable religious and political centre of the Shia world, and it was during the Safavid era 
that Shi’ism became a defining feature of the Iranian state” (Louer, 2012, p. 7). Under the Shia 
Qajar dynasty (1781-1925) the clergy levied taxes on the faithful. This partially accounted for 
their proselytising zeal amongst the tribes as the greater the number of Shia, the more 
financial means became available (Louer, 2012, p. 8).  As such, we can see that prior to the 
establishment of states, religion and religious conversation was closely tied to the expansion 
of territorial power through religious identity.  This was not just seen in the Muslim world:  it 
was also evident during the expansion of European colonial power, which saw the military 
domination of nations supported by the spread of Christianity, enabling Christian clergy to 
socially contest the existing leadership structures. The idea of exporting a religion, often with 
an accompanying religio-political ideology, in order to expand spheres of influence is an 
enduring state strategy.  
                                                          
51 Literally means “Authority of the Doctor of the Law”. Khomeini’s doctrine stipulates that during the period in 
which the twelfth Imam is obscured from view, the Imam’s political powers and governance of the state may 
be legitimately exercised by religious scholars. 
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Looking at Iran through the framework of the extended Competitive Perspective and Identity 
Hegemony Theory makes two things clear; firstly, following the revolution against the Shah 
the state’s religious leadership manoeuvred itself into a position of absolute power over any 
potential secular leadership and secondly, Iran’s foreign policy is a policy of identity 
hegemony, specifically fundamentalist Shia Islamism. As Iran is outnumbered by Sunni states 
(demonstrated in Figure 4.1 below), many of whom are hostile to it, the Iranian regime often 
seeks allies from within states, specifically within Shia populations or Shia political opposition 
movements.  Iran initially attempted to spread its theocratic concept across all Muslim sects, 
but this proved to be unsuccessful with the exception of Sunni Hamas and some Lebanese 
Christian groups.  
 
Figure 4.1. Proportion of Sunni to Shia states in the MENA Region 
Transnational Islam, Hegemony, and Iran’s Attempts to develop Regional Shia 
Solidarity 
Iran’s mosque diplomacy began in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution. Given Shi’a are the 
minority Muslim sect at approximately 15% of the global Muslim population, Iran’s tactics are 
more nuanced than Saudi Arabia’s (Mandaville & Hamid, 2019). In order to involve 
themselves in political tensions within other states, Iran has tailored narratives for different 
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Additionally, very few Shi’a leaders or militia groups deny that Sunni are legitimate Muslims, 
in contrast to some Sunni Salafi groups who refuse to acknowledge Shia as Muslim. Cross 
sectarian narratives of resistance sit tidily with the Iranian identity, thus we see Iranian 
cultural diplomacy in Gaza with aid given to Palestinian Sunni from the Imam Khomeini Relief 
foundation (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 18). The Iranian regime has reworked the historical 
Shia identity, from one of oppression and dispossession at the hands of the Sunni majority to 
a revisionist agenda, framed as resisting the US’s new imperialism. The 2003 war in Iraq gave 
considerable fodder to this narrative, driving up anti-Western and anti-American sentiment. 
Despite some outreach to receptive Sunni groups such as Hamas, Iran’s religious outreach 
typically focuses on Shia and Shia-linked sects, from the Shia majority in Sunni-led Bahrain 
and the Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia, to the Shia and Alawite minorities in Alawite-led Syria. 
Iran works to wedge itself into political and religious narratives in order to drive up and unify 
Shia activism. This indirect approach can be difficult to counter. Iran’s soft power outreach is 
at times accompanied by a hard power strategy. Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) coordinate and carry out the hard power policies of the regime  
(Mandaville & Hamid, 2019).   
Iran and Saudi Arabia are involved in a struggle over the hegemonic identity of Islam. However, 
this is part of a bigger struggle for geopolitical leadership of both the MENA region  (Degang 
& Zhang, 2020, p. 230)   and of the Islamic Umma, which Kamran Bokhari calls 
“geosectarianism” (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 9). The Iranian revolution of 1979 began “a 
new phase of ‘geo-religious’ competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran – both of them vying 
to assert supremacy among Muslim countries” (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, pp. 8-9) (Degang 
& Zhang, 2020, p. 230).  However, the Shia identity and the Shia theocracy’s core doctrine of 
velayat-e faqih, whereby the clerics lead the state, both have limited appeal. Although initially 
the region’s Sunni Islamists saw the Iranian regime as a potential ally against the existing 
autocracies, it became apparent to Khomeini that spreading the revolution had internal 
Muslim barriers. Given this, and the balance of power in the Middle East, a bargain was struck 
with the Alawite led, secular although Muslim, Syrian Baath regime (Degang & Zhang, 2020, 
pp. 230-231). Despite the secular nature of the Syrian regime, during the Syrian civil war Iran 
initially leveraged sectarian narratives by framing Hezbollah’s presence in Syria as protecting 
Shia religious shrines for instance (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, pp. 15-16).  
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Following the 1979 revolution, Iran circulated religious narratives that challenged the 
legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s religious prominence in the Muslim world and even guardianship 
of Mecca and Medina; the Iranian Ayatollahs sought to position themselves as an alternative 
leadership of the Muslim Umma. In the 1980s, Saudi investment in the international Muslim 
community increased in response  (Al-Rasheed, 2005, p. 155). With Iran’s influence within 
Western Muslim communities restrained by its open antipathy towards the West, this contest 
for influence is predominantly contested in the Middle East and the resource rich, but poorly 
governed, Africa. For instance, the presence of Salafi and Shia centres in Senegal funded by 
Saudi and Iranian interests is indicative of the situation on the African continent. Al-Mustafa 
University is based in the Iranian city of Qom and overseen by Khamenei, with branches in 50 
countries.  The Senegal’s campus is overseen by an Iranian Branch Director, and teaches Farsi 
and Iranian culture alongside Shia theology. Nearby, Salafi clerics working for the Islamic 
Preaching Association for Youth which funnels money from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Dubai and 
Kuwait, argue that Senegal’s secular state was forced on it by its British colonisers and that 
Salafism is preferable to the state’s moderate apolitical Sufi52 orders. With transnational Islam 
existing before the state system and retaining a system of religious leadership from earlier 
eras, religious conversion correlates with increasing support for the theological authority of 
Qom in Shia Iran or Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. Possessing religious authority gives 
states significant political influence amongst transnational religious communities (Cocks & 
Sharafedin , 2017). Thus, given the transnational nature of religion, religious sites can create 
additional sites of influence for states. Iran’s Qom, as the site of the mausoleum of Fatima the 
sister of the eighth Imam, was already a pilgrimage destination when the suppression of the 
ulama in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s reign drove Najaf’s scholars into Iran. This led to a 
revival of Qom as a centre for religious studies. Najaf in Iraq retains a high religious status due 
to it being the burial place of the Imam Ali and as the place of residence for the most 
important Maraji`53; however now Qom is also a key location for the training of Shia clergy 
(Louer, 2012, p. 11).  Additionally, Shia religious authority centralised in Najaf and Qom where 
previously both religious authority and training had been local. This was a significant step 
                                                          
52 Sufism is a mystical Islamic belief that aims to find the truth of divine love and knowledge through a personal 
relationship with Allah. Modern Sufi’s practise tolerance and pluralism, putting them at odds with many Salafi 
Muslims.  
53 Literally means the “Source of Emulation”. Refers to the supreme religious authority/scholar whom Shias 
should refer to in matters of religious doctrine (Louer, 2012, p. xi). 
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towards the development of a Shia transnational religious movement, through which Iran 
sought to export its 1979 revolutionary aims. As Louer describes,  
The centralisation of religious authority in Najaf had therefore the effect of bringing into 
existence a transnational clerical infrastructure spanning the Shia world. From the close of 
the 1960s, this has been a key element in the system of recruitment of Shia Islamic activists 
and their movement from one place to another. It is what perpetuates the interconnection 
between Shia movements across the Middle East (Louer, 2012, pp. 27-28). 
The Shia political movement exists as an opposition force against the Sunni majority in many 
Muslim states. Historically, in order to avoid Sunni political domination, the Shia ulama moved 
to geographical areas in which the caliphate’s authority was low; for instance, the eastern 
province of Saudi Arabia. In these regions they were able to establish political entities based 
on rebellion against the Sunni caliphs (Louer, 2012, p. 6). The historical precedent of Shia as 
an opposition force is interwoven into the Iranian revolution’s narrative. This was aptly 
described by IRGC chief commander Mohammed Ali Jafari: “The Islamic Revolution has two 
key dimensions, one internal and the other external. The external dimension of the revolution 
is expanding by the way of the Islamic resistance in the region and across the world”.  Jafari 
asserts that Iran is the regional leader of the ‘resistance axis’ (Majidyar A. , 2017), an alliance 
which resists Israeli Zionism and Western intrusion into the Middle East. The axis alliance 
consists of Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, various Iraqi and Syrian Shi’a militias and 
Iran.  The state and non-state actors that make up this alliance, for the most part, form the 
basis of Iran’s networks in its drive for regional hegemony against Saudi Arabia (Sullivan, 2014, 
p. 9). 
The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran had a significant impact on Shia Islamic 
transnational networks such as al Dawa, the Shirazists and the Sadr clerical family’s networks. 
With Iran announcing that a key platform of their foreign policy was the export of the 
revolution, these transnational networks became the key channels for advancing this strategy 
(Louer, 2012, p. 52). Social Mobilisation Theory54 outlines how political ideologies and models 
seldom spread without the help of pre-existing networks (Jackson, 2006). Thus, Iran was able 
                                                          
54 This theory asserts that the three causal factors that lead to social movements/political activism are ‘political 
opportunity, mobilisation structures and framing’.  Collective action is typically mobilised through established 
social structures and communicated through existing social networks (Jackson, 2006, p. v & 4). 
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to mobilise its revolutionary zeal through these historically established transnational clerical 
networks. This in turn led to the establishment of other transnational connections, such as 
those through Lebanon’s Hezbollah  (Louer, 2012, p. 52 & 60).   
Iran’s ability to influence the Shia transnational networks, however, took a blow during the 
succession from Khomeini to Khamenei.  Khamenei did not have the religious credentials of 
his predecessor who was from the clerical establishment and considered a marja55 (Louer, 
2012, pp. 78-79)56. Khamenei’s lack of clerical credentials cast some doubt on his legitimacy 
which he sought to strengthen by asserting his status as marja. Whilst this was somewhat 
overcome, he failed to wholly establish his self-proclaimed marja`iyya status, domestically 
and abroad which resulted in a deepening of a pre-existing division within Shia circles 
between pro- and anti-Iranian factions (i.e. a split between those who supported the concept 
of velayat-e faqih and those that rejected it) (Louer, 2012, pp. 78-79). This split has deepened 
to the point that whilst for the most part Shia movements back Iran in return for support, 
they also ensure they keep a suitable distance. Too close a relationship discredits them with 
their fellow compatriots who do not want to be beholden to Iran’s leadership. This has meant 
the ‘export the revolution’ Iranian foreign policy prong has become a secondary consideration 
amongst Shia movements. Instead Shia movements primarily reflect domestic concerns 
rather than regional goals (Louer, 2012, pp. 82-85).  
The potential of the Iranian revolutionary Shia movement seems exhausted although the 
‘Arab Spring’ has provided Iran with opportunities to insert its sectarian political aims into the 
resultant uprisings and civil war (Louer, 2012, pp. 94). The ‘Arab Spring’ protest movements 
represented attempts to revise the arrangement between citizen and state in the Middle East. 
This clearly presented a threat to the existing regimes, but it was also an opportunity to 
attempt to revise the distribution of power and reform the region to favour their own 
                                                          
55 Title given to the highest level of Shia religious authority. After the Quran and the prophets and imams, the 
maraji are the highest authority on religious laws. By the nineteenth century Shi’ite clerics had looked to 
centralise authority over the Shia community. This led to the creation of the marja al-taqlid.  Although initially 
designed to be an office only held by one marja for all Shia, and that the whole Shia community was held to 
obey his decrees, this only lasted for the first two marja.  The current system is that several marja exist at one 






interests whilst things were in a state of comparative flux. For instance, Iran saw a regional 
opportunity to engage with Shia rebels by “initiating a concerted campaign of transnational 
influence operations in countries across the Middle East – particularly in the Gulf region – 
where grievances of Shia communities align with the themes that inspired the toppling of 
regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen” (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 17). These 
alliances are ultimately not about religious or ideological affinity despite the sectarian bonds 
holding them together, but are a recognition that the involved parties benefit from such an 
alliance (Louer, 2012, p. 94). Additionally, despite the ‘Arab Spring’, opportunities for Iran to 
establish allies in the Sunni sphere remain limited, with the exception of its alliance with 
Palestinian Sunni group, Hamas. It is the strength of religious community bonds, not loyalty 
to religious doctrine, which ultimately secures sectarian political alliances. These religious 
community relationships can have significant impacts on politics; for example, Khamenei-led 
religious foundations over the years have funnelled support to Hezbollah, contributing to the 
political party’s army growing in size to exceed the strength of the national military. 
Additionally, the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel reinforced Hezbollah’s reliance on 
Iran as Khamenei’s religious foundations were the predominant providers of aid during this 
time (Louer, 2012, p. 122).  
Clerical families and Shia Islamic activists are key links in these religious community networks 
(Louer, 2012, p. 45).  Iran provides sanctuary for Shia Islamic activists, in return hoping to gain 
extra influence amongst activist transnational networks (Louer, 2012, p. 66).  Exiled Islamist 
activists are often seen as part of the marja`iyya, i.e. as having religious authority.  Therefore 
the local elites would receive them both as exiled political activists and as religious scholars 
(Louer, 2008, pp. 115-118). The extension of the transnational networks through these exiles 
brought with it “not only political ideas but also a general worldview” (Louer, 2008, p. 129). 
Elvire Corboz outlines the inner workings of the Shia religious networks as follows:  
The constitution of interpersonal networks, the distribution of patronage and political 
participation each constitute a sphere of social engagement within which relations of 
authority are built and sustained. […] the marja`iyya provides the best illustration of the value 
of international networks for the diffusion of clerical fame. Maraji` are the holders of 
transnational authority par excellence, yet they do not, in fact, have much face-to-face 
interaction with their worldwide following, for their travels abroad and the possibility for 
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people to visit them are quite limited. Instead it is through their networks that connections 
are established (Corboz, 2015, p. 190).  
These networks have made good use of the additional tools supplied by globalisation. Many 
clerics and marja` have considerable investments in media and are thus able to reach 
followers at considerable distance to themselves. This has also given them greater capacity 
to operate within the restraints of the authoritarian states they inhabit (Louer, 2008, p. 269).  
The transnational political bonds of the Shia has led to the perception across the Middle East 
by Sunni regimes that their Shia citizens are the “Trojan horse of Iranian interests” (Louer, 
2008, p. 15). However, Shia communities and movements across the Middle East are 
predominantly focused on domestic concerns.  This is despite the foreign policy aim of Iran 
to unite Shia across the region and thus strengthen the regional Shia political presence. Due 
to the focus on domestic goals, transnational links do not set the agendas of Shi’ite 
movements (Corboz, 2015, p. 265). This is not to say, however, that Iran is not an important 
part of the Shia movements’ strategic calculations.  In order to assert their position, whether 
politically or militarily, the support of Iran is invaluable.  Furthermore, in accordance with 
sociologists views of diffusion, as Louer states, “the Shia religious institution therefore 
provided the ideal framework through which to diffuse political ideologies”, with 
transnational ties between political activists following “previously established lines of 
interaction” (Louer, 2008, p. 103). Both Iran and Iraq, due to the significance of their religious 
centres have been key proponents of the Shia resurgence (Louer, 2008, p. 103) (Mandaville 
& Hamad, 2018, pp. 16-17).  
Generally, the revolutionary zeal of the Iranian regime’s foreign policy has not been that 
successful. However, “the Islamic Republic’s greatest successes of exporting the revolution 
have come through the development of client armed groups in Shi’ite societies. Shared 
religious identity is the foundation for these relationships. Shi’ism is the ether through which 
Iran’s influence is most effectively transmitted” (Ostovar, 2016, p. 239). Thus, Iran sees 
regional conflicts as opportunities to engage with already formed and active Shia opposition 
or militia groups. Iran’s agenda has been strengthened by the rampant sectarian and anti-Shi’i 
rhetoric of groups such as Daesh (Ostovar, 2016, p. 239).  A few days after the fall of Mosul in 
2014 and a day after 1600 Shia were killed in the Camp Speicher massacre, top ranking Iraqi 
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cleric Ayatollah al Sistani issued a fatwa that called for Shia to come to Iraq to help defend 
Iraqi Shia against Daesh threat. Existing Shia militias and thousands of volunteers entered Iraq.  
The resulting militias, called Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), relied on Iranian funding and 
support and were overseen, alongside Syrian Shia militias, by Qassem Soleimani - a top 
ranking Iranian military official who leads the Quds Force. The Quds Force is the military force 
that is responsible for Iranian extra territorial and clandestine missions. Reflecting the 
importance of Iranian support these militias draw inspiration from Twelver 57  Shia 
jurisprudence and velayat-e faqih. The Iranian militia exist alongside more quietist groups 
who work to strengthen the Iraqi central political structure. Despite then Iraqi Prime Minister 
Al Abadi, with the support of the Iraqi religious establishment, calling for the militia’s 
demobilisation once ISIL was largely defeated the militias are reluctant to disband. Instead, 
some militia leaders have resigned to run for office, whilst others align themselves with 
politicians (Mercadier & Arash, 2018).  
Iran has sought to capitalise on both the power vacuums created by the US invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan and, more recently, from the fallout of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’. This has 
resulted in the cultivation of a raft of various Shia militias across the region in the Palestinian 
territories, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan. As was evident in Syria and Iraq 
following the declaration of the creation of the ISIL, Iran frequently frames its support for the 
creation and support of Shia militias as defending the Shia nation against Sunni extremism 
and intolerance.  The networks through which Iran projects influence are based on sectarian 
community bonds and are facilitated by the bonds between Shia religious establishments and 
clerical connections (Mandaville & Hamad, 2018, pp. 15-19).  
The Limits of Religion as a Prong of Iran’s Foreign Policy 
As Laurence Louer describes, “the most reliable means by which Iran can exercise its influence 
remains its ability to intervene in theatres of action, such as Lebanon, that are sometimes far 
from its frontiers, through the instrumentalization of Shia Islamic movements” (Louer, 2012, 
p. 1). This is limited, however, by both the sectarian focus solely on Shia, and by the primary 
domestic focus of Shia Islamic movements (Louer, 2008, p. 265). 
                                                          
57 The Twelver Shia sect is the largest Shia branch, and believes that there are twelve divinely ordained Imams 
and are waiting on the reappearance of the twelfth Imam.  
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The first limit on Iran’s ability to spread its foreign policy ideals, and to extend its influence, is 
sectarian. Iran belongs to the minority Shia sect. A 2017/2018 poll discovered that 66% 
percent of Arabs held negative views towards Iran (Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies, 2017-2018, p. 30). Therefore, attempts to extend political influence into the Sunni 
world have proved to be limited, although with regards to Iran’s alliance with Hamas, 
ultimately resilient despite differences over the Syrian civil war (Amer, 2020). Iran’s support 
for the Assad regime in Syria against the mostly Sunni protesters in the Syrian uprising forced 
Hamas to pick sides. They chose the Sunni street over the Iranian state, despite Iran’s financial 
and rhetorical support of their cause. Iran’s meddling in regional crises, such as the post-2005 
civil war in Iraq which descended into Sunni versus Shia chaos, and the Syrian civil war where 
Iranian military support has so far helped the Assad regime’s survival, has further damaged 
Iran’s reputation with Sunni citizens. According to Daniel Byman, the increasingly sectarian 
reputation of Iran has been capitalised on by its regional foes, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
playing up any sectarian moves made by Iran.  This includes Iran’s involvement in the Yemeni 
civil war on the side of the Zaydi Shia Houthis, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE are attempting 
to install a ‘friendly’ new regime in post-revolution Yemen (Byman, 2018).  Further to this, 
Iran’s influence amongst Shia has inflamed resentment from the Sunni Arab publics and states. 
The growth of the virulently sectarian and anti-Shia ISIL is an example of this (Ostovar, 2016, 
p. 241).  This increased sectarianism is not good for the region or for Iran.  With Shia 
increasingly seen as a fifth column, Sunni states are wary of this sectarian dynamic.  
Another factor limiting the regional expansion of Iran’s power is the comparative weakness 
of its regional alliances. Syria has been its key state alliance, hence its support for the Assad 
regime in the current crisis. Iran also leverages regional influence through client organisations 
such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Badr Corps, Kataib Hezbollah, and Asaib Ahl al Haq 
(Ostovar, 2016, p. 238).  However, currently Syria is in no position to engage in any regional 
power plays and has little credibility as a government on the international or regional scene. 
Furthermore, Iran’s client organisations, with the possible exception of Hezbollah, would 
struggle if directly challenged by a state.  
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Part II. Mosque Diplomacy: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
Mosque Diplomacy  
The mosque is an important part of a shared Islamic identity, serving as a unifying symbol 
within the Islamic world, and a place of prayer and socialization. In the past, large 
monumental mosques were symbols of a ruler’s power and authority. Today, mosques still 
serve to strengthen the ruling elite’s legitimacy, but they also represent nationhood and the 
continued prominence of Islam in the Middle East  (Kishwar, 2015, p. 13). Rizni Kishwar 
describes how “mosques in the contemporary Middle East are built through both local and 
transnational patronage networks, and their architecture reflects the complex and 
heterogeneous nature of religious identity in the Islamic world” (Kishwar, 2015, p. 13). The 
Mosque is a key symbol of state identity and a shared symbol of international Muslim identity. 
By the second half of the twentieth century nation-building projects began to include the 
building of state mosques, linking nations to their Islamic past  (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 15-17).  
State mosques serve as an important conduit of political and religious ideology, whether 
religion is subtly restrained by state legislation or controlled by state ministries  (Kishwar, 
2015, pp. 15-17).  Both nationalist and fundamentalist movements contain a narrative that 
includes an idealisation of a ‘golden age’ and seeks to return to the traditions and standards 
of this time. Mosques represent this narrative, and aim to maintain Islam’s relevance across 
time zones. Today, religion has reclaimed its place in society to levels not seen since the early 
years of the twentieth century (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 15-17).  Given Islam’s high profile across 
the MENA region, the Gulf States all seek to use religion as a source of influence, developing 
religious links in the manner described by Joseph Nye as soft power, particularly in the form 
of aid, often to assist with the building of mosques. This influence can be used to shift the 
norms of global Islam to suit the donor state, impacting on leadership, politics and theology 
in the Muslim realm.  
Iran and Mosque Diplomacy 
The Iranian regime made clear from 1979 that exporting the revolution was a key foreign 
policy aim of the new theocracy. The Iranian revolution and the resurgence of political Islam 
in the 1970s saw the two heavy weights, Iran and Saudi Arabia, looking for new ways to 
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survive. This resulted in both seeking to export their own “ideologically tailored religious 
beliefs that justified their rule” (Jayamaha, et al., 2019).  However, the most successful part 
of these efforts has been the leveraging of Islamist discontent, particularly Shia discontent 
towards their own interests. The main strategy has involved the support of militias in regional 
conflicts and the promotion of their own ideology to these groups. The most successful 
example of this has been Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, the Iranians have applied much of 
what they learnt through their experience with Hezbollah in Syria, and through attempts to 
export the revolution in the 1980s and 1990s, within the Syrian civil war. It has not just been 
the military strategy through proxy groups in the conflict that have been used to steer Syria’s 
internal dynamics, but also religious, political and cultural efforts. Similar to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s strategy, Iran has supported social, religious and economic programs aimed at 
communities that lack alternative means of securing support. For instance in as part of their 
efforts to secure the south western province of Deraa, and supporting the development of 
military networks there, Hezbollah and the Iran have “constructed at least eight local Shia 
religious centres and five religious schools” (Ghaddar & Stroul, 2019). The construction of 
mosque and religious schools has been part of the Iranian regimes attempts to survive by 
promoting its own version of theocratic rule, velayat-e faqih. Religious influence is part of the 
construction of the security umbrella that Iran offers to Shia in the region and beyond 
(Jayamaha, et al., 2019).   
Saudi Arabia and Mosque Diplomacy 
The twentieth century saw a side-lining of religion as the region engaged in a quest for 
independence and modernity. However, monumental mosques continued to be built during 
this period. At the same time, mosque building by Middle Eastern state sponsors of the 
European Muslim diaspora emerged58 (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 15-17). The 1980s was a period of 
unprecedented mosque building in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia began its practise of 
globally sponsoring mosques, “as a way to expand its political influence and simultaneously 
disseminate Salafist religious goals” (Kishwar, 2015, p. 23).  Kishwar describes further: 
In countries where the Kingdom has sponsored the mosques, the government also appoints 
the prayer leaders, or imams and provides the fundamental educational literature (often read 
                                                          
58 Some mosques had been built in Europe from at least the nineteenth century (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 15-17). 
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as “propaganda”). In such cases, the mosques are extensions of the donor country, sites for 
propagating ideology, and home to covert political machinations. In many cases the historical 
style serves as shorthand for ideology; it is a conscious decision undertaken by the builders 
and patrons of transnational mosques (Kishwar, 2015, p. 23).  
Information gathered by Antontio Giustozzi59 from Saudi intelligence operatives confirms that 
Saudi Arabia has a policy of funding Islamic fundamentalist and Islamist insurgencies. This 
sponsorship creates a dependency on the Saud government and can result in a reduced 
tendency to criticise the Saudi regime and some leverage over the group/s by the regime. For 
example, indicators point to both Saudi Arabia and Qatar sponsoring the Taliban in the 2000s 
(Giustozzi, 2017, p. 145).  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plays an important role in the dissemination of political and 
religious ideology throughout the Muslim world. The Kingdom, a proponent of the Salafi Sunni 
doctrine, is legitimized by its guardianship of the holiest sites in Islam, the Ka’ba in Mecca and 
the holy mosque of the Prophet, Muhammad, in Medina. The Government is an active patron 
of mosque building in Saudi Arabia and has contributed financially to the construction of 
mosques and Islamic schools around the world (Kishwar, 2015, p. 28). 
Within Saudi Arabia, religious authority is linked to the Sunni identity and mosque building 
emphasises this point (Kishwar, 2015, p. 29).  Mosques built in Muslim states outside of the 
Middle East point to efforts to unite the Islamic world thereby strengthening Islam and 
essentially broadening its civilizational borders (Kishwar, 2015, p. 31). Most of the Gulf States 
specifically seek to unite global Islam under the Sunni banner. The late King Fahd devoted 
resources to this end. His efforts at international proselytization were reported by the 
Washington Post in 2004: 
King Fahd issued a directive that “no limits be put on expenditures for the propagation of 
Islam” according to Nawaf Obid, a Saudi oil and security analyst…King Fahd used the cash to 
build mosques, Islamic centres and schools by the thousands around the world. Over the next 
two decades, the kingdom established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centres, 1500 
mosques and 2000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic countries, according to King 
Fahd’s personal website (Kishwar, 2015, p. 88). 
                                                          
59 Antonio Giustozzi is an independent researcher who has worked for the UN and at King’s College in London. 
134 
 
By propagating Islam, Saudi Arabia is seeking to strengthen its position as the guardian of not 
only Mecca and Medina, but of the Sunni faith as a whole. Ideally, the Saud’s, perhaps with 
the exception of the current Crown Prince, would like to achieve a global Islamic identity in 
accordance with the Salafist position 60 . Beyond this, mosque building is also seen as a 
diplomatic gesture, working to forge political and ideological alliances. Salafism appeals to a 
significant number of modern followers of the Islamic faith; backed by Saudi money it has 
become increasingly accessible. Therefore, “the popularity of global Salafism is thus 
monumentalized in the transnational mosques that mark its presence in almost all quarters 
of the world”, with Saudi built mosques spread from Indonesia to Rome and Culver city, 
California (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 87-103, 101). Often the architecture of transnational mosques 
reflects the style of the longest standing and most powerful Muslim empire, the Ottoman 
Empire.  Currently rulers seek to strengthen the appeal of the Islamic identity by evoking this 
successful period in Islamic imperial history (Kishwar, 2015, p. 104).  Furthermore, supporting 
Islamic religious endeavours in secular states such as in Western Europe helps to ensure that 
secularism does not emerge as a dominant Arab ideology amongst the diaspora; political 
secularism challenges the Saudi regime identity and legitimacy and as such is resisted by the 
Saudi Arabia.  
However, recent moves by the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman, possibly 
indicates a shift towards Islamic moderation.  Illustrating his position, Muhammad bin Salman 
stated:  
Terrorism is a result of extremism, no doubt. Amid the need to confront it, we announce 
today the launch of the International Center for Combating Extremism, a measure aiming, in 
collaboration with peace-loving countries and international organizations, at spreading the 
principles of moderation, confronting the attempts to lure the juniors, vaccinating families 
and societies against deviant thought and waging a fierce war against the weak logic and 
controversy of the terrorists (Arab News, 2017).  
Mike Kelvington claims that Saudi Arabia lost control of the transnational Salafi networks and 
ideologies they supported and as such these networks have less utility (Kelvington, 2019). This 
                                                          
60 There appears to be a shift in policy by the Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman, towards a more moderate 




could explain the Saudi Crown Prince position. However, domestically Saudi Arabia’s control 
over the religious establishment remains firmly in place. For instance, the religious 
establishment supports the government by participating in delegitimising campaigns against 
foreign enemies of the ruling dynasty, with the Council of Clerics excommunicating Ruhollah 
Khomeini and Saddam Hussein for example. Beyond excommunication, the ulama is involved 
in long-standing campaigns against enemies of the regime on religious grounds with the 
Grand Mufti Abdulaziz Al Sheikh claiming in 2016 that Iranians were not Muslims for instance 
(Puteaux, 2018). 
Saudi Arabia operationalizes religious soft power in both the domestic and international 
sphere. It is able to do this because of the significance of religion within the Muslim umma. 
Given Saudi Arabia is both a monarchical and Islamist regime, it is therefore sensitive to 
changes in the Islamist dynamic in the region.  As such, to protect regime security Saudi Arabia 
has sought to rein the Islamist groups in that have capitalised on the ‘Arab Spring’: the 
extremists groups like ISIL, and the Muslim Brotherhood for example. Both challenge the 
regime’s legitimacy in terms of its Islamic credentials and its right to govern as a monarchy. 
The ‘Arab Spring’ has intensified difficulties around how to configure religion and domestic 
legitimacy for the region’s regimes. This will impact on the way that Saudi Arabia conducts its 
religious diplomacy.  
The UAE and Mosque Diplomacy 
Islam has a high profile in Emirati society with a mosque in every neighbourhood. Mosques 
serve to communicate, both to citizens and the migrant workers who constitute 80% of the 
population, the centrality of Islam to the key idea and ideology of the Emirati nation (Kishwar, 
2015, p. 169). The regime uses mosques domestically to strengthen the Al Nahyan family’s 
right to lead the Emirates, and the founding father Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan’s 
identity is a national ‘brand’. For instance, the national mosque, which was completed in 2007, 
is named the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque. The mosque itself is a modern adaption of the 
great imperial mosques from Islamic history. Sheikh Zayed’s tomb is positioned on the 
northern side of the mosque, and within the tomb the Quran is recited continuously  (Kishwar, 
2015, pp. 176-177).  
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The state also works to project religious legitimacy overseas, particularly focusing on 
moderate Islam. This serves to present the UAE as a tolerant and religiously open society, 
thereby encouraging foreign workers and investors to participate in the economy (Kishwar, 
2015, p. 169). The building of transnational mosques and Islamic cultural centres is an 
important part of the UAE’s external projection of its political ideology and religion. A notable 
example is the Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Mosque in Jerusalem which sits atop a hillside 
opposite the site of the Dome of the Rock and the al Aqsa Mosque, the 3rd holiest site in Islam. 
The mosque is the second largest in Jerusalem after the al Aqsa mosque, and is capable of 
accommodating over six thousand worshippers  (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 184-185).   
A well utilised platform for projecting international influence is their state charitable 
foundations. The UAE’s Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahya foundation was founded in 2007.  The 
charitable organisation was established to “pioneer initiatives in the service of humanity,” 
with a strong focus on education, health and emergency assistance. In 2010, the organisation 
provided aid to thirty eight countries, “including twelve Arab countries, thirteen Asian, four 
African, and eight European, as well as Australia” (Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, 
2010).  Internationally the foundation also focuses on establishing clinics and educational 
facilities. Both at home and overseas the foundation helps with free meals during the month 
of Ramadan (Kishwar, 2015, p. 183), for instance in 2010 the foundation provided dates and 
free iftar61  meals in France, Spain, Indonesia and Bangkok (Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Foundation, 2010).  
Rizni Kishwar further describes the UAE’s agenda to use religion to strengthen bonds with 
states that also have an Islamic identity: 
In order to make itself viable on the transnational arena, the UAE brings the world to the Gulf. 
Now, however, the wealthy nation is starting to assert its ideological agenda outward, 
through the patronage and construction of monumental transnational mosques in other 
countries chosen both for their sympathetic political vision and for their compatible economic 
agendas (Kishwar, 2015, p. 191). 
                                                          
61 Iftar (or Fatoor) (Arabic: إفطارʾif ṭār 'breakfast') is the evening meal when Muslims end their daily Ramadan 
fast at sunset. Muslims break their fast at the time of the call to prayer for the evening prayer. 
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Regimes like Morocco and the UAE have sought to “reinforce their religious purchase” and 
similar to the case of Saudi Arabia, to develop “new religious messages to distinguish 
themselves from both domestic and foreign opponents” (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 19).  
Mandaville and Hamid discuss how Morocco’s use of religious soft power “solidifies regime 
legitimacy” by reinforcing the religious credentials of the monarchy, at the same time as 
elevating “Morocco in the international arena as an important voice for religious ‘moderation’” 
(Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, pp. 19-20). The same description aptly applies to the UAE as well. 
Narratives in support of moderate Islam help to neutralise domestic competition for religious 
legitimacy from Islamist movements who seek to reform the state. This is particularly 
important given a recent poll observed that two-thirds of Emirati citizens disagree that “we 
should listen to those among us who are trying to interpret Islam in a more moderate, tolerant, 
and modern direction” (Pollock, UAE Public Privately Split on Key Issues, New Poll Reveals, 
2018).  Given this obstacle to the moderate Islamist identity at home - in line with Hintz’s 
theory on identity hegemony - the UAE seeks to advance religious secularism and moderate 
Islam in the Muslim world.   
With the moderation of Islam central to the UAE’s financial plans and internal stability, the 
UAE has begun to actively oppose the spread of Salafist transnational Islam. Anwar Gargash, 
the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, explained the existence of religious extremism 
and terrorism in the Middle East whilst outlining the issue as a “battle of ideas” in a speech at 
George Washington University. He laid the success of Islamism at the feet of the three 
geopolitical events; the secular Arab nationalists defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 and its propagation of narratives against secular leaders and the 
West, and the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the success of the extremists 
Jihadis who fought them (Gargash, 2017): 
Our cosmopolitan society and globalised economy depend for their very existence on the 
containment of the divisive and regressive ideologies and the associated terrorism that have 
taken a foothold in some other parts of the Middle East.  […] Daesh62, Al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups have fed off a wider current of extremist ideas that have been allowed to go 
unchecked for too long. These extremist narratives have been propagated and used by 
                                                          
62 The Islamic State. 
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political Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood for decades. Their narratives are 
backward-looking and reject open, pluralistic societies (Gargash, 2017). 
On a systemic level, the UAE has embraced secular, economic globalisation in contrast with 
such states as Pakistan and Iran who support Islamic globalisation. This focus has helped to 
highlight economic priorities, and dilute Islamic currents. This has also worked to counter 
globalisation’s tendency to reinforce religious extremist groups as globalisation tends to 
threaten local tradition thereby intensifying reactionary religious radicalism (Christie, 2010, 
pp. 209-211). The UAE Ambassador Usef al-Otaiba asserts that the UAE wants "more secular, 
stable" governments in the region, an order he claimed Qatar "fundamentally opposed" (The 
National, 2017).  Kishwar believes that whilst other Middle Eastern nations look to export 
their ideology, the UAE typically conveys an image of embedded transnationalism, i.e. all of 
the UAE’s international actions are aimed at supporting their domestic agenda.  As such, their 
support for transnational Islam places an emphasis on the moderate Islam and progress they 
emphasise at home (Kishwar, 2015, p. 159). Taking into account Hintz’s discoveries, this 
research extends Kishwar’s assertion; whilst states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia look to 
export their ideology, in common with the UAE their international actions also support their 
domestic agenda, working to ensure the survival of their regime.  
Qatar and Transnational Islamist Networks  
As a small wealthy state Qatar has sought to protect its sovereignty from its large and 
powerful neighbour, the fellow Wahhabi state Saudi Arabia. Part of this strategy has been to 
maintain ties with transnational Islamic institutions and leaders. Qatar has typically 
maintained networks across the moderate Islamist networks. With the outbreak of the ‘Arab 
Spring’, it was clear that Qatar saw the potential of its connections in the transnational 
Brotherhood and Salafi networks to amplify its reach and political influence. Many of the 
exiled Islamists that resided in Qatar returned to their home countries to bid for political 
power in the space opened up by the uprisings. However, despite initial gains, the ‘Arab Spring’ 
turned out to be a difficult event to capitalise on both for these networks and Qatar. Uprisings 
broke down into conflicts mired in division and external interference. Whilst the US tolerated 
Qatar’s response to the Arab uprisings, Qatar’s neighbours had clearly had enough. By 2014 
a diplomatic crisis broke out when fellow Gulf countries, the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
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withdrew their ambassadors and threatened Qatar with suspension of its GCC membership 
(Dickinson, 2014) due to its support of pro-Muslim Brotherhood Islamists in the ‘Arab Spring’, 
and also over its media’s, specifically Al Jazeera’s, negative reporting on fellow Arab states.   
During and since the ‘Arab Spring’ Qatar has been the focus of suspicion regarding its support 
of transnational political Islam. CNN’s Christiane Amanpour queried Qatar’s reaction to this 
criticism in an interview with Qatar’s new Emir. Emir Tamim al Thani responded by saying the 
dispute had arisen over disagreements regarding which movements are considered terrorist 
groups and which are not, stating, “some countries [say] any group that is Islamist is terrorist 
and we don’t accept that” (Thani, 2014).  This defence has not quietened criticism of the 
Qatari state nor some of its wealthy citizens over the funding of Islamist groups.  Foreign 
Policy ran an article in 2014 which explained that Qatari support of Islamist groups had 
contributed to increased destabilisation within the region’s conflicts. The article pinpointed 
several examples, such as the proxy funded militias in Libya where Qatar and the UAE support 
opposing forces, the internally divided Syrian opposition that has been overrun by extremists, 
and the humanitarian plight in the Gaza strip, arguably prolonged by outside backing of 
Hamas by entities such as Qatar (Dickinson, 2014). Qatar’s Islamist networks are recognised 
widely as being held through the Muslim Brotherhood, but this network also includes Salafi 
activist connections. Qatari Salafi networks are linked through such charities as the Sheikh Eid 
bin Mohammad al Thani Charity, described by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace as “probably the biggest and most influential activist Salafi-controlled relief 
organization in the world” (Dickinson, 2014). The diplomatic uproar broke out again in 2017 
when select Middle Eastern states, primarily from the Gulf and led by the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, again ended diplomatic relations with Qatar in protest over its support of ‘terrorist’ 
groups, and its comparatively neutral attitude towards Iran (Meuse, 2017). Qatar has been 
described by Dr Salah Eddin Elzein, the center director for the Qatari Al Jazeera Center for 
Studies, as supporting change across the Middle East, whereas the other Gulf monarchies are 
fighting to maintain the status quo (Dickinson, 2014). The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to 
change the governance structures and leadership of the Middle East and has affiliated parties 
across the region (Laub, 2019). The ‘Arab Spring’ enlivened Qatar’s Islamist networks, and 
strengthened Qatar’s conviction that the moderate Islamist networks would emerge as 
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sources of political power in the future, and that monarchical and autocratic regimes would 
face serious civil Islamist challenges in the long term.  
An aspect of Qatar’s revisionism has gone almost unmentioned by the media and within the 
media releases pushed by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This is that Qatar has gained 
considerable soft power within the Arab Street for its support of the Arab protests, and 
through Al Jazeera’s round the clock coverage of the ‘Arab Spring’. Qatar’s support for Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda who both, initially at least, support democratic 
Islamism, is aligned with a sentiment in the region which favours moderate democratic 
Islamism. This region-wide sentiment, as it relates to democracy, was demonstrated by Pew 
Research Center’s survey which found that 55% of respondents from the Middle East 
preferred democracy over a strong leader (Pew Research Center, 2013).  The Qatari Emir, 
Tamim al Thani, has gained considerable soft power through his alignment with the Arab 
protests. He illustrated the Qatari position in an interview with CBS:  “We stood with the 
people because they wanted freedom and dignity, and I think we made the right choice when 
we stood with the people” (Thani, 2017). The Financial Times quoted a Western diplomat 
describing Qatar’s support for Islamists within the ‘Arab Spring’ despite being an autocratic 
state, “The Qataris say if there’s a tsunami coming your way you ride it, not let it hit you” 
(Fielding-Smith & Khalaf, 2013). Whilst most have focused on Qatar’s support for the Islamist 
current in the uprisings, Qatar’s media support of liberalising and democratic revisionist 
movements that helped drive the uprisings has largely gone unreported. Ali Fadi claims that 
“Doha’s relationship with the ‘Arab Spring’s societal movements—despite the tension it 
causes to relations with the rest of the countries—continues to be an important source of 
popular regional power for Doha and will continue to serve the country well in the future” 
(Fadi, 2018). Qatar’s heavy investment in media and information, particularly through Al 
Jazeera, has given Qatar the ability to give media coverage to these social movements (Fadi, 
2018). None of this goes down well with its neighbours: fellow dictatorships working to secure 
their hold on power following disruption of the ‘Arab Spring’.  
The ‘Arab Spring’ has weakened the states in the Middle East and North Africa region, and 
combined with the subsequent decentralisation and fragmentation, this has affirmed Qatar’s 
commitment to developing relationships with both states and non-state actors.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood is the most prominent non-state actor in the region.  The Brotherhood network 
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has also played an important role in politics following the ‘Arab Spring’.  However, it does not 
make sense at first glance, in terms of Selectorate Theory’s paradigm that regimes seek first 
and foremost to survive, that Qatar would support Islamism. Islamists want to topple and 
replace the autocratic regimes, including the Persian Gulf’s monarchical regimes. However, if 
we consider Peter Henne’s statement that “Muslim states’ uncooperative behaviour 
[regarding suppressing Islamic terrorism] is not due to regimes’ embrace of Islamic groups: it 
is because regime’s survival calculations in the face of powerful Islamist pressure” (Henne, 
2016, p. 14), Qatar’s cynical manipulation makes more sense. With a strong Islamic identity 
at home, and perceiving potential risks from the Arab Street’s drive for greater political 
freedoms, Qatar’s support for democratically elected Islamist groups and Islamic actors across 
the region potentially convinces their citizens that the Qatari regime is less resistant to shifts 
in the status quo than its neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and, more significantly, gives 
it considerable regional soft power with the Arab Street.   
The ‘Arab Spring’, Mosque Diplomacy and Islamists 
The ‘Arab Spring’ highlighted the differences between the Middle Eastern and North African 
regimes; specifically, how they reacted to the subsequent domestic and regional threats to 
their political survival. Initially, the protests were very secular in character, with aims 
revolving around dignity, freedoms, political corruption and economic issues. However, as the 
uprisings progressed religious debates came to the fore as Islamist groups – the most 
organised opposition groups in the region – began to participate and assume leadership of 
the opposition movements. Unrest was strongest where secular regimes significantly 
restricted religious practices such as Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (Henne, 2016, p. 203). It 
is important to note that these regimes may have been relatively secular, but it was a religious 
secularity in which Islam’s influence was still visible in politics and society. Baghourpour has 
observed that: “Those leaders which have largely ignored the rising religious tides in their 
countries have suffered at their own peril” (Bagherpour, 2012, p. 77). Protests were 
frequently organised after Friday prayers and participation often organised through the 
mosques, (Henne, 2016, p. 203) and research by Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamel argued 
that “individual piety [..] is associated with higher levels of protest  (Hoffman & Jamel, 2014, 
p. 593).  
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Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE faced domestic pressure to support these uprisings. Qatar 
was the most supportive, allowing the uprisings to be broadcast from the protesters’ 
perspectives on Al Jazeera, and reportedly supporting the participating Islamist movements, 
including providing foreign economic aid to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood when they 
temporarily ran the Egyptian government. Saudi Arabia allowed citizens to support Syrians 
engaged in the Syrian civil war, whilst keeping a close watch on these activities. The UAE was 
particularly reticent about the ‘Arab Spring’, and chose to focus on countering Islamic 
extremist activities, joining in airstrikes against ISIL under US direction in 2014  (Henne, 2016, 
p. 203; Ulrichsen, 2014, pp. 9-19).  However, it was the Muslim Brotherhood’s emerging role 
within the uprisings that generated the most concern in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, probably 
because of all the Islamist groups, they are the most likely to succeed in supplanting the 
existing regimes. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood aims have shifted towards a greater 
acceptance of democracy, at the very least as an avenue to get into government. This 
intensified Saudi and Emirati hostility to the movement in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’.  
Thus Islamism gained prominence in the ‘Arab Spring’ due to its pre-existing role in opposition 
to the existing regimes.  Courtney Freer describes how “in the restrictive states of the Middle 
East, then, political Islam, multifaceted as it is, has become, in Ayubi’s words, ‘on the whole a 
protest movement’” (Freer, 2018, p. 23).  Freer goes on to state, “Islamism aims to deliver on 
ideological and practical promises”, and that the “Muslim Brotherhood has been particularly 
successful in appealing to followers with its wide-ranging platform and political ideology” 
(Freer 2018, p. 23).  This meant that the Brotherhood was ideally placed to capitalise on the 
protest movements given it was also the “world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist 
organization” (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).  
Part III.  Rifts in the Sunni Camp 
The UAE has worked to counter both Qatar’s transnational favourite, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and Saudi Arabia’s ultra conservative movements, Wahhabi and Salafi, by seeking to advance 
a more liberal interpretation of Sunni Islam (Dorsey, 2014). These splits within Islamism, 
between the moderate and Salafi positions, and between Islamist and secular positions, is 
reflected across the Sunni Muslim world.  
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Primary Rift: Anti-Islamist versus Pro-Islamist Camps 
The rift between the pro- and anti-Islamist camps is typically framed in religious terms. For 
instance the pro-Qatar camp has accused the Emirati-led quartet of Saudi Arabia, the 
Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, of having betrayed Islam and attempting to shift the Middle East 
towards Western secularism. Al Jazeera journalist, Ahmad Mansūr,  accused the Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia of attempting to secularise their Muslim states. Additionally Michel Brignone 
outlines how Soumaya Ghannouchi, the daughter of the founder and leader of the Tunisian 
Islamist party Ennahda, described the confrontation between the pro- and anti-Islamists 
camps as between a “democratic and liberal Islam versus an authoritarian system that had 
previously used religion but has turned secularist” (Brignone, 2018). These claims are being 
resisted with the Emirati camp accusing the pro-Islamists of being the cause of the region’s 
unrest, both in terms of the ‘Arab Spring’ and terrorism, laying particular blame on the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Brignone, 2018).  
However, for Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate Islamism helps to balance against 
the Islamic power of Saudi Arabia. Mandeville and Hamid describe how, “in a sense, today’s 
‘moderate Islam’ can be understood as the most recent chapter in a much longer effort by 
countries in the Middle East to offset the influence of the region’s most well-resourced 
religious hegemon” (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 22).  This also helps explain Qatar’s close 
relationship with Turkey. Turkey has moved towards a strengthening of neo-Ottoman 
Islamism and a foreign policy turn towards the Middle East, further offsetting Saudi’s religious 
hegemony (Maziad & Sotiriadis, 2020). Like Qatar, Turkey has also provided a haven for exiled 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood following the ‘Arab Spring’ (Black, 2014).  
The current Gulf leaders all belong to the same prominent families that contested for power 
over 150 years ago; the al-Thanis in Qatar, al-Nahyans in the UAE, the house of Saud, the Al-
Busaidis in Oman, the Al Sabah’s in Kuwait and the Khalifas in Bahrain. Rumours of 
assassination plans between ex Qatari Emir Hamad al Thani and the now ousted leader of 
Libya, Colonel Gaddafi, and orchestrated coup attempts against the Al Thanis abound63. As 
such, Saudi leadership of the Sunni identity in the region is not in Qatar’s best interests. The 
                                                          
63 For instance in 2018 reports emerged that then US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, had intervened to 
prevent the invasion and subsequent take-over of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Emmons, 2018). 
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Qataris need the transnational networks, and Turkey, to balance against the power of the 
UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and their attempts to direct Qatari policy (Sly, 2018) and 
possibly even remove the current branch of the Al Thani family from power. Thus in the 
interests of political survival, the Al Thani’s have developed influential allies within the 
Islamist networks, projecting their need to balance against the Saudi and Emirati regimes into 
the regional sphere.  
However, Emirati concerns regarding the Muslim Brotherhood began prior to the ‘Arab 
Spring’. In a 2004 cable revealed by Wikileaks Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahayan, informed the US that “we are having 
a (culture) war with the Muslim Brotherhood in this country” (Dorsey, 2014).  In 2006 Abu 
Dhabi’s Crown Prince spoke again on the matter, telling Frances Townsend, the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security and Counter terrorism,  that if the UAE held elections, 
as was encouraged by the US, that the Muslim Brotherhood would likely be voted into power. 
The Emirati regime saw the Muslim Brotherhood as the most organised political opposition 
group in the Emirates (Wikileaks, 2006). In 2009 the Crown Prince stated flatly to US officials 
that “Qatar is allied with the Muslim Brotherhood” and that the he saw the “Iranian influence 
in the Brotherhood very clearly as both a way to agitate the Arab populace and render the 
traditional leaders of Arab society impotent” (Wikileaks, 2009).  
It is evident that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider Islamism and democracy key threats 
to the autocratic regimes. The democratic election of a Muslim Brotherhood government in 
Egypt following the Egyptian revolution was a turning point. Not only was this event exactly 
what Qatar’s previous Emir predicted – that democracy in the Middle East would led to the 
election of Islamist governments (Al Thani H. b., 2005) - but it also occurred in the region’s 
most populous country. A democratic, Islamist-led Egypt could potentially enliven the 
activism of the rest of the Middle East’s Islamists and democratic citizens. Qatar supported 
the Morsi government whilst Iran hailed Morsi’s rise to President as an “Islamic Opening”. In 
contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported General Sisi’s 2013 coup against President 
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in  (Al Jazeera, 2012); (Wehrey, 2015); (Roberts D. B., 
2017).   As Tamara Cofman Wittes explains; 
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After Brotherhood political parties won elections in Egypt and Tunisia (pluralities, not 
majorities, in both places), these governments came to understand the Brotherhood as an 
existential threat: a model of governance that challenged their own authoritarian, 
monarchical Islamism with populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process (not civil 
liberties, but the monarchies don’t care much about civil liberties either). Thus began a 
campaign to re-brand the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, ideologically 
indistinguishable from al-Qaida, a threat that must be rooted out with brutal discipline 
(Wittes, 2018). 
A recent poll showed that 1/3 of Emirati citizens still support the Muslim Brotherhood despite 
the regime’s best efforts to undermine their standing (Pollock, 2018). With efforts to reduce 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood seemingly stalled at home, moves to ensure they did not 
emerge powerful from within the turmoil and disrupted regional power structures after the 
‘Arab Spring’ became a key motivation of the UAE government. The regime needs an 
additional mechanism to combat the domestic influence of the Brotherhood.  As such, this 
issue has been pushed out into the foreign policy arena. Given Qatar’s assertive support for 
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist factions during and following the ‘Arab Spring’, the UAE has 
sought to counter the impact of this support and has extended these efforts as far as Europe. 
A report emerged from The Guardian that the UAE had proposed financial incentives in order 
to encourage the British government to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Measures 
included completing a lucrative arms contract and oil deals worth billions of pounds if then 
British Prime Minister David Cameron worked to constrain the Brotherhood’s operations. The 
report revealed that the UAE was concerned because “our ally is not seeing it [Muslim 
Brotherhood] as we do: an existential threat not just to the UAE but to the region” (Ramesh, 
2015).  
European Islamists protested UAE interference. They felt that both the UAE and Saudi Arabia 
had pressured the UK to commission the report on the Muslim Brotherhood.  Controversy at 
the time became so heated that the release of the report was delayed. It was not released 
publically until 17 December 2015.  The report was accused of being politically motivated. At 
the time then Prime Minister David Cameron made the following statement in relation to the 
report’s findings,  
146 
 
The main findings of the review support the conclusion that membership of, association with, 
or influence by the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered as a possible indicator of 
extremism...We will also intensify scrutiny of the views and activities that Muslim 
Brotherhood members, associates and affiliates – whether based in the UK or elsewhere – 
promote overseas (Al Jazeera and Agencies, 2015). 
However, following political pressure, the report’s findings were followed by the release of a 
new report in 2016. This revised report took a softened stance on the Brotherhood and 
addressed earlier accusations of political manoeuvrings and bias. Within this revised version 
political Islam was described as a potential firewall against more extremist religious ideologies. 
This description is presented below, 
Based on the experience of Tunisia, political Islam could in some countries be a way of 
providing a democratic alternative for political, social, and economic development and a 
counter-narrative against more extremist ideologies. […] Political Islam is far from the only 
firewall, but in the Muslim World it is a vehicle through which a significant element of citizens 
can and should be able to address their grievances (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016, p. 50).  
In his written evidence provided to the Foreign Affairs Committee for the report Rifai 
Sulaiman further contradicted the Emirati stance, stating that: 
Scholars such as Prof Hashim Kamali, Prof Abdul Haleem, Prof Tariq Ramadan, Prof Abu 
Sulaiman and thousands of Muslim intellectuals [have] maintained democratic principles are 
enshrined in Islamic teaching…. Of course, there are some social values and democratic 
traditions which clash with basic teachings of Islam.  There are clear cut differences between 
western social values and democratic traditions in some areas of theological, economic, 
political matters. Islamic theology dictates that sovereignty belongs to God alone whereas 
western democratic traditions say that sovereignty belongs to people (Sulaiman, 2016). 
As the political brouhaha stirred by this report indicates, fears and hopes regarding political 
Islam escalated during and following the ‘Arab Spring’. Sulaiman describes an increasing trend 
towards citizen engagement with the Islamists, a position which appears to match Qatari 
calculations. This increased engagement with democratic Islamism is the basis of this split 
within Sunni Islam.  US President Donald Trump has attempted to weigh in on this rift, despite 
having his hands somewhat tied by the fact that Qatar hosts the largest US military base 
outside of North America. Despite analysts pointing out that the Muslim Brotherhood does 
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not meet the criteria for being designated as a terrorist organisation, Trump has still sought 
to have this label applied, in keeping with the anti-Islamist Quartet’s wishes (Benjamin & 
Blazakis, 2019); (Iftikhar, 2019).  
Secondary Rift: Religious Secularism/Moderate Islam versus Fundamentalism 
Olivier Roy categorises transnational Sunni Islamic movements into two main streams; 
Salafism, primarily supported by Saudi Arabia, or through extremist networks, and the neo-
Ottoman movement, typically sponsored through the structures of the Turkish state or 
through non-state groups such as the Gulen Movement, which has been truncated since the 
2016 coup attempt (Roy O. , 2015, p. 243).  Qatar has connections with another Sunni Islamist 
movement, moderate or pluralist Islam, predominantly through the Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, as James Dorsey points out, the UAE is seeking to advance another strain, that of 
Sufi Islam or a form of religious secularity, which, with its more liberal interpretation of Islam, 
is the perfect foil against which to push back the advance of fundamentalist and intolerant 
strains of Islam (Dorsey J. M., 2016).  This presents a dilemma for the al Saud’s as their support 
of Salafi Islam has, up until Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s declaration of support for 
Islamic ‘moderation’, coincided with Saudi designs to constrain the Islamic credentials of Iran 
(Mandaville & Hamid,  2017, p. 8).  
Therefore, although Saudi Arabia and the UAE are united in their front against moderate 
Islamist non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, they are at opposite ends of a 
theological shift within Sunni Islam. Since the rise of Sunni terrorism and ISIL, criticism of the 
Wahhabi religion and its fundamentalism has not been confined to the Iranians. Over 25-27 
August 2016 an Islamic conference was held in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny. The conference 
was paid for by Putin’s ally, the Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, who is ostensibly Sufi 
(Mamouri, 2016) and co-organised by the Tabah Foundation64 (Diwan, 2016).  Saudi Arabian 
clerics were not invited to attend and only a limited number of Qatari clerics were present 
(Mohsen, 2016). The Tabah foundation, which is based in Abu Dhabi, aims to direct Islamic 
discourse away from Salafi elements, and shares the UAE regime’s focus on the acceptance 
of diversity (Diwan, 2016); (Dorsey, 2016).   
                                                          




The declared aim of the Grozny conference was “Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’ah” (Kadhim, 2016), 
or a discussion amongst various Muslim sects on the ‘true interpretation of Islam’. The focus 
of the conference appears to have been to create a narrative that Wahhabism is not true 
Islam, and to strengthen the position of the moderate and peaceful Sufi sect within the 
Muslim world. This is a reversal of the normal state of affairs, in which purist Salafi voices hold 
the moral high ground and declare that sects such as the Sufi, Ash’airis and Maturidis are not 
part of the Muslim Umma. Predictably the Saudi’s reacted with fury to the conference and its 
conclusions (Kadhim, 2016).   
The Saudi’s have spent an estimated US$100 billion globally in support of Wahhabi Islam in 
order to give legitimacy to their claim to leadership of the global Sunni umma (Norton, 2016). 
This conference is a direct challenge to that assumed leadership, and an attempt to redirect 
the path of Islam away from purist voices and the ultra-conservative leadership of Saudi 
Arabia’s faithful (Kadhim, 2016). In another example of concern regarding theological 
differences, in 2015 Malaysia’s National Fatwa Council declared that Wahhabism was not 
welcome in Malaysia due to the propensity for Wahhabi leaders to declare other Muslims 
apostates when they do not follow Wahhabi dictates (Malay Mail Online, 2015).  This rift is 
not enough to prevent close cooperation between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but perhaps 
points to the future direction of Islamic discourse and identity. 
Despite the UAE’s move to shift the region’s Islam towards religious secularity and moderate 
Islam, the Saudi’s and Emiratis remain closely aligned. In terms of the region’s security 
complex, the drive to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, linked to efforts to curb Qatar’s 
foreign policy, is the most significant shift. It represents a shift in the patterns of amity and 
enmity across the region, with Qatar and Turkey aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Islamist actors, against the Saudi led bloc.  This battle is primarily fought in regional and proxy 
wars, such as the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni civil wars.  
Conclusion: Transnational Islam and the Regional Strategies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE and Qatar 
The Middle East derives considerable ideational power from its stewardship of the Islamic 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina and as the birthplace of Islam. The cities of Mecca and 
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Medina, combined with the financial might of the wealthy Gulf nations, position the region 
as the epicentre of the Islamic world. This combination has enabled the Arab states in the 
region to fund and export Sunni Islam as a means of expanding their soft power and influence. 
Additionally Shia Iran’s claim to religious authority as the region’s sole Shia theocracy enables 
it to sponsor and deepen existing transnational Shia networks. 
It is clear that competition between sectarian groups is prevalent in Middle Eastern politics. 
The instability in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Iraq attest to the presence of this dynamic. James 
Lacey describes how “rivalries, at their base, are power contests over who will dominate a 
specific sphere of interest and establish the rule-set” (Lacey, 2018). Religion and sectarianism 
are significant instruments in these contests over power in the Middle East and this chapter 
looked at how states use these dynamics as competitive shaping strategies in the region.  For 
instance, the global export of Islam and the provision of religious aid represent a state’s 
attempt to strengthen the regional Muslim identity that best serves their elites interests – 
typically this will be the hegemonic identity within the aid donor state. This hegemonic 
identity is the identity that the ruling elite share with the winning coalition, for instance the 
Shia identity in Iran and Wahhabi Sunni identity in Saudi Arabia. This identity is 
instrumentalised to negate any domestic competition or any potential domestic resistance to 
regime leadership on a sectarian or religious basis. For instance, for the Gulf States of Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Qatar the hegemony of the Sunni identity helps to repress the Shia 
minorities.  Furthermore, promoting the ideal religious identity across the region is aimed at 
increasing political ties between sectarian communities and negating any competing 
identities. Saudi Arabia works to increase the profile of the Wahhabi identity and to 
overshadow the Shia and Sufi identities for example. These efforts extend beyond the Middle 
East to include the Muslim diaspora. Shared identities and consequent aid strengthens the 
Muslim Diaspora’s ties to foreign states.   
Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar use Islam to extend both their influence, and the idea 
of the state that matches their stance on secularism and religion.  Thus the states use their 
wealth and religious credentials to promote the Muslim theology that bests serves their 
domestic interests.  Analysing the patterns of mosque diplomacy reveals several patterns. The 
first pattern is that the states typically seek influence within their own sect; Iran sends aid to 
Shia religious institutions and organisations, the Sunni states to the Sunni mosques. The next 
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pattern is between the Islamist and anti-Islamist camps. Regimes tend to sponsor religious 
groups that best match their position on the scale between secularism and fundamentalism, 
and do not undermine autocracy. Beyond this, they also work with specific religious 
institutions and groups that are part of a particular Islamic network – for instance, Saudi 
Arabia tends to focus on Salafi networks and Qatar with Islamist Muslim Brotherhood 
networks. Michele Brignone describes how the Qatari camp focuses on a political reading of 
Islam; Qatar is attempting to revise the current order, through addressing issues such as 
gender issues and social justice alongside the re-Islamisation of societies and the 
establishment of “Islamic-democratic” regimes. In contrast, the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince 
Muhammad Bin Zayid represents the rival interpretation of Islam, pushing for changes the 
move Islam into the realms of personal spirituality, opposes violent interpretations of Islam 
and towards religious secularism (Brignone, 2018). These connections and splits reflect the 
patterns of amity and enmity in the Middle Eastern security complex with Qatar facing a 
blockade from a Sunni state faction led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE for example. This 
blockade is an attempt to get the Qatari regime to fully align with the regional aims of Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE.  
These patterns are extensions of domestic survival concerns of the regimes in question. The 
UAE and Saudi Arabia are wary of the potential for the Muslim Brotherhood to capitalise on 
the citizen dissatisfaction that was revealed during the ‘Arab Spring’. The Brotherhood is the 
most established opposition organisation in the region and made gains, albeit temporarily in 
the case of Egypt, in the aftermath of the revolutions. Additionally, surveys in the region show 
that both moderate Islamism and democracy have considerable sway with the Arab Street.  
The Muslim Brotherhood, having shifted its position to include democratic norms, now stands 
to represent both of these political aims. Given the Muslim Brotherhood has a reasonable 
domestic presence in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the group represents a significant threat 
to these regimes. The second rift in the Sunni camp is between the religious secularism and 
moderate Islam of the UAE and the fundamentalism of Saudi Arabia. This rift, whilst significant, 
has not led to changes in the pattern of amity and enmity in the region i.e. alliances remain 
in place despite this debate about how secular or religious Islam should be. 
Religion is an important source of legitimacy and political identity for Middle Eastern states. 
Whilst this is immediately clear in states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is also evident within 
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and the UAE and Qatar. The national mosques built in these states serve to signpost the 
state’s political and religious ideologies, plus unify the state under a religious and cultural 
shared identity (Kishwar, 2015, pp. 193-194). As Kishwar states “the complex interplay of 
political and religious ideologies is at the core of contemporary discourse in the Middle East” 
(Kishwar, 2015, p. 195). Regionally, and further abroad, mosque building and charity 
foundations have become an important means of asserting an ideological and religious 
preference globally, both for the donor nation, and for global political Islamic connections. 
Through establishing connections with fellow Muslim nations and Muslim Diasporas, the 
borders to the Middle East are broadened beyond their geographical limits. Following 
disenchantment with communism and capitalism and a weakening of Arab Nationalism, 
political agency within the Middle East in the twenty first century has turned towards religion  
(Kishwar, 2015, pp. 200, 204, 206).  
The next two chapters look at the specifics of the state’s engagement with religion and 
secularism across the region.  The focus is on the sponsorship of militias by the case study 
states in the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars. This sponsorship is analysed in terms of the 
sectarian and secular or fundamentalist stances of the militia groups, and then related back 
to state identity through the secular religious index rating and sectarian identities of Iran, 




Chapter Five: Intervening in the Syrian Civil War: Regime Survival 
Strategies as Foreign Policy 
Introduction: Religion and Political Survival in the MENA Region  
The previous chapter outlined the ways in which sectarianism, secularism and 
fundamentalism are used as regional strategies by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar in 
the MENA region.  This chapter narrows the focus to specific regional strategies used by these 
states in the Syrian civil war. As such, the militias sponsored by each state in Syria are 
investigated in terms of their sectarian makeup, and religiosity. The militias are then 
compared to the regime/s that sponsor them.   
This test is undertaken to ascertain the impact of sectarianism, fundamentalism and 
secularism on patterns of militia sponsorship in the Syrian civil war. We previously established, 
states use the domestic contest between religion and secularism to build support and 
undermine their political rivals. This chapter looks to see if this authoritarian survival strategy 
is also used in the regional sphere. Another authoritarian survival strategy, the favouring or 
repression of certain sectarian groups, is also tested for within the Syrian civil war.  These 
factors are then tested against Selectorate Theory by looking for patterns of militia 
sponsorship in Syria that indicate that the primary focus of ruling elites in the domestic sphere 
(i.e. their own political survival) is also evident in regional politics.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. It starts by establishing the context through outlining 
sectarian and secular-religious competition in Syria and in the Syrian civil war. It then moves 
on to analyse the data collected on militia sponsorship. For instance, Iran’s militia sponsorship 
is examined for signs of sectarian favouritism. The militias sponsored by Iran are compared to 
the sectarian makeup of Iran’s winning coalition and real selectorate, and where the militias 
place on the secular-fundamentalist is compared to the regime’s index rating to see whether 
the regime’s domestic favouring of fundamentalist Shia is extended into the regional sphere.  
Next, the ratings of the loyalist militias that Iran sponsors are compared against the loyalist 
militias that Iran does not directly support to establish the importance of a militia’s religiosity 
to Iran in terms of selecting which militias to support from within the Assad camp.  The militias 
directly sponsored by Iran are then compared to the regime using the theoretical pillars 
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outlined in Chapter 2. These same tests are then applied to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. 
Following this, the findings are evaluated in relation to the research’s key questions, and then 
tied to the theoretical framework. The conclusion ends by relating this chapter’s research 
criteria and findings to the next chapter which applies these same tests to militia sponsorship 
in the Yemeni civil war.  
Part I. The Syrian Civil War 
The Sunni – Shia Sectarian Divide in Syria 
The structure of power in the Syrian state, with disproportionate number of Alawite elites at 
the top and the other groups comparatively more marginalised or repressed, accounts in large 
part for why the state collapsed into civil war in 2011 with opposition to the regime 
significantly coming from the Sunni sect. This is despite cross-sectarian support for the regime, 
particularly from co-opted or secular Sunni, the merchant class and Christians. The Alawite 
sect were persecuted by Sunni for centuries, eventually driven to seek sanctuary in the harsh 
environment of the ‘Nusayriyya’ mountains in today’s Syria in order to avoid Sunni prejudice 
(Talhamy, 2010, pp. 181-183).  After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following WWI, this 
Alawite area, alongside other areas which were later to form Syria, was placed under French 
administration and initially administered as a separate area.  Many Alawites were fearful of 
Sunni domination and persecution so were wary of reunification plans, which the French were 
later forced to carry out and which included integrating the Alawite area into Syria (MacKey, 
2011). Once integrated into Syria, Alawites were on the bottom most social rung and 
marginalised in the new state.   
With few other options available to them, the Alawites joined the military in order to climb 
out of the lowest social rung. Over time, the Alawites came to dominate the officer class 
paving the way for an Alawite General, Hafez al Assad, to seize power in November, 1970. 
Hafez al Assad established a regime that relied on the minorities’ greater fear of Sunni 
persecution than the regime’s repression, and the co-optation of the Sunni business class and 
moderates. In the current era, Sunni make up the majority of the armed forces. However, in 
the higher ranks, the regime has engaged in sectarian stacking, with Alawite’s 
disproportionately occupying officer positions  (Bhalla, 2011); (Nassif, 2015); (Malik C. , 2016). 
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Defining the Syrian military as an Alawite institution, though, is problematic given that Sunni 
make up the greatest proportion of the rank and file. It is the leadership – both military and 
political - that is Alawite dominated, with Syria effectively ruled by an inner circle of security 
chiefs led by Bashar al Assad and his brother Maher al Assad (Tabler, 2013); (Abuhamad, 2013). 
Unlike Ben Ali’s Tunisia, where the ruling elite did not have a significant hold over the military 
and thus were quickly toppled by the 2011 uprising, the Syrian elite have the loyalty of a 
significant portion of the military leadership. The Assad family’s hold over the military is 
secured through sectarianism and patronage with internal loyalties based around corruption, 
and patronage distribution channels reminiscent of mafia networks (Simpson, 2018; Sadowski, 
1987).   
With the strong Alawite presence within the Assad regime, and its religious identification with 
Shia Islam, it makes ideological sense that the Assad clan would seek ties within a Shia political 
alliance with Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. However, the relationship is based more solidly 
on geopolitical calculations; both resist the Israeli and the US presence in the Middle East, 
and both saw Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a threat, additionally both regimes have few allies in 
the region for instance (Byman, 2006). This is an important alliance for Iran as Syria provides 
a land bridge for Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, allowing Iranian power to reach as far as the 
Mediterranean. Since protests broke out in 2011, Iran has supported the Assad regime and is 
now considerably invested in the survival of the Assad regime against the Sunni dominated 
uprising.  The Iranian regime’s narrative frames their involvement in Syria as an integral part 
of resisting Sunni terrorism and takfiri65 groups such as Daesh which threaten the safety of 
Shi’a (Pantucci, 2016, p. 4). The narrative was subsequently broadened, “framing the conflict 
in Syria as part of both a wider ideological struggle (driven in part by ethnic and sectarian 
tensions) and a geopolitical (or structural) competition for power with Saudi Arabia” (Pantucci, 
2016, p. 4).  
This sectarian narrative was is somewhat mirrored by the Syrian regime, who beyond blaming 
Western and Zionist conspiracies,  positioned the regime as a secular actor fighting against 
Islamist forces and as a guarantor of stability in the region, thus framing their strategic 
narrative in terms of fundamentalist Sunni extremism (Scartozzi, 2015, p. 324). Whilst this 
                                                          
65 Professed Muslims who are considered unbelievers. 
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reflected political reality to a significant extent, it is also a propaganda tool of the Syrian 
regime. Playing off minorities’ fear of Sunni political power against their comparative sense 
of security with the Assad regime’s secularism, specifically Sunni extremist’s rejection of 
Christian and obscure Islamic sects such as the Alawites, the regime worked to frame the 
conflict in terms of the secular-religious contest, positing itself as the protector of secularism 
and minorities in a religiously chauvinistic and dangerous neighbourhood (Farha & Mousa, 
2015, pp. 182-185). The regime also strove to obscure the Arab Street’s dissatisfaction with 
the Assad regime, reframing the initial protests and outbreaks of violence as the work of Sunni 
terrorists (Scartozzi, 2015, p. 324). However, regime’s narrative has switched to a focus on 
sectarian inclusion and patriotism as the regime looks to put the state back together again 
(Assad, 2019). 
The Secular-Religious Dynamics of Syria and the Syrian Civil War 
The Assad regime presents itself as politically secular and supportive of religious minorities 
such as the Christians and Druze.  However, secular militias are split between supporting and 
opposing Assad (Al Tamimi, 2013); (Phillips, 2018). Additionally, there are extremist Islamist 
Shia groups fighting for the regime (Sinjab, 2012). These extremist groups tend to be under 
Iran’s tutelage. The secular loyalists include militias such as the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party’s armed unit, the Eagles of the Whirlwind, whose youth camps and workshops focus on 
secularism and encouraging Syrians to identify as Syrian in preference to their sectarian 
identity (Samaha, 2016); (Al Tamimi, 2013). The predominantly secular loyalist groups 66 
contrast with the conservative religious Sunni groups in the opposition such as the Sunni 
Jihadi group Daesh, who resist not only secularism, but also other religions and branches of 
Islam that differ from Sunni Salafi Islam.  
Sunni Jihadism in Syria grew as an offshoot of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In the past, the 
Muslim Brotherhood prior to 1980, and the Jihadists sought to lead resistance movements 
and challenge the existing elites in Syria.  A prominent Jihadi who sought to challenge Hafez 
                                                          
66 Of the sample of loyalist militias studied in this research 44% had a secular rating (3-4) on the Secular-
Fundamentalist Index Scale and 10% had a rating of 5-6 so were moderately or somewhat secular.  So just over 
half of the militia were secular or somewhat secular. This is shown in Figure 5.9 on page 175 of this chapter.  
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al Assad, the former President of Syria, was Abu Musab al-Suri67 who wrote that “Allah knows 
that the most important for me after believing in him is Jihad against Alawite Nusayris, Jews 
and Crusaders who desecrated the holy soil of Al-Sham”68 (Adyan Foundation, 2015, p. 22); 
(Alvarez-Ossorio, 2019, pp. 51-54).  This historical narrative, drawn from Hanbali tradition and 
Ibn Taymiyya, has been used as a sectarian mobilisation strategy throughout the current 
conflict (Alvarez-Ossorio, 2019, pp. 51-54). Successful suppression by the regime during the 
1990s and 2000s reduced the impact of Jihadi activity (Adyan Foundation, 2015, p. 40), 
however, the opportunity provided by the Arab protests has given groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Al Qaeda room to manoeuvre against the regime.  
The Jihadis are not the only group within the civil war to use fear as part of an identity driven 
narrative. The regime’s discourses against Islamism and the weaponisation of religion 
paradoxically also features attempts at religious and sectarian mobilisation. The Syrian regime 
portrays itself as the “secular defenders of religious pluralism” (Phillips, 2018). The regime 
favours political secularism, although Islam is portrayed as an important part of Syria’s 
identity, partly to ensure the regime does not isolate conservative Muslims, particularly 
amongst Sunni.  For instance, although in 1973 the regime introduced  a decree into the 
constitution which states that Syria’s President must be Muslim, it works to limit the use of 
Sharia law to govern society. Like Qatar and the UAE, the Assad regime is engaged in a 
balancing act between political secularism and religion. This balancing act reflects Syria’s 
selectorate options; for instance, its winning coalition is predominantly made up of elite 
minority sect members who support pluralism and secularism. To maintain support from 
minority sects such as the Christians, Twelver Shias, fellow Alawites and the Druze, the 
regime’s key narrative is that it is the bulwark against an Islamist Sunni government and 
against Salafi Sunni Islamist groups, both of which might persecute minorities. Yet Syria’s 
nominal selectorate features a majority of religiously conservative Sunni69  citizens. Given 
these issues the regime tends to swing towards political secularism, but does not support the 
                                                          
67 A Syrian Jihadist who joined the ‘Fighting Vanguard’ and fought during the Hama uprising against the regime 
in 1982. 
68 Al Sham is Bilad al-Sham was a Rashidun, Umayyad and later Abbasid Caliphate province in what is now the 
Levant. 
69 “Current reports estimate that between 71-74% of Syrians are Sunni” (Khatib, 2016, p. 4). However, this 
figure is likely to be affected by the vast death and displacement of Syrians, especially since 2015. 
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removal of religion from society in the manner of secularism in Western Europe. Syrian 
analyst Lina Khatib describes the Syrian regime and its religious/secular stance as follows: 
One outcome of the authoritarian upgrading that the Syrian regime undertook over the two 
decades preceding the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011 was the promotion of 
religion in a way that accommodates the secular vision – and, one might add, the 
authoritarian nature – of the state. Arguably then, Syrian secularism is no longer the hard line, 
uncompromising ideology that the Ba´ath party intellectuals once promoted, but rather a 
more complex ideology that is transforming Syrian society and pulling it in many directions 
that cannot simply be categorized as ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ (Khatib, 2016, p. 1 & 3). 
Khatib describes how Syria embraced a secularism that accommodated religious nationalism 
in the post-colonial period due to citizen desire for change and to help create unity in a highly 
diverse nation (Khatib, 2016, pp. 44-47). This shifted in the 1950s and 1960s where the 
Ba’thists sought to modernise society and move towards secularism by positing “secularism 
against religiosity”.  With rifts developing over this issue, however, the regime shifted again, 
to a secularism that positions religion prominently within society and in the state’s identity, 
but supported political secularism. Following the 1976-1982 Islamist rebellion led by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Lina Khatib and Joseph Daher point out that clerical networks that were 
able to be co-opted were encouraged to serve the state’s political agenda (Khatib, 2016, pp. 
3 & 4, 45) (Daher, 2019, p. 10) with the remainder marginalised or repressed (Mosinger, 2018). 
Hafez al Assad had noted the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and protests against the 
secularisation of Syria (among other issues), and thus had moved Syria towards a more 
pragmatic compromise between secularism and Syria’s “Sunni religious leaders who had ruled 
Syrian political life for centuries” (Khatib, 2016, p. 51). By the end of Hafez al Assad’s rule, the 
state sanctioned religious movement dominated the religious landscape and had largely 
supplanted the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Khatib, 2016, p. 53). Upon succeeding his father, 
Bashar al Assad “made it clear in his inaugural presidential address that it was important to 
recognise and to communicate with Islamists in order to avoid the radicalization of their 
discourse. The idea was that radicalism is less likely to prosper within an environment that 
recognises the vital role of religion in society” (Khatib, 2016, p. 53).  State sanctioned Sunni 
discourse was given priority with the Grand Mufti of Syria Admad Hassoun, who has been 
described as a mouthpiece of the regime, embracing both secularism and interfaith dialogue 
(Khatib, 2016, pp. 53-54); (Glass, 2012, p. 86).  
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The state sanctioned religious discourse;  
Stressed the importance of dialogue, co-existence and tolerance between citizens, between 
different Muslim sects and between Muslims and non-Muslims. […] Islam is promoted as a 
religion of peace predicated on communication with and acceptance of the other […] In this 
context, secularism seems to have become a framework for religious pluralism and co-
habitation, and Islam a religion that accepts to exist within that secular framework (Khatib, 
2016, p. 55).   
At the onset of the civil war, Assad developed narratives that were careful to integrate secular 
Arab nationalism with a unifying Muslim identity, whilst at the same time using religiosity to 
identify the rebels as the extremist ‘other’ who sought to divide Syrians through the 
application of their “takfiri extremist ideology” (Matar, 2019, pp. 2406-2409).  Even though these 
state sanctioned religious leaders are discredited as being mouth-pieces of the regime, they 
have also opened up space to discuss secularism within Syria (Khatib, 2016, p. 59).  Khatib’s 
description of the relationship between religion and secularism as being a dynamic and 
continually evolving mechanism of regime survival is a key observation of this research, and 
draws upon Fox’s Competition Perspective which states that religion and secularism are 
continuously engaged in an ongoing contest for dominance over the social and often also 
political spheres.  
The Sectarian Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War 
Despite the regime’s version of secularism, the Syrian civil war still contains significant 
sectarian mobilisation. Spurred by the contagion effect of the rapid success of the Egyptian 
and Tunisian uprisings, the Syrian civil war began as a social movement for democracy, 
freedom and human rights.  Across the region, civilians were frustrated by rising poverty, the 
lack of opportunity for the relatively more educated youth population bulge (60% of the 
region’s population is under 25 years), corruption and human rights abuses (Wilkins, 2011).  
Largely due to Sunni being the majority sect in Syria, there was a high level of Sunni 
participation within the protests. However, this resulted in the uprising developing a 
significant Sunni face. The leadership was typically Sunni which discouraged cross-sectarian 
participation. The high number of Sunni protesters can be attributed to several factors. Bashar 
al Assad abandoned his support for the rural and urban poor, the greater numbers of whom 
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were Sunni, in favour of policies and networks that favoured his contemporaries within the 
wealthy urban elite (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. ii; Kilcullen & Rosenblatt, 2014, p. 37) 
whose support is essential for his political survival. There was also a general perception 
amongst Sunni that the regime discriminated against their sect, in favour of the Assad’s 
Alawite sect. The continued acquiesce of the Alawites is also essential for Assad’s political 
survival. This perception of sectarian bias has endured despite the presence of Sunni within 
the wealthy urban elite that supports Bashar al Assad’s Presidency, and despite most Alawites 
being poor and not benefiting directly from the Assad regime (Tsurkov, 2019). 
Assad’s abandonment of large sections of the population, particularly rural, to the oversight 
of the security forces meant that citizens felt very alienated from the regime. Ultimately, they 
turned to other affiliations for support fuelling the development of a layer of leaders in Syrian 
society that sit between the regime and the citizens, acting within what Michael Crawford 
and Jami Miscik call the mezzanine level (Crawford, 2010). Most of the mezzanine leaders 
were from religious organizations which provided charitable and social support, filling the gap 
left by the regime (Hamidi, 2005). Similar to the Iraqi experience, the mosque had increasingly 
provided an important social space for citizens to connect over their dissatisfaction with the 
regime (Jackson, 2006, p. 17), with protests typically taking place after Friday prayers (Grira, 
2011). Subsequently, the increased stature of religious organisations enabled the use of Sunni 
mosques and religious institutions as the starting points for protests in 2011  (Khalil, 2017, p. 
148); (Ozgul, 2020, p. 168). Additionally, a corresponding rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
across Syria, and funding from Muslim Brotherhood members in exile replacing government 
subsidies, drove Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi ideologies amongst poorer Sunni Syrians 
(Khalil, 2017, p. 148). Significant Sunni mobilisation through the mosques meant that an 
increasing number of Syrians saw the uprising as potentially a threat to non-Sunni sects, and 
as Sunni retaliation for Hafez al Assad’s  atrocities against the Sunni dominated Muslim 
Brotherhood insurgency in the 1980s (Khalil, 2017, p. 141); (Wimmen, 2016, p. 21). 
The protests that preceded the Syrian civil war were primarily organised to start after Friday 
prayers as the Sunni mosques were the only places where congregation was possible (Ozgul, 
2020, p. 159). This highlighted the presence of Sunni as a sectarian group within the uprising 
and impacted on the uprising in the following ways:  
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First, it deterred Syrians who did not take part in the Friday prayers. Second, it deterred many 
Syrians who feared the sectarian nature of the protests. Third, adopting mosques as the main 
sites of the protests implied a sectarian nature of the protests that was not inclusive or 
engaging to various segments of the heterogeneous Syrian society that allowed for different 
religions, sects and ethnicities; rather it addressed only a specific segment of Syrian society, 
that is, religious Sunni. Fourth, by making from mosques after Friday prayers, many times led 
by the imams, protesters were strongly indicating that their Sunni religious identity was more 
important than their national identity, and this deterred the diverse Syrian populace from 
joining the demonstrations as they perceived and feared the sectarian nature of the protests. 
Last, and the most important, the Friday protests made associations between very specific 
religious affiliations and protesting for a national cause, which divided Syrian society across 
various political and religious lines rather than uniting it for a national political purpose (Khalil, 
2017, pp. 148-149).    
Additionally, some of the protest’s chants had verses that ‘stressed the Sunni identity of 
protesters in opposition to the Alawite regime, such as “Christians to Beirut, and Alawite to 
Coffin”’ (Khalil, 2017, p. 146) thus moving the some of the framing of the struggle from one 
against political and economic grievances into a narrative that described a religious struggle 
against a specific minority sect (Khalil, 2017, p. 150); (Wimmen, 2016, p. 5). However, whilst 
sectarian tensions were increasingly present in the protest movement, dissatisfaction with 
the regime was felt across the sectarian divide, with the initial protests in Dara’a featuring 
cross sectarian participation for example (Brønd, 2016, p. 21). Despite this, fears of sectarian 
conflict emerging from within the protest movement continued to grow.  Moreover, this 
sectarian element developed despite the co-optation of much of Syria’s religious leadership, 
with Grand Mufti Admad Badreddin Hassoun seeking to rally his Sunni followers to the regime, 
in return receiving dividends from the government.  Other religious leaders and scholars were 
under the same arrangement. The regime’s close relationship with the religious clerics of the 
country’s sects helped strengthen the regime’s image as inclusive and secular to the minority 
sects and co-opted Sunni (Wimmen, 2017, pp. 71-72), and helped contradict the widespread 
suspicion that the Alawites were favoured.  The regime was, in fact, engaged in a policy of 
partial sectarian favouritism, although this was set against a pragmatic effort at sectarian 
balancing to ward off potential sectarian opposition to the regime (Wimmen, 2017, pp. 72-
73).  Since the 1960s, part of this sectarian balancing involved downplaying Alawite religiosity 
and encouraging Alawite participation with Sunni mainstream religious practices (Wimmen, 
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2017, p. 73). However, despite favouring privileged Alawite elites from clans and tribes 
connected to the Assads, the main currency for privilege and prominence within Syria was 
loyalty to the Assads (Wimmen, 2017, p. 70), which given that the regime’s real selectorate 
contains a significant identity group element with strong minority support still meant that a 
disproportionate number of the regime’s winning coalition are Alawite. This is indicated in 
Figure 5.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.1. The Assad’s Sectarian Governing Structure. (Venn diagram created by author from 
assessments based on the research). 
The high number of Sunni in the protests meant that the Assad regime could leverage off 
minority fears of Sunni Islamic conservatism and Alawite fears of sectarian revenge to 
mobilise their base against the uprising. Assad played into existing minority fears of extremists 
through circulating a narrative that the uprising was the work of Salafist terrorists and 

























and themselves as non-sectarian appears to have been fairly convincing, especially amongst 
the minority sects. For example, Aymenn Al-Tamimi interviewed activists belonging to the 
Druze militia group Katiba al-Muwahhiden, who stated that ‘“people’s committees for the 
protection of villages and towns” have been formed to fight against “terrorism,” working “in 
cooperation with the Syrian army.” The militia also praised the Syrian army as non-sectarian, 
claiming that “the Syrian Arab Army is for all Syria. In it are Druze, Alawites, Sunnis, and 
Christians” (Al Tamimi, 2013). Despite this militias support for Assad, Druze loyalty to the 
regime was not assured. However, security concerns generated by the civil war, some rebel 
attacks on Druze villages, and the Assad’s strategic narrative that they represent the secure 
and stable choice for minorities has generated reluctance acquiesce from many Druze 
(Balanche, 2016). This type of strategic narrative is typical of authoritarian counter-insurgency 
tactics. Ucka describes how regimes frequently seek to generate fear of rebels based on 
sectarian, racial or ethnic considerations and frame them as either criminal elements or 
terrorists with no legitimate agenda or cause (Ucko, 2016, p. 39).  
This narrative has considerable power within the Christian and Alawite communities (Worren, 
2007, pp. 57-60). The Christians, for example, are reassured by the secular stance of the 
Ba’ath party given their fear of an Islamic state (Collet, 2010, pp. 84-85). However, it is 
important to qualify Christian support for the Assad regime.  For instance, Hazim of the Greek 
Orthodox Church in Syria claimed that fear of radical Islam does not translate into enthusiastic 
support for the Assad regime, but rather fear of the alternative (Khoury, 2012, pp. 48-49). 
This fear of radical Islam, alongside the dominant presence of Sunni within the uprising, has 
led Syrian Christians to generally shy away from the uprising in favour of supporting the status 
quo.  These minority apprehensions were stoked by the Assad government. According to the 
regime, without its protection the minorities would instead be dominated and persecuted by 
the Sunni.  The Assads have thus been able to leverage the fears of minorities to their own 
advantage. 
Syria and the MENA Regional Security Complex 
A defining feature of Middle Eastern international society is the sectarian politics that 
permeates inter-state and intra-state relations. In the current era, Shia remain the minority, 
accounting for between 10-15 percent of the global Muslim population. Middle Eastern 
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Shi’ites are concentrated in Iran, southern Iraq and southern Lebanon with significant Shia 
populations in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Shuster, 2007). Despite the current 
tension between the two religious blocs, around which political alliances and rifts have 
formed, over the centuries there have been periods of time in which both sects have lived 
relatively peacefully alongside each other.   
Tensions in the current era, however, run high. In 2006, the King of Jordan declared that Sunni 
domination of the Middle East was under threat from the rise of the Shi’a and that an Iranian 
led Shia crescent of power was developing through southern Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and Syria 
which sought to politically link, and therefore strengthen, Shi’a populations across the region. 
This alliance, principally between Iran, Iraqi Shi’a, Syria and Hezbollah, identified itself as the 
axis of resistance to the ‘evil’ of the US supported occupiers in Israel and railed against US 
‘imperialism’ in the Middle East (Abdo, 2013, p. 4). Sunni fears grew due to new developments 
within Shi’a regional politics. Hezbollah was on the rise in Lebanon, and has since cemented 
power, having the largest military in the state. Hezbollah’s rise in status has been achieved 
with the support of the Iranian government.  Moreover Iraq, from a Sunni point of view, was 
effectively handed to the Shia by the US after the ouster of Saddam Hussein and the 
predominantly Sunni Ba’ath party. The Alawites, an eclectic sect most commonly linked with 
Shi’ism, dominated Syria and the Assad regime were aligned with Iran. Given these 
developments, Iran was able to cement political links with these states and also with other 
state’s Shia minority communities. Iran was able to do this in part because these groups were 
often marginalised by their Sunni governments.  The ‘Shia crescent’ demonstrated the split 
between revisionist and status quo states in the Middle Eastern security complex. Sunni 
dominated the region and many of the Shia communities within the region, and consequently 
Shia were keen to revise the power structure within the security complex to one more 
favourable to themselves. It also revealed that the divides between political units on a 
regional level, rather than being state based such as you might see in Europe, were often 
based on sectarian political alliances that extended beyond state borders.  
Structural Realism outlines how states international behaviour reflects the hierarchies and 
power realities between states. Neorealism treats states as “black boxes” wherein a state’s 
place in the system’s hierarchical structure, rather than their internal features or governance 
regime, is prioritised in analysis. A state’s place in the international hierarchy is largely 
164 
 
dependent on a state’s material capabilities, thus Neorealism describes power as “based on 
the material capabilities that a state controls” and on latent power; i.e. “the socio-economic 
ingredients that go into building military power” (Mearsheimer J. J., 2010, p. 72). A state’s 
capabilities are typically assessed according to five criteria: its natural resources, its 
demographics, economic, military and technological capacity. This materialist explanation can 
also be applied to the hierarchical relationships between states within regional security 
complexes. The next section, through testing to see if religious domestic survival strategies 
are reflected in the regional sphere, essentially tests Structural Realism’s assertion that 
domestic politics has little relevance in the international realm because, as Mearsheimer 
states, “the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers. 
Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively little for how it acts towards 
other states. Nor does it matter much who is in charge of conducting a state’s foreign policy. 
Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save 
for the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 
78). Applying the theoretical pillars of this research to the regional sphere is essentially 
alleging that Selectorate Theory applies beyond its theoretical focus on domestic politics; that 
the international choices of a state reflect the ultimate aim of the ruling elite - to survive as 
political leaders.  This challenges the assumptions of Structural Realism. This research argues 
that Selectorate Theory also applies to the international and/or regional sphere, and tests this 
through searching for indications of domestic survival strategies within the regional sphere.  
This research therefore argues, that ultimately foreign policy will reflect the structural 
pressures of the international system, and the political survival strategies of the ruling elite.  
As such the next section analyses the patterns of militia sponsorship by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Qatar in the Syrian civil war, and analyses what these patterns reveal regarding the 
domestic religious survival strategies of the state’s ruling elites.  
 De Mesquito and Smith outline how the primary focus of the state is its own survival. As such, 
this research tests how intervention in civil wars relates to the domestic survival strategies of 
states. In the Middle East, the prominence of Islam means that survival strategies typically 
feature either degrees of Islamism or secularism as a means of offsetting, co-opting or 
countering potential domestic opposition. Previous chapters have shown how Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, the UAE and Qatar use religion to manage domestic survival and the use of transnational 
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Islam to strengthen their regimes’ legitimacy and identity. This section looks at how patterns 
of militia support in Syria relate to these previous discoveries.  
As Iran’s key state ally, Syria has an important role to play in the regional animosity between 
the Iranian alliance and the (now divided) Sunni camp. Therefore, the outcome of this conflict 
has geostrategic considerations for all the states considered in this research. Actors within 
the conflict are compelled to pick a side in this regional hegemonic contest in order to secure 
support from state backers. Figure 5.2 below demonstrates the differing levels and types of 
involvement in the Syrian civil war of each of these regimes. What is clear is that all the case 
study states have an interest in the outcome of the civil war and all of them are working, to 
varying degrees, to advance the outcome that best suits their own domestic and regional 
interests. 
Table 5.2. Case Study State Involvement Levels in Syrian Civil War 
State/Involvement Iran Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Neutrality or Non 
intervention 
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 (Figure created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in 
the Syrian civil war and on the regional security complex dynamics). 
Additionally, actors in the Syrian conflict, including states, all have an ideology with which and 
for which they hope to gain supporters. Given the religiosity of the region, these ideologies 
prominently feature a position on the scale between political secularism and fundamentalism. 
Therefore this research analyses the civil war’s militias through their position on the Secular-
Fundamentalist Index. The militia’s ratings are compared to their key state sponsor. Before 
comparing the militias and their state sponsors, the key actors of the civil war are described.  
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 (Figure created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in 
the Syrian civil war and on the regional security complex dynamics). 
The table above provides a broad overview of the key actors and sects in the Syrian civil war, 
including their relationship to the winning coalition of the Assad regime, their Secular-
Fundamentalist Index rating, their key idea, whether they aim to revise the state, and whether 
or not they are revisionist or status quo in terms of regional dynamics.  
The outcome of the Syrian civil war does not just potentially affect regional dynamics - 
particularly the Sunni/Shia state contest over hegemony - it also impacts the domestic 
stability of the region’s states. Elections in Syria, with the potential for Islamist participation, 
would particularly threaten the predominantly autocratic governments in the region for 
example. Although civil war has been arguably won for now, with ongoing instability, by the 
Assad regime’s sponsors, Figures 5.4 to 5.7 below demonstrate how threatening each 
potential outcome of the civil war would be from the perspective of each of the states under 
consideration (Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar). For instance, in Figure 5.5, the most 
severe threat to Saudi Arabia’s domestic political arrangements is presented as the success 
of the democratic pluralist or democratic populist Islamist actors. However, as these factions 
are predominantly Sunni, it would be likely that they would support the Sunni camp in the 
region. The ideal outcome for the Sunni quartet of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain 
in terms of their own domestic survival and their regional contest with Iran would be an 
autocratic moderate Sunni Islamist government. Iran, on the other hand, is keen for the 
existing Syrian regime to remain in power due in part to its sectarian alignment with the Shi’i 
identity, and despite its largely secular status which clashes with Iran’s theocratic ideology. 
Geopolitically, the regimes share a stance against Sunni extremism and have few friends 
amongst the Sunni states and actors in the region. It appears that regional and domestic 








Figure 5.4. Potential Outcomes of Syrian Civil War: Iranian Perspective. (Figure created by 
author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the Syrian civil war 
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Figure 5.5. Potential Outcomes of the Syrian Civil War:  Saudi Arabian Perspective.  (Figure 
created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the Syrian 
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Figure 5.6. Potential Outcomes of the Syrian Civil War:  Emirati Perspective.  (Figure created 
by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the Syrian civil 
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Figure 5.7. Potential Outcomes of the Syrian Civil War: Qatari Perspective. (Figure created by 
author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the Syrian civil war 
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Part II: Sectarianism and ‘Secularism versus Islamism’ as Regime Survival Strategies 
in the Regional Sphere: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
Militia Sponsorship and Sectarianism in the Syrian Civil War 
The outcomes in the following sections on the militias in the Syrian civil war have been 
calculated by correlating data from sources that report and analyse actors in the Syrian civil 
war. These sources are listed under the figures, however, all data has been cross-checked 
across multiple additional sources to ensure veracity. Given the fluid nature of militia in an 
active civil war, militias are not stable units. They merge, divide, fade from significance and 
emerge throughout the civil war. Therefore these figures, and those in the chapter that 
follows on the Yemeni civil war are used to extrapolate trends, not exact numbers in relation 
to the data. The first feature investigated is the relationship between sect and militia 
sponsorship. Figure 5.8 reveals that the states in question predominantly support militias that 
are the same sect as their ruling elites. Thus, there is a clear sectarian bias in militia 
sponsorship; Sunni states predominantly support Sunni groups and Iran predominantly 
supports Shia. This correlates with two features:  firstly, the regional hegemonic contest 
between Sunni states and Shia Iran, and secondly, the patterns of domestic sectarian inclusion 
and marginalisation as demonstrated by applying Selectorate Theory to each state in Chapter 
3. For instance, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar all marginalise Shia citizens with 
predominantly Sunni included in their winning coalitions, and Iran marginalises Sunni and 
other minority sects, with Shia featuring within its winning coalition. This supports the idea 
that states move religiously derived domestic survival tactics into the international sphere, 




Figure 5.8. 71  Sect of Militias Supported by Case Study States. (Sources: see Appendix 9, 
Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the 
Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
The next sections analyse the specific sponsorship of the case study regimes, and compares 
the Secular-Fundamentalist Index72 ratings of the regimes73 against that of the sponsored 
groups to see if there is a religious pattern beyond sectarian affiliation.  
Militia Sponsorship and Secular-Religious Competition 
Patterns of Iran’s Militia Sponsorship in the Syrian Civil War 
As shown in Figure 5.9, the largest bloc of militias in the loyalist alliance are secular militias.  
Given the secular nature of the Assad regime this is not surprising.  Additionally, given the 
strong link between religion and politics in the MENA region, and the fundamentalism of the 
Iranian regime, it is also not surprising that approximately 25% of the sample share Iran’s 
religious conservatism. Breaking this down further, Figure 5.10 shows that all the militias in 
                                                          
71 In the bar graph above, the Sunni militias that Iran sponsors are Palestinian Arab groups, clearly beholden to 
Iran for its support of their fight against Israel.   
72 Shown in Chapter 2 in Table 2.4, page 51. 
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the loyalist sample that Iran directly sponsored were in this category, rating 9 on the Secular-
Fundamentalist Index Scale. This indicates that despite working to secure the survival of the 
relatively secular Assad regime, Iran has also worked to encourage and support Shia 
fundamentalism within Syria during the civil war. Iran is both supporting its domestic interests 
in supporting the militias that share the regime’s fundamentalism and supporting its regional 
interests through encouraging Shia militias to fight on behalf of the Assads, ensuring that 
Iran’s state ally survives. This has caused tensions in Syria between the Assad regime and the 
Alawi and other minorities (Alam, 2019); (Al Souria Net, 2016). 
 
Figure 5.9. Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on 
pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the Sources used for 
Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings: Total Sample 
of Loyalist Militant Groups
Anglo-Saxon Secularism to Secular Model of Religious Accommodation: 3 to 4
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8




Figure 5.10. Iran: Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings for Iranian Sponsored Militias 
(Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 
10, Description of the Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
 In order to reveal in more detail how Iran’s sponsorship of militias in Syria relates to the 
regime’s religiously based domestic survival tactics, the positions of the militias directly 
sponsored by Iran are compared to the regime’s tactics in accordance with the theoretical 
pillars74 . As such, Table 5.11 below shows the Iranian regime’s positions relative to the 
theoretical pillars. This is then contrasted with the positions of the Iranian sponsored militias 





                                                          
74 Shown in Chapter 3, Table 3.10, page 115. 
Iran: Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings for Iranian 
Sponsored Militias
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
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Table 5.11. Iran’s Domestic Stance Relative to the Theoretical Pillars.   
Theoretical Framework Iran’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State  Velayat e-faqih  
 Conservative Shia Islamism  
 Leader of the axis of resistance against Israel and the West 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Represses both the moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic 
extremists who oppose the state.  
 Suppresses sects such as Sunni, Bahai’i and other minority 
sects.  
 Works to discredit secularists.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 Resistance to secularization through enforcement of 
conservative religious dictates such as the women wearing the 
hijab.  
 Police enforce the regime’s Islamist ideology.  
 Rewards given to volunteers who join the Baij 75  and the 
religious institutions.  
 The IRGC has a significant hold over the economy and thus 
politics.   
 Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: 9 
Selectorate Theory  Religious authority: the Shia theocratic left and right are 
cornerstone of the winning coalition/essential support for the 
regime.   
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
 Conservative Shia Islam 
                                                          
75 The Sāzmān-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin, or Mobilisation Resistance Force is a paramilitary volunteer militia that is 
involved with internal security and religious ceremonies among other things. The Volunteers get greater access 





 Iran leads a largely Shia alliance that seeks to constrain Sunni 
hegemony, Israel and the US.  
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 
Table 5.12. Iran’s Support of Specific Militias Explained through the Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical Framework Patterns of Militia Support in Syria 
Idea of the State  Only 9 out of the 77 Iranian backed militias were able to be 
confirmed as supportive of velayat e-faqih, however all Iranian 
sponsored militia’s ideologies were conservative Shia 
Islamism.  
 The Palestinians groups sponsored by Iran actively opposed 
Israel, it is extremely likely all the rest of the militias do as well.  
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Militias actively oppose Sunni - Sunni extremists typically.  
 Iran fights on the same side as Christians and Assyrians. 
However conservative Shia militias can be somewhat hostile 
to all religious groups that are not Shia.     
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 All groups able to be identified as supported by Iran directly 
had a Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating of 9 - so highly 
conservative and religious in keeping with Iran’s position.   
Selectorate Theory  The vast majority of groups supported by Iran are in keeping 
with the sect and religious fundamentalism of Iran’s domestic 
winning coalition i.e. theocratic Shia.     
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
 Iran predominantly supported Conservative Shia Muslim 
Militias, but also a small number of Palestinian Sunni Militias 
Regional Security 
Complex 
 Iran sponsors Shia groups that are supportive of Iran’s efforts 
to revise the regional arrangements; i.e. groups that resist US 
and often also Sunni power in the region. 
 (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 
10, Description of the Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-335).  
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It is evident by comparing the two tables that Iran’s domestic survival strategies relative to 
the theoretical pillars are largely matched by the political and theological positions of the 
militias they sponsor. Therefore, it is likely that Iran moves its domestic survival strategies 
into the regional sphere – specifically through its sponsorship of Shia militias.  
Iran: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex Motivations in Syria   
First of all, the patterns of alliance and competition in the MENA regional security complex 
broadly corresponds to the Sunni states versus Iran’s “axis of resistance”76. Given this it is not 
unexpected that Iran supports the survival of the Alawite dominated regime in Syria. However, 
although Iran is on the side of the Assad regime, who are supported by a range of secularists, 
minority sect groups, and Shia Islamists, the Iranian regime appears to directly support only 
the conservative Shia militias that match the domestic ideology of the Iranian regime; i.e. Shia 
religious conservatism. Therefore, it is likely that the religious authoritarian survival strategies 
that Iran uses domestically (i.e. the privileging of Shia and in particular religiously conservative 
Shia) are also employed in the regional sphere given that the regime supports the most 
conservative Shia groups from amongst the Assad loyalist militias. This domestic pattern 
corresponds with Iran’s alliances in the region which are significantly based on Shia led groups 
and regimes. The similarity between sectarian privileging patterns domestically, and Iran’s 
militia sponsorship choices in Syria, supports the idea that domestic regime survival and the 
realities of the regional system have both impacted on Iran’s decision making when it comes 
to selecting which loyalist groups to directly support in the Syrian civil war.  However, both 
religious strategies, the use of society’s ongoing secular-religious contest and sectarianism, 
are first and foremost political tools, and as such religious ideology is trumped by geo-political 
concerns. For instance, the Iranian and Syrian regimes arguably indirectly supported the 
expansion of Daesh into Eastern and North Eastern Syria (Read, 2018); (Behravesh, 2018), 
stoking insecurity and fear amongst religiously moderate Sunni and minorities that they faced 
suppression by an extremist opposition, thus strengthening the legitimacy of the regimes’ 
narrative that they are battling takfirist extremists, not a popular uprising.  
                                                          
76 The “Axis of Resistance” consists of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, previously and possibly Hamas. Some analysts also 
include the Shia militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.   
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Secular-Fundamentalist Ratings of Opposition Militias in Sample 
Figure 5.13 displays the secular to fundamentalist ratings of the all the militias in the sample 
that oppose the Assad regime.  Of all the militias assessed, 97.5% were Sunni or included 
more than 90% of Sunni fighters in their units. The militia’s position on the scale from 
secularism to fundamentalism typically ranged from religious secularism to religious 
extremism.  
 
Figure 5.13. Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: All Sample Opposition Groups (Sources: see 
Appendix 9, Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, 
Description of the Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
Patterns of Saudi Arabian Militia Sponsorship in the Syrian Civil War 
Figure 5.14 displays the Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings of the sample of militias 
sponsored by Saudi Arabia individually combined with militias that were supported by the 
Military Operation Centers (MOCs) with which Saudi Arabia was involved. Figure 5.15 
separates out the militias that Saudi Arabia reportedly sponsored directly; i.e. separately from 
the Military Operation Centers.  
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: All Sample 
Opposition Groups
French Laicite to Secular Model of Religious Accommodation: 2 to 4
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8




Figure 5.14. Patterns of Militia Support: Saudi Arabia and MOCs (Sources: see Appendix 9, 
Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the 
Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
All the groups that Saudi Arabia supported, including both directly and indirectly through the 
MOCs, predominantly ranged from religious secularism to fundamentalist.  
*  
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: Combined Saudi and 
MOC Militias
French Laicite to Secular Model of Religious Accommodation: 2 to 4
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
Secular Fundamentalist Index Rating: Saudi Arabia
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
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Figure 5.15. Patterns of Militia Support: Saudi Arabia (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List 
A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the Sources used for 
Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
However, after removing the MOC’s militia groups from the data, it is evident that Saudi 
Arabia typically directly supported Sunni Salafi groups that were/are highly fundamentalist 
with theocratic ideologies that scored 9 on the Secular-Fundamentalist Index. This is in 
keeping with Saudi Arabia’s domestic legitimacy needs. The militias that Saudi Arabia directly 
supported are compared against Saudi Arabia’s domestic survival strategies in the two tables 
below.  
Table 5.16 The Stance of the Saudi Arabia Relative to the Theoretical Pillars.   
Theoretical Framework Saudi Arabia’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State  Authoritarian monarchical Salafi Islamism. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Opposes both moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic 
extremists who oppose the state.  
 Supresses’ minority sects such as the Shia. Works to discredit 
political secularists.  
 Actively oppresses the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of 
“populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process” (with 
little emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018), seeking with 




 Highly conservative and theocratic regime.  
 Scored 8 on Secular-Fundamentalist Index.  
 Police enforce the regime’s Islamist ideology.   
Selectorate Theory  Al Saud Family and the Religious Establishment: the royal 
family and the religious elites are the cornerstone of the 





 Conservative Islamism 
Regional Security 
Complex 
 Part of anti-Islamist quartet.  
 Opposes Iranian influence.   
 Contests with Iran and Turkey for hegemony.  
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 
Table 5.17 The Saudi Arabia’s Support of Specific Militias Explained through the Theoretical 
Framework 
 Theoretical Framework Saudi Patterns of Militia Support in Syria 
Idea of the State  Looking at Figure 15.5, outside of the groups it supported as 
part of MOCs, Saudi Arabia supported militias whose position 
would not challenge its authoritarian monarchical Salafi 
Islamism.  
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Opposes both moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic 
extremists such as ISIL.   
 Does not support Shia militias.   
 Does not support the Muslim Brotherhood.   
 These positions are in keeping with its domestic stances.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 Predominantly supportive of groups that sought the 
Islamization of society, and predominantly supported groups 
with a rating of 9 but also highly supportive of groups with a 
rating of 8 which is the same rating as the regime – so highly 
Salafi groups.   
Selectorate Theory  With the possible exception of some of the more extremist 
groups that Saudi Arabia has sponsored, most of the groups 
are in keeping with the sect and ideology of Saudi Arabia’s 





 All groups that Saudi Arabia supports outside of the MOC’s 




 None of the groups that Saudi Arabia supports are Islamic 
populists or connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, this 
includes within the MOCs.  
 All the groups supported specifically by Saudi Arabia promote 
Sunni Islamism with probable sectarian stances on Shia and 
other minorities therefore side against the Iran within the 
contest between Sunni states and Iran in the region. 
 (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 
10, Description of the Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
Saudi Arabia: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex Motivations in 
Syria   
Saudi Arabia predominantly supports Sunni groups that oppose the Alawite regime in Syria. 
Furthermore, reflecting the rifts within the Sunni camp, the findings showed that Saudi Arabia 
did not provide aid to the Muslim Brotherhood which is perceived as an enemy of the anti-
Islamist quartet. Nor was it found to directly support the more secular actors in the conflict. 
However, Saudi Arabia does not oppose the secular or religious secularist rebel groups given 
it indirectly provides them with aid through its participation in the Military Operation Centers.  
Both of these positions, although reflecting rifts and alliances in the MENA region, are also 
indicative of the domestic survival needs of the regime. The regime is a highly conservative 
Wahhabi regime: it supports Salafi militias that share its predominantly sectarian world view, 
its position within the ongoing societal contest between secularism and religion, and thus the 
justifications for its continued rule. It is clear that the domestic concerns of Saudi Arabia are 
strongly reflected in its sponsorship of rebel groups in the Syrian civil war. Therefore, 
Selectorate Theory’s observations in the domestic sphere - that regimes are first and foremost 
preoccupied with political survival - is evident in these findings.  
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Patterns of United Arab Emirates Militia Sponsorship in the Syrian Civil War 
The UAE appears to have not sponsored any individual militias, preferring to support groups 
through the MOC framework. The groups supported by the MOCs typically range from secular 
to conservative, but not extremist. This is in keeping with the UAE’s religious secularism and 
moderate Islamism.  
 
Figure 5.18. Patterns of Militia Support: UAE and MOCs (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List 
A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the Sources used for 
Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
Because no information was found on any groups individually supported by the UAE, 
additional research was undertaken into the groups that the UAE actively opposed in Syria to 
provide a deeper insight beyond the regime’s involvement in the Southern MOC. The UAE has 
released an entire list of the groups it has designated as terrorist organisations.  Of the groups 
on this list that operate in Syria (and where adequate open source information was available), 
the UAE identified following groups as terrorists: Shia, Sunni jihadi extremists, or Muslim 
Brotherhood affiliated groups such as the Al Ka’kaa’ Brigade and the Al Tawheed Brigade, who 
were reportedly supported by Qatar (The National, 2014) (Oweis, 2013). This fits with the 
general trends of the UAE’s domestic strategies in relation to Shia groups, Sunni extremists 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: UAE and MOCs 
(There is no information to suggest that the UAE sponsored militas outside of the 
MOCs)
Anglo-Saxon Secularism to Secular Model of Religious Accomodation: 3 to 4
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
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The tables below compare the domestic survival strategies of the UAE regime with the 
ideological and policy positions of the militias that the UAE indirectly sponsored through its 
involvement with the MOCs.  
Table 5.19. The UAE’s Domestic Stance Relative to the Theoretical Pillars.    
Theoretical Framework UAE’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State  Authoritarian monarchical moderate Islamism, religious 
secularism, modernity and progress. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Opposes both moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic 
extremists. Supresses’ minority sects such as the Shia.  
 Works to discredit political secularists.  
 Actively oppresses the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of 
“populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process” (but with 
little emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018), seeks with 
the Trump administration’s help to rebrand the Muslim 
Brotherhood as extremists.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 Islam is the preferred religion and identity, this is protected 
and promoted by the state.  
 Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating 6. 
Selectorate Theory  Essential support: wealthy connected Sunni particularly those 
linked to the royal family’s tribal bloc. 
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
 Modern Sunni Religious Secularity. 
Regional Security 
Complex 
 Anti-Islamist populism Quartet.  
 Opposes Iranian influence.   




Table 5.20. The UAE’s Support of Specific Militias Explained through the Theoretical 
Framework 
Theoretical Framework Emirati Patterns of Militia Support in Syria 
Idea of the State  The Emirates mostly provided support through the US backed 
MOC’s.   
 The MOCs typically provided support for secularists through to 
moderate Islamists.  
 This is in keeping with the UAE’s idea of the state which is 
based around religious secularity.  
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Opposes both moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic 
extremists such as ISIL.   
 Does not support Shia militias.   
 Does not support the Muslim Brotherhood.   
 These positions are in keeping with its domestic stances.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 Typically, the MOCs support militias that are secular to 
moderate, with Religious-Fundamentalist Index Ratings of 
between 1-8.  
Selectorate Theory  Supports militias that do not seek democracy or conservative 
Islamism. This matches the regime’s domestic stance and the 
religious stance of its winning coalition.  
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
 Supports Sunni groups that broadly speaking link to its position 
on religious secularity. This is in keeping with its key identity; 
moderate comparatively tolerant Islamism.  
Regional Security 
Complex 
 None of the groups that the UAE supports are Islamic populists 
or connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, this includes within 
the MOCs.  
 All the groups supported by the MOCs would be likely to side 
with Sunni states against Iranian influence. 
 (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 




The United Arab Emirates: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex 
Motivations in Syria   
Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s foreign policy in Syria reflects its strong opposition to Iran and its 
influence across the region as it supports no Shia groups. Additionally, the UAE only supports 
those groups that do not oppose its domestic identity and idea of the state; namely, militias 
that range from religious secularist to Islamist (not extremist) in religiosity. This research was 
unable to verify that the UAE directly sponsored any militias in Syria as all it’s support 
appeared to be through the MOCs. The UAE is actively contesting within two rifts in the region: 
opposing the moderate Islamists and Qatar, and religious extremism. Both of these groups 
were not supported in Syria by the UAE, and the extremist ISIL was actively opposed. This is 
indicative of domestic concerns regarding the stability of their autocratic, religious secularist 
and nominally pluralist regime within the wider Middle Eastern and North African context.  
Patterns of Qatari Militia Sponsorship in the Syrian Civil War 
By comparing Figure 5.21 to Figure 5.22 below, it becomes evident that Qatar, separate from 
its involvement with the MOCs, tends to support moderate Islamist and Salafi groups.  
 
Secular Fundamentalist Index Rating: Qatar and MOCs
Anglo-Saxon Secularism to Secular Model of Religious Accomodation: 3 to 4
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
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Figure 5.21. Patterns of Militia Support: Qatar and the MOCs (Sources: see Appendix 9, 
Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the 
Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
 
Figure 5.22. Qatar: Patterns of Militia Support (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on 
pages 334-335, Source Description: see Appendix 10, Description of the Sources used for 
Syrian Militia Data, pages 336-337).  
This contrasts with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia supported a greater proportion of Salafi groups, 
and less moderate Islamist militias, and none of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated moderate 
Islamist groups that Qatar sponsored in Syria.  
Tables 5.23 and 5.24 below compare Qatar’s domestic survival strategies that involve religion, 






Secular Fundamentalist Index Rating: Qatar
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
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Table 5.23. Qatar’s Domestic Stance Relative to the Theoretical Pillars.    
Theoretical Framework Qatar’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State  Qatar supports a range of Islamist actors which matches with 
its idea of the state: which is moderate Wahhabi Islamism and 
religious secularism. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Has co-opted moderate Islamists and the religious 
establishment.   
 Monitors minority sects such as the Shia but also monitors 
Sunni activism.  
 Actively supports the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of 
“populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process” (but with 
little emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018). 
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 Islam is the preferred religion and identity, this is protected 
and promoted by the state.  
 Co-opted prominent Muslim Brotherhood and moderate 
Islamists such as Yusuf Qaradawi and Tariq Ramadan.  
 Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating 6 




 Wahhabi Religious Secularity. 
Regional Security 
Complex 
 Resistant to Saudi hegemony of Sunni camp.  
 Opposes Iranian influence but is less hostile to the Iranian 
regime than Saudi Arabia and the UAE.   
 Supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic populism 
around the region. 
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 
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Table 5.24. Qatar’s Support of Specific Militias Explained through the Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical Framework Qatari Patterns of Militia Support in Syria 
Idea of the State  Qatar promoted a wide range of groups with differing 
ideologies and Islamic identities.  
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
 Actively supports the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of 
“populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process” with 
little emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018) within Syria. 
However, domestically, activism by this group is very 
effectively suppressed. This move does not match with 
domestic survival considerations in a clear way, excepting if 
Qatar fears domination by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (see 
section conclusion below). 
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
 Typically supports militias that are secular to conservative, 
with a Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating of between 5-10.  
This matches either with the moderate Islamism of the regime, 
or with the conservatism of many of its Wahhabi citizens. 
Selectorate Theory  Again a complicated position in Syria. Most likely reflects that 
the political authority of the regime relative to its religious 
establishment and the strength of its domestic legitimacy, 
enabling Qatar to support a wider range of actors.  
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
 Supports groups that align both with its stance on religious 
secularity and with its conservative Wahhabi faith.  
 The Wahhabi faith in Qatar is not as powerful in politics as it is 
in Saudi Arabia.   
Regional Security 
Complex 
 Actively supports Muslim populism across the region, 
particularly if linked to its Muslim Brotherhood networks.  
 Is possible it promotes the Muslim Brotherhood and is aligned 
with Turkey as a means of balancing against Saudi Arabia and 
UAE in the region.  
 Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have appeared to insist that 
Qatar align its foreign policy with their own.  
 (Sources: see Appendix 9, Citation List A. on pages 333-334, Source Description: see Appendix 
10, Description of the Sources used for Syrian Militia Data, pages 335-336).  
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Qatar: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex Motivations in Syria   
Qatar was the only one of the three Arab states examined to support the Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliated groups. Qatar supported Islamists and Salafi militias, reflecting the prominence of 
Islam in Qatari society and across the region. Qatar faces very little threat from religious 
pressure given the lack of a domestic clerical leadership class and the political secularism of 
its governance structure. However, given the religious secularism of Qatar, its support of 
Salafi groups is a surprise. Additionally, given Qatar is an autocratic monarchy, its support of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups also appears to be 
somewhat risky in terms of regime survival. Both groups have the potential to disrupt the 
Qatar regime’s domestic legitimacy. So either the regime is more interested in Islamism than 
its own survival, which is unlikely, or it perceives it faces a greater threat than if certain actors, 
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, emerge victorious in Syria. By supporting the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Syria, Qatar risked its alliance with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  However, given 
past and present animosity between the current ruling branch of the Al Thani family and Saudi 
Arabia and the Emirates, allowing these two states too much influence in Qatar could provide 
them with the opportunity to promote another Al Thani branch into power. Indeed, in 2017, 
the UAE asserted that Sheikh Abdullah bin Ali al-Thani and then Sheikh Sultan bin Suhaim al-
Thani had ‘rightful’ claims to greater power in Qatari political landscape. This was an attempt 
to damage the legitimacy of the past and present Emirs, Hamad and Tamim Al Thani  
(Ulrichsen, 2018, p. 16).  Furthermore, the strengthening of Saudi Arabia’s hegemonic bid for 
regional leadership would also be likely to give Saudi Arabia additional means to meddle in 
Qatar. Therefore, the Qatari ruling elites potentially risked sacrificing their alliances within 
the Gulf Cooperation Council for domestic distance from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. 
However, Qatar’s regional power is based in the ‘Arab Street’, and by backing down to Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, this regional soft power would have been reduced. Qatar sought to 
promote a form of Islamism that weakened Saudi Arabia’s ability to lead the region, and this 
created a rift with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The resultant ‘blockade’ of Qatar by Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE has increased Qatari distrust of both regimes, and created a “newfound 
nationalism” (Ulrichsen, 2018, p. 18) and thereby provided some protection to the current 
ruling family from interference. However, had the Muslim Brotherhood succeeding in gaining 
power in Syria, this would have protected the Qatari ruling elite from Saudi and Emirati 
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interference, increased nationalism and national pride at home, and increased Qatar’s 
regional influence. This is in keeping with Selectorate Theory which stresses that politicians 
are ultimately concerned with their own political survival. Hal Brands assertion that “much of 
what the Russian and Chinese governments do in foreign affairs is related to securing their 
domestic power” (Brands, 2018, p. 72) also applies to Qatar. 
In contrast to the Qatari position, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reject democratic Islamist actors 
on the basis that they challenge authoritarianism and consequently have been actively 
opposing them across the region since the ‘Arab Spring’. As Tamara Cofman Wites states, 
“After Brotherhood political parties won elections in Egypt and Tunisia (pluralities, not 
majorities, in both places), these governments came to understand the Brotherhood as an 
existential threat: a model of governance that challenged their own authoritarian, 
monarchical Islamism with populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process (not civil 
liberties, but the monarchies don’t care much about civil liberties either)” (Wittes, 2018). On 
the other hand, Turkey, another potential hegemon in the region, and Qatar have supported 
the emergence of these groups in the post-‘Arab Spring’ environment. The emergence of a 
Sunni democratic Islamist government in Syria would likely side with other Sunni States 
against Iran. However, as a democratically elected Islamist government it would also be likely 
to face some reticence from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, so this government would be likely to 
resist Saudi leadership of the Sunni camp, in line with Qatar and Turkey’s aims. Given this it is 
reasonable to assume that Qatar wants a Sunni government in Syria that restrains or balances 
against Saudi hegemony. The quartet have become firm enemies of the Qatari regime, and it 
appears, if attempted coup rumours are to be credited (Emmons, 2018), behind the scenes 
this branch of the Al Thani family have faced hostility from the Emiratis and Saudis ever since 
Emir Tamim al Thani’s father, Hamad al Thani, succeeded to power after staging a peaceful 
coup against his father, Khalifa al Thani in 1996.  Unlike his father, Hamad al Thani did not 
marry into the Attiyah family. “Saudi influence in Qatar has long been through prominent 
families, most notably that of the Attiyahs, who are their blood relations”  (Ramesh, 2017).  
Furthermore Khalifa al Thani was also generally understood to be supportive of Saudi 
interests in the region. In contrast Tamim and Hamad al Thani have stressed foreign policy 
independence and have behaved as mavericks amongst the Sunni camp, resisting Saudi 
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pressure and instead pursuing an activist foreign policy and an assertive Qatari identity.  As 
such, Saudi dominance of the Sunni camp is not in Qatar’s best interests. 
Analysis: The Domestic Survival Strategies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
in the Syrian Civil War 
This section analyses the findings outlined above in relation to the following theoretical pillars: 
the Selectorate Theory and sectarian alliances, Secular-Religious Competition Perspective, 
the patterns of religious regulation and political opponents, the idea of the state and Identity 
Hegemony Theory. The findings establish that there is a connection between the religious 
domestic survival strategies and the militias sponsored in the Syrian civil war and show that 
the sect of the ruling elites strongly matched the militias they chose to sponsor. The 
connection between the Secular-Fundamentalist rating of the regimes and the militias they 
sponsor is not as pronounced, but there is still a clear preference towards sponsoring those 
militias that share the same rating.  The same rating tends to indicate a similar ideology 
relative to religion and secularism, as well as a similar religious identity. It follows from this, 
that the willingness of various militias to accept sponsorship from a certain state can be an 
indication of their beliefs and vision for Syria. 
All the regimes sponsored rebels or militia groups that were predominantly the same sect as 
their ruling elites. For instance, in all the states studied, 99% of the militias sponsored were 
the same sect as the regimes. In Chapter 3 it was established that all the regimes had a 
preferred religion; the militias sponsored by the studied states were of the same religion and 
sect as this preferred religion, with Iran sponsoring Shia Muslim militias 99% of the time, and 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar sponsoring Sunni Muslim militias. This links to the domestic 
survival strategy of distributing dividends to a select sectarian group, i.e. the same sect as the 
ruling elites. This was established by applying the Selectorate Theory against the regimes in 
Chapter 3. However, given that this sectarian dynamic of Sunni versus Shia rivalry is also 
present in the regional sphere, it is difficult to establish whether or not the motivation behind 
sponsoring same-sect militias comes from the need to pursue regional or domestic objectives. 
Indeed, it is likely that the strategy of supporting militias of the same sect as the regime 
supports both objectives: that of working to strengthen the sectarian alliance that the regime 
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belongs to within the region, and working to ensure the continued support of the ruling elite’s 
sectarian group at home.  
It is not just Islamism, but also its opposite – secularism - that features as a key pattern in 
militia sponsorship. Fox proposed in his Secular-Religious Competitive Perspective Theory 
that the contest between secularism and religion is an ongoing feature in society. Within the 
Middle East this research suggests that this contest is used as a domestic survival tactic with 
the regimes promoting a secular or religious ideology against which they criticise or contrast 
with their main domestic opposition groups, and through which they secure domestic support. 
In order to see if this domestic survival tactic is also used in the regional sphere, the Religious-
Fundamentalist Index rating of the regimes was compared against that of the militias they 
support/supported in Syria. Generally speaking, the regimes backed militias with a similar 
rating to their own. This was particularly evident with Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of whom 
preferred to sponsor militias that shared the conservative Islamism that they use to secure 
their domestic legitimacy – albeit Saudi Arabia supports Sunni Salafi groups and Iran supports 
Shia. Both regimes tended to avoid supporting extremist groups, such as ISIL, who oppose 
and directly challenge existing regimes. The UAE, who was the least active state of the case 
studies in the Syrian civil war, also tended to sponsor groups whose position on religious 
secularism and Islamism was similar to their own. The MOCs predominantly supported groups 
that ranged from religious secularism to Islamism in keeping with the UAE’s domestic 
narratives in support of its Muslim identity and religious secularism. These narratives are also 
used to contrast the regime against such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIL, framing 
both groups as extremist. Qatar is more complicated. It supported the widest range of actors, 
ranging from religious secularist through to Salafi groups. Additionally, it supported the 
Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups which both Saudi Arabia and the UAE opposed. It is 
likely that given its Wahhabi conservative citizens combined with the regime’s moderate 
religious secularism, Qatar can domestically afford to sponsor quite a wide range of actors 
without generating significant domestic opposition. Furthermore, given Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE want Qatar to follow their lead within regards to counter revolutionary strategies across 
the Middle East, whereas Qatar seeks to maintain its foreign policy independence, Qatar may 
wish to use the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Brotherhood’s other supporter Turkey, to 
balance against Saudi dominance of the Sunni regional alliance. Qatar tends to be seen as a 
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maverick actor in the region, and clearly aims to continue to exercise its sovereignty in this 
manner. However, given instability in Iraq and the post-‘Arab Spring’ chaos in Egypt and Libya, 
the other large Middle Eastern Sunni states are too weak to exert significance influence across 
the region leaving Saudi Arabia room to dominate the Sunni camp. With long standing friction 
between Saudi Arabia and the current ruling branch of the Al Thani family, this is not in the 
interests of the Qatari regime.  
The evidence shows that groups and sects suppressed domestically in the case studies states 
are the same groups they seek to suppress within the Syrian civil war and across the region. 
The domestic sectarian divide in Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE and Qatar exists across the region 
so it follows these sectarian cleavages would be leveraged as states support allied sects 
regionally, in their domestic and regional policies. Furthermore, many opposition movements, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, operate both within states and transnationally; therefore, 
in order to weaken these sources of domestic opposition, states aim to weaken the larger 
groups and movements across the region as well. Qatar is able to support the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the group is present, but largely inactive in Qatar. This is indicated in Figure 
5.25 below. Saudi Arabia and the UAE share their animosity towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
with the Syrian regime. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood is indicated as banned in the UAE, 
Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Figure 5.25 demonstrates that the quartet 
(Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE) has cut ties with Qatar over its regional support of the 
group. Given that the Muslim Brotherhood is inactive in Qatar, it is likely that Qatar views the 
threat to its independence from Saudi Arabia and the UAE as more concerning than any 
potential threat from the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region. From the 
perspective of Saudi Arabia and the UAE it is clear that, with “legal Brotherhood offshoots 
participating in parliamentary politics” across the region (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 2017), 
electoral Islamism emerging as a force following the ‘Arab Spring’ would be considered a 




Figure 5.25. The Muslim Brotherhood in the MENA Region. The information presented in 














Bahrain (Diplomatic links 
with Qatar Severed)
Yemen (One of goverments
cut ties with Qatar)
Palestinians
Libya (One of Goverments 









(Diplomatic links with 
Qatar Severed)












All the states tended to support groups that shared the same idea as the regime. Generally 
speaking, Saudi Arabia supported fellow Salafis, Iran supported conservative Shia Islamists 
who resisted Western and Sunni dominance, the UAE supported moderate Islamists who did 
not mention democracy, and Qatar supported Islamists. Given that transnational dynamics, 
particularly those that relate to religion and sect, impact domestic politics in the MENA region, 
these states are particularly concerned with ideas, identities and ideologies that are gaining 
strength within the regional security complex. With the Muslim Brotherhood winning 
elections in Egypt and Tunisia following the ‘Arab Spring’ the UAE became increasingly hostile 
towards the movement. Despite the Emirati regime’s efforts to suppress it, the Muslim 
Brotherhood retains a reasonable amount of support in the Emirates. With its efforts against 
the movement seemingly stalled at home, the UAE appears to have moved this political and 
identity contest into the regional sphere where it has more room to manoeuvre against the 
movement. This is in keeping with Hintz’s Identity Hegemony Theory which posits that 
identity contests that are blocked at home are often contested regionally instead.  
As Hintz notes, both states and transnational civil society use foreign policy to extend their 
influence. Civil society makes use of transnational networks because activists and opposition 
movements are disadvantaged in their domestic settings by their lack of institutional access 
(Hintz, 2016, p. 341). The Muslim Brotherhood is a prime example of this, utilising its 
transnational networks in order to overcome the repression it is often subject to within states. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that states attempt to compete with the Brotherhood where 
they seek to advance their influence: through the Muslim Umma.  
In sum, where it matches with or does not disrupt regional policy, the case study regimes 
extend domestic survival strategies that use religion as a tool into the regional sphere. As such, 
patterns of support and opposition within the domestic sphere has a causal relationship in 
terms of which militias are supported regionally. The patterns analysed relate to sectarianism 
and the ongoing contests between political ideologies that propose either a form of 
secularism or a form of Islamism. In the conclusion that follows these patterns will be analysed 
against the theories used in this research, leading to some new assumptions.  
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Discussion: The Theoretical Implications of Domestic Survival Strategies that use 
Religion as a Tool in the Regional Sphere  
First of all the findings show that domestic survival strategies that use religion as a tool are 
also used in the regional sphere, specifically in terms of militia sponsorship in the Syrian civil 
war. This supports the premise that Selectorate Theory has relevance beyond the domestic 
sphere and is, in fact, also relevant in the regional sphere: regime elites seek to secure their 
own political survival through domestic and regional policies. As Hintz points out in relation 
to her position that states move domestic identity contests into the regional sphere, this is at 
odds with Structural Realism which posits that states are black boxes whose international 
actions are determined by their hierarchical position within the regional and international 
systems. Whereas Structural Realism dismisses the domestic environment or ruling elites of 
states, claiming that interests dominate, the operation of Selectorate Theory in the regional 
sphere conversely reveals that ruling elites and the strategies they use to survive have an 
impact on international decision making. Hintz’s work supports this finding in that she states 
that foreign policy is a mechanism through which states can “compete against their domestic 
rivals as much as their international counterparts” in contests over domestic identity (Hintz, 
2016, p. 340). Hintz’s identity argument is relevant to domestic survival strategies as identity 
proposals establish who the in- and out-groups are within a state (Hintz, 2016, p. 341). The 
in-group/out-group pattern makes up a state’s real selectorate and winning coalition as per 
Selectorate Theory.   
Furthermore, Hintz points out that her theory challenges rational IR understandings because 
she contends that state interests are not fixed, and that foreign policy is not immune to the 
politics of identity nor to domestic stimuli (Hintz, 2016, p. 340). Therefore, foreign policy can 
be used to realise the interests of ruling elites as well as state interests. This has been largely 
borne out by this chapter’s analysis. For instance, all states supported militias aligned with 
the same sect as their source of essential support at home, or as Smith and de Mesquito state, 
their winning coalition. Additionally, the militias the states supported were closely aligned 
with the ruling elite’s idea of the state and their position within the secularist-fundamentalist 
contest.  This means that the states’ domestic authoritarian survival strategies are supported 
by their choices regarding militia sponsorship in the region. 
200 
 
However, despite this focus on the domestic origins of foreign policy choices, far from 
rejecting Structural Realism this research accepts that structural considerations act as a 
restraint on the projection of authoritarian survival strategies into the regional sphere. This 
goes further than Neoclassical Realism which includes domestic considerations such as 
“public opinion, the legislature and privileged interest groups” in its analysis of foreign policy  
(Ripsman, 2009, p. 170). Instead, the conclusion reached here is in line with Hal Brands’ 
observations regarding China and Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policies: that “Russia 
and China are employing strategies more specifically tailored to making the international 
environment safe for their regimes” (Brands, 2018, p. 73). This research supports the 
proposition that Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are working to create a regional sphere “in 
which autocracy [continues] to be privileged and protected” (Brands, 2018, p. 75), a strategy 
Brands outlines in relation to China and Russia. Thus, ruling elites will act in the interests of 
their own political survival - except where state interests by urgent necessity trump this 
internationally. Iran’s relationship with Syria is an example of this. Iran’s idea of the state and 
state legitimacy is firmly based in velayat e faqih and conservative Iranian theology. This 
contrasts with the legitimacy and idea of its key State ally, Syria. Iran has non-state allies such 
as Hezbollah and Hamas. The Syrian regime promotes religious secularism and Islamic 
moderation, a stance on which the Assad regime’s support from minorities is based. However, 
Syria is the only other Middle Eastern state led by an authoritarian government that is not 
dominated by Sunni, and regionally Iran needs allies to resist pressure from hostile Sunni 
states such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, although in terms of sect Syria is a match with Iran’s 
authoritarian survival strategies, which are based on privileging the Shia sect, in terms of 
religiosity the Syrian regime is at odds with Iran’s domestic promotion of conservative Shia 
Islamism. However, due to regional considerations this is overlooked in the interests of 
developing a regional network of Shia allies.  This research contends that a more secure ruling 
elite group will work more strongly in the interests of the state, except if this interferes with 
their domestic political survival. Where they are able to pursue regional policies that work in 
the ruling elite’s favour domestically, they will do so. Additionally, whilst domestic survival 
concerns of ruling elites and the intervening state’s interests are projected into the Syrian 
conflict, it is evident that little consideration is given to potential outcomes in terms of the 
Syrian domestic scene; outcomes appear to be selected based on how well they match the 
aims of the intervening state. Thus, in the MENA region international state behaviour is 
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impacted by ruling elite’s political survival concerns, and de Mesquito and Smith’s theory that 
elites seek to stay in power above all, is also evident in foreign policy.  
This chapter, however, has revealed an issue with assessing the sponsorship of militias in the 
civil wars: the need to further separate the two motivational criteria – (1) state interests as 
per Structural Realism and (2) the regional survival strategies of the ruling elite as assessed 
through an extended understanding of Selectorate Theory. Structural Realism treats states as 
“black boxes” wherein a state’s place in the international or regional system’s hierarchical 
structure, rather than internal factors or governance regime, is prioritised in analysis. A state’s 
place in the international hierarchy is largely dependent on a state’s material capabilities, thus 
Structural Realism describes power as “based on the material capabilities that a state controls” 
and on latent power; i.e. “the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power” 
(Mearsheimer J. J., 2010, p. 72). This materialist explanation can also be applied to 
hierarchical relationships between states within regional security complexes. A state’s 
capabilities are typically assessed according to five criteria: its natural resources, its 
demographics, economic, military and technological capacity. Using Structural Realism as a 
guideline for assessing state interests in order to differentiate them from domestic survival 
strategies leads to a question: can research separate out the interests of the state from the 
interests of the ruling elites in terms of their own political survival?   
Overall, this chapter takes a step towards answering this research’s questions in the 
affirmative, establishing firstly that Selectorate Theory relates to the regional sphere and that 
states are not just ‘black boxes’. Therefore, we can expect to see the features of religion as a 
ruling elite survival tool in the regional sphere, and that this is discoverable in terms of militia 
sponsorship in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. This has been borne out given that the militias 
sponsored matched with both the sectarian strategies the regimes used domestically and, to 
a lesser extent, with the degree of religiosity the states supported as part of the idea of the 
state. The presence of militia sponsorship patterns that reflected the states domestic contests 
between religion and secularism established that Fox’s Secular-Religious Competition 
Perspective also has relevance in the regional sphere. It is evident that efforts to promote a 
certain degree of fundamentalism or secularism domestically were reflected in regional 
militia sponsorship patterns with the theocratic Iranian regime supporting the more 
conservative militias in the Syrian civil war, for example. This reflects Hintz’s Identity 
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Hegemony Theory whereby identity and ideological contests blocked domestically are moved 
by regimes into the regional sphere where the regime may have more room to manoeuvre. 
The state’s domestic relationship between religious regulation and opposition groups extends 
into the regional sphere as well. For example, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates both work to 
suppress the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, and  their regional policies following the 
‘Arab Spring’ reflected a similar drive to curtail the political power of the Muslim Brotherhood 
within the states which fell or were openly contested as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’.  MENA 
politics is a mixture of Realism and Selectorate Theory – we can see domestic elite group 
competition played out regionally set within the constraints and opportunities of state 
interests within the regional security complex.  
Beyond Selectorate Theory, this research investigates beyond the understanding that religion 
in politics in the MENA region is driven solely by sectarianism. It has been clear with the 
emergence of ISIL that another significant religious cleavage in the region is between religion 
and secularism. There is an additional rift emerging between democratic Islamism and 
autocratic Islamism. The cleavage between religion and secularism is multifaceted. It is not a 
black and white ‘fundamentalism versus political secularism’ dynamic, but about degrees 
along the scale from one extreme to the other. States and the non-state religio-political 
leaders compete to take over the region.  Both sectarianism and the competition between 
secularism and religion are tools used by actors to compete for power and to impose 
contrasting political and religious agendas.  It is important to note that Iran also supports 
groups with which they do not share a religious connection; namely, Hamas in the Gaza Bank 
and Christian groups in Lebanon. Whilst these groups are still sectarian in their makeup, and 
place an emphasis on religions role in governance, neither are Shia. This is an example of Iran 
pragmatically pursuing geopolitical aims through different sectarian groups where an alliance 
is able to be made.  
This research seeks to contribute to filling the gap in the international relations literature on 
how regimes use religion in foreign policy as a mechanism for domestic political survival. The 
research looks at the projection of domestic regime survival tactics through the contestation 
of issues that involve religion such as secular-religious competition, Selectorate Theory and 
sectarianism, the idea of the state, religious regulation and political opponents and Hintz’s 
Identity Hegemony Theory. These issues have been addressed through the analysis of the 
203 
 
case study states patterns of support for militias in the Syrian civil war. The findings indicate 
that all these strategies are present in the regional sphere through testing patterns of militia 
sponsorship against the theoretical framework. All the states support, where they can, 
militias whose stance on sectarianism, secularism and fundamentalism best supports the 
legitimacy of their own political survival at home.  
The next chapter looks to make explicit the difference between regional authoritarian survival 
strategies and regional aspirations. In order to do this, the following chapter applies the same 
tests to the Yemeni civil war. The chaotic nature of the Yemeni state, both prior to and during 
the current civil war, is important in terms of this research. The Yemeni case reveals a greater 
difference between the domestic survival strategies and the states regional interests, 
allowing these to be more firmly established than the case in Syria where the two are harder 
to separate.  In Yemen, politics reflects a constant drive for political survival in a chaotic 
political scene. The interests of the Yemeni state have been, and are, neglected by a 
dysfunctional ruling elite. The assumption is that disruptive contests over political power 
dominate the domestic political scene. In this environment, the intervening states behaviour 
is more blatant and less nuanced than in the Syrian example. Furthermore, due to the 
difficulties in getting information for all militia groups, and therefore having selected a sample 
group of militia’s based on access to enough information, the findings in this chapter need to 
be tested further. Testing the Syrian civil war findings against the Yemeni civil war thus 
strengthens the case that regime’s project domestic survival strategies that use religion as a 








Chapter Six: Intervening in the Yemeni Civil War: Religion, 
Sectarianism and Religious Secularism as Externalised Authoritarian 
Survival Strategies 
Introduction:  Militia Sponsorship Patterns in the Yemeni Civil War 
The previous chapter investigated the sectarian and secular/religious patterns of militia 
sponsorship in the Syrian civil war, and related this to the domestic survival tactics of the four 
regimes examined in this thesis. This chapter carries out a similar investigation, but focuses 
on the Yemeni civil war.  As such, the patterns of militia and group sponsorship in Yemen by 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE and Qatar are analysed and then related to the theoretical pillars. 
Specifically, this chapter looks for religiously-derived authoritarian stabilisation and survival 
tactics that are utilised in the regional sphere.  
The Yemeni case is more complicated than the Syrian example as the sectarian divide 
between domestic actors is less pronounced, and politics in Yemen is typically pragmatic 
being based on relationships to tribal leadership rather than ideological affiliation between 
groups. This blurs the religious/secular boundaries between foreign actors and militias. 
However, divisions are still evident and, as such, Yemen provides an additional environment 
in which to analyse these dynamics. In contrast to Syria, where the regime leadership features 
elites that are frequently Alawite and linked to the Assad family, and is aligned with Iran, prior 
to the confusion of the ‘Arab Spring’ Yemen’s government contained politicians of different 
sects and the uprising against it comes from multiple fronts including the Zaydi Shia Houthis 
seeking to establish political dominance in the North and a predominantly Sunni group from 
the South pursuing secessionism. Thus the Yemeni civil war offers the opportunity to apply 
the tests from the previous chapter in another political environment thereby deepening the 
findings. In doing so, the research’s findings are tested to see if they relate just to the Syrian 
example, or whether they have broader regional relevance. 
The first half of the chapter outlines the dynamics of the Yemeni environment and the Yemeni 
civil war beginning with the legacy of President Saleh and moving onto the secular and 
religious dynamics of the current civil war. The second half of the chapter analyses the 
research’s findings regarding militia sponsorship by Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE and Qatar in 
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Yemen. These findings are related to the theoretical pillars. Strategies that are found to be 
present in both the domestic and regional spheres are tested against regional strategies in 
order to assess the motivation for them: regional aspirations or domestic survival strategies. 
The conclusion then considers whether Selectorate Theory, secular/fundamentalist 
competition, or a state-based material explanation is the better explanation for sectarian, and 
religion based militia sponsorship in Yemen.  
Part I: Yemen and the Yemeni Civil War 
The Legacy of President Saleh 
Ginny Hill, a journalist and policy advisor on Yemen, summarised the complexity of Yemen in 
2017 when she stated that “in Yemen the truth is especially fluid. It is often elaborate, 
sometimes unbelievable and always many layered. Yemen is a world of relationships, not 
institutions, and each version of events that is revealed to you depends on the speaker’s 
assessment of your connections and suspected affiliations” (Hill G. , 2017, p. xi).  
She goes on to explain Yemeni politics under President Saleh as follows:  
For more than three decades, during the long running presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
Yemenis learned to function in a system of power that thrived on speculation, denial and false 
allegations. Saleh’s decision making was highly personalized and chaotic, and he deliberately 
fostered confusion (Hill G. , 2017, p. xi).  
Lisa Wedeen explains this further, 
“[The Yemeni case suggests] that regimes can rely on spaces of disorder as a model of 
reproducing their rule. Maintaining domains of disorder as a way of exercising control may 
not be a self –conscious or optimal strategy, but it has its own logic and efficacies for regime 
survival (Wedeen, 2008, p. 151).  
The current state of affairs in Yemen still strongly reflects the legacy of President Saleh’s rule. 
The state does not consistently act in its own interests; instead, the state operates according 
to the elite’s tactics for securing their own political survival. Thus, in keeping with Selectorate 
Theory, the Yemeni state operated not in the interests of the state, but in the interests of the 
political and tribal elite and the strategies that they used to remain in power. This has meant 
that the political scene in Yemen continues to consist of confused “multiple realities”  (Hill G. , 
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2017, p. xiv). As Ginny Hill adds, “Since the outbreak of civil war in March 2015, [President 
Abdrabbuh Mansour]  Hadi’s flight from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, and the start of the Saudi-led 
air campaign in Yemen, the culture of feint and slander continues to be stoked by factional 
politics and a highly partisan media” (Hill G. , 2017, p. xii).    
A preoccupation with political survival has also marred the rest of Yemen’s political groups. 
Applying the findings to the theoretical framework revealed a key flaw in Yemen’s political 
groups. Looking at the ‘idea of the state’ section within Tables 6.11, 6.14, 6.17, 6.20 of this 
chapter, it is evident that the ideas and stances of the opposition are ill defined. They are 
based around procuring political allies and establishing distribution channels to provide 
political dividends.  As a result, their plans for the country are murky and ideologically flexible 
and are failing to deliver a unifying and inspiring vision of the future.  The Yemeni political 
scene is thus likely to remain divided for the foreseeable future. Owing to this complex picture, 
it is essential to understand Yemen’s domestic sectarian and political dynamics before the 
case study states strategies in Yemen are considered.   
The Sectarian Dynamics of Yemen and the Yemeni Civil War 
Yemen’s population is primarily divided across two sects.  The largest group comes under the 
Sunni umbrella, the Shafi`i sect. There are also small numbers of the Maliki branch of Sunni 
Islam.  Sunni are approximately 56% of the population and Shia, of the Zaydi denomination, 
approximately 44% (Zady, 2000). Historically, Sunni and Shia have had good relations in the 
country. This is likely attributable to the moderate version of Islam in Yemen and its Sufi 
element (Kabir Helminski, 2017). Sunni Islam in Yemen comes under the Shafi`i school, which 
is relatively tolerant.  Zaydism, the Shia sect in Yemen, is similar to Sunni Islam on matters of 
theology and is closest to the Shafi’i school in matters of Islamic law.  
Zaydi Islam is a moderate version of Shia Islam.  Theologically the sect is closer to Sunni Islam 
than the mainstream Twelver Shia Islam followed by Iran. Partially as a result of this 
sectarianism has not been a strong feature of Yemeni politics and society. The Zaydis hold 
particular views on the political leadership of the Muslim community, which differ from the 
Shafi’i school. These include (a) an affirmation of Ali’s appointment as the successor to 
Muhammad, (b) the theoretical right of a Sayyid to the Imamate, and (c) support for Zayd ibn 
Ali’s revolt against the Umayyads in 740. 
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In order to understand leadership within the Houthis and Zaydis as a whole, we need to look 
at the Zaydi doctrine of the Imamate. The Zaydi Imamate existed in Northern Yemen from 
893 until the revolt in 1962.  Zaydi political and social hierarchies are built on the Sayyid’s 
cultural right to leadership. “The crux of Zaydism’ rests on legitimacy through this line of 
descent. True claims to the Zaydi Imamate, however, do not rely exclusively on the bloodline; 
rather – in theory – they also rest on the principle of khuruj or ‘coming out’ against oppression, 
during periods of poor governance or control by unjust authority” (Hill G. , 2017, p. 10).  The 
Sayyid leader must enforce Islamic legal rulings and interpret revealed texts whilst possessing 
political qualities such as “military prowess, courage, tactical intelligence, political acumen, 
fiscal responsibility and a commitment to justice.  In addition to Sayyid descent, religious 
knowledge and political skill, a candidate for the imamate must lead a military uprising against 
an unjust ruler preceded by a period of missionary work” (Haider, 2010). Due to these 
principles, Zaydis had a strong preference for an activitist Imam. However, as ‘Sunnification’ 
accelerated and the influence of Wahhabism grew in the 18th and 19th centuries, Zaydis 
scholars moved away from political activism. A clash grew within the Zaydi Imamate between 
the ‘Sunnified’ scholars who supported rulers unconditionally and traditional Zaydism which 
endorsed rebellion. Haider describes how “the consequences of this conflict between a 
Sunnified Zaydism resembling Shafi’ism77 and a traditional Zaydism rooted in the traditional 
theological tenets and political activism of the community’s early history continue to 
reverberate in contemporary Yemen” (Haider, 2010).   
The last Zaydi monarchy, the Mutawakkilite dynasty, held spiritual and temporal power in 
Northern Yemen between 1918 and 1962. The monarchy was headed by Imam Yahya 
Muhammed (Notholt, 2008, p. 4.07). Zaydism’s central tenet was that the spiritual leader of 
the Muslim community should also be the supreme ruler (Imam) of the Muslim state. Political 
and legal authority belonged to “the people of the (Prophets) house” (Weir, 2007, pp. 230-
232).  A coup, backed by Egypt, overthrew the Zaydi dynasty in 1962 and a civil war erupted 
lasting from 1962 to 1970. In 1990 the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen unified under the President of Northern Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh 
(Notholt, 2008, p. 4.07).  
                                                          
77 A moderate branch of Sunni Islam that is prominent amongst Sunni in Yemen.  
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In the current era, Najam Haider describes Zaydism as in crisis between two fault lines: one 
religious and the other lineal. The first fault line centres on ‘Sunnification’, with the 
government under Saleh favouring an educational curriculum that strongly leaned towards 
Shafi’i Islam. For instance, Saleh’s government made moves towards restricting the influence 
of traditional Zaydism, as despite being Zaydi, Saleh is not religiously motivated. This included 
closing religious schools run by Zaydi scholars who preached “the political activism 
characteristic of traditional Zaydism and restricting the activities of cultural organisations run 
by those that follow traditional Zaydism. This has caused a decline in their influence in major 
urban centers” (Haider, 2010).  
The second fault line is between the Sayyid and non-Sayyid Zaydis. The authority of the Sayyid 
families has, over time, led to systematic social discrimination and disempowerment amongst 
non-Sayyids. From the 1980s, Wahhabi scholars (who focused their missionary efforts on the 
non-Sayyid) exploited this rift. This also aggravated a long-standing contest for influence 
between Zaydi scholars, who were predominantly Sayyid, and the largely non-Sayyid tribal 
leaders. Faced with the spread of ‘Sunnification’, non-Sayyid scholars began working to 
defend Zaydism against Wahhabism. The ‘Believing Youth’ movement was one of the 
grassroots organisations that sprung up in the traditional Zaydi stronghold of Saa’da. This 
group stressed religious study based on the non-Sunnified form of Zaydi Islam.  By the early 
2000s, Hussein al Houthi, a junior member of a prominent clerical family, led this group in 
open revolt against the Yemen government (Haider, 2010). The suppression of Zaydi clerical 
establishments by the Saleh government and the instability and disruption of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
prompted the Houthi’s to rise against the government. 
Alongside dissatisfaction with President Saleh, the Houthi rebellion, which began in 2004, was 
also driven by the rise in Salafi – especially Wahhabi – Sunni Islam in Yemen.  Salafi Islam has 
made inroads into Yemen in the last few decades, mostly due to transnational proselytising 
and a shift in religious identities (Bonnefoy, 2009). However, it is important to separate 
Yemeni Salafi into two branches.  The core branch emerged in the 1980s and stems from the 
teachings of the prominent Yemini Salafi cleric, Muqbil al-Wadi’i who was exiled in 1979 from 
Saudi Arabia prior to the Ikhwan uprising in Mecca.   
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Salafism has grown over the last three decades to compete with the traditional political and 
religious identities in Yemen, such as Sufis, Zaydis and to an extent the Muslim Brotherhood.  
One of the doctrines of Al-Wadi’i’s thought, and hence the core branch of Yemeni Salafism, is 
the rejection of partisanship, or hizbiyyah, due to the belief that it divides the Muslim 
community. As such, the theological stance of the main Yemeni Salafi branch rejects party 
politics, democracy and voting on principle, thus resulting in a reduced participation by 
Yemeni Salafis in the country’s politics, and a stress on loyalty to existing rulers whilst 
eschewing uprisings. These apolitical Salafis have been very active during the current era, 
stigmatising other groups, particularly the Socialists, but also the revivalist Zaydis (Houthis) 
and the Sufis. In an illustration of this branch’s attitudes, the main heir to Al-Wadi’is position 
as leading cleric of the quietist Salafis, Yahya al Hajuri, was quoted from a conference 
recording by analyst Laurent Bonnefoy as having described the “Arab Spring is a plague due 
to Masonic doctrine orchestrated by Jews who have exploited the Muslims” (Hill, 2012, pp. 
3-5).   
In the 1990s, another Salafi branch emerged - the Salafiya Harakiya - which is politically active. 
The Houthi narrative is that this activist Salafi community, and indeed the wider Salafi 
community, is heavily involved with the Saudi regime. There is a Yemen wide narrative that 
Salafi Islam is a Saudi import and that, given this, the Saudis are able to meddle in Yemeni 
politics through their links with the Salafiya Harakiya (Hill, 2012, p. 11).  This narrative is 
overlaid with the fact that Yemen is a highly conservative country; as such, Salafi extremism 
is not dramatically different from the religious social rules and values that already exist in 
Yemen, particularly in rural areas (Hill, 2012, p. 18).   
The Secular-Religious Dynamics of Yemen and the Yemeni Civil War 
Secularism and the Yemeni civil war 
Secularism in Yemen is rooted most deeply in Southern Yemen, largely due to its socialist past.  
The socialist republic was formed in 1970, uniting with the North in 1990. However, 
Southerners have felt marginalised under this new arrangement and are unhappy with the 
extraction of southern resources by the North.  Therefore, in 2007 the Southern Movement 
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(STC) or al Hirak al-Janoubi was formed calling for secession and the return of the South 
Yemen Republic (Alsaafin, 2019).   
The Southern Movement has taken an active role in the current Yemen civil war, fighting 
against extremist groups and the Houthis on the side of the nominal government led by 
President Hadi. However, there are reports of fighting between the STC groups and pro-
government forces, with a clash described in April 2017 between the two over control of 
Aden’s airport (Ardemagni E., 2019).  President Hadi is supported by the Saudi Arabian 
government whilst the STC is supported by the UAE.  The STC contains multiple actors but due 
to its socialist membership, it is considered secular. The General People’s Congress (GPC), 
now led by President Hadi, is also generally considered moderately secular, at least by Middle 
Eastern standards. The characteristics of the STC and the Hadi government are outlined below. 
The Southern Secessionists 
The STC’s focus is not secularism, but separation from the North which they see as exploiting 
the South. However, there are socialist party members in its ranks and amongst its leadership. 
For instance, the current leader of the movement is  Ali Salem Al-Beidh who was the Former 
General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist party and a former President of South Yemen 
(Southern Hirak, 2019). Therefore, it is likely that the STC at least supports religious secularism.  
However, fighting within the Southern Movement are units such as the Shabwani Elite Forces, 
Hadhrami Elite Forces and the Security Belt Forces who are essentially tribal secessionist 
movements who frequently focus on protecting tribal interests. As Eleonora Ardemagni states 
“ these military groups include armed Salafis, socialists, and sympathizers of the former 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), all of whom share secessionist beliefs” 
(Ardemagni E., 2019).  As such, to claim that the Southern Movement contains exclusively 
secular actors would be inaccurate. The group largely represents a drive to secede from the 
North. This complicates, but doesn’t negate, claims that the UAE’s foreign policy in Yemen is 
strictly focused on efforts to “strengthen secular forces in the country at the expense of 
Islamist factions backed by Saudi Arabia” (Salacanin, 2019). However, the STC do not so much 
as promote secularism as oppose domination by Northern Islamists and Northern elites. As 
such, their position on religion and secularism is unclear, excepting the Marxist groups within 
the secessionist camp.  
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The Hadi Government 
The legacy of Saleh’s presidency sets much of the scene for Yemeni politics.  Ginny Hill 
describes this aptly. 
Under Saleh’s protracted leadership, competing tribal, regional, religious and political interest 
agreed to hold themselves in check by a tacit acceptance of balance. This implicit system of 
power sharing bound itself together through a dense network of personal relationships, 
which – in effect – formed the foundation of the regime. Access to, or exclusion from, this 
system was defined by marriage, military stipends, business contracts and political pay-offs. 
Personal interests trumped the authority of formal institutions in almost every instance (Hill 
G. , 2017, p. 2). 
This balancing is seen clearly in Hadi’s government (who replaced Saleh as President in 2012). 
Hadi’s coalition against the Houthis, which contains both the Yemeni socialist party and the 
Muslim Brotherhood linked Al Islah party, is a testament to this. Therefore, although the Hadi 
Government opposes extremist Islamist groups and the Houthi, given they contain Al-Islah as 
a coalition partner it is likely they are not opposed to moderate Islamism.   Hadi’s fight against 
Islamic extremists, such as al Qaeda, points to the Hadi government as being uninterested in 
Islamist arguments for governing but not secularist. Hadi’s party, the GPC, is generally 
considered to be comparatively non-ideological, instead being viewed as pragmatic and 
representative of certain interest groups.  
Islamism in Yemen 
In the North, the toppling of the Zaydi imam’s monarchy in 1962 saw a move towards political 
secularism with the establishment of a republican regime.  However, the strong influence of 
religious actors remained.  Despite this, prior to the outbreak of the civil war which toppled 
President Saleh, sectarian groups in Yemen were tolerant of each other; with Sunni at times 
praying in Zaydi mosques and vice versa (Bonnefoy, 2009). Thus, the most notable feature of 
Islamism in Yemen is how well integrated it has been within the state and its institutions.  
Unlike states such as Syria which chose to repress political Islam, Yemen sought to integrate 
and co-opt its Islamist actors, from the Muslim Brothers, Salafist, jihadists, Sufis to the Zaydi 
revivalists. Although this system reduced political violence and increased political stability, as 
a political formula it has come under increased pressure in recent times. 
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The Yemeni ‘Arab Spring’ protests were mainly led by those disgruntled with the regime. The 
Islamist Houthis in Saada were among those calling for the removal of the regime having 
dropped their demands for independence. The Muslim Brotherhood party, Al Islah, also 
joined calls for Saleh to step down. As a result, activists became concerned that the 
international community would see the uprising as Islamist, with Tawakkol Karmn, a member 
of Islah’s Shoura Council stating: “Our party needs the youth but the youth also need the 
parties to help them organize. Neither will succeed in overthrowing this regime without the 
other. We don’t want the international community to label our revolution an Islamic one” 
(Hill G. , 2017, p. 207).  The regime used Al Islah and the Houthis involvement in the ‘Arab 
Spring’ protests to further the narrative that any transition of power would result in an 
Islamist government in Yemen (Hill G. , 2017, p. 213). Al Islah’s attempts to downplay the role 
of Islam was met with some scepticism by Western journalists working in Yemen. It was 
reported by journalists that: “The protesters keep telling me that Saleh and his family have 
been neglecting Islam in the way they rule Yemen, and they don’t respect the principles of 
Islam” (Hill G. , 2017, p. 225). 
Muslim Brothers 
Groups that follow the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood are the most prominent within 
Yemeni Islamism. From the 1940s, these groups were involved in opposition to the Zaydi 
monarchy and the 1962 overthrow of the Zaydi imamate was achieved by a coalition of 
nationalists, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, and modernists. A founding principle of the 
resultant republic was the integration of all parties. Therefore, the Muslim Brothers were 
bought into the state system, particularly within the education system and the security forces. 
The early group of Brothers’ ideals were carried on through the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood 
branch; the Al Islah (Reform) party which was created in 1990 (Bonnefoy, 2009). It is 
important to note that Al Islah does not advertise its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood 
and although the Muslim Brotherhood members are the backbone of the party it also includes 
merchants, Salafi and tribal leaders such as General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar. The Muslim 
Brotherhood had been part of the state’s regime and military for the last two decades and 
has since emerged as the main political competitor to the remnants of the regime (Alles, 2014, 
p. 45 & 48).  Yemeni politics revolves around what Robert Burrowes called the ‘tribal-military-
commercial’ complex.  Post-1977, the military became the prominent vehicle through which 
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the tribes sought to secure political influence and ‘dividends’ from the government in terms 
of preferential advantages for their own tribes. General Ali Mohsen, long considered second 
in command of Yemen after President Saleh, is a prominent Sheikh in the politically dominant 
and largest Hashid tribe (Knights, 2013) which is based in the predominantly Zaydi North. 
Zaydi Islamists 
Zaydism has been challenged by the growth of Salafi Islam, at times supported by the Saleh 
government with the help of Saudi Arabia (Bulos, 2018), in Northern Yemen. As Haider 
describes, 
 Zaydism was challenged by a gradual Sunnification that began in the 9th/15th century and the 
intensification of Wahhabi missionary activities in the 14th/20th century. These tensions 
persist into the modern period and have given rise to a new wave of political activism 
reflected in (a) the armed resistance of the ‘Youthful believers’ led by the Al Huthi78 family 
and (b) the emergence of a new generation of Zaydi scholars such as Muhamad Yahya Salim 
Izzan who do not trace their descendants to Ali and Fatima (Haider, 2010). 
There was a civil war between a Zaydi Islamist group, the Believing Youth (al-Shabab al-
Mummin), and the regime from 2004 – 2010.  The group shifted to violent resistance under 
the leadership of Hassein bin Badr al-Din al-Houthi. “The complicated role of the state in 
relation to the expansion and (lack of) supervision of Salafi religious schools in Saada was at 
the heart of the early grievances by a Zaydi revivalist movement under the leadership of 
Husayn al Houthi” (Yadav, 2017, p. 283).  The Al-Houthi spearheaded efforts to promote 
Zaydism and thwart attacks from Salafists. The issue is not a clear-cut case of sectarianism as 
President Saleh was also Zaydi; however, he represented tribal interests as opposed to 
religious interests. The Zaydi Believing Youth’s opposition to the regime was despite the fact 
that the regime elites were predominantly from the Zaydi sect (Alles, 2014, p. 44). In fact, 
despite the South becoming Marxist following the removal of the British and being 
predominantly Sunni, in the unified Yemen its leaders have typically come from the Zaydi 
North, which did not come under British colonisation.  However, the regime Zaydi were not 
under any particular Zaydi influence and are opposed by the Houthi (Alles, 2014, p. 44).  
Instead, the regime Zaydi were part of the tribal patronage system that existed, and typically 
                                                          
78 The Al Houthi or Huthi family claims to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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aligned with tribal interests and networks. However, the conclusions drawn have both 
religious and historical foundations.  
The ‘Arab Spring’ disrupted the unstable Yemeni political scene resulting in a power vacuum 
that allowed the Houthis to gain control of most of the area around Saada. There has been 
no evidence that the group has tried to reinstate Zaydi religious rules in this area (Alles, 2014, 
p. 46)  and, despite most Houthi members focusing their opposition to the regime on calls for 
more “inclusive governance and accountability”, there were some amongst them who called 
for the revival of the Zaydi theocracy (Yadav, 2017, p. 383).  In UN-led negotiations following 
the fall of the regime, representatives from the Houthi were recognised as a political group. 
An argument erupted within the negotiations over the role of Sharia in the constitution. 
During the negotiations fighting on the ground continued with Houthi coming up against a 
group of Salafi in Dammaj, where a prominent Salafi centre is located.  Both sides claim they 
have been subject to the proselytising actions of the other with the Houthis making the 
additional claim that Saudi Arabia has supported anti-Zaydi Salafi expansion in the region. This 
degree of sectarian infighting is new to Yemen (Alles, 2014, pp. 47-48).  
Jihadist Groups 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was founded in 2009 following the merger of the 
Saudi and Yemen branches in an effort to resist a Saudi crackdown.  Ansar al Sharia emerged 
in 2011.  The group has ties to AQAP. There is some speculation that it is in fact a rebranding 
of Al Qaeda; for instance, Shiekh Abu Zubayr Adil bin Adbullah al-Abab, a leader within AQAP, 
stated that Ansar al Sharia is the name that they use when introducing themselves to local 
populations (Alles, 2014, p. 45).  
In 2011 the Arab protests swept the Middle East. The resultant Yemeni uprising provided 
Ansar al Sharia with the opportunity to seize the southern towns of Zinjibar and Jaar.  They 
kept control of Zinjibar and its surrounds following the withdrawal of the Yemeni army who 
retreated in order to counter the uprising in the ‘change squares’ of the main cities. Ansar al 
Sharia implemented religious rule until pushed back by the Yemeni army, with US support, in 
May 2012 (Alles, 2014, p. 46).  AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia are still active in Southern Yemen 
(Alles, 2014, p. 48). 
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In areas such as Bayda where fears remain that the Houthi seek to reinstate the Zaydi 
theocracy overthrown in 1962 and the Houthis have been accused of atrocities, the tribes, 
who had previously sought to block AQAP’s influence, at times seek to work with them against 
the Houthis and vice versa.  This is not an ideological, religious or political alliance however 
and it is therefore tenuous as a result.  Unlike the Houthis, the AQAP has avoided antagonising 
the tribes.  However, the mainstream narrative, which states that AQAP is embedded within 
the Yemeni tribes, is inaccurate.  The tribes are largely resistant to AQAP, but those tribes 
faced with the Houthis have joined with AQAP in the face of their common enemy. These 
alignments are temporary and is not as sectarian as it first appears; it is ultimately a strategic 
alliance. However, the longer the war continues the harder it will be for the tribes to push out 
either group (Nada & Rowan, 2018).  
Both prior to and after the ‘Arab Spring’ the secular-religious contest in Yemen has been 
fractured between multiple domestic actors, most of whom demonstrate varying degrees of 
ideological insincerity. Thus, the contest between secularism and religion is blurred in Yemen 
due to the political parties and actors tending to be more pragmatic than ideological. 
Generally speaking, the Southern movement is considered the most secular, followed by 
Hadi’s government although both of these groups contain Islamists and Salafi groups so 
secularism is not a clear-cut objective for either group. It is more accurate to classify the Hadi 
government as representing certain interest groups and seeking power, and the Southern 
movement as being the most secular actor in the conflict, though its key focus is secessionism.  
Yemen and the MENA Regional Security Complex 
Regional security complexes are vulnerable to ‘contagion effects’.  Civil wars frequently reflect 
the dynamics in their regional neighbourhood. Evidence has been found for a spatial 
clustering of civil wars; where one civil war breaks out, neighbouring states are destabilised 
and so more likely to fall into civil war as well (O'Loughlin & Raleigh, 2008). Civil wars often 
develop a transnational dynamic due to shared grievances across borders by sects or ethnic 
groups in neighbouring countries, their shared sympathies or fears and participation in the 
war economy by regional actors seeking to project their influence into these conflicts. Given 
that the Middle East and North African regions’ political alliances, both domestically and 
regionally, tend to reflect sectarian favouritism, the combination of weak borders with cross-
216 
 
border sectarian groups with shared goals and grievances brings a sectarian dynamic into the 
security complex. The rapid spread of the ‘Arab Spring’ across the Middle East regional 
security complex is indicative of the fact that the region’s states share an authoritarian regime 
type and this has meant that the region’s populations have shared grievances in relation to 
this. Thus, the Middle Eastern protest movements of 2011 gathered a regional momentum.  
The structural dynamics within regional security also impact on civil wars.  Regional states 
compete for hegemony, over the dominant ideology, for resources and alliances and this 
encourages states to participate in civil wars to ensure the outcome results in a regime that 
is sympathetic to the participating state’s own regional aspirations and, this research posits, 
its domestic survival strategies. If we consider the Yemeni civil war it can be observed that all 
the states studied have a high level of investment in the outcome of the conflict (see Table 
6.1).   
Table 6.1. Case Study State Involvement in Yemeni Civil War. 
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 (Figure created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in 
the Yemeni civil war and on the regional security complex dynamics). 
The Middle East and North African security complex has no hegemon, but rather a number of 
competing regional powers:  Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. In recent years, the large 
non-Arab states, Turkey and Iran, have opted to challenge the Saudi and Israeli influence in 
the region.  The patterns of amity and enmity in the region cluster around two key conflicts: 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Saudi-Iranian hegemonic competition in the Persian 
Gulf.  There are also lesser regional conflicts: the contest between Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
(Schmidt, 2019) and the UAE.  As such, the outcome of both the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, 
one in which Iran stands to lose an ally (Syria), and the second where it stands to gain an ally 
(Yemen), will have a marked influence on the hegemonic Islamic identity of the security 
complex and impact on the power arrangements between the states.  Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE largely seek to maintain the status quo in the region, although given the ‘Arab Spring’ 
establishing a new arrangement between power and religion appears to be the aim of Prince 
Muhammad bin Salman and the UAE. Iran wants a revolutionary revision in that it both seeks 
to advance its power and position within the regional hierarchy, and wants to change the 
regional structure and hegemonic Islamic identity to reinforce its own survival at home.  Qatar, 
for its part, is a radical revisionist state: it does not seek dramatic change in the regional 
structure but it does seek to alter its position within it, or perhaps more accurately, to be able 
to continue its independent and frequently maverick foreign policy that at times runs against 
the policies of the GCC.  The domestic actors in the Yemeni conflict all have preferred 
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arrangements with regards to regional politics, and their positions affect whether or not 
intervening states will support them. The militias’ respective views on both Yemeni domestic 
politics and regional politics affect the foreign policy decisions of the intervening states. 
Therefore the stances of the Yemeni actors on religion and secularism, the idea of the state 
and their preferences regarding regional arrangements impact on the sponsorship patterns 
of the intervening states. The positions of the major Yemeni actors are outlined in Table 6.2 
below.  
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 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in 
the Yemeni civil war and on the regional security complex dynamics). 
Given the regional and domestic aims of the Yemeni domestic actors, the intervening states 
have preferred and least preferred outcomes.  These are demonstrated for each state in 
Figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 below.  
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Figure 6.3. Potential Outcomes of Yemeni Civil War: Iranian Perspective.  (Figure created by 
author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the Yemeni civil war 
and on the regional security complex dynamics). 
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Figure 6.4. Potential Outcomes of the Yemeni Civil War: Saudi Arabian Perspective. (Figure 
created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the 
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Figure 6.5. Potential Outcomes of the Yemeni Civil War: the Emirati Perspective. (Figure 
created by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the 
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Figure 6.6. Potential Outcomes of the Yemeni Civil War: Qatari Perspective. (Figure created 
by author from assessments based on the research into favoured militias in the Yemeni civil 
war and on the regional security complex dynamics). 
Figures 6.3-6.6 have demonstrated the likely preferred and least preferred outcomes of the 
Yemeni civil war for the case study states. Prior to this, the section outlined whether the 
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characteristics of the domestic actors were outlined, including whether or not they are likely 
to prefer a revision of the region’s political structure or the status quo. Finally, the outcomes 
of the Yemeni conflict from the point of view of the intervening states was outlined, 
predominantly considering the outcomes for the point of view of their regional goals.  
Having considered these aspects, Part Two extends this analysis by looking at how the 
domestic actors in the Yemeni civil war support or undermine the domestic survival strategies 
of the intervening states and how this relates to patterns of militia sponsorship. The first 
section considers the characteristics of the militias backed by Iran and the other states in 
Yemen. 
Part II: Sectarianism and ‘Secularism versus Islamism’ as Regime Survival Strategies 
in the Regional Sphere: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
Militia Support and Sectarianism in the Yemeni Civil War 
Tribal dynamics play a greater role in the Yemeni crisis than sectarian dynamics. Despite this, 
however, an analysis of rebel sponsorship by the case study states still reveals a largely 
sectarian basis to state choices regarding which militias to support in the conflict. 
Unfortunately, in comparison to Syria, there is scant information on specific militias in Yemen 
and therefore this research has had to rely on information regarding the larger umbrella 
groups such as the Southern Movement. In Syria, articles on individual militias within larger 
umbrella groups can often be found, however, in Yemen, this information is difficult to access 
or non-existent in English language sources.  Although this means that the data is not as 
detailed as was available for Syria, the main trends are still apparent. With regards to Iran, 
the IRGC supports the Shia Houthi in the Yemeni conflict despite their theological differences. 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE work mainly with Sunni groups, but their geopolitical concerns 
regarding the spread of Iranian influence appear to trump their Sunni favouritism. They will 
support groups that oppose the Iranian aligned Houthis, including groups that contain Zaydi 
heritage politicians such as Mohsen al Ahmar, whose leadership is based on his tribal 
connections. Looking at sectarianism and militia sponsorship, this correlates with two 
features: the patterns of domestic sectarian inclusion and marginalisation as demonstrated 
within the Selectorate Theory derived diagrams for each state as outlined in Chapter 2, and 
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with the patterns of amity and enmity within the Middle Eastern and North African regional 
security complexes.  
In this instance, given the lack of a distinct divide between Sunni and Shia politicians in Yemen, 
(except within the Muslim Brotherhood faction of Al Islah, in Salafi groups and the Houthi 
Movement) the UAE and Saudi Arabia have chosen to privilege geopolitical strategy that 
resists the spread of Iranian influence over strict adherence to sectarian favouritism.  
Therefore, the Sunni states support the groups that oppose the Houthi whether they include 
Zaydi politicians or not. However, it is important to point out that in this case, given the 
insurgency developing in Saudi Arabia’s Najran region amongst the Shia, with the apparent 
involvement of the Houthis (Southfront, 2019); (Shay, 2019), Saudi Arabia’s regional policy 
supports authoritarian stabilisation tactics as well.  Qatar, although somewhat marginal in 
this conflict, has chosen to continue its support of Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups 
across the region, supporting Al-Islah militias in the Yemeni civil war. Al-Islah’s leadership 
includes members of the al Ahmar family who are Zaydi heritage tribal leaders of the 
prominent Hashid tribe. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is typically Sunni, in Yemen the 
picture is more nuanced. Stacey Philbrick Yadav explains, 
Resistance to the Houthi advance did not come from “Sunni tribesmen,” as so many reporters 
suggest, but from sons of Zaydi tribesmen who, when they joined the neo-conservative Islah, 
adopted or converted to a “Sunni” identity inspired by Saudi Wahhabism and/or the Egyptian 
Society of Muslim Brothers. The al-Ahmar clan, paramount sheikhs of the historically Zaydi 
Hashid tribal confederation clustered between Sa‘ada and Sanaa, and who detest the Houthis, 
are Zaydi by parentage and Sunni by denominational conversion via partisan affiliation with 
Islah (Yadav, 2014).   
Al Islah was created by President Saleh to bring Islamists into politics in support of his General 
Peoples Congress party. It has three factions: the Muslim Brotherhood, tribal leaders from 
the Hashid tribe (predominately Zaydi or Zaydi heritage) and Sunni Salafis such as Abdul 
Majeed Al Zindani. Yadav describes the Hashid tribal leaders who have joined Al-Islah as 
converting to Sunni Islam due to their affiliation with Al-Islah (Yadav, 2014). Given how fluid 
the situation is in Yemen, including regarding sectarian loyalty as is seen in this instance, it 
has been difficult to place the Hadi and Al-Islah aligned Zaydi heritage politicians into a 
sectarian category in terms of their political impact. However, in Figure 6.7 below the Hadi 
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aligned Zaydis are counted as Zaydi by denomination, whilst the Al-Islah Zaydi heritage 
members are recorded below as Sunni converts.  Although the results are less distinct than in 
the Syrian example, it is still clear that sectarian favouritism, specifically towards the same 
sect as the sponsoring states’ winning coalitions, is a key factor in militia/group sponsorship.  
 
Figure 6.7. Militia Sponsorship and Secular-Religious Competition, (Sources: see Appendix 12, 
Citation List B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, Description of the Sources 
used for Yemeni Militia Data, page 339).  
Militia Sponsorship and Secular-Religious Competition 
Patterns of Iran’s Militia Sponsorship in the Yemeni Civil War 
As shown in Figure 6.8, the secular-religious range of most of the militias in the Supreme 
Political Council, which included President Saleh before his assassination on the 4th December 
2017 and the subsequent split of his bloc, and the Houthis, ranges from religious secularism 
to fundamentalism.  President Saleh’s faction tended towards supporting religious secularism, 
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Figure 6.8. Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings for the Supreme Political Council (Sources: 
see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, 
Description of the Sources used for Yemeni Militia Data, page 339).   
 When this is broken down further, to reveal the groups specially sponsored by Iran in this 
political alliance, Iran only directly sponsored the Houthis – who are typically Zaydi and 
Islamist.  However, in keeping with the pragmatic approach to ideology that is present in the 
Yemeni political scene, the Houthi have demonstrated a range of political stances. Since 2011, 
the Houthi have broadcast narratives that are designed to appeal to nationalist and populist 
opinions, focusing on elite corruption (Glenn, 2018). The group has advocated for a 
democratic non-sectarian republic in Yemen, but their opposition accuse them of seeking to 
re-establish the Zaydi theocracy.  The truth is probably that different factions represent 
different ideologies and that, like other political groups in Yemen, if they were in a position 
to govern they would likely pragmatically position their ideology in accordance with their best 
chances of political survival.  The group does, however, have a consistent position, and this is 
Zaydi revivalism - therefore they are very likely to support some form of Islamism. 
Additionally, the Houthi leadership would work to reduce the influence of Sunni 
fundamentalism and Saudi connections with Sunni Salafi groups. They would also work to 
promote the Zaydi identity and interests in Northern Yemen. In sum, the Houthis are a Zaydi 
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings: Total Sample 
of Militant Groups Fighting within the Supreme 
Political Council
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
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revivalist movement and opposed to Sunni Salafism which typically labels other sects as non-
believers.  
With regards to Iran’s Shia theology and velayat e-fatiq, aside from occasional overtures 
towards Twelver Shiism, the Houthis are unlikely to move away from local Shi’ism as they 
need the support of the Zaydis. Looking at the section on the ‘Idea of the State’ in Tables 6.10 
and 6.11, it is evident that although the Houthis are Islamists, they are not as closely aligned 
with Iranian fundamentalism as were many of the Syrian Shia militias sponsored by Iran. 
Furthermore the militias that rated 9-10 in Yemen were Liwa Fatemiyoun and Harakat 
Hezhobllah al Nujaba, both of whom are foreign militias, respectively Afghani and Iraqi. Both 
of these groups are heavily involved with the IRGC and profess to follow Khomeini’s doctrine, 
velayat e-fatih.  However, despite the shared enemies of Iran and the Houthis, the Iranian 
ideology is not deeply embedded in Northern Yemen. But if the Houthis become more 
desperate in face of Saudi and the Hadi coalition’s attacks, they may move closer to Iran in 
order to secure additional support.  
Many Houthis are concerned about Saudi hostility, so oppose Saudi hegemony in the regional 
system and thus seek to reduce Saudi and Emirati influence in Yemen. This is in keeping with 
Iran’s regional aspirations. It is clear from Figure 6.9 below that the Houthis are less 
fundamentalist than the Iranians, with a secular-fundamentalist rating of 7-8 indicating high 
but not fundamentalist levels of religiosity. There are sources that claim the Houthis are 
fundamentalist (Teller, 2016); (Razaghi, Chavoshian, Chanzanagh, & Rabiei, 2020, p. 4), but 
also sources that claim they seek a less sectarian Yemen and that they oppose Sunni 
fundamentalism, not Sunni in general (Gordon & Parkinson, 2018); (Tharoor, 2015); (Boucek, 
2010). However, they are a Zaydi revivalist group in opposition to Sunni fundamentalism. 
Sunni fundamentalism tends to be highly sectarian and anti-Shia, so opposition to Salafi Islam 
is a predictable stance for the Zaydi movement.  Taking these factors into account, when 
scoring the Houthis on the secular-fundamentalist index below they have been cautiously 




Figure 6.9.79  Patterns of Militia Support: Iran (Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on page 
338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, Description of the Sources used for Yemeni Militia 
Data, page 339). 
Tables 6.10 & 6.11 below compare Iran’s position relative to the theoretical pillars (Table 6.10) 










                                                          
79 The Houthi militias are grouped together in the sample due to difficulties finding information on the individual 
units. They are rated as 7 to 8 on the secular-fundamentalist index so appear as the yellow section in the pie 
chart. The sample size for the Yemeni civil war is much smaller than the sample of militias in the Syrian chapter 
due to limited information available for individual units, so the sample consists of the large umbrella 
organisations and broad coalitions that house respective militias. Therefore, rather than a cross section of Houthi 
allied militias, the Houthis militias are included as one force due to significant gaps in the information available 
for individual Houthi militias.   
 
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Ratings: Iranian 
Sponsored Militias
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
Religious Fundamentalism/Theocratic to Religious Extremist: 9 to 10
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Iran’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State Velayat e-faqih, conservative Shia Islamism, leader of the axis of 
resistance to Israel and the West. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
Represses both the moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic 
extremists who oppose the state. Suppresses sects such as Sunni, 
Bahai’i and other minority sects. Works to discredit secularists.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
Resistance to secularization through enforcement of conservative 
religious dictates such as the women wearing the hijab. Police enforce 
the regime’s Islamist ideology. Rewards given to volunteers who join 
the Baij80 and the religious institutions. The IRGC has a significant hold 
over the economy and thus politics.  Religious-Fundamentalist Index 
Rating: 9. 
Selectorate Theory Religious authority: the Shia theocratic left and right are cornerstone 
of the winning coalition/essential support for the regime.   
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
Conservative Shia Islam. 
Regional Security 
Complex 
Iran leads a largely Shia alliance that seeks to constrain Sunni 
hegemony, Israel and the US.  
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 
 
                                                          
80 The Sāzmān-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin, or Mobilisation Resistance Force is a paramilitary volunteer militia that is 
involved with internal security and religious ceremonies among other things. The volunteers get greater access 
to state provided resources. 
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Patterns of Militia Support in Yemen 
Idea of the State Only 2 out of the 6 Iranian backed groups were able to be confirmed 
as supportive of velayat e-faqih, however all Iranian sponsored 
militia’s ideologies are conservative Shia Islamism. The Houthis are not 
Twelver Shias like the Iranians, but Zaydi.  The Zaydi theology is more 
similar to Sunni Islam than Twelver Shi’ism. The Houthi tend to be 
independent of Iranian leadership and regional goals to a significant 
extent.  
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
The Houthi also repress and target religious minorities suppressed in 
Iran such as the Baha’i (Farr, 2018) (Azizi, 2018).    The Houthis are also 
resistant to the rise in Salafism in Yemen given  
Salafi Islam is hostile to Shia.  The Houthis opposed Saleh’s corrupt 
authoritarianism initially, then allied with him when it was expedient 
to do so.  In addition, Saleh is also Zaydi, and his Zaydi relations 
controlled military and security units. Although the Houthis have a 
blurred political vision, it is unlikely they would govern in a fashion 
modelled after the Iranian theocracy.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
All groups able to be identified as supported by Iran directly have a 
Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating of 8-10 - so highly conservative 
and religious in keeping with Iran’s position.   
Selectorate Theory The groups supported by Iran are in keeping with the sect and religious 
fundamentalism of Iran’s domestic winning coalition i.e. theocratic 
Shia. However, due to the Houthis needing broader support to govern 
then just the Zaydi sect, it is likely that they would be pragmatic 





Iran predominantly supports Shia Muslim Militias.  However, in 
contrast to Syria, the Shia militias in Yemen are not closely supportive 
of Iranian Shi’ism.  Shia groups tend to side with Iran geopolitically as 
they get financial, ideological and sometimes military support.  
Regional Security 
Complex 
Iran sponsors Shia groups that are supportive of Iran’s efforts to revise 
the regional arrangements; i.e. groups that resist US and Sunni power 
in the region.  The Houthis are anti-Israel and anti-US.  
 (Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, 
Description of the Sources used for Yemeni Militia Data, page 339). 
The firmest match between the Houthis and Iran, looking at the tables above, is their mutual 
revisionist stance within the Middle Eastern and North African regional security complex. 
Both resent Israel and the US presence in the region. If the Houthis controlled Yemen, they 
would be very likely to side with the Iranian alliance, thus strengthening Iran’s quest for 
regional hegemony to the detriment of Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s hegemonic aspirations.  
Transnational Shia communities and movements across the Middle East are predominantly 
focused on domestic concerns.  This is despite the foreign policy aim of Iran to unite Shia 
across the region and thus strengthen the Shia political presence.  However, this is not to say 
that Iran is not an important part of Shia groups’ strategic calculations.  In order to assert their 
position, whether politically or militarily, the support of Iran is invaluable.  Thus, the Shia 
groups play a line between enough support for Iran’s aims to secure support and funding, 
whilst enough distance to be able to place their domestic goals and considerations first (Louer, 
2012, pp. 125-126).   
Iran’s efforts to influence the Yemeni civil war are exaggerated by Saudi Arabia – however, 
there does appear to be links between Iran and the Houthis (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 
17).  If Shi’ism is strengthened, then its political power strengthens as well. In order to project 
political power, Iran must work through the region’s political factions, and many political 
groupings in the Middle East have a significant sectarian component. Therefore, by seeking 
to strengthen Shia religious communities, Iran potentially strengthens the political power of 
its political allies. A former Iranian security official confirmed this view of Iranian regional 
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politics, telling Reuters that Iran planned to empower the Houthi uprising in order to 
“strengthen their hand in the region” (Saul, Hafezi, & Georgy, 2017).  
Iran tends to ally with fellow religious identity groups.  With Lebanon’s Hezbollah operating 
closely with Iran’s military, particularly in Syria, the effectiveness of this strategy is clear.  This 
raises fears amongst Sunni that Iran is hoping to expand its military allies by supporting 
Houthis in Yemen.  Reuters quoted a Western diplomat in the Middle East:  
Iran has long been trying to cultivate portions of the Houthi militias as a disruptive force in 
Yemen. This is not to say that the Houthis are Hezbollah, but they do not need to be to achieve 
Iran’s goals, which is to encircle the Saudis, expand its influence and power projection in the 
region and develop levers of unconventional pressure (Saul, Hafezi, & Georgy, 2017).  
Iran’s support for the Houthis is a combination of hard power and religious soft power efforts 
to cultivate a strategically useful militant group (Mandaville & Hamid, 2017, p. 17).   
Iran: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex Motivations in Yemen   
From a security complex perspective, it makes sense that Iran would support the Houthis. It 
also makes sense from a strategic domestic perspective.  The Houthis are Shia and in keeping 
with Iran’s real selectorate and winning coalition, despite theological differences, they share 
a Shia identity. The Houthi are unlikely to be supportive of secularism, in keeping with Iranian 
theocratic governance, and both Iran and the Houthis oppose select minorities such as the 
Baha’i and the spread of Salafi Sunni Islam.  Although the Houthi’s Zaydism is closer to Shafi 
Sunni Islam than Shiism, both seek to advance the Shia identity to protect their interests from 
Sunni Salafi or Sunni regimes. It is clear that both regional and domestic concerns have 
motivated Iranian support for the Houthis. This is particularly relevant as Iran is moving from 
its largely failed ‘spread the revolution’ strategy through Khomeini’s valayet e-faqih, to a 
strategy based on military and political support for opposition or revisionist movements that 
oppose the Sunni states, Israel and the US.  
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Secular-Fundamentalist Ratings of Opposition Militias in Sample 
Patterns of Saudi Arabia’s Militia Sponsorship in the Yemeni civil war 
Saudi Arabia is very wary of an increased Iranian influence in its backyard, particularly given 
tensions with its Shia citizens and unrest in the Najran province.As Khaled Fattah describes, 
Saudi Arabia sees Yemen as the “the weakest link in the chain of security of the Arabian 
Peninsula, and thus easy prey for Tehran to penetrate and manipulate”  (Esfandiary & 
Tabatabai, 2016).   
In contrast to Syria, where Saudi Arabia typically backed Salafi militias, in Yemen, Saudi Arabia 
is more pragmatic backing those politicians most likely to side against Iranian influence there.  
The Saudi backing of the Hadi faction in the Yemeni civil war is indicative of their pragmatic 
approach as this alliance includes politicians of Zaydi heritage. However, the Hadi government 
shares the Saudi resentment of the Houthis and Iran and is dominated by leaders that are 
either Sunni or more loyal to tribe than sectarian identity group.  The al Saud’s have shown 
little enthusiasm for the Southern Transitional Council, whose leadership is significantly more 
secular than Saudi Arabia’s. This is despite the Southern Transitional Council’s militias 
including many Salafi Sunni militias who fight against Al Qaeda and Daesh.  It is likely that 
Saudi Arabia’s objection to the secessionist movement is based on the instability that is likely 
to result should Yemen split again. Such instability across the border from Saudi Arabia would 




Figure 6.12. Patterns of Militia Support: Saudi Arabia (Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List 
B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, Description of the Sources used for 
Yemeni Militia Data, page 339). 
Figure 6.12 demonstrates that Saudi Arabia has typically provided support to groups that fall 
into the religious secularism category in Yemen. This does not fit with Saudi Arabia’s 
fundamentalist Sunni idea of the state, although it is in line with Prince Muhammad bin 
Salman’s statements recently regarding the need to moderate Islam. However, given the fact 
that this does not match with Saudi Arabia’s theocratic tendencies, it does raise the likelihood 
that Saudi Arabia is more concerned about the spread of Iranian influence, and/or the rise of 
Shia led states around the region, than the societal contest between secularism and 
fundamentalism in this instance. Therefore, it is clear that the contest between secularism 
and religion as outlined by Fox is used primarily as a geopolitical tool in the regional context 





Secular Fundamentalist Index Rating: Saudi Arabia 
Sponsored Militias
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
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Saudi Arabia’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State Authoritarian monarchical Salafi Islamism. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
Opposes both moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic extremists 
who oppose the state. Supresses’ minority sects such as the Shia. 
Works to discredit political secularists. Actively oppresses the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s brand of “populist Islamism rooted in the democratic 
process” with little emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal 
Khashoggi, the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018), seeking 
with the Trump administration’s help to rebrand them as extremists.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
Highly conservative and theocratic regime. Scored 8 on Secular-
Fundamentalist Index. Police enforce the regime’s Islamist ideology.   
Selectorate Theory Al Saud Family and the Religious Establishment: the royal family and 
the religious elites are the cornerstone of the essential support for the 






Part of anti-Islamist quartet. Opposes Iranian influence.  Contests with 
Iran and Turkey for hegemony.  










Saudi Patterns of Militia Support in Yemen 
Idea of the State Saudi Arabia supports militias whose position would not challenge its 
authoritarian monarchical Salafi Islamism.  However, the Hadi 
government is more pragmatic than Islamist. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
Saudi Arabia supports the status quo in Yemen – i.e. a Sunni dominated 
largely autocratic government. The Saudi regime opposes the Shia 
Houthi militias in keeping with its repressive of domestic Shia.   In 
contrast to its position in Syria, the Saudis has support the alliance to 
which the Muslim Brotherhood connected Al Islah belongs: this is likely 
a reflection of  its lack of opportunities in Yemeni politics, particularly 
given Yemeni politics is more about patronage then ideology. Al Islah 
has denounced links with the Muslim Brotherhood but this is likely to 
be a more political than ideological shift.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
Predominantly supportive of groups that sided against Iran.  Saudi 
Arabia’s patterns of rebel sponsorship in Yemen do not appear to 
strongly reflect the workings of the Competition Perspective.   
Selectorate Theory Most of the groups sponsored are not opposed to the sect and 
ideology of Saudi Arabia’s winning coalition. However, there is a 
moderate (not strong) correlation between these factors.     
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
All groups that Saudi Arabia supports have a similar identity proposal 
as the regime, i.e. contain elements of support for Sunni Islamism but 
the Yemeni actors are more pragmatic than committed to an ideology. 
The groups are not necessarily in support of the conservative Islamism 
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(with the exception of Al Islah) that the Saudi regime promotes but 
would not oppose it either. 
Regional Security 
Complex 
Saudi Arabia supports the Sunni dominated groups in the Yemeni civil 
war. Due to the muddied scene, this includes Al Islah.  Saudi Arabia 
appears to view the threat of an Iranian aligned regime in Yemen as 
more pressing than a Muslim Brotherhood affiliated government, 
possibly given the Shia separatist activism against the regime along its 
border with the Houthi held territory that was historically part of the 
Zaydi theocracy.  
(Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, 
Description of the Sources used for Yemeni Militia Data, page 339).  
In comparing Tables 6.13 and 6.14, it is clear that the most defining characteristic that is 
similar between Saudi Arabia and the groups it supports relative to the theoretical pillars is 
that they are not aligned with the Houthis. The actors Saudi Arabia supports are more 
pragmatic than ideological, even the Muslim Brotherhood aligned Al-Islah. Therefore, they do 
not match closely with Saudi Arabia patterns of domestic regime survival strategies, aside 
from being largely the same sectarian group as the Saudi regime elites.  The al Saud’s 
leadership is strongly linked to the Wahhabi identity and its real selectorate consists of Sunni 
families and clergy.  As such, it is heavily invested in maintaining the dominance of the Sunni 
identity hegemony, both domestically and regionally. The al Saud family’s leadership is 
dependent on distributing dividends to its Sunni supporters such as Sunni social dominance 
and state support for the Wahhabi faith; as such, its foreign policy reflects its domestic aims. 
This follows the theoretical framework of this thesis which outlines that identity and 
hegemonic issues are pursued regionally in order to advance or maintain them domestically.  
As Razvan Munteanu points out: 
Moreover, a potential Houthi success in Yemen could lead to the so-called “Shiite awakening”, 
destabilizing   both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, countries which were confronted with massive 
protests of the Shiite communities  (Munteanu, 2017). 
This clearly places Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in Yemen within Hinz’s Identity Hegemony 
Theory.  Saudi Arabia needs to keep its Shia population subdued, and a powerful Shia 
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government next door will inspire Shia aspirations if not directly support and encourage them. 
As such, Saudi Arabia is attempting to use foreign policy to put a government into power in a 
neighbouring state that is largely from the desired identity, i.e. Sunni (or Zaydi heritage but 
not active in promoting the interests of the Zaydis as a sect), in part in order to help manage 
the Shia minority at home. 
Religion has provided Saudi Arabia – and Iran – the means to pursue its foreign policy 
objectives in this instance. As so often happens in the Middle East, Yemeni men that travelled 
to other states to pursue their religious motivations bought back social, religious and political 
ideas with which to enact change.  In the 1970s-1980s Yemeni men who had travelled to Saudi 
Arabia to study religion and those who had fought against Russia in Afghanistan bought back 
the puritanical Muslim faith Wahhabism to the Sa’dah region and Razih.  Both places are deep 
within the territory that for a thousand years, up until 1962, had been a Zaydi theocracy.  Not 
only was the Wahhabi theology emerging within the region where the Zaydis were the 
majority, but the new Wahhabi scholars directly positioned Wahhabism in confrontation with 
Zaydism (Weir, 2007, p. 296). This is in keeping with Wahhabi doctrine, as one of the key ideas 
of the faith is the rejection of different Muslim sects as takfir if they do not practise Islam 
according to the theological understandings of the Wahhabiyya (Firro, 2013, pp. 711-773).   
Wahhabi activities in Yemen were funded by the Wahhabi controlled Ministry of Religious 
Guidance, Yemeni/Saudi merchants, and by al Islah. Together these groups constituted a 
coalition of tribal, religious and mercantile interests. The growth of Wahhabism in the center 
of Zaydi country was largely due to its ability to tap into previously dormant resentment at 
Zaydi doctrines and Zaydi elites. Many were resentful of the Zaydi Sayyid elites’ insistence 
that they had religious authority and social superiority; this clashed with Wahhabi ideals 
regarding equality (Weir, 2007, p. 296).  To counter the Wahhabi challenge, the Zaydi have 
accused Yemeni followers of promoting a foreign Islam for monetary gain. Given these 
tensions, intra-religious competition has served as the gateway to both Saudi and Salafi 
influence in Yemen, and the Zaydi backlash has provided, through sectarian channels, an 
opportunity for Iran to enter the conflict as well.  
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Saudi Arabia: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex Motivations in 
Yemen   
Saudi Arabia supports the Hadi government which opposes Iranian influence in Yemen. 
However, Saudi Arabia has avoided supporting the other prominent anti-Houthi faction, the 
Southern Transition Council,  either because of the instability of secessionism or its more 
secular stance. If the Southern Transition Council succeeds in its aims and Yemen splits in two, 
it is possible that in the ensuing chaos the Houthis could secure Northern Yemen through 
appealing to the Zaydi majority, leaving Sunni to dominate Southern Yemen. The Saudi state 
does not want predominantly dormant tensions with Shia in its border provinces with Yemen 
to intensify and as such will not want a Shia Houthi government in Northern Yemen. This 
would encourage the irredentist ambitions of such groups as the Shia Ahrar al Najran in the 
Najran region, which borders Zaydi dominated Northern Yemen. In terms of the ongoing 
societal competition between secularism and religion, given Saudi Arabia is a Sunni Wahhabi 
state it supports a generally Sunni or Sunni aligned faction that is unlikely to attempt to alter 
the conservative religiosity of Yemeni society. In regards to the Southern Transition Council, 
in terms of self-preservation, the Saudi regime is unlikely to support the ideologically more 
secular Southern Movement. Additionally Saudi Arabia wants to avoid a Shia Islamist 
leadership, or an Islamic extremist’s regime led by the likes of Al Qaeda, who challenge the 
Saudi state’s religious legitimacy.  
Furthermore, an often overlooked point relevant to understanding the sectarian hostility 
between the Saud family and the Houthis is that the Houthis are Sayyid, and emphasise this 
as a pillar of their religious legitimacy.  In contrast, the Saudi royal family are a tribal dynasty, 
albeit the early Saud state leaders went by the clerical title of Imam, as did the Zaydi 
theocracy’s rulers  (Hill G. , 2017, p. 286). Additionally, the Zaydi tradition of Kuruj, whereby 
uprisings against oppression are accepted, contrasts with the Saudi Salafi notion of absolute 
loyalty and obedience to leaders. Clearly a religion that promotes obedience to political 
leadership is of greater utility in terms of regime survival and this theological stance therefore 
helps support the rule of the al Saud family in Saudi Arabia. Moreover the Houthis pose a 
territorial threat to the Saudis, given the Houthis have rhetorically laid claim to the Saudi areas 
previously part of Greater Yemen, which predates the 1934 Treaty of Ta’if and the 2000 
border agreement between the two states. This region stretches into the Saudi border 
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provinces of Jizan, Azir and Najran and resonates with the deeper history of Arabia (Hill G. , 
2017, p. 286).  
The Saudi Arabian regions that contain the highest concentrations of Shia are either on the 
Yemeni border or within Qatif Saudi Arabia’s largest oil resource region. However, Shia are 
not part of Saudi Arabia’s nominal selectorate nor do they need the support of Shia support 
to govern.  What they do need is Shia compliance. This is largely secured through repression 
alongside some recent attempts to appease the Shia minority (Kalin, 2019), and the 
hegemony of the Wahhabi Sunni religious identity that is hostile to non-Salafi and non-Sunni 
sects (Alrebh, 2017, p. 279).  
Patterns of the United Arab Emirates’ Militia Sponsorship in the Yemeni civil war 
The Emirati regime’s idea of the state is based on religious secularism. This aligns with the 
political goals of the more secular Southern Transitional Council that has a rating of 5-6 on 
the secular-fundamentalist scale and has been actively (and, at times, militarily) assisted by 
the Emirates. Only pragmatism and a lack of other options explains both the Council’s and the 
Emirati regime’s alliance with the Salafi Sunni militias that fight within this alliance. Much of 
the fighting is against Sunni extremist groups like Ansar al Sharia and the Houthis. It appears 
likely that these mostly tribal Salafi militias are interested in secession and tribal security, 
rather than pursuing a Salafi political ideal in Yemen.   
 
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: Emirati 
Sponsored Militias 
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
Politically Theocratic/Highly Religious to Highly Theocratic: 7 to 8
242 
 
Figure 6.15. Patterns of Militia Support: UAE (Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on 
page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, Description of the Sources used for Yemeni 
Militia Data, page 339).  




UAE’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State Authoritarian monarchical moderate Islamism, religious secularity, 
modernity and progress. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
Opposes both moderate Islamist opposition and Islamic extremists. 
Supresses minority sects such as the Shia. Works to discredit political 
secularists. Actively oppresses the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of 
“populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process” with little 
emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018), seeking with the Trump 
administration’s help to rebrand them as extremists.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
Islam is the preferred religion and identity; this is protected and 
promoted by the state. Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating 6. 
Selectorate Theory Essential support: wealthy connected Sunni particularly those linked 
to the royal family’s tribal bloc. 
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
Modern Sunni Religious Secularity. 
Regional Security 
Complex 
Part of Anti-Islamist populism Quartet. Opposes Iranian influence.   
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 
243 
 
Table 6.17. The UAE’s Support of Specific Militias Explained through the Theoretical 




Emirati Patterns of Militia Support in Yemen 
Idea of the State The UAE supports the group that supports both its religious secularist 
idea of the state, and opposes the groups that challenge its domestic 
stance. The Southern Transition Council resists the Islamic extremists, 
the Houthis and more recently has ousted the  Hadi government and 
its ally Al Islah from Aden.  
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
The Emirates typically sides with groups that oppose its domestic 
enemies: the Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni extremists and Shia political 
activism. Al-Islah was put on the UAE’s terrorism list for example. The 
Emirates backed Zaydi President Ahmed Abdullah Saleh initially, as he 
focused on opposing Islah and Sunni extremists (Sabbour, 2018).   
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
The Emirates has chosen to support the political group that represents 
the more secular outlook, i.e. the Southern Transition Council. 
However, the Salafi tribal militias that fight on the side of the Council 
complicate this position due to their support for the conservative Islam 
of traditional tribal culture.   
Selectorate Theory Supports groups that do not strongly discuss representative 
government or conservative Islamism as policy. Supports the more 
secular Southern movement (despite allied Salafi militias). This 
matches the stance of its winning coalition.  
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
Supports Sunni groups that broadly link to its position on religious 
secularity. This is in keeping with its key identity; moderate, 
comparatively tolerant Islamism.  It would be difficult for the Emirates 
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to find a group to support that strongly stood for a specific stance given 




The UAE sides with the Sunni political movements as predicted, but 
picked the Sunni grouping that did not include Al Islah, - i.e. the 
Southern Transition Council. All the groups supported would side with 
Sunni states against Iranian influence in the region. 
(Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, 
Description of the Sources used for Yemeni Militia Data, page 339).  
Considering Tables 6.16 and 6.17, the Emirati regime supports groups that align with its 
suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, albeit the Emirates has shown some 
signs of accepting Al-Islah’s role in Yemeni politics given a lack of other options. The Emirates 
has typically avoided supporting the Hadi government, the assumption being because Al Islah 
is an important part of Hadi’s coalition and a lack of faith in Hadi’s ability to govern.  The UAE 
has been moving away from Islam as the idea of the state and towards nationalism to 
strengthen the regime against the moderate Islamist forces that capitalised on the ‘Arab 
Spring’. 
The United Arab Emirates: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex 
Motivations in Yemen   
The UAE appears to frame the conflict in Yemen as a three-way contest between Islamists, 
secularists and the Iranian aligned Houthis. The UAE’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’ seems to 
be a combination of supporting nationalism, religious secularism, authoritarianism, resisting 
the expansion of Iranian influence and opposing Islamists. Thus, in keeping with the regime’s 
strategy for emphasising religious secularism as a means of ensuring its domestic survival 
against the regionally emergent Islamists, the UAE is backing the secularist Southern 
Transnational Council in Yemen. The Emirati presence has caused some concern in Yemen. 
For instance, animosity towards the UAE rose in Aden following the ongoing assassination of 
Aden based clerics.  Many of the targeted clerics are/were aligned with Al-Islah and have since 
fled their mosques as a result (The Associated Press & Haaretz, 2018).   
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As Saudi Arabia doubles down on support for Hadi in Yemen, the Emirates is showing signs of 
acquiescing to geopolitical concerns over domestic survival strategies; clearly, a coalition that 
includes Al Islah is preferable to the Iranian aligned Houthis. The Emirates is focused on 
preserving the regional status quo and as such is resisting both Iranian and Sunni extremist 
attempts to seize power in Yemen. The Emirates has worked hard in Yemen to establish tribal 
militias that resist Sunni extremists who clash with the Emirates’ more moderate and 
somewhat pluralist ‘idea of the state’.  Recent developments, both the partial withdrawal of 
Emirati troops and the seizure of the Hadi government’s base in Aden by Emirati trained 
militias with the Southern Transition Council, are yet to unfold at the time of writing.   
The anti-regime and nearly region wide protests of the ‘Arab Spring’, appear to have 
intensified the Emirates’ understanding that regional developments can be very threatening 
to its domestic survival. Thus mirroring the regionally activist shift within Qatar under the 
previous Emir Hamad al Thani, the UAE, under the leadership of the Crown Prince Muhammad 
bin Zayed, has developed an increasingly activist foreign policy, earning itself the title of “the 
Arab World’s most interventionist regime” (The Economist, 2017). To support this new 
foreign policy assertiveness, the Emirates has expanded its military capabilities (The 
Economist, 2017) and worked to generate a shift in identity. The ‘Arab Spring’ intensified 
internal tensions between those citizens and opposition groups that are outside the regimes’ 
real selectorates, with the increased visibility of transnational religious groups such as ISIS and 
the Muslim Brotherhood challenging the established relationships between ruler and ruled 
and the existing relationship between Islam and governance. Islamists forces are typically part 
of the opposition movements in the region and frequently attempt to discredit the existing 
regimes by labelling them ‘Un-Islamic’. As such, Eleanora Ardemagni believes that as it does 
not possess the strong Islamic credentials of Saudi Arabia, the UAE has sought “through 
military service […] to promote nationalism above Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
jihadism” (Ardemagni E. , 2016).  Ardemagni goes on to state that “In recently-unified states, 
conscription has often helped central institutions to build a national political discourse. 
National identity, as a dynamic set of shared beliefs and historical legacies, is a theoretical 
concept, but at the same time it is an incessant social construction” (Ardemagni E. , 2016, pp. 
6-9). Given the shift towards nationalism, there is a greater emphasis on the military (Fromkin, 
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2015) with the Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum thanking them 
specifically in the 46th National Day speech, this excerpt is below, 
I also extend my sincere greetings to our brave soldiers in the UAE Armed Forces - the 
shields of this nation who keep our national flag flying high in pride and dignity amongst 
world nations so that the UAE will continue to remain an oasis of security and stability, 
and maintain its sovereignty and safety (Wam, 2017). 
An additional prong of the new nationalist identity in the UAE is religious secularism. Without 
religious secularism, the Emirates’ nationalism would lack sufficient appeal to its religious 
citizens. The incorporation of religion, but as a moderate and non-political doctrine, 
strengthens the Emirati drive towards a new national identity that potentially protects it from 
challenges from moderate Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood. As such, religion is still 
a significant part of the Emirati identity, but the regime is working to change its relationship 
with the state. This new approach contrasts sharply with the attitude of the Prince’s late 
father who declared, “Be obedient to Allah, and use your intelligence instead of resorting to 
arms”. However, the Prince might argue that the new security situation following the ‘Arab 
Spring’, and the increased militarization of internal conflicts, requires a different approach 
(The Economist, 2017). Not only has the Emirates worked to oppose the revisionism in the 
region, but the regime has also attempted to insulate its domestic politics against dominant 
revisionist groups such as the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.  
Patterns of Qatar’s Militia Sponsorship in the Yemeni Civil War 
Qatar’s support for moderate Islamists is clearly demonstrated in Yemen. Qatar has only 
supported the Al Islah branch of the al Hadi government. This group generally matches with 
Qatar’s support for moderate Islamism and religious secularity despite Al Islah being made up 
of three main factions: the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi politicians and tribal leaders led by the 
Al Ahmar family.  The Muslim Brotherhood faction currently dominates the party.  Figure 6.18 
below places the secularism-fundamentalism rating for Al-Islah as a whole broadly ranging 
from 6-8. The Muslim Brotherhood members are likely to be at the lower end of that range.  
Although it is likely that Qatar mostly supports the Muslim Brotherhood faction within Al Islah, 
given its support of Salafi militias in Syria it is likely that Qatar is not opposed to its de facto 
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support of the Salafi faction.  This does not clash significantly with the Qatari regime’s 
religious secularity, and its Wahhabi citizens’ religious conservatism.  
 
Figure 6.18. Patterns of Militia Support: Qatar (Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on 
page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, Description of the Sources used for Yemeni 
Militia Data, page 339).  




Qatar’s Position relative to the Theoretical Pillars 
Idea of the State Qatar supports a range of Islamist actors which matches with its idea 
of the state: which is moderate Wahhabi Islamism and religious 
secularism. 
Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
Has co-opted moderate Islamists and the religious establishment.  
Monitors minority sects such as the Shia but also monitors Sunni 
activism. Actively supports the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of 
“populist Islamism rooted in the democratic process” with little 
Secular-Fundamentalist Index Rating: Qatari 
Sponsored Militias
Politically Secular/Religious to Religious Secularism: 5 to 6
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emphasis on civil liberties) (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia, 2018). 
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
Islam is the preferred religion and identity, this is protected and 
promoted by the state. Has co-opted prominent Muslim Brotherhood 
and moderate Islamists such as Yusuf Qaradawi and Tariq Ramadan. 
Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating 6. 
Selectorate Theory Essential support: wealthy connected Sunni. Al Thani tribal bloc.  
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
Wahhabi Religious Secularity. 
Regional Security 
Complex 
Resistant to Saudi hegemony of Sunni camp. Opposes Iranian influence 
but is less hostile to the Iranian regime than Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
Supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic populism around 
the region. 
 (Table created by author from assessments based on the research). 




Qatari Patterns of Militia Support in Yemen 
Idea of the State Qatar supported Al Islah predominantly which is in keeping with its 
policy of supporting moderate, representative Islamists around the 
region. This clashes with Qatar’s autocratic monarchy system, but is 
supportive of its moderate Islamism and religious secularity. 
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Religion Regulation & 
Political 
Opponents/Outgroups 
Actively supports the Muslim Brotherhood’s brand of “populist 
Islamism rooted in the democratic process” combined little emphasis 
on civil liberties (Wittes, On Jamal Khashoggi, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Saudi Arabia, 2018) within Yemen. However, domestic activism by 
this group in Qatar is very effectively suppressed so this move does not 
match with domestic survival considerations in a clear way, excepting 
if Qatar fears domination by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
Secular-Religious 
Competition Perspective 
Typically supports militias that range from religious secularism to 
conservative with a typical Religious-Fundamentalist Index Rating of 
between 5-6.  This matches with the moderate Islamism of the Qatari 
regime.  Qatar does not support the Southern secessionist movement 
which is politically a largely secular organisation.   
Selectorate Theory Al Islah is a predominantly Sunni party that is ideologically similar to 
Qatar’s winning coalition’s stance on religious secularism and 
moderate Islamism.  
Identity Hegemony 
Theory 
Qatar supports a moderate Sunni faction – the Muslim Brotherhood 
affliliated Al Islah. This is in keeping with Qatar’s reliance on the 
religious credentials of such regional figures as the prominent Muslim 
Brotherhood linked cleric Yusuf al Qaradawi who lives in Qatar and is 
generally supportive of moderate Islamism.  
Regional Security 
Complex 
Actively supports Islamic populism across the region, particularly when 
it is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood networks. Is possible it 
promotes the Muslim Brotherhood and is aligned with Turkey as a 
means of balancing against Saudi Arabia and UAE in the region. Both 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have insisted that Qatar align its maverick 
foreign policy with their own.  
(Sources: see Appendix 12, Citation List B. on page 338, Source Description: see Appendix 13, 
Description of the Sources used for Yemeni Militia Data, page 339).  
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Comparing Tables 6.19 & 6.20 it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood closely resembles 
Qatar’s domestic stances on religious secularity and Islamism but not on democracy. Religion 
is a key identity for both entities but neither seek the fundamentalist Islam endorsed by 
extremist groups or theocratic states like Saudi Arabia and Iran.  However, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and by extension Al Islah, represent a calculated risk to Qatar. Like the UAE, the 
Qatari elite appears to accept that democracy would result in the election of Islamist 
governments. Qatar appears to have decided this is both inevitable and an opportunity to 
expand its political networks beyond the existing Middle Eastern political leadership. Whilst 
it is highly unlikely that Qatar actively supports democracy, it appears likely that Qatar does 
not seek to oppose forces it sees as beyond its control as a small, albeit very wealthy, state. 
Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to lead a move towards religious moderation 
and away from Salafi forces which may be seen by Qatar as reducing the risk of Islamic 
extremism. Both Islamic extremism and democracy are domestic threats to the existing 
regimes. Qatar appears to have made peace with one, whilst resisting the other.  
Qatar: Domestic Survival versus Regional Security Complex Motivations in Syria   
As described above, in terms of self-preservation, supporting Muslim Brotherhood groups 
carries an element of risk for Qatar, particularly given the Brotherhood’s recent move towards 
Islamist democracy. However, the previous Emir, Hamad al Thani, stated in an interview with 
Charlie Rose that he thought that Islamist democracy was inevitable in the Middle East, that 
elections would result in the election of Islamists, and that the regimes needed to adapt to 
that reality (Al-Thani, 2005).  Moreover, it appears likely that Qatar seeks to support 
alternative sources of Sunni hegemony around the region rather than Saudi/Emirati 
leadership of the Sunni alliance. With the instability in Iraq, the weakening of Egypt and Libya 
following revolutions and the attempted coup in Turkey in 2016, the weakening of Saudi 
Arabia’s Sunni rivals since the ‘Arab Spring’ has strengthened the Saudi drive for hegemony.  
If the region had more governments like Tunisia, which share Qatar’s religious secularity and 
moderate Islamism, then this would be a bulwark against Saudi dominance of the Sunni bloc.  
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is evidence that Saudi Arabia has 
long been hostile to the current ruling branch of the Al Thani family.  
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Qatar’s acceptance of Islamism and transnational groups that seek to install it, coupled with 
its mediation efforts, has provided it with links to powerful activist figures across the region 
and within Yemen. This has given it considerable leverage following the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
However, given its small size as a nation, and the lack of other states that whole-heartedly 
support its stance, these linkages have been difficult to leverage into long-term benefits for 
Qatar particularly given the resentment and push back from the other Sunni states in the 
region.  
Analysis: The Regional Strategies of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar in the 
Yemeni Civil War:  Domestic Survival or Regional Interests?   
States’ Militia Sponsorship Choices: Best Explained by Regional or Domestic 
Explanations? 
This chapter aimed to further the findings regarding militia sponsorship, but also sought to 
further differentiate between regional and domestic explanations for militia sponsorship 
patterns. Establishing a clear separation between regional and domestic explanations for 
militia sponsorship patterns has been difficult as can be shown by looking at an adapted 
version of Jack S. Levy’s list of causal mechanisms relating to why states chose to intervene in 
the internal wars of other states with regards to the ‘scapegoat hypothesis’ (which is not 
considered here). This adapted list is as follows: 
1. The internalization of external conflict. A shift or potential shift in power in the region (Levy, 1989, 
p. 271), i.e. if Iran loses Syria as an ally then this will strengthen Saudi Arabia’s influence within the 
region.  
2. The externalization of internal conflict through the intervening mechanisms of (a) a shift in the 
dyadic balance of power, or (b) external intervention in another state (Levy, 1989, p. 271), i.e. the 
fall of the existing government or the outbreak of civil war in a neighbouring state, with or without 
another state seeking to promote new leadership that best suits their own interests. 
3. The internalization and externalization of a conflict that has an impact both within and without 
the intervening state (Levy, 1989, p. 271), i.e. region-wide and domestic protests that signal less 
acquiesce to authoritarian rule such as the ‘Arab Spring’. 
The difficulty with separating the explanations for choices regarding militia sponsorship from 
domestic or regional explanations is revealed above. Option (3.) best represents the current 
252 
 
situation in the MENA region. As a result, explanations could potentially be both regionally 
and domestically derived. However, we can logically infer that given that region-wide protests 
have resulted in the overthrow of some of the region’s authoritarian regimes, the remaining 
states will thus be highly concerned with their own domestic political survival. Therefore, 
domestic politics is likely to be a key consideration concerning the choices of ruling elites 
regarding militia sponsorship in both the Yemeni and Syrian conflicts.  Alastair Smith makes a 
supporting observation regarding the projection of domestic survival concerns into foreign 
policy, outlining that there are conditions under which a democratic government may make 
foreign policy choices aimed at “maximising the government’s chance of re-election”, as 
opposed to “maximising the nation’s welfare” (Smith, 1996, p. 133) such as when a 
government is under pressure regarding re-election at the end of an electoral cycle (Smith, 
1996, p. 133). This is similar to the situation that the Middle Eastern states, excluding Qatar, 
found themselves in during the ‘Arab Spring’ given that, although they are authoritarian states, 
they faced domestic pressure to either reform or relinquish control of government. As Smith 
identifies, the electorate or (nominal selectorate) “care about economic and foreign policy 
outcomes. The government cares about foreign policy but it also cares about retaining office” 
(Smith, 1996, pp. 135-136). Therefore, when under domestic strain, states are more “likely to 
use foreign policy for political gains, rather than the good of the nation” (Smith, 1996, p. 134). 
Thus, under the insecure conditions of the post ‘Arab Spring’, it is highly likely that foreign 
policies in the region strongly reflect externalized domestic survival strategies designed to 
shore up the ruling elite.  
Islamism as an electoral force has emerged from the ‘Arab Spring’ as a significant focus of 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, with Qatar in support and the other two opposed. The 
Muslim Brotherhood has strengthened its position as the prominent electoral Islamist group 
following the ‘Arab Spring’. The promotion of religious secularism by the UAE potentially 
negates this form of Sunni driven revisionism that has strengthened across the region 
following 2011. Sunni revisionism tends to present itself in terms of ideologies that 
significantly feature religion and as such the UAE’s religious secularism targets both electoral 
Islamism by contesting religion’s participation in politics, and extremism by positioning 
fundamentalism as the cause of the region’s conflicts. The projection of regime survival 
strategies into the regional arena affords another advantage: there are fewer and weaker 
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means of enforcing norms and rules in the international arena as compared to the domestic, 
enabling regimes to strike against the regional counterparts of domestic opposition groups 
with greater impunity than they are able to domestically. For instance, whilst the Emirates is 
able to provide troops to oppose groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, the UAE 
would be likely to suffer catastrophic domestic consequences if it attempted to be this heavy 
handed at home.   
All four case study regimes are seeking to steer events in the region in their favour after the 
2011 ‘Arab Spring’ protests. The outcome of resulting civil wars will significantly affect the 
viability of the regimes, and potentially also the regional alliances between states which are 
structured around sectarian patterns of amity and enmity. As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Qatar have supported (often different) groups in Libya and Syria, financially backed 
General Sisi or the Muslim Brotherhood Government in Egypt, sent ground forces or 
sponsored groups in Yemen to block Houthi or the Muslim Brotherhood control of the state 
and sent security forces to Bahrain to quell the protest movement which was portrayed by 
the government as Shia-led, however in reality this reflects the demographics in Bahrain 
where Shia are the majority sect. Iran has been equally active, particularly in Syria and Iraq 
but also in Yemen. Iran has been less active in Libya and Egypt given the lack of influence it 
has within these states overwhelmingly Sunni populations. The Sunni states, despite 
differences over Islamism, all primarily want to prevent a Shia-affiliated state in Yemen as 
they are concerned about the increased opportunity for influence this offers Iran. Warbner 
and Cafiero state that the Emirates is also working to suppress the Houthi uprising as it is 
concerned that a Shia state in the Gulf will intensify the tensions between the Gulf states and 
local Shia movements (Wagner & Cafiero, 2016). Additionally both the Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia perceive the Houthis' advance as an Iranian-orchestrated plot to destabilise the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).  Geopolitically Yemen is important because the security of the 
Bab-el- Mandab strait, a globally significant oil and gas shipping lane. The security of this strait 
directly affects oil and gas shipments in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, enabling trade with 
Europe and North America.   
In face of the instability and threat to the existing regimes that the ‘Arab Spring’ represented, 
the autocratic states are seeking means to prevent another rash of uprisings. The ‘Arab Spring’ 
showed how quickly the contagion effect works when the region’s citizens share similar 
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concerns against their governments.  The patterns of militia sponsorship from within the 
sample, which show a strong pattern of states’ selecting militias that share same sect and the 
same level of religiosity/secularism as their domestic position, strengthens the premise that 
the regimes are interested in more than just regional politics.  They are involved in the 
region’s civil wars to ensure that the outcomes support the survival of their respective 
regimes, as well as ensure their continued or increased regional influence.  
Conclusion: Domestic Survival Strategies that use Religion as a Tool in the Regional 
Sphere 
Looking at states as Structural Realism’s ‘black boxes’ is insufficient in terms of assessing the 
impact of religion, secularism and sect on patterns of militia sponsorship in the Yemeni civil 
war.  The strategies of the intervening states tie more closely with regime survival than with 
solely regional motivations.  
In order to ensure their own survival the regimes need to create a new arrangement between 
themselves and their citizens. In the Middle East, given opposition to the regimes is frequently 
framed through Islamism, and where so many of the regimes base their legitimacy on their 
position relative to Islam, this has given the struggle between fundamentalism and secularism 
added political weight in this context. This has provided an opportunity for both status quo 
and revisionist actors to utilise this dynamic to their advantage. Therefore, authoritarian 
survival strategies studied in this research involved both sectarianism and the contest 
between religion and secularism. Moreover, it was found that there was a pattern to militia 
sponsorship in the Yemeni civil war reflected both secular-religious competition and sectarian 
divides, albeit that both dynamics appeared to influence militia sponsorship choices to a 
lesser extent than the Syrian situation, probably given the lack of clear choices in these 
regards in Yemen. The sponsorship of specific militias represented attempts to manage the 
civil war’s outcome in the best interests of the survival of the region’s existing regimes. The 
militia sponsorship patterns typically reflected the intervening regimes’ legitimising 
narratives and identities as these related to sect and religiosity. The regimes calculated this 
differently: Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia all supported predominantly Sunni militias or 
tribal Zaydi actors disengaged from Yemen’s sectarian politics, Iran primarily Shia. Relating to 
Fox’s Competition Perspective, Qatar worked with the new electoral Islamism, the UAE in 
255 
 
pursuit of authoritarian religious secularism, Saudi Arabia in support of Sunni militias that 
supported the regional status quo.  Iran also sought to maintain the regional status quo 
concerning autocracy, but worked to increase the likelihood of a Shia led state in Yemen 
emerging.  
The post-Arab spring environment provides ample opportunity to study the use of religion, 
secularism and sectarianism as survival strategies that are deployed in regional politics.  The 
‘Arab Spring’ represented a political and social shift of epic and unforeseen proportions.  As 
such, religion, secularism and sectarian divides in the region are being altered, preserved or 








Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
Religion in Regional Politics: Regional Aspirations or Political 
Survival Strategies of Ruling Elites? 
Part I: Discussion 
Introduction 
Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have long used foreign policy strategies that utilise 
and harness links between religion and politics. A key example is Iran’s harnessing of sectarian 
politics. As a Shia theocratic regime, Iran has capitalised on Sunni regimes’ marginalisation of 
Shia in their countries, offering aid to Shia movements and thereby spreading its regional 
influence. The growth in influence of its client actor in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Hezbollah’s 
assistance in Syria on behalf of Iran, shows that this strategy can produce dividends. However, 
Iran is not the only Middle Eastern state to use religion as both an instrument and a purpose. 
Furthermore, as the US draws down its involvement in the Middle East, these local dynamics 
have become more prevalent, freed from the overlay of a heavily involved and militarily active 
superpower.  
This research argues that the study of religion has relevance for understanding regional 
dynamics. However, the findings do not support religion as an “interest versus values” 
confrontation that states must resolve in the regional sphere. Instead, this research finds that 
religion is present in regional systems as an extension of the domestic survival strategies of 
political elites. As such, this finding adds an important expansion to Selectorate Theory.  
Selectorate Theory establishes that the primary goal of leaders is their own political survival 
and it provides an explanation for regional foreign policy choices. Structural Realism holds 
that it is the state’s position in the international hierarchy that is the predominant restraint 
on how a state chooses to behave, that it will behave in its own best interests and that these 
interests will be both rational and based on material interests. Within the region, the elites in 
the case studies are acting in ways consistent with Structural Realism and their domestic 
survival strategies. Furthermore, Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory analyses state 
behaviour through patterns of amity and enmity, and theorises that these structural features 
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are reflected in states’ regional policies. However, this research’s findings demonstrate that 
these interests are balanced against, and considered alongside, the domestic survival needs 
of the ruling elites. In fact, during times of regime insecurity, as has existed in the Middle East 
following the Arab Spring, it is likely that political elites’ regional calculations are primarily 
focused on their own political survival. Given the threat to their political survival during the 
‘Arab Spring’ from the contagion effect of the protest movements in other states, attempts 
to alter or maintain regional characteristics under these conditions seems rational. Therefore, 
this research proposes the incorporation of an additional causal variable into Structural 
Realism and RSC’s explanations for international state behaviour: the desire of elites to stay 
in power and the subsequent regional externalisation of the domestic strategies they use to 
secure their rule.  
Selectorate Theory identifies that regimes survive through the co-option and exclusion of 
sectors of the population. This research found that in the Middle East, the regime’s in-out 
group patterns were broadly decided on sectarian identity and to a lesser extent, on a group’s 
stance between secularism/fundamentalism. Lasse Røbæk has presented descriptive 
statistics which support this finding. Røbæk concluded that the “Middle East is the only region 
in the world where religious (including sectarian) affiliation is the predominant identity 
marker determining group membership and, second, that people in the Middle East, on 
average, are twice as likely as people in other developing nations to belong to identity groups 
excluded from legitimate political representation” (Røbæk, 2019, p. 23). There has been a 
large focus on the repression of sectarian out-groups as a regime survival mechanism in the 
Middle East. There is not a corresponding amount of research on the use of political 
mobilisation and support as an authoritarian maintenance strategy. Ultimately, as Bruce de 
Mesquito and Smith point out in The Dictators Handbook, 2011, a dictator’s power lies in the 
maintenance of coalitions of support. Selectorate Theory demonstrates that it is the ability of 
regimes to maintain the support of a small group, the winning coalition, that helps secure 
authoritarian survival. For example, the Syrian regime maintains significant support within its 
real selectorate and winning coalition through successful strategies of political mobilisation 
around sectarian insecurity and fear, alongside other seemingly contradicatory strategies that 
seek to promote cross sectarian support for the regime (Matar, 2019, p. 2411). Iran also uses 
strategies to politically mobilise their base of support through religious legitimacy, 
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distributing dividends according to support for Shia theocratic politics.  In the Middle East, 
both regionally and domestically, political support and alliances are largely structured around 
sectarian favouritism and shared positions on degrees of secularism/fundamentalism. This 
research investigated the connections authoritarian survival strategies and regional politics. 
International Authoritarian Survival Strategies: Inside Out or Outside In? 
Authoritarian survival strategies can be motivated by either external goals focused on state 
interests, or by internal concerns such as regime survival and stability. Gerschewski analysed 
domestic authoritarianism, identifying the three pillars of authoritarian stability as 
“legitimation, repression and co-optation” (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 13). Selectorate Theory 
asserts that the co-optation mechanism through different selectorates is the most important 
aspect of authoritarian regime survival. Co-optation is linked to domestic legitimacy which, in 
turn, is connected to a specific identity proposal created by political elites that represents a 
position on sect and religiosity. The impact of this on regional policy is a key focus of this 
research. As Sandal et al. identify, politicians avoid foreign policies that undermine their 
domestic support base and this is a consideration against which alternative foreign policies 
are assessed (Sandal, Zhang, James, & James, 2011, p. 28). However, this research extends 
this, finding that in the context of the instability of the post ‘Arab Spring’ environment, the 
political survival of the ruling elites is not what potential foreign policies are tested against, 
but the key focus and goal of such decisions. 
Recent research by academics such as Del Sordi and Dalmasso investigates authoritarian 
regimes’ use of the international sphere to boost their domestic legitimacy. In keeping with 
this, Lisel Hintz’s Hegemonic Identity Theory posits that regimes move identity contests that 
are blocked at home into the international arena. For instance, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have 
increasingly driven their Islamic identity initiatives (anti-extremism, anti-electoral Islam, anti-
Shia) through their foreign policies in Yemen and Syria where they oppose groups that either 
represent Shia interests and/or advocate for either electoral or extremist Islamism. Given the 
prominence of Islam, any new Gulf strategy aimed at neutralising the forces that drove the 
protests will need an Islamic identity; one which negates political Islam, extremism and avoids 
association with Western style secularisation. One of the UAE’s responses to the ‘Arab Spring’ 
is to promote religious secularism, an ideology that supports moderate and pluralist Islam. 
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Religious secularism is less amenable to instrumentalisation by Islamists and terrorists against 
the existing regimes while, at the same time, potentially weakening the legitimacy of the 
conservative Iranian theocracy.  
There has certainly been an uptick in foreign policy activism by Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Qatar states following the ‘Arab Spring’. However, these regimes are not the only 
authoritarian regimes that are increasingly active in their regions. Elizabeth Taussig Torrey 
also describes Russia and China as “reasserting influence in their regions and are progressing 
from consolidating power within their borders to projecting power beyond them” (Torrey, 
2018, Dissertation). Torrey explains that for Russia and China, “internal consolidations of 
power and assertive foreign policy strategies are needed to achieve stability at home” (Torrey, 
2018, Dissertation). The argument could be made that this increased foreign policy activism 
could also stem from China and Russia’s respective global hegemonic projects rather than 
efforts to maintain authoritarian stability domestically. The same argument could be made 
regarding Iran and Saudi Arabia’s increased regional foreign policy activism.  However,  for 
the small states of Qatar and the UAE, given they cannot aspire to hegemon status, this 
foreign policy activism is more likely to directly reflect efforts to manage the challenges of 
globalisation and the dynamics released by the ‘Arab Spring’. 
Globalisation has affected the pillars of autocratic regimes such that it is difficult to shield 
populations from external influences due to the internet and greater mobility (Gerschewski, 
2013, p. 10). The transnational environment therefore now has an amplified impact on 
authoritarian survival. Does this explain the increased activism of some of the Gulf States in 
question?  Are they increasing their regional involvement because managing autocracy 
strategies at home through “legitimation, repression and co-optation” (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 
1) is now much harder?  Given that globalisation has increased the risk of regional contagion 
from destabilising international events, do authoritarian regimes have an increased need to 
manage regional dissent and ward off potential shifts in regional governance styles? For 
instance, for an authoritarian Sunni Middle Eastern state, a neighbouring democracy would 
allow for greater Shia political participation, potentially inspiring their own Shia. This would 
be likely to threaten the effectiveness of their Selectorate management strategies which 
secure power through the repression of certain groups, namely Shia, whilst concentrating 
dividends and power in the hands of a favoured group, the Sunni. Additionally, legitimation is 
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more difficult in the globalised world. For instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia have both built their 
authoritarian projects on religion and religious legitimacy. However, with increased 
connectivity between peoples across state borders, how does a regime continue to justify its 
own version of religion when its populations have access to alternative theologies and 
approaches?  The ability of authoritarian regimes to prevent exposure to alternative ideas is 
considerably weakened. As such, the Middle Eastern states have worked to increase their 
control over information via the internet since the ‘Arab Spring’ where much of the opposition 
coordination was conducted online (or through mosques). Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar 
have also sought to install governments that support the most favourable conditions for their 
own survival. It makes sense that they would given that the ‘Arab Spring’ showed that 
autocracies are not just vulnerable to internal opposition, but are highly vulnerable to the 
contagion effect from the success of opposition movements in other states.  
Regional and Foreign Policy Decision Making: State interests or Elite Survival 
Strategies 
Hintz describes how Hegemonic Identity Theory “extends to state and non-state actors”, 
“aiding understanding of how identity struggles spill over into foreign policy” (Hintz, 2018, p. 
28). As such, the case study states attempt to use their religious credentials and wealth to 
advance the sectarian solidarity that serves their own leadership or interests. They also 
generally seek to advance the form of Islam that matches their legitimacy in terms of the 
secular-fundamentalist scale in order to strengthen approval from citizens at home and pacify 
or repress select Islamists forces.  To illustrate this, Table 7.1 below demonstrates the identity 
proposals, which all have a sectarian and secular-fundamentalist position, of Saudi Arabia, 














































Sunni Muslim faith 
Ethnic/Cultural 
Arab membership; 
Sunni Muslim faith 
Social Purpose 
(interests of group) 
Spread Wahhabi 
Islam in region 
and globe, 
provide religious 
aid and deepen 







































around the globe 
Relational 

















Eastern and global 
market 
orientation, 
invests in West 
Both Middle 
Eastern and global 
market 
orientation, 











(general role, belief 
about position in 








































8 9 6 6 
The format of this table is derived from Lisel Hintz’s Table of Identity Proposals (Hintz, 2018, 
p. 37) but contains different content which has been created by the author. 
The ongoing societal movement along the secular-fundamentalist scale represents a 
reference point for regime’s to use as they see to frame their narratives. This relates to Sarah 
Feuer’s idea that “an authoritarian regime’s ideology of legitimation influences the religious 
establishment because the regime’s discursive justification for its right to rule creates a 
framework within which the leadership can manoeuvre” (Feuer S. , 2014).  It also relates to 
the selectorate. The religious/secular scale is crafted in a manner which excludes opponents 
as too secular or too religious in order to legitimise rule with co-religionists. Dr Abdelmajid 
Sghiar states that when a regime’s opponents summon the moral authority to mount a 
challenge, Middle Eastern regimes use both Islamic and secular values to counter their 
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arguments; if the opponents use an Islamic argument they are labelled as Islamic 
terrorists/extremist and the regime counters them in the name of religious secularism for 
example. If the opposition uses the language of international human rights, the regimes 
emphasise the risk of Westernization. Thus, both secular and Islamic moral positions are used 
to shield the regimes against moral criticisms: the regimes use each position to manage the 
other (Sghiar, 2018).  As Gutkowski outlines, “values such as religious moderation can be used 
instrumentally, as ‘discursive markers used by actors to build alliances, send political signals 
to their constituencies and elide normally and politically problematic actions’” (Sordi & 
Dalmasso, 2018, p. 99). Thus authoritarian regimes’ legitimation frames feature stances 
regarding identity and a specific degree of secularism-fundamentalism. These provide 
positions from which they can legitimise their rule as well as pursue and select international 
and domestic partners.  As such, this research found that patterns of militia sponsorship in 
the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars were strongly reflective of religiously based patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion used for authoritarian survival domestically. Therefore militia 
sponsorship is an example in this case of states extending the secular/religious competition 
dynamic as an authoritarian survival strategy into regional politics.  
Existing structures of selectorate management are complicated by the need to readdress the 
bargain between ruler and ruled in the Middle East following the ‘Arab Spring’.  Given the rise 
of Islamist movements within the ‘Arab Spring’, the religio-political ideology of emerging 
governments/political parties has become a key focus for Iran and the Gulf. Qatar and the 
UAE emerged from the ‘Arab Spring’ largely unscathed leaving them stronger than their less 
stable regional counterparts. This explains their willingness to get involved in redirecting 
politics in the region. In the case of the Qatar, the UAE and increasingly, Saudi Arabia, this 
entails ensuring that religion is defanged as a political force. For Qatar, the ‘inevitable and 
inescapable’ political power of religion and Islamism is minimised and controlled at home, 
and instrumentalised abroad. Iran aims to ensure that religion retains its political power 
thereby maintaining the Iranian theocracy’s legitimacy.   
When considering foreign policy choices in the post-‘Arab Spring’ context, it is clear that the 
criteria involved in decision-making shifts when it is considered from the point of view of the 
state or from the point of view of the interests of the ruling elite. It is possible that different 
militias would be provided support from the respective viewpoints.  This is illustrated by 
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Figure 7.2 below which shows the post-‘Arab Spring’ alliance decision making process as it 
relates to militia sponsorship in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Decision Making Process (Arab Spring). Figure 7.2 is adapted from Lars-Erik 
Cederman’s diagram titled The Extended Simulation Loop with Alliance Formation (Cederman, 
1994, p. 516).  
However, although this research makes a case to consider the externalisation of authoritarian 
maintenance strategies when seeking to explain interventions in civil wars, there are other 
possible causes. For instance, scholars such as Rosecrance and Mayer have established that 
there is a link between internal instability and external war  (Mayer, 1969). In such cases, 
engagement in external war is considered a diversionary tactic to distract from internal 
instability and to bind the country together against a common foe. This explanation has a long 
history with Ibn Khaldun positing that strong group bonds are reinforced in war (Khaldun, 
2005/1377, p. 101), and Mayer identifying “Aristotle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Montaigne, 
Treitschke and Simmel” as having discussed the use of war to consolidate unstable societies 
(Mayer, 1969, p. 296).  
Arno J. Mayer believed it was unified sets of elites who attempted to hold onto power through 
the diversionary use of force in other states. However, Jack S. Levy argues that “a more 
pluralistic political model” is more convincing “in which one faction may seek a foreign 
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confrontation to advance its own interests in the intra-elite competition for power” (Levy, 
1988, p. 668) in the domestic sphere. Levy’s point relates to Mesquito and Smith’s work in 
that Selectorate Theory establishes that ruling elites use societal groups to shore up their 
domestic power. These key groups (and out-groups) were identified in this research’s case 
studies. For instance, Saudi Arabia relies heavily on the continued support of Wahhabi Sunni 
citizens and Wahhabi clerics. Saudi Arabia also seeks to repress competing sources for power 
from out-groups, for example executing prominent Shia clerical leader Sheikh Nir al-Nimr in 
2016 (BBC, 2016), and at least 33 of the 37 executed on April 23 2019 were Shia (Human 
Rights Watch, 2019). Of the Shia that were executed, 14 were from the Qatif Shia majority 
region which has seen unrest against the Saudi regime since the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
(BBC, 2017). These executions were a sign of intra-elite competition for power in which one 
faction, the Sunni elite, has executed potential leaders from within the Shia identity group. 
Importantly for this research, Saudi Arabia opposes the Shia militias’ drive for political power 
in both Yemen and Syria as well. Therefore, this research argues that religion is present in 
militia sponsorship as a sign of domestic intra-elite competition (which is played out both 
domestically and regionally in the Middle East). This research essentially argues that rather 
than solely using intervention in external wars as a diversionary tactic or to pursue state 
interests, the ruling elites in question are using interventions in Syria and Yemen to shore up 
domestic support and to weaken the potential power of those groups excluded from power 
domestically. Intervention does this by supporting like-groups and suppressing out-groups in 
overseas conflicts in ways that reflect patterns of inclusion/exclusion domestically. So 
although this research accepts the point from diversionary war scholarship that involvement 
in external conflicts is more likely if ruling elites are under threat at home, which applies to 
Middle Eastern states’ elites as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’, it provides an additional 
explanation for their behaviour other than the use of intervention to divert attention from 
internal strife. Rather, it seeks to explain that the tactics are frequently a regional extension 
of the authoritarian survival strategies these states deploy domestically.  
This research accepts Structural Realism’s assertion that structural concerns and rational 
state interests influence international relations. However, it also asserts that state elites are 
focused on their own political survival. Therefore, in order to understand this process and 
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predict foreign policy decisions rational state interests need to be considered against the 
political survival strategies of ruling elites. 
PART II: Conclusion 
Key Findings 
Middle Eastern regimes move domestic survival strategies that use religion, sectarianism 
and religious secularism as authoritarian stabilization tools into the regional sphere.  
Given the similarity between domestic regime survival strategies and the patterns of militia 
sponsorship in the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars, it is clear that these strategies extend into 
the regional sphere. Sponsorship patterns strongly reflected the sectarian and religiosity 
preferences of the regimes and their support base. Additionally, the militias they opposed 
strongly reflected the groups whose sectarian identity and/or religiosity challenged the idea 
of the intervening state and the regime’s relationship with domestic religious authority. 
Although secular-fundamentalist positions impacted on militia sponsorship, this was trumped 
by sectarian considerations when no militia clearly represented both the sectarian and 
religiosity stances of the sponsoring regime. Sect and secular-fundamentalist positions were 
both trumped by geopolitical considerations, or it is more likely, were a function of 
geopolitical considerations. The Middle East’s authoritarian survival strategies frequently 
feature religion given that religious identity is based on politics, rather than theology. If you 
are a certain religious identity, you support certain ruling elites – whether for the regime, or 
against. Potential or actual ruling elites will typically be of the same sectarian group, and same 
level of religiosity as supportive citizens. For instance, a moderate Sunni citizen who is critical 
of their regime, might support the moderate Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. A key factor is the 
match between sect and religiosity.  The calculation extends towards militias/groups as well; 
their willingness to accept support from certain sponsors is also a function of their beliefs and 
vision for the contested state.  
Selectorate Theory, which asserts that the key focus of politicians is their own political 
survival, has relevance when predicting and explaining regional policy choices. 
Given the similarity of domestic survival strategies and regional political divides, further 
research is required to establish which held greater weight: regional or domestic 
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explanations for state choices. This research found that domestic survival strategies that 
involved religion were projected into the regional sphere. However, it is likely that the 
extent to which authoritarian survival strategies are externalised shifts under different 
circumstances; i.e. given the regional threat from the ‘Arab Spring’ it is like ly that the key 
focus of the region’s states is currently on domestic survival. This research points to 
Selectorate Theory (i.e. politicians key focus is on their own political survival) extending into 
the regional sphere given the links between domestic survival strategies that involve 
religion and militia sponsorship choices. Structural realism has established the importance 
of systemic structure and systemic challenges in terms of states’ international choices. 
Structural concerns are likely to dictate under what conditions and constraints domestic 
survival strategies are pursued internationally. This research was unable to firmly establish 
which explanation held more weight in terms of militia sponsorship given the similarity of 
domestic and regional aspirations and the effect of the ‘Arab Spring’. As such, whilst it 
cannot be claimed based on this research that domestic survival strategies are the key focus 
of regional policies, it is likely that they impact on international strategies.  
Autocratic states project authoritarian survival strategies into their regional political 
decisions. 
Given the similarity between militia sponsorship partners and the domestic strategies used 
to maintain authoritarianism domestically, it is clear that these strategies are extended, 
where possible, into regional politics. Additionally, with the threat from regional protest 
movements and the increasing external threats to authoritarianism from globalisation, it is 
predictable that authoritarian states will need to increasingly manage external threats to 
maintain their domestic power.  
Regional hegemonic contests are linked, in the cases of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, 
to domestic survival strategies that focus on maintaining political dominance over potential 
communal contenders. 
Regional hegemonic contests are linked, in the cases of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, 
to domestic survival strategies that focus on maintaining political dominance over potential 
communal contenders such as other religious sects or groups with a different understanding 
of Islam’s role in governance. Different understandings of secularism and/or Islamism can 
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represent a significant risk to elites, as it can consist of the most threatening case, internal 
opponents from within the same group. With regards to maintaining political domestic 
dominance over different religious sects, the Gulf States need to contain Iranian influence in 
the region and prevent the emergence of more regimes that contain a significant number of 
members belonging to a sect that is linked to Shia, and is also aligned with Shia-Iran. This is 
particularly evident in the contest by Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Qatar to remove the 
Assad regime from power in Syria, and the efforts to prevent the Houthi (given their, albeit 
not that strong, connections with Iran) from gaining power in Yemen.  Generally, these 
strategies are assumed to be about regional dominance, however, in this instance there is a 
clear similarity between domestic survival strategies and strategies that support the 
hegemonic contest. The Selectorate Models of the respective regimes clearly showed that 
support from the real selectorate and winning coalition reflect sectarian, and to a lesser 
extent religiosity, favouritism. This sectarian favouritism illustrates the underlying sectarian 
character of the support bases of these Middle Eastern regimes; however this sectarian 
platform is established alongside other considerations such as material co-optation and tribal 
connections for example.  Within these support bases are more defined structures of support, 
frequently linked to tribe, patronage networks, class, co-opted groups and rentier social 
contracts. Most, but not all, of these sub-structures contain a significant number of members 
of the same sect and religiosity as the regimes. These dynamics are uniquely strong in the 
Middle East. Again this means that due to the exceptional character of Middle Eastern 
sectarianism the prevalence of religion in foreign policy is likely to be more marked in this 
region. Therefore, the results need to be tested in a less religious region to test the presence 
of religion in regional politics further. 
Regime security is tightly linked to regional dynamics in the Middle East, and the studied 
strategies (patterns of religion/secularism and militia sponsorship in civil wars) are likely to be 
unusually prominent in this volatile and authoritarian region given it is overlaid with the 
transnational force of Islam.  
This test has been conducted in a largely autocratic region that has recently faced threats 
from region-wide protest movements. Testing these findings against other regions where 
elites have a set term in power such as Western democracies, and where governance is stable 
and not facing a regionally generated threat, may reveal a different result. Given this 
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research’s focus on intervention aimed at steering internal dynamics relating to religion and 
secularism in unstable states, the outcomes reflect the dynamics of the Middle Eastern 
security complex. The security complex level of analysis “provides an insight into the regional 
level security dynamics that shape and mediate [..] intervention”  (Buzan, 2007, pp. 163-164). 
The Middle East has a strong interconnecting element that is arguably not as strongly present 
in other regional security complexes: the existence of the “transnational political force of 
Islam” (Buzan, 2007, pp. 163-164). The transnational force of Islam means the Middle Eastern 
security complex contains “an unusually high degree of security interpenetration” (Buzan, 
2007, p. 164). Security interconnectedness between the states intensified following the ‘Arab 
Spring’, with the threat from electoral Islamism and citizen protests further heightening the 
risk to regimes. This was also intensified by the lessening of US involvement in parts of the 
Middle East, first under President Barack Obama and then under President Donald Trump, 
which has resulted in a freer rein for states and, in some instances, non-state actors, to 
conduct local challenges and pursue their rivalries. This combined with the increased regional 
interventions and political manoeuvrings following the ‘Arab Spring’, makes the Middle East 
the ideal region for studying the use of competition between religion and secularism in 
interventionist foreign policies - a highly prevalent phenomenon in the region. However, it 
also creates a unique example where the dynamics may be exaggerated in comparison to 
other regions given politics is overlaid by the prominence of transnational Islam. Additionally, 
statistics presented by Røbæk confirm that “religious (including sectarian) affiliation is the 
predominant identity marker determining group membership” (Røbæk, 2019) in the Middle 
East. Given this is specific to the Middle East and relates directly to this research, this again 
suggests that the findings may only apply in this region. This study demonstrated that regime 
security is tightly linked to regional dynamics in this instance, and that the studied strategies 
(religion and militia sponsorship in civil wars) are likely to be unusually prominent in this 
volatile and authoritarian region. Therefore, this research needs to be explored in a stable 
and democratic region to test the findings further.   
Ongoing societal competition between secularism and religion is used as an authoritarian 
survival strategy in regional conflicts. 
Fox’s Competitive Perspective posits that religious and secular actors compete over policy, 
and that this dynamic is ongoing. Given this is a persistent societal rift, this competition is 
270 
 
exploited by authoritarian regimes to maintain power domestically. Narratives are 
developed that frame the fundamentalist or more secular opposition movements as either 
extremists, or as anti-religion according to the regime’s legitimation strategy as it relates to 
religion/secularism. In this research, the stance regimes’ used domestically to legitimise 
their rule in relation to religiosity was reflected in their choices regarding militia sponsorship 
in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars.   
The sponsorship of militias in civil wars reflects both domestic and regional politics.  
The sponsorship of militias was shown to be linked to both regional aspirations, and 
domestic survival strategies. However, regional political decisions ultimately reflect elites 
objectives to survive politically, especially considering that regional power and influence 
strengthens elite standing domestically, thereby reinforcing authoritarian stability. In sum, 
Realism is right, states seek power.  However, in the regional sphere, they do not necessarily 
just seek power relative to other states, but additionally seek to implement strategies that 
help maintain their power at home.  
Militia Sponsorship: Inside Out or Outside In? 
Although it was established that there is a clear link between domestic survival strategies and 
militia sponsorship, the divide between regional and domestic motivations is still unclear. 
Further research is required to separate these two possible explanations. This difficulty is due 
to the similarity of regional and domestic strategies in these cases. Whilst this establishes 
there is a link, it makes it difficult to separate out the two motivations.  
Figures 7.3-7.10 demonstrate the similarity between potential regional and domestic 
explanations for militia sponsorship patterns by comparing domestic survival strategies with 







Iranian domestic strategies compared to its regional policies relating to militia sponsorship  
 
Figure 7.3. Iran: Domestic Survival Strategies that involve Religion/Secularism 
 
 
















































Saudi Arabian domestic strategies compared to its regional policies relating to militia 
sponsorship  
Figure 7.5. Saudi Arabia: Domestic Survival Strategies that involve Religion/Secularism 
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UAE domestic strategies compared to its regional policies relating to militia sponsorship  
 
Figure 7.7. United Arab Emirates: Domestic Strategies that Involve Religion/Secularism 
 
 





















































Qatari domestic strategies compared to its regional policies relating to militia sponsorship  
 
Figure 7.9. Qatar: Domestic Strategies that Involve Religion and Secularism 
 
 
Figure 7.10. Qatar: Regional Strategies that Involve Religion and Politics 
Excluding Qatar, this strong similarity between strategies indicates that regime survival, 
particularly in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’, is a top priority of the regimes. It also shows 
that autocratic regimes extend their regime survival tactics into populations outside of their 
domestic sphere where proximity and/or religious identity links are relevant and that regional 
contests are also about regime survival – particularly given the more powerful a state is within 
its region, the more likely the regime is to endure. Regional and international success is in the 
interests of the ruling elite and is an effective authoritarian survival strategy. However, 
Qatar’s regional strategies do not reflect their domestic survival strategies as strongly as the 
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regionally for example. The difference between Qatar’s regional and domestic survival 
strategies is due to the following factors: 
 Qatar was the only state unaffected by the ‘Arab Spring’. This gave Qatar greater 
freedom of action in the post ‘Arab Spring’ environment. The Emirates was also 
relatively unaffected by the unrest but not as thoroughly as Qatar. 
 Qatar has co-opted regional electoral Islamism. Many Muslim Brotherhood exiles 
reside in Qatar on the proviso that the Brotherhood is not active in Qatar. 
 Due to the above factors and the animosity between the current ruling branch of the 
Al Thani family and the Saudi and Emirati regimes, it is possible that Qatar’s elite see 
the Saudi and Emirati regimes as the main threat to their continued rule and, as such, 
seek to balance against the potential regional hegemony of the Saudi regime.  
Therefore, it is likely that stronger regime stability results in a reduced externalisation of 
domestic survival strategies into the regional sphere as such states pursue regional 
aspirations to a greater extent and are less constrained by domestic survival concerns.  
Predicting Patterns of Militia Sponsorship and other Foreign Policy Decisions 
The Middle East was chosen for this research on a pattern-based case selection bias, whereby 
the cases with highly evident patterns that relate to religion and the regional sphere were 
selected. Looking for the dynamics that explained the patterns required investigating the 
domestic politics of the case studies. The process patterns regarding militia sponsorship 
revealed a potential structure for understanding and predicting militia sponsorship patterns 
(and other foreign policy choices) through considering the impact of elites’ political survival 





Figure 7.11. Determining Foreign Policy Choices  
Limitations and Further Research 
Regional Politics, Authoritarian Survival Strategies and Religion 
The relationship between structural politics and externalised regime survival strategies needs 
further explanation. The question of whether or not domestic politics involving religion 
extends into the regional sphere has been borne out by the findings. There is a clear match 
between the secular/fundamentalist ideologies and the sect of militias and the states that 
sponsor them. The clearest example is in the Syrian civil war where Iran supports the Assad 
regime which is frequently described as a secular regime; although, upon closer examination 
Syria upholds religious secularism not political secularism: the use of Islamic symbols and 
vocabulary by the Assad regime despite maintaining rule independently of the religious 
establishment (Pinto, 2011, p. 203) for example. However, although Iran supports the Assad 
regime, they typically avoid giving direct aid to the secular militias and instead extend aid, and 
at times instructions, directly to the Shia Islamist actors fighting for Assad, in common with 
their theocratic domestic legitimacy. However, in order to establish the balance between 
authoritarian survival strategies, structural concerns and other approaches a comprehensive 
comparison between the different rationales is necessary. Furthermore, it is possible though 












within Middle Eastern cases – i.e. this similarity between domestic survival strategies and 
regional strategies only exists in the volatile Middle East where “regional and domestic 
theatres are linked by supra-state identities” (Valbjørn, 2020, p. 260), and where there is 
arguably a willingness to pursue cross border strategies that is unparalleled in the non-
European (Valbjørn, 2020, p. 257) or European world.  
It is likely that regional conditions have a significant impact on the extension of domestic 
survival strategies into the regional sphere. After a region wide challenge to autocracy, such 
as the ‘Arab Spring’, whereby protests and dissent spread across the region, states are very 
aware of how dynamics in one state can embolden political opponents and activists of a 
similar ilk in their own state. Therefore, following an unstable period such as the ‘Arab Spring’, 
a strong emphasis on domestic stability and regime survival in regional policies is to be 
expected. The extension of domestic authoritarian survival strategies into the regional sphere 
needs to be tested further under more stable conditions in order to gauge whether 
authoritarian survival strategies are employed regionally across all cases or whether this only 
applies when domestic and regional conditions are unstable and threatening to regime 
survival. 
A compelling explanation for the presence of religion in foreign policy is as an authoritarian 
regime survival strategy. This research demonstrates what to expect when religion, 
sectarianism and secularism are employed as an instrument of policy during interventions in 
civil wars. However, the predictive power of these findings needs to be strengthened by 
further testing of domestic authoritarian survival strategies beyond civil wars and in other 
regions, as well as more comprehensive testing in the MENA region. It is difficult to establish 
the extent to which religious piety and dedication to a religious cause is driving the states’ 
choices regarding the sponsorship of rebels. However, Iran’s readiness to support the more 
secular Assad regime in Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s support of political groups that contain Zaydi 
heritage politicians in Yemen indicates that this is a not a strong explanation for sectarian 
sponsorship patterns. As such, it is more likely that the patterns reflected the domestic use 
of religion as a political tool, not religion as an interest or set of values in and of itself.  
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Testing the Research’s Conceptual Architecture in Europe 
Together with a strong anti-establishment message,  the far right, notably France’s French 
National Front, has stressed secularism alongside Christianity as a “matter of identity, not a 
matter of faith or religious observance” in the face of rising fears over the cultural impact of 
the large numbers of Muslim refugees, predominantly Syrians, that surged into Europe in 
2015-2016. This represents a “disconnect between Christianity as faith and Christianity as 
culture” (Roy, 2016, p. 91) that in a secular society provides a political opportunity which the 
far right has seized.  Merijn Oudenampsen of Tilburg University argues that Europe’s far right 
has followed the lead of Pim Fortuyn (who was assassinated in 2002) of the Dutch Pim Fortuyn 
List party, who discovered that the winning argument for the far right was not to support 
religious conservative values in the manner of the US right, but to position themselves as 
“defending secular, progressive culture from the threat of immigration” (Polakow-Suransky, 
2016) and this culture can be represented in the form of a post-religious but Christian identity. 
Fortuyn’s party’s 2002 manifesto “expressed the view that all citizens had equal rights and 
duties, irrespective of race, gender, faith or sexual orientation”, (Kessel, 2016, pp. 96-97) 
therefore avoiding a clash with European ideals of pluralism, whilst at the same time 
mobilising Christianity as an identity as opposed to a faith, through stating that immigrant 
minorities were untouched by the ‘century-long Jewish-Christian-Humanist developments’ of 
the European continent (Kessel, 2016, p. 65). Habermas describes the instrumentalisation of 
this dynamic in his outline of Post Secular Theory, stating that “multiculturalists fight against 
enforced assimilation”, and argue that minorities should not be subjected to the “imperatives 
of the majority culture” (Habermas, 2008, p. 24).  However, secularists, in line with the far 
right to a significant extent, “fight for a colorblind inclusion of all citizens” and warn against 
going “too far in adapting the legal system to the claims of preserving the intrinsic 
characteristics of minority cultures. From this laicistic viewpoint, religion must remain an 
exclusively private matter” (Habermas, 2008, p. 25). In this argument “The Enlightenment has 
become attractive specifically because its values are not just universal, but because they are 
‘our’ i.e., European, Western values” (Habermas, 2008, p. 26).  As such “Religious citizens and 
communities must not only superficially adjust to the constitutional order. They are expected 
to appropriate the secular legitimation of the constitutional principles under the premises of 
their own faith”  (Habermas, 2008, p. 27). The conceptual architecture developed in this 
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research could be advanced to analyse this instrumentalisation and politicization of religion 
in the West, particularly by these right wing populist movements. Some seminal work had 
been done by Marzouki, N., McDonnel, D., & Roy, O. (Marzouki, McDonnel, & Roy, 2016); this 
is a growing area of research in which the conceptual framework used in this thesis could 
make an important future contribution. 
The Impact of Globalisation on Authoritarian Survival Strategies 
Further research also needs to be done on the impact of globalisation on regime survival 
strategies given it is increasingly difficult to shield populations from external influences due 
to the internet and greater mobility (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 10/48). As such, the transnational 
environment has become more important in terms of authoritarian survival. Does this explain 
the increased activism of some of the Gulf States, China and Russia?  Has this led to more 
authoritarian survival strategies being conducted in the international sphere?  In order to test 
this, future research could compare the regional and domestic regime survival strategies for 
different eras: the colonial/industrial revolution and pre-colonial eras compared to the 
globalised present for instance. Additionally, this research, as evidence of the relevance of 
regime survival mechanisms being extended into international politics, only focuses on militia 
sponsorship. Further research needs to test beyond religiously based regime survival 
strategies to see whether or not other authoritarian strategies are also extended into the 
regional sphere. 
The Incorporation of Domestic Political Survival Strategies into Regional Policy 
Jack Levy stated that a “greater recognition of the role of domestic factors by political 
scientists would increase the explanatory power of their theories and provide more useful 
conceptual frameworks for the historical analysis of individual wars” (Levy, 1988, p. 653). This 
research has explored the role of religious domestic factors as explanations for militia 
sponsorship patterns. As such, this research is a point of departure for further investigation 
into the externalisation of authoritarian survival strategies and the use of religion, 
sectarianism and secularism in regional politics to maintain political power domestically. This 
research establishes that when analysing the foreign policy of autocratic regimes, the regimes’ 
domestic survival mechanisms should be considered as a potential explanation for regional 
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policy choices. The links between secularism, fundamentalism and sectarianism and the 
patterns of militia sponsorship appear strong; a point which emphasises the potential regional 
significance of research which identified the statistical prevalence of sectarian identity as the 
predominant marker of political group membership in the Middle East (Røbæk, 2019, p. 23). 
The correlation between the patterns of militia sponsorship and the statistics presented by 
Røbæk relating to sectarianism and the prevalence of religious considerations as drivers of 
alliance choices, strongly supports the idea that a religious mechanism, alongside other 
crucial factors, is driving the militia sponsorship choices of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates 
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Pew Research Center’s Government Restrictions Index and the Social Hostilities 
Index 
Appendixes 1-8 show select results for Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar from the 20 
questions that comprise the Pew Research Center’s Government Restrictions Index (GRI) and 
the 13 questions that comprise the Social Hostilities Index (SHI). Although each question is 
weighted equally, many of the questions can contain gradations, allowing partial scores 
depending on intensity or severity. For example, on SHI Question No. 2 – “Was there mob 
violence related to religion?” – a country that had no religion-related mob violence would 
receive zero points, a country that had mob violence in which no deaths were reported would 
receive 1/2 point (0.50), and a country that had mob violence in which deaths were reported 
would receive a full point (1.00). The scores are presented for three years: the latest year, 
ending Dec. 31, 2016; the previous year, ending Dec. 31, 2015; and the baseline year, ending 
in mid-2007 (July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007). Scores for the years ending in mid-2008, 
mid-2009, mid-2010 and December 2011 are not presented due to space constraints (Pew 
Research Center, 2018).   
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Appendix 1.  Pew Research Centre’s Questions on Government Restriction Index: 
Iran 
GRI Q.5.  Is public preaching by religious groups limited by any level of government? 
Yes for some religious groups 0.5 
GRI.Q.7. Is converting from one religion to another limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI Q.8. Is religious literature of broadcasting limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.10. Is the wearing of religious symbols, such as head covering for women and facial fair 
for men, regulated by law or by any level of government? 
No 0.0 
GRI.Q.11. Was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of 
government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.14. Does the national government have an established organisation to regulate or 
manage religious affairs? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20. Do some religious groups receive government support or favours, such as funding, 
official recognition or special access? 
Yes, Islamic religious education is required in public schools by the local government or the 
national government 0.87 
GRI.Q.20.1. Does the country’s constitution or basic law recognise a favoured religion or 
religions? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.2. Do all religious groups receive the same level of government access and privileges? 
One religious group has privileges or government access unavailable to other religious groups, 
and it is recognised by the national government as the official religion. Islam is recognised by 
the Iranian Constitution as the official religion (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 
2019). Yes 1.0 




GRI.Q.20.3a. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
education programs and/or religious schools? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3b. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property (e.g. Buildings, upkeep, repair or land)? 
No 0.0 
GRI.Q.20.3.c. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property? 
No 0.0 
GRI.Q.20.4. Is religious education required in public schools? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.5. Does the national government deter in some way to religious authorities, texts, 
doctrines on legal issues? 




Appendix 2. Pew Research Centers Questions on Government Restriction of 
Religion: Saudi Arabia 
GRI Q.5.  Is public preaching by religious groups limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.7. Is converting from one religion to another limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI Q.8. Is religious literature of broadcasting limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.10. Is the wearing of religious symbols, such as head covering for women and facial fair 
for men, regulated by law or by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.11. Was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of 
government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.14. Does the national government have an established organisation to regulate or 
manage religious affairs? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20. Do some religious groups receive government support or favours, such as funding, 
official recognition or special access? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.1. Does the country’s constitution or basic law recognise a favoured religion or 
religions? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.2. Do all religious groups receive the same level of government access and privileges? 
One religious group has privileges or government access unavailable to other religious groups, 
and it is recognised by the national government as the official religion (Islam is recognised by 
the Saudi Arabian Constitution as the official religion (US Department of State, 2016)  
Yes 1.0 




GRI.Q.20.3a. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
education programs and/or religious schools? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3b. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property (e.g. Buildings, upkeep, repair or land)? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3.c. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.4. Is religious education required in public schools? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.5. Does the national government deter in some way to religious authorities, texts, 
doctrines on legal issues? 
Yes 1.0 (Pew Research Center, 2018) 
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Appendix 3. Pew Research Centres Questions on Government Restrictions of 
Religion: UAE 
GRI Q.5.  Is public preaching by religious groups limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.7. Is converting from one religion to another limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI Q.8. Is religious literature of broadcasting limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.q.10. Is the wearing of religious symbols, such as head covering for women and facial fair 
for men, regulated by law or by any level of government? 
No 0.0 
GRI.Q11. Was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.14. Does the national government have an established organisation to regulate or 
manage religious affairs? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20. Do some religious groups receive government support or favours, such as funding, 
official recognition or special access? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.1. Does the country’s constitution or basic law recognise a favoured religion or 
religions? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.2. Do all religious groups receive the same level of government access and privileges? 
One religious group has privileges or government access unavailable to other religious groups, 
and it is recognised by the national government as the official religion (Islam is recognised by 
the United Arab Emirates Constitution as the official religion (US Department of State, 2019)). 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3. Does any level of government provide funds or other resour ces to religious groups? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3a. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 




GRI.Q.20.3b. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property (e.g. Buildings, upkeep, repair or land)? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3.c. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.4. Is religious education required in public schools? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.5. Does the national government deter in some way to religious authorities, texts, 
doctrines on legal issues? 




Appendix 4. Pew Research Centres Questions on Government Restrictions of 
Religion Qatar 
GRI Q.5.  Is public preaching by religious groups limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.7. Is converting from one religion to another limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI Q.8. Is religious literature of broadcasting limited by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.10. Is the wearing of religious symbols, such as head covering for women and facial fair 
for men, regulated by law or by any level of government? 
No 0.0 
GRI.Q11. Was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of government? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.14. Does the national government have an established organisation to regulate or 
manage religious affairs? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20. Do some religious groups receive government support or favours, such as funding, 
official recognition or special access? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.1. Does the country’s constitution or basic law recognise a favoured religion or 
religions? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.2. Do all religious groups receive the same level of government access and privileges? 
One religious group has privileges or government access unavailable to other religious groups, 
and it is recognised by the national government as the official religion (Islam is recognised by 
the Qatari Constitution as the official religion (World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2019) 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources to religious groups? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3a. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 




GRI.Q.20.3b. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property (e.g. Buildings, upkeep, repair or land)? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.3.c. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious 
activities other than education or property? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.4. Is religious education required in public schools? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.20.5. Does the national government deter in some way to religious authorities, texts, 
doctrines on legal issues? 




Appendix 5. Questions that relate to hostility towards religious out-groups: Iran  
GRI.Q.12. Did the national government display hostility involving physical violence toward 
minority or non-approved religious groups? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.18. Does any level of government ask religious groups to register for any reason, 
including to be eligible for benefits such as tax exemption? 
Yes, and the process clearly discriminates against some religious groups 1.0 
GRI.Q.19. Did any level of government use force towards religious groups that resulted in 
individuals being killed, physically abused, imprisoned, detained or displaced from their home, 
or having their personal or religious properties damaged or destroyed? 
Yes, 1,001-9,999 cases of government force 
Questions from Social Hostilities Index.  These questions do not necessarily relate to state bias 
against religious groups, but it does indicate a level of discrimination. Discrimination at its 
core is attempts to preserve privileges for status of a particular identity group in society. If a 
state has a real selectorate that is based on dividends to an identity group, then it makes 
sense that this identity group will work to keep other lesser groups marginalised so as to 
preserve the benefits of their identity group’s status with the regime - including greater safety 
from state persecution.  
SHI.Q.1a. Did individuals face harassment or intimidation motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
Yes, 1.0 
SHI.Q.1c. Were there detentions or abductions motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
No, 0.0 
SHI.Q.8. Did religious groups themselves attempt to prevent other religious groups from being 
able to operate? 
No, 0.0 (Pew Research Center, 2018) 
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Appendix 6. Questions that relate to hostility towards religious out-groups: Saudi 
Arabia 
GRI.Q.12. Did the national government display hostility involving physical violence toward 
minority or non-approved religious groups? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.18. Does any level of government ask religious groups to register for any reason, 
including to be eligible for benefits such as tax exemption? 
No 0.0 
GRI.Q.19. Did any level of government use force towards religious groups that resulted in 
individuals being killed, physically abused, imprisoned, detained or displaced from their home, 
or having their personal or religious properties damaged or destroyed? 
Yes, 201-1.000 cases of government force 
Questions from Social Hostilities Index.  These questions do not necessarily relate to state bias 
against religious groups, but it does indicate a level of discrimination. Discrimination at its 
core is attempts to preserve privileges for status of a particular identity group in society. If a 
state has a real selectorate that is based on dividends to an identity group, then it makes 
sense that this identity group will work to keep other lesser groups marginalised so as to 
preserve the benefits of their identity group’s status with the regime - including greater safety 
from state persecution.  
SHI.Q.1a. Did individuals face harassment or intimidation motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
Yes, 1.0 
SHI.Q.1c. Were there detentions or abductions motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
Yes, 1.0 
SHI.Q.8. Did religious groups themselves attempt to prevent other religious groups from being 
able to operate?     Yes, 1.0 (Pew Research Center, 2018) 
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Appendix 7. Questions that relate to hostility towards religious out-groups: UAE 
GRI.Q.12. Did the national government display hostility involving physical violence toward 
minority or non-approved religious groups? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.18. Does any level of government ask religious groups to register for any reason, 
including to be eligible for benefits such as tax exemption? 
Yes, and the process clearly discriminates against some religious groups, 1.0 
GRI.Q.19. Did any level of government use force towards religious groups that resulted in 
individuals being killed, physically abused, imprisoned, detained or displaced from their home, 
or having their personal or religious properties damaged or destroyed? 
Yes, 0.4 10-200 cases of government force 
Questions from Social Hostilities Index.  These questions do not necessarily relate to state bias 
against religious groups, but it does indicate a level of discrimination. Discrimination at its 
core is attempts to preserve privileges for status of a particular identity group in society. If a 
state has a real selectorate that is based on dividends to an identity group, then it makes 
sense that this identity group will work to keep other lesser groups marginalised so as to 
preserve the benefits of their identity group’s status with the regime - including greater safety 
from state persecution.  
SHI.Q.1a. Did individuals face harassment or intimidation motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
Yes, 1.0 
SHI.Q.1c. Were there detentions or abductions motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
No, 0.0 
SHI.Q.8. Did religious groups themselves attempt to prevent other religious groups from being 
able to operate? 
No, 0.0 (Pew Research Center, 2018) 
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Appendix 8. Questions that relate to hostility towards religious out-groups: Qatar 
GRI.Q.12. Did the national government display hostility involving physical violence toward 
minority or non-approved religious groups? 
Yes 1.0 
GRI.Q.18. Does any level of government ask religious groups to register for any reason, 
including to be eligible for benefits such as tax exemption? 
Yes, and the process clearly discriminates against some religious groups 1.0 
GRI.Q.19. Did any level of  government use force towards religious groups that resulted in 
individuals being killed, physically abused, imprisoned, detained or displaced from their home, 
or having their personal or religious properties damaged or destroyed? 
No, 0.0 
Questions from Social Hostilities Index.  These questions do not necessarily relate to state bias 
against religious groups, but it does indicate a level of discrimination. Discrimination at its 
core is attempts to preserve privileges for status of a particular identity group in society. If a 
state has a real selectorate that is based on dividends to an i9dentity group, then it makes 
sense that this identity group will work to keep other lesser groups marginalised so as to 
preserve the benefits of their identity group’s status with the regime - including greater safety 
from state persecution.  
SHI.Q.1a. Did individuals face harassment or intimidation motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
Yes, 1.0 
SHI.Q.1c. Were there detentions or abductions motivated by religious hatred or bias? 
No, 0.0 
SHI.Q.8. Did religious groups themselves attempt to prevent other religious groups from being 
able to operate? 
No, 0.0 (Pew Research Center, 2018) 
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Appendix 9. Citation List A 
The following are the sources from which information was collated for the findings in 
Figures/Tables 5.8 – 5.24  
 (Aboufadel, 2016; Adesnick, 2018;  AFP, 2015;  Agence France-Presse, 2012; Agence France 
Presse, 2015; al-Salhy, 2013;  Alsouria Net (Opposition Website), 2017; Al-Tamimi, 2013;  al-
Tamimi, 2013; al-Tamimi, 2013;  Al-Tamimi A. J., The National Ideological Resistance in Syria: 
A ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ Brand, 2014; Al-Tamimi A. J., Interview with Sayyid Hashim Muhammad 
Ali: Commander of the National Ideological Resistance in Syria, 2014; Al-Tamimi A. J., Quwat 
al-Jalil: A Pro-Assad Palestinian Syrian Militia, 2015;  Al-Tamimi A. J., Overview of some pro-
Assad Militias, 2015;  Al-Tamimi A. J., 2015;  Al-Tamimi A. J., 2015;  Al-Tamimi A. J., Jabhat al-
Nusra and the Druze of Idlib Province, 2015; Al-Tamimi A. J., Shi'i Militias in Iraq and Syria, 
2015; Al-Tamimi A. J., Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi: A Syrian Hezbollah Formation, 2016; Al-Tamimi 
A. J., Syrian Hezbollah Militias of Nubl and Zahara', 2016; Al-Tamimi A. J., The Fifth Legion: A 
New Auxiliary Force, 2016; Al-Tamimi A. J., The Situation in al-Fu’a and Kafariya, 2016;  Al-
Tamimi A. J., The Dir’ al-Watan Brand: Liwa Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, 2016; Al-Tamimi A. J., Liwa 
Usud al-Hussein: A New Pro-Assad Militia in Latakia, 2016; Al-Tamimi A. J., Saraya al-Areen: 
An Alawite Militia in Latakia, 2016;  Al-Tamimi A. J., Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi: Syrian IRGC 
Militia, 2017; Al-Tamimi, The U.S.-Iranian confrontation on the Syria-Iraq Borders: Interview 
with an Iraqi Militia Official, 2017; Al-Tamimi A. J, 2017;  Al-Tamimi A. J., 2017; Al-Tamimi A. 
J., Quwat Muqatili al-Asha'ir: Tribal Auxiliary Forces of the Military Intelligence, 2017; Al-
Tamimi A. J., Liwa Al-Jabal: A New Loyalist Militia Unity Initiative In Suwayda', 2017; Al-Tamimi 
A. J., Quwat Dir’ Al-Qalamoun: Shifting Militia Links, 2017;  Al-Tamimi A. J., The Suwayda' 
Attacks: Interview, 2018; Al-Tamimi A. J., Fursan Al-Din: Interview, 2018;  Al-Tamimi A. J., The 
Think-Tanks Bark and the IRGC Moves On, 2018; ARA News, 2017;  Beshara & Roche, 2016; 
Bulbajer, 2019;  Cafarella & Casagrande, 2015;  Cher-Leparrain, 2017;  Civil War Al Sham, 2016;  
Clingendael Netherlands Institute, 2019;  Daher, 2018;  Deeb, 2013;  Fakih, 2013;  Halevi, 2015;  
Heras & O'Leary, 2013; Issa, 2012;  Jaffal, 2014;  Jerusalem Post Staff, 2013; Jihad Intel: Middle 
East Forum, 2019;  Jihadology: Clearinghouse for Jihadi Primary Source Material, 2019;  
Joscelyn, 2016;  Khaddour, 2018;  Koca, 2017;  Lefevre & El-Yassir, 2013;  Levitt & Zelin, 2013;  
Lund, 2013;  Lund, Holy Warriors, 2012; Lund, The Other Syrian Peace Process, 2014;  
McDonald, 2017;  Mahmood & Chulov, 2013;  Mustafa, The Moderate Rebels: A Growing List 
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Porter, 2015;  Reuters, 2012;  Roberts, 2017; Roche & O'Farrell, 2016;  Sadjadpour, 2013; 
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2013; Symth, 2014; Smyth, How Iran is Building its Syrian Hezbollah, 2016;  Smyth, Iran is 
Outpacing Assad for Control of Syria's Shia Militias, 2018;  Smyth, 2019;  Stanford University: 
Center for International Security and Cooperation , 2012-2019;  Syria Direct, 2015; Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party, 2019;  Syrian War Daily , 2018-2019;  Terrosism Research and Analysis 
Consortium, 2019;  Tomson, 2016;  Tomson, Syrian Army captures first village from Turkish-
backed rebels on the outskirts of al-Bab, 2016;  Toumaj, 2016; Toumaj, Array of pro-Syrian 
government forces advances in Aleppo, 2016;  Toumaj & Weiss, Iran tests the US in 
Southeastern Syria, 2017; Toumaj, IRGC-controlled Iraqi militia forms ‘Golan Liberation 
Brigade’, 2017;  Trade Arabia, 2015;  Washington Institute, 2015-2019;  Waters, 2019; Weiss, 











Appendix 10. Description of Sources used for Syrian Militia Data 
Source Type Language Example Source: 




English for end-users, 




Foreign Policy Journal, 
Washington Post, The 
Guardian, New York 
Times, CNN 
Roche, Beshara and 
O’Farrell: work for 
Bellingcat 
Hasan Mustafa: 
Material used by 
Bellingcat 
Bulbajer: 











English for end-users, 















Jihad Intel: Operated 














Center at US Military 
Academy 
Academic research 
News Media Outlet English for end-users, 
most use Arabic 
sources 
Reuters, The 
















Syrian Direct, Al 
Masdar News, 
Jerusalem Post, Daily 






Think Tank English Washington Institute, 
Carnegie Endowment 
for International 





German Institute for 
International and 
Security Affairs, 
Middle East Institute, 
Terrorism Monitor: 
Jamestown 
Foundation,  Institute 
for the Study of War, 
Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs, 









English, may use 
Arabic sources 







Swansea, fellow at the 
Center for Global 
Policy, Middle East 
Institute 
 
English/Arabic Aymen Al-Tamimi 
Blog, Rubin Center, 









contacts in Middle 
East, YouTube,  
Journal English Foreign Policy, Middle 
East Journal, 
Research, analysis 
Political Website English/Arabic Syrian National Party, 
Chechans in Syria, 
Alsouria Net, Syrian 






Appendix 11. Secular–Fundamentalist Ratings for Case Studies 
  Separatist Secularism                             Religious Extremism 
 
        1            2            3            4            5            6            7            8            9            10       
 
State Secular-Fundamentalist Rating 
Iran 9 (Iran has a higher rating than Saudi Arabia 
due to the direct rule of the clerics) 
Saudi Arabia  8 






Appendix 12. Citations List B  
The following were the sources from which information was collated for the findings in 
Tables/Figures 6.7-6.20  
 (Abdul-Ahad, 2018;   Aboudi, 2015;  Al Bawaba, 2017; Al-Dhahab, 2016;  Al-Dhahab, 2016;  
Al-Hamdani, 2019; Al Arabiya, 2017;  Ali, 2016;  Al Jazeera, 2019;  Al-Zindawi, 2014; Al-Ashwal, 
2018;  Al-Yemeni, 2003;  Amnesty International, 2019;  ARA News, 2015; Ardemagni E. , 
Yemen's Military: From the Tribal Army to the Warlords, 2018;  Ardemagni E. , 2018; Bayoumy 
& Stewart, 2016; Bayoumy & Stewart, 2016;  Browne, 2018;  Campbell, 2015;  Caris, 2015;  
Critical Review, 2017;  Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Dorsey J. , 2019;  Elbagir, Abdelaziz, 
El-Gheit, & Smith-Spark, 2019; Emirates News Agency, 2018; Faizi & Mashal, 2017;  Faizi & 
Mashal, Iran Sent them to Syria. Now Afghan Fighters are a Worry at Home, 2017; Forum, 
2016;  Gaub, 2015; Gulf News, 2018; Haaretz and Reuters, 2014; Haaretz & The Associated 
Press, 2017;  Hearst, 2017; Horton, 2011;  Human Rights Watch, 2017;  Javaid, 2018;  Jihad 
Intel: Middle East Forum, 2019;  Kalin & Ghantous, 2019;  Kube, 2016; Landry, 2015;  Mello & 
Knights, 2016; MEMO Middle East Monitor, 2017; Middle East Eye, 2017; Mukhashaf, 2015;  
Partrick, The UAE's War Aims in Yemen, 2017; Patton, McDonnell, & Cataldi, 2016; Pestano, 
2016;  Rafi, 2015;  Ramani, 2018;  Reuters, 2015; (Reuters, 2016);  Riedel, 2017; Riedel, 
Advancing Separatists could restore South Yemen, 2018;  Roggio, 2010;  Robertson & 
Almasmari, 2015; Roy, 2018; Saul, Hafezi, & Georgy, Exclusive: Iran Steps up Support for 
Houthis in Yemen's War - Sources, 2017;  Saba, 2017; Sabbour, 2018; Salisbury, 2018; Segall, 
2017;  Shahine & Carey, 2014; Shi'ite News, 2018;  Taleblu & Toumaj, 2016;  Trew, 2019; 





Appendix 13. Description of Sources used for Yemeni Militia Data 
Source Type Language Example Source: 
used in Data 
Methodology 
Clearinghouse English for end-users, 
translates Arabic 
sources 
Jihad Intel: Operated 




News Media Outlet English for end-users, 
most use Arabic 
sources 
Reuters, The 
Guardian, Middle East 









Al Bawaba, The 
National, Al Jazeera, 










Institute, Middle East 
Forum, European 
Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 


























Terrorism Center at 
the United States 
Military Academy in 
West Point, Project on 
Middle East Political 
Science, American 
University in Cairo 
Academic research 
 
 
 
